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ABSTRACT
This thesis examines the international community's response to the challenge of 
controlling small arms and light weapons since the early 1990s, paying specific 
regard to the maturing relationships among particular actors of world affairs and 
the nascent interconnectivity among their strategies for, and approaches toward, 
controlling these weapons. Because small arms and light weapons feature as vital 
ingredients in contemporary conflict, the various attempts to control these 
weapons represent a crucial element in the collective pursuit of international 
security. It is an element, moreover, which ought necessarily to concern not only 
those policymakers currently involved in confronting issues dominating the new 
security agenda, but also all of those analysts of world affairs (including scholars 
of international relations) seeking to better understand the serious matters of war 
and peace, and of conflict and cooperation, however broadly each is defined.
Although the myriad of grisly and macabre impacts which are generated, at 
least in part, by the widespread availability and ongoing use of these weapons are 
not, in and of themselves, of a magnitude sufficient to radically reorder 
contemporary world affairs, awareness of the nature and extent of these impacts 
compels some international actors into taking decisive action. As arms-control 
protagonists, these actors help comprise an international community. By 
demonstrating the major ways in which researchers, intergovernmental 
organisations, the Security Council of the United Nations, and civil society 
organisations each respond to the immediate and ongoing consequences 
associated with small arms and light weapons, the thesis also identifies ways in 
which the captains of small arms industry, arms brokers, and chief users of these 
weapons are able to mitigate, resist, or elude the intended effects of those 
responses. Circumventing those responses and, at times, exploiting them to their 
own ends, these international actors unmask themselves as arms-control 
antagonists.
vi
Eschewing simplistic explanations blaming the existence of insufficient political 
will and the inadequate provision of resources, the thesis contends that controlling 
small arms and light weapons poses an intractable and insurmountable challenge 
to the international community primarily because the current strategies to control 
these weapons are based upon, and also seek to strengthen, an internationalist 
governance architecture which is underpinned by assumptions that remain 
contested by some international actors and, incidentally, by many analysts of 
world affairs.
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2INTRODUCTION
The grave impacts resulting from the widespread availability and ongoing use of 
small arms and light weapons are sufficient, in and of themselves, to render these 
weapons a necessary topic of inquiry for any policymaker confronted by, or any 
analyst seeking a better comprehension of, contemporary conflict. First and 
foremost, small arms and light weapons feature as vital ingredients in today's wars. 
Regardless of whether these weapons find use in the hands of amateur or 
professional soldiers, as tools of violence they have devastating and enduring effects 
within conflict zones and can destablise post-conflict settings. Since the early 1990s, 
armed criminality has emerged as a crucial characteristic of conflict, helping to 
internationalise some internal conflicts,1 and has problematised the distinction 
between areas under the rule of law and those deemed conflict zones. The violent 
legacies of weapons availability also problematise the distinction between conflict 
zones and post-conflict settings.2 The evolution of United Nations (UN) 
peacekeeping operations, from monitoring the peace between states to helping 
manage the transition to peace within states,3 and the increasing resort to these 
interventions, reflects a growing recognition of the prevalence, intensity, and 
magnitude of the armed violence occurring not only across, but also within and 
beyond international borders.
1 Roderic Alley, Internal Conflict and the International Community: Wars Without End? (Aldershot: 
Ashgate, 2004), 1.
2 Robert Muggah, "No Magic Bullet: A Critical Perspective on Disarmament, Demobilization, 
and Reintegration (DDR) and Weapons Reduction in Post-conflict Contexts," The Round Table 
94, no.379 (April 2005): 240-242. Refer also to Robert Muggah, "Emerging from the Shadow of 
War: A Critical Perspective on DDR and Weapons Reduction in the Post-Conflict Period," 
Contemporary Security Policy 27, no.l (April 2006): 190; and to Beatrice Pouligny, The Politics 
and Anti-Politics of Contemporary 'Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration' Programs 
(Paris: Centre D'etudes et de Recherches Internationales, Secretariat General de la Defense 
Nationale, Programme for Strategic and International Security Studies, 2004), 14.
3 Virginia Page Fortna, "Does Peacekeeping Keep Peace? International Intervention and the 
Duration of Peace After Civil War," International Studies Quarterly 48 (2004): 269.
3Affluent societies too, even in times of peace, do not evade the immediate and 
often lethal consequences of these weapons, which are routinely used to perpetrate 
violent crime. According to Rebecca Peters, "[o]ne of the lessons learned since 2001 
is that although guns kill more people than other weapons of war, most gun deaths 
occur in countries or contexts unrelated to war."4 Besides direct mortalities, the 
violence associated with these weapons inspires civilians, fearful for their safety and 
desiring to protect their property, to engage in weapons procurement and helps 
create millions of internally displaced persons and refugees. In the wake of the Cold 
War especially, these weapons have become vehicles not only for localised, but also 
for internationalising and globalising, violence. In brief, small arms and light 
weapons facilitate violent crime, provide the means to create and exacerbate 
instability, function as insecurity multipliers, intensify and prolong conflict, and 
hinder post-conflict reconstruction efforts.
The major ways in which the international community responds to the 
widespread availability and ongoing use of these weapons is a more specific, but 
equally necessary topic of inquiry for those analysts claiming an interest in the 
concepts informing, and for those policymakers having professional duties to best 
conduct the practices of, international security. This particular topic, which is the 
central concern of this thesis, is worthy of detailed, systemic, and critical study 
because it illuminates the conduct of contemporary world affairs, revealing some of 
the ways in which its dynamics continue to evolve and register. More specifically, 
understanding the ways in which the international community responds to this 
challenge might benefit those policymakers confronting, and analysts considering, 
other international security initiatives, whether these are, for example, treaties 
covering the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, of chemical and biological 
weapons, or of anti-personnel landmines. The topic also signals the ways in which 
so-called domestic affairs can significantly influence the conduct of world affairs, 
especially when security considerations overlap with complex economic and social
4 Rebecca Peters, "Small Arms and Light Weapons: Making the UN Programme of Action
Work," Disarmament Diplomacy, no. 82 (Spring 2006): 2.
4dimensions. Furthermore, it reveals the ways in which some international actors can 
willingly impede and deliberately undermine the international community's 
cooperation to control these weapons. Indeed, this particular topic deserves urgent 
attention given that, as Roderic Alley laments, "the international community has 
failed to produce the problem-solving mechanisms needed to deal with unrestrained 
[small arms and light weapons] transfers busily exploiting globalisation's 
opportunities."5
Used in the thesis' title, the term 'subaltern' alludes to a broadening of the focus 
of many official security experts following the Cold War's end. Broadening their 
focus from controlling weapons of mass destruction which, designed to kill on a 
massive scale in a single blow, possess the potential to annihilate the human species, 
policymakers are now increasingly aware of the importance of controlling those 
weapons that have actually been used in recent wars. As the most prevalent tools of 
violence used in contemporary conflict, small arms and light weapons claim many 
more casualties than the combined death toll resulting from the atomic bombs 
dropped on Nagasaki and Hiroshima in August 1945. These subaltern killers are 
currently the primary means of death for somewhere between 300,000 and 500,000 
people each year.6 However, these weapons were, until only recently, prioritised by 
many policymakers as a threat ranking 'beneath the high' nuclear bombs. Even 
though the terror attacks against the United States (US) on 11 September 2001 
reinvigorated debates over enhancing control regimes for weapons of mass 
destruction, distracting diplomatic attention away from the continuous devastation 
caused by small arms and light weapons, it has not relegated the task of exerting 
control over these subalterns to its previous lowly status on the Cold War's security 
agenda, if it even meaningfully featured there at all.7 As John Darby and Roger Mac
5 Alley, 8.
6 Small Arms Survey, Small Arms Survey 2001: Profiling the Problem (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2001), 197.
7 Denise Garcia, Analyzing the Issue of Curbing the Unrestricted Availability and Proliferation of 
Small Arms and Light Weapons: Some Implications for the Study of International Relations and for 
Education in Defense and Security, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs
5Ginty correctly note, "September 11 and the subsequent 'war on terror' are likely to 
be exceptions to the complex political emergencies that will dominate the first 
decades of the twenty-first century."8
In spite of the recent diplomatic posturing over the proliferation of weapons of 
mass destruction,9 the new regimes installed following the US-led invasions of 
Afghanistan in late 2001 and of Iraq in early 2003 have both been confronted by 
insurgencies. In particular, these insurgencies have so far been fought, in the case of 
the Karzai government, mostly to the South of Kabul and, in the case of Iraq's 
Interim, Transitional, and Full-Term governments, mostly in the urban centres 
including, but not limited to, Baghdad, Fallujah, Najaf, and Basra.10 Small arms and 
light weapons, the prevalent tools of violence here, are sourced primarily from the 
armed forces which were defeated by US-led invading militaries, but whose 
weapons were neither captured nor destroyed. Adding to these illicit stockpiles, the 
Coalition Government of Iraq "dismissed almost 400,000 soldiers, and initially 
refused to allow them to keep their pensions, when at the same time, most of them 
kept their weapons."11 That the widespread availability and ongoing use of small 
arms and light weapons is proving an obstacle to achieving security in Afghanistan 
and in Iraq—not to mention proving an impediment to fostering an enduring peace 
in these two countries, a task likely to prove far more difficult to obtain and sustain
Discussion Paper 2003-12 (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University, Kennedy School 
of Government, 2003), 1.
8 lohn Darby and Roger Mac Ginty, "Introduction: What Peace? What Process?" chap, in 
Contemporary Peacemaking: Conflict, Violence and Peace Processes (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2003), 5.
9 The acquisition of a nuclear weapons capability by both India and Pakistan in 1998, closely 
followed by North Korea's withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 
2003, the suspected existence of concealed stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons in 
Iraq (based upon US intelligence reports written in the early 2000s which were either 
inaccurate, obscure, or misread) and, in 2006, Iran's declared nuclear ambitions, have each 
been the subject of the UN Security Council's deliberation with respect to whether or not any 
of these constitute a threat to the international peace. Refer to United Nations Security 
Council Resolutions 1172 (1998), 1695 (2006), 687 (1991), and 1696 (2006), respectively. 
Concerns regarding weapons of mass destruction also include their possession and use by 
non-state actors.
10 For a chilling account of this ongoing conflict, refer to Robert Fisk, The Great War for 
Civilisation: The Conquest of The Middle East (London: Fourth Estate, 2005).
11 Pouligny, 16.
6than an imposed cessation of armed hostilities —signals the residual legacy of Cold 
War strategic theorising, still preferred by key policymakers ahead of a full 
consideration of the actual obstacles to security registering on the ground. Yet these 
subaltern killers are probably as much a reality now for millions of people living in 
the post-Cold War era, as they were for those living under the shadow of the Cold 
War.
The term 'subaltern' has a secondary allusion here because it also signals a broad 
shift in the foci of practitioners of disciplinary international relations. Shifting away 
from focusing primarily upon diplomacy among states, the so-called high politics 
with its attendant emphasis on those that do the affecting, a growing number of 
practitioners now also focus on those who were more frequently neglected by the 
discipline, but who are nevertheless affected by the conduct of contemporary world 
affairs. Since its formal inception in 1919 at the Department of International Politics 
at the University of Wales, Aberystwyth, followed in 1924 by the establishment of a 
similar department at the University of Southern California,12 the discipline of 
international relations has broadened its focus from beyond a state-based system in 
which statemakers acknowledge no superior authority over matters considered of 
vital interest, to include as themes the unsustainable utilisation of the world's 
resources and associated planetary degradation, the gender inequalities confronting 
more than half of humanity, and the increasingly polarised distribution of wealth 
among humankind. (However, the importance of each of these themes as essential 
to the discipline remains both disputed and contested.) As John T. Picarelli puts it, 
"[t]he constructivist turn, the positivist debate, and the increasing consideration of 
gender, race, and class as analytical constructs have broadened the ontological 
building blocks of international relations theory while expanding the 
epistemological breadth of their foci."13 Although remaining vitally important, the
12 Stephen Toulmin, Return to Reason (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 
2001), 143. As Toulmin notes, "[t]hese departments were not called into existence out of the 
blue; they were set up in response to a historical occasion, which is worth defining."
John T. Picarelli, "The Turbulent Nexus of Transnational Organized Crime and Terrorism: A 
Theory of Malevolent International Relations," Global Crime 7, no.l (February, 2006): 5.
13
7causes, conduct, and consequences of inter-state conflict are no longer the 
discipline's key themes in the way that they might have been in the immediate 
aftermath of the First World War. It is not that statemakers, as important actors in 
the affairs of this world, have been relegated to the dustbins of history, but rather, 
that other actors, and the entities to which they belong, have increasingly gained 
currency as topics among a sufficient number of those claiming membership to the 
discipline of international relations, as well as among many of those analysts of 
world affairs who do not.
The bourgeoning research and teaching agenda of disciplinary international
relations was enabled, in part, through the recognition by some of its practitioners
that non-state actors can, and often do, play decisive roles in the conduct of world
affairs. This recognition continues. According to Elke Krahmann, for instance:
Two key developments have been central to international security in the 
post-Cold War era: the emergence of new threats such as ethnic wars, 
terrorism, transnational crime, HIV/AIDS, and small arms, and the 
proliferation of non-state actors such as nongovernmental organizations 
(NGOs), transnational corporations, private security companies, and 
international regimes, in the provision of human, national, and 
international security. 14
Consequently, practitioners develop new analytic frames of reference through which 
to make sense of, and then write meaningfully about, these actors and the activities 
in which they engage. This does not imply that non-state actors are new to world 
affairs15 or, conversely, that they have always and necessarily played decisive roles 
in world affairs, but rather, recognises that in some circumstances they do play a 
significant part in the drama of world affairs and now increasingly receive analytic 
attention. According to R.B.J. Walker, for instance, critical social movements "have
14 Elke Krahmann, "New Threats and New Actors in Security Governance: Developments, 
Problems, and Solutions," chap, in New Threats and New Actors in International Security (New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 199.
15 Beatrice Pouligny, NGOs as transnational forces? Beyond the myth, evolving interactions which 
question the political (Paris: Centre d'Etudes et de Recherches Internationales, CERI—Sciences 
Po., 2000), 5.
8to be evaluated not in terms of some timeless notion of what power is but in terms of 
their capacity to alter our understanding of what power can be."16
In this sense, the term subaltern deliberately invokes the work of historical 
revisionists, such as Howard Zinn, Dipesh Chakrabarty, and Partha Chatterjee, the 
latter two as members of the Subaltern Studies Group emerging from South Asia 
during the 1980s. As Gayatri Spivak explains, this group sought to revise "the 
insurgent or the 'subaltern'" as the pivotal agent of change in colonial Indian history, 
rather than the imperial master or the indigenous elite engendered by the colonial 
administration.17 In this light, the term recognises that, in the hands of various non­
state actors, these tools of violence have a powerful transformative effect when used 
in conflict zones which, in turn, can encourage foreign interventions that have 
further transformative effects over governmental, economic, and social institutions.
This recognition of non-state actors as active participants in world affairs, and 
the writing into existence of their importance by practitioners of disciplinary 
international relations, reveals an inadequacy inherent in the term 'international 
relations.' Strictly speaking, the term does not accurately convey the subject it 
regards: as nomenclature, 'international relations' privileges 'inter' over 'intra' 
national relations, thereby obscuring what Khatchik Derghoukassian refers to as the 
"intermestic," which I take to mean the kind of relations which are conceivable 
following the dissolution of demarcations separating the domestic/civil from the 
extemal/intemational.18 By denoting a social dimension of world affairs whereby 
nations, which Benedict Anderson defines as "an imagined political community,"19 
are preferred over states, the term also fails to reflect the importance of the economic
16 R.B.J. Walker, One World, Many Worlds: Struggles for Just World Peace (Boulder, Colorado: 
Lynne Rienner Publisher, 1988), 146.
17 Gayatri Chakavorty Spivak, "Subaltern Studies: Deconstructing Historiography," chap, in In 
Other Worlds: Essays in Cultural Politics (New York and London: Routledge, 1988), 197.
18 Khatchik Derghoukassian, "U.S. Hegemony and the Global Rifle Association: Small Arms
and Light Weapons on the International Security Agenda," Paper Delivered at the 
International Studies Association 2004 Annual Convention, March 17-20, 2004, Montreal, 
Quebec, Canada, 5. <http://www.64.112.226.77//meta/p73700 index.html?type=info>
(accessed 31 March 2007).
19 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism 
(London: Verso, 1991), 6.
9dimension to world affairs, and does not fully acknowledge the cultural and sacral 
contexts in which these world affairs occur. Moreover, it tends to draw focus away 
from questions regarding the inter-governmental, the inter-ethnic, the inter-cultural, 
and the inter-sacral. The term does little to compensate for those who find 
themselves living (for want of a more appropriate term) at the margins of world 
affairs.
In some respects the term 'relations' proves inadequate too. Unsatisfactory as it 
may first seem, this discipline, with its centrifugal tendencies and evolving research 
agenda, loosely coheres around a broad concept of politics. In this thesis, politics 
refers "to all those things we do, individually and in concert, to get and use power 
over others for non-trivial purposes. Politics is always about trying to get our own 
way to some substantive end. It is always a verb."20 Thus, engaging in politics can 
involve inaction and omission, if refraining from activity and acknowledgement 
helps obtain power over others. While this definition of politics might appear 
unlimited in its potential application, the necessary inclusion of the common noun 
'nontrivial matters' restricts the scope available to the discipline by discriminating 
against subjects in a way that ultimately prioritises those who exercise power in its 
decisive sense over future access to, and further use of, power. However, those who 
have been denied power, or even the opportunity of empowerment, insert 
themselves among the concerns of disciplinary international relations in ways that 
are often immediate, urgent, and readily discernible, but which are also often based 
on longstanding grievances, articulated in ways that are difficult to anticipate, and 
that generate enduring effects. International relations are, in this sense, a subset of 
world politics, which are themselves a subset of world affairs.
In spite of these concerns, the discipline of international relations remains an 
entirely appropriate academic discipline in which to undertake a study of the 
challenge to control small arms and light weapons: a challenge which has, as the 
editors of the Small Arms Survey 2001 Yearbook observe, "been variously defined as 
an arms control and disarmament issue, a human rights and humanitarian law issue,
20 Ralph Pettman, World Politics: Rationalism and Beyond (New York, Palgrave, 2001), 6.
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a public health or economic development issue, a problem of post-conflict 
disarmament, or as an issue of terrorism and criminality.//21 Featuring here as a 
significant part of the discipline's broadening agenda, the conduct of non-state 
actors involved in either confronting or sustaining the challenge of controlling small 
arms and light weapons (specifically researchers, civil society organisations, 
weapons manufacturers, arms brokers, private security firms, combatants, organised 
crime groups, and gun-owning civilians) signals that, although governments are 
undoubtedly important, the international community comprises more than a society 
of states. It also demonstrates that a society of states does not have a monopoly in 
determining the shape of significant events and important trends that are often 
described as international.
Because of these concerns, however, this thesis distinguishes the few 
practitioners of disciplinary international relations focusing on this topic from the 
many analysts of contemporary world affairs expressing concern over of the 
availability and use of these weapons: while some analysts of world affairs consider 
themselves practitioners of disciplinary international relations, many do not. The 
separation of the discipline, as a way of making sense of world affairs as they 
happen 'out there,' dissolves too: while not central actors of world affairs, 
practitioners of disciplinary international relations, like analysts of world affairs, 
nevertheless participate in world affairs. Contests over notions of the political occur 
not only among those actors engaging in contemporary world affairs, but also 
among those practitioners engaging in disciplinary international relations and 
among those who analyse world affairs. Having said that, however, as a deficient 
nomenclature, the term 'international relations' serves to highlight the complexity of 
the very themes the discipline seeks to explore, relate, and explain.
This thesis focuses upon the recent past—more precisely, since the early 1990s — 
as the period of time during which the international community first became 
actively engaged in confronting the problems created, at least in part, by the
21 Small Arms Survey, 2. Refer also to Luden Mufor Atanga, Tackling Small Arms in Central
Africa, Paper no.29 (Bonn: Bonn International Center for Conversion, 2003), 31.
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widespread availability and ongoing use of small arms and light weapons. In 
particular, researchers, intergovernmental organisations, including specifically the 
UN Security Council, and civil society organisations continue to respond to this 
challenge in various, ongoing, and, at times, interconnected and overlapping ways. 
The chronological scope of the thesis closes with the second Biennial Meeting of 
States to Consider the Implementation of the United Nations Programme of Action to 
Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All its 
Aspects (BMS), which was held at the UN Headquarters in New York between 11 
and 15 July 2005. With the United Nations Protocol Against the Illicit Manufacturing of 
and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and Components and Ammunition (UN Firearms 
Protocol) having also entered into force the previous week, much of the international 
community's attention focused upon the second BMS as an important lead-up event 
to another, potentially more significant, conference held in July 2006, also in New 
York. The purpose of that conference was to provide an opportunity for 
policymakers to review their progress towards implementing the UN Programme of 
Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradiate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons 
in All its Aspects (UNPoA), and to reappraise its viability as an arms control method.
"A bad outcome" was the phrase chosen by the New Zealand Minister for 
Disarmament and Arms Control, Phil Goff, to describe the UN Small Arms Review 
Conference. Goff laments that:
The meeting was not well organised. The general debate that should have 
lasted 2 days took 6. There was no provision for separate drafting 
committees to get on with work on the outcome document while that 
went on. When negotiations finally got under way, major differences that 
had been signalled earlier became more entrenched.
At the end of the 2-week conference, including some protracted 
negotiating sessions that lasted up to 18 hours, many paragraphs in the 
document remained in dispute. When time ran out as the UN interpreters 
downed tools on the evening of Friday 7 July, the formal outcome was a 
2-line report informing the General Assembly that the conference was 
unable to reach agreement on an outcome document.22
22 Phil Goff, "Speech to Wellington Branch of the UN Association on Disarmament," 
<http://www.beehive.govt.nzAhewDocument.aspx?DocumentID=26666> (accessed 31 March 
2007).
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It is an assessment likely shared by many of those involved in the conference 
proceedings, as well as by those observing it. Rebecca Peters, Director of the 
International Action Network on Small Arms (IANSA), provides a civil society 
perspective when she writes: "By allowing this meeting to fail, governments have 
squandered the opportunity to take action that would have saved lives around the 
world. It is unacceptable for two weeks of talking to produce no outcome, 
particularly when 1000 people are still dying at gunpoint every day."23 This 
frustration is reminiscent of the disappointment expressed by the President of the 
UN Small Arms Conference, Camilo Reyes Rodriguez, who reported to the UN 
General Assembly in July 2001 that much work remains to be done before "the 
conscience of humanity is at long last satisfied that all that can be done has in fact 
been done to alleviate this global tragedy."24 It appears, then, that not too much has 
changed over the past five years and, in some respects, the Review Conference's 
failure to progress beyond the UNPoA's original terms reveals the fragile basis upon 
which the international community builds some of its responses to other major 
issues on the new security agenda.
While the historical circumstances accounting for the rise and spread of small 
arms and light weapons around the world are fundamental to those analysts 
concerned with better understanding the causes, conduct, and resolution of 
contemporary conflict, the ongoing impacts generated by these tools of violence 
remain deeply and forcefully felt by millions of people, making the challenge of 
controlling these weapons an urgent one for policymakers. Yet this thesis is not 
intended as a policy document offering a set of recommendations to policymakers in 
order to either solve or manage an international security problem: nor does this
23 International Action Network on Small Arms, "Media Release: UN world conference on 
small arms collapses without agreement," <http://www.controlarms.org/events/ 
unreview.htm> (accessed 31 March 2007).
24 United Nations General Assembly, "Statement by the President of the Conference after the 
adoption of the Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in 
Small Arms and Light Weapons in All its Aspects," in Report of the United Nations Conference 
on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All its Aspects, UN Doc. A/Conf.192/15 
(New York: United Nations, 2001).
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thesis purport to be a treatise on the technical development of small arms and light 
weapons, a chronicle of the global trade in small arms and light weapons, nor for 
that matter a history of any other major aspect of the small arms and light weapons 
topic. Instead, representing the culmination of three years7 worth of reading, 
talking, listening, thinking, and writing about this topic, this thesis is self­
consciously and unapologetically academic, without pretence to influencing 
contemporary world affairs in any decisive way. As Hedley Bull observed in the 
late 1970s, /7[t]he search for conclusions that can be presented as 'solutions7 or 
'practical advice7 is a corrupting element in the contemporary study of world 
politics, which properly understood is an intellectual activity, not a practical one.77 25
Following in the wake of the UN Small Arms Review Conference, the
presentation of this thesis is timely. The value of its timeliness, however, lies not so 
much in the expectation that those policymakers directly involved in reviewing 
intergovernmental measures of control will take notice of this thesis, but more that 
this thesis represents a critical scholarly reflection on an increasingly important issue 
in contemporary world affairs. In this important respect, the thesis differs from 
much of the existing literature on this topic. Refraining from adding to the
bourgeoning literature seeking to provide a series of recommendations for
policymakers, however, does not necessarily preclude active policymakers from 
inducing policy modifications from this thesis.
Because this thesis relies, for the most part, upon existing data sets relating to the 
proliferation, transfer, possession, collection, and deactivation of these weapons, it 
contains little primary information that can be considered new. However, the thesis 
makes its contribution to the scholarly literature of international relations through 
the novel way in which it treats its topic. Its value lies in illuminating and then 
problematising the international community's favoured solution (for want of more 
appropriate term) to the multifaceted and dynamic problems caused by the 
widespread availability and ongoing use of small arms and light weapons.
25 Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A  Study of Order in World Politics, 3rd Ed. (New York:
Palgrave, 2002), 308.
14
International Community
Although the international community is commonly referred to as though it is 
exclusively a society of states,26 this thesis takes a broader view. It considers the 
roles played by statemakers, especially those involved in intergovernmental 
organisations, alongside the various roles played by researchers and activists 
belonging to civil society organisations. As arms control protagonists whose 
responses to the widespread availability and ongoing use of small arms and light 
weapons reveal a nascent interconnectivity, each of these actors helps comprise an 
international community. The emergence of an international community, in this 
case cohering around the composition and, at times, the imposition of controls over 
these weapons, has a very recent precedent in world affairs. At the successful 
conclusion of the 1997 anti-personnel landmine convention, largely a result of the 
civil society campaign coordinated by Jody Williams, former Secretary-General Kofi 
Annan rejoiced: "only a living, thriving 'international community' could come 
together, across borders and beyond regions to eliminate this universal plague."27 
As the relationships among these actors mature, the bonds of community strengthen, 
though as this thesis contends, this does not necessarily translate into more effective 
responses to this challenge.
In addition to these arms control protagonists, a broad range of actors have 
mobilised around the UN Small Arms Conference. As Edward Laurance and Rachel 
Stohl observe, the UN Department for Disarmament Affairs has acted as a 'clearing 
house' for governments submitting reports in accordance with their commitments 
under the UNPoA and has assisted with weapons collection and destruction 
programmes. The Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and the 
Inter-Agency Standing Committee, the UN Department for Political Affairs, the UN
26 Hedley Bull, for example, places the emergence of an international society, that is, a society of 
states which has its origins in Europe's fifteenth century expansionism, in the middle of the 
nineteenth century. See Hedley Bull and A. Watson, eds., The Expansion of International Society 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), 117.
27 Kofi Annan, "Statement by the United Nations Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, to the signing 
ceremony of the Anti-personnel Mines Convention, Ottawa, 3 December 1997," quoted in 
Stefan Brem and Ken Rutherford, "Walking Together or Divided Agenda: Comparing 
Landmines and Small-Arms Campaigns," Security Dialogue 32, no.2 (2001): 172.
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Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa, and the UN Regional Centre 
for Peace and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean, are just some of the 
UN Secretariat's bureaucratic agencies that have become engaged with this problem 
since the adoption of the UNPoA.28
Some of the UN's specialised agencies have been active too. Most notably, the 
UN Development Programme (UNDP) "has many large-scale activities on small 
arms, with a greater budget and more personnel than any other UN agency or 
department."29 In January 2005, for instance, the UNDP Small Arms and 
Demobilisation Unit sent a consultant to Burundi in order to assess the extent of 
weapons held by civilians and to help local authorities design a community 
development programme.30 The World Health Organization (WHO), the UN 
Institute for Disarmament Research (UNDIR), the UN Commission for Human 
Rights, the UN Children's Fund (UNICEF), the UN Development Fund for Women, 
the Centre for International Crime Prevention, and the Office for Drug Control and 
Crime Prevention, have each worked in various ways, and according to their various 
strengths, in order to promote action to control small arms and light weapons in 
accordance with the principles and purposes of the UNPoA. These actors, while not 
directly involved in composing international agreements, have important roles 
enabling the better implementation of those controls.
Other actors neither compose agreements, nor help implement their provisions, 
but instead, deal with the lethal consequences of these weapons, helping to mitigate 
some of their deleterious effects. The International Committee of the Red Cross 
(ICRC) and Medecins San Frontiers are two examples of the more prominent non-
28 Edward Laurance and Rachel Stohl, Making Global Public Policy: The Case of Small Arms and 
Light Weapons, Occasional Paper no.7 (Geneva: Small Arms Survey, 2002), 15.
29 Ibid.
30 United Nations Security Council, Third report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations 
Operation in Burundi, UN Doc. S/2005/149 (New York: United Nations, 2005), paragraph 29. 
The report continues: "The Small Arms Reduction Programme Secretariat of the UNDP 
Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery has been developing a Great Lakes regional 
approach, with renewed focus on Burundi. In cooperation with [the United Nations 
Operations in Burundi (ONUB)] and the Small Arms Reduction Programme, the Small Arms 
and Demobilisation Unit is planning to set up programmes in Burundi by September 2005."
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state actors involved in ameliorating the conditions confronting victims of armed 
conflict. Although undoubtedly part of the wider international community, these 
actors helping implement control measures or ameliorating the suffering of gun 
victims do not feature in this thesis among the international community's major 
protagonists of arms control. Thus, the international community is not perceived 
here as all of humanity, a meta-society encompassing the world's entire population, 
nor as an aggregate of all the international actors engaging in world affairs. At the 
same time, the thesis recognises that the term 'international community' is often 
used uncritically by analysts and is invoked disingenuously by policymakers 
claiming their policies somehow represent its will or in some way advance its 
interests.
As members of the international community who are, or aspire to be, effective in 
attempts to establish and maintain control over these weapons, governments are 
fundamental here. This is partly because, as Denise Garcia correctly notes, "[t]he 
wealth of initiatives promoted by governments suggest that states were the main 
actors in the advancement of the small arms issue in the international agenda. They 
acted more as agenda-setters than the nongovernmental actors. " 31 However, such 
leadership is evident only where common interests among those governments are 
prioritised ahead of specific national interests. To be sure, as Bruno Simma and 
Andreas L. Paulus put it, "if there is an international community, it needs to have 
certain interests common to all its members and a certain set of common values, 
principles and procedures. " 32 Some non-state actors claim a sense of solidarity as 
arms-control protagonists within this international community, even though such 
solidarity is sometimes based more upon their consultative role than upon a shared 
representation in non-trivial decision-making processes.
This international community emerges from, and is deeply embedded in, an 
internationalist governance architecture comprising primarily, but not exclusively,
31 Garcia, 11.
32 Bruno Simma and Andreas L. Paulus, "The "International Community': Facing the Challenge 
of Globalization," European Journal of International Law 9, no.2 (1998): 267.
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of the UN System, the Bretton Woods institutions, and the World Trade 
Organization (WTO). This particular set of grand politico-strategic frameworks is 
then used by members of the international community as a vehicle to convey, and as 
a means to secure, world order. And here, I use the term world order in the same 
way that Robert W. Cox uses it:
In preference to "inter-state system" as it is relevant to all historical 
periods (and not only those in which states have been the component 
entities) and in preference to "world system" as it is more indicative of a 
structure having only a certain duration in time and avoiding the 
equilibrium connotations of "system." "World" designates the probable 
interactions (some past "worlds" being limited to the Mediterranean, to 
Europe, to China, etc.). "Order" is used in the sense of the way things 
usually happen (not the absence of turbulence); thus disorder is included 
in the concept of order. An inter-state system is one historical form of 
world order.33
Debate surrounds the precise emergence of the interstate system, however. The 
Treaty of Westphalia, signed on 24 October 1648 between the Holy Roman Emperor 
and the King of France, and their respective allies, is often cited as a document 
founding a state-based system in which participants mutually recognise sovereignty, 
though the Treaty did not invent the notion of a state and referred only to Europe.
As the current manifestation of world order, the internationalist governance 
architecture has its roots dating back at least to the Treaty of Versailles in 1919 and 
the establishment of the League of Nations, the latter an important experiment based 
upon governments cooperating in order to prevent a recurrence of inter-state conflict 
of global proportions. US President Woodrow Wilson's "peace proposals [for the 
League of Nations] focused primarily on the problem of interstate conflict, but he 
also believed that these principles were essential to domestic or civil peace as well, 
because people denied justice and freedom would be prone to disaffection and 
unrest."34 Wilson's ideas—variously described as the Liberal Peace Thesis,
33 Robert W. Cox, "Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations 
Theory," in Culture, Ideology, and World Order, ed. R.B.J. Walker (Boulder and London: 
Westview Press, 1984), 291.
Roland Paris, At War's End: Building Peace After Civil Conflict (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2004), 40-41.
34
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Democratic Peace Theory, or, as this thesis prefers more broadly, as
internationalism35—reveal a commitment to a particular notion of the political which
prioritises statemakers as the primary actors of world affairs, positing that
cooperation among governments is the most preferable way in which to achieve
mutual benefits, especially in matters deemed essential to international security.
This set of ideas therefore expresses a strongly-held belief in the promise of
collective security. As Inis L. Claude, Jr describes it, collective security:
...has generally been regarded as a halfway house between the terminal 
points of international anarchy and world government. Given the 
assumption that the former has become intolerable and the latter remains, 
at least for the foreseeable future, unattainable, collective security is 
conceived as an alternative, far enough from anarchy to be useful and far 
enough from world government to be feasible. Advocates of collective 
security have differed as to whether it should be envisaged as a 
temporary expedient, contributing to the ultimate possibility of world 
government, or a permanent solution to the problem of order, eliminating 
the ultimate necessity of world government.36
Although the League of Nations did not endure beyond Nazi Germany's and 
Imperial Japan's aggressive foreign policies of the late 1930s and the outbreak of the 
Second World War, the principles of collective security inform the UN.37 The
35 There are, of course, important nuances among these terms. Whereas the Liberal Peace Thesis 
suggests that conflict is less likely to occur where economies are closely interdependent, the 
Democratic Peace Theory suggest leaders will be less likely to conduct foreign wars if they 
fear the displeasure of those who voted them in. Internationalism, on the other hand, 
suggests that statemakers will cooperate together in order to secure a collective advantage.
36 Inis L. Claude, Jr. "Collective Security As An Approach To Peace," in Classic Readings and 
Contemporary Debates in International Relations, eds. Phil Williams, Donald M. Goldstein, and 
Jay M. Shafritz, 3rd Ed. (Belmont: Thomson Wadsworth, 2006), 290. More specifically: 
"Collective security assumes the existence of a world in which every state is so limited by the 
distribution of power, the reduction of military power levels by a disarmament program, and 
the lack of economic self-sufficiency, that any state which may develop aggressive 
inclinations can be held in check by methods which probably need not include the large-scale 
use of force. It assumes the possibility of securing the acceptance by states of theoretically 
formidable responsibilities for enforcing the peace, only because it assumes the improbability 
that it will be necessary to invoke the performance of the most drastic enforcement duties." 
Ibid, 301.
37 As Ramesh Thakur, strongly echoing Claude, eloquently puts it: "Established to provide 
predictability and order in a world in constant flux, the United Nations—a bridge between 
power and principles, between state-based realism and universal idealism—is at once the 
symbol of humanity's collective aspirations for a better life in a safer world for all, a forum
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prospects of success for collective security in the aftermath of the Second World War 
were enhanced by the international community promoting the rule of international 
law and strengthening the role of intergovernmental organisations, particularly the 
UN, as well as those international organisations dealing with issues of finance, trade, 
and economic management.
The rule of international law is a key element of the internationalist governance 
architecture, facilitating cooperation among governments as the basis of maintaining 
world order. As Bull explains:
Order in the great society of all mankind has been attained, during the 
present phase of the modem states system, through general acceptance of 
the principle that men and territory are divided into states, each with its 
own proper sphere of authority, but linked together by a common set of 
mles. International law, by stating and elaborating this principle and by 
excluding alternative principles—such as the Hobbesian notion that 
international politics is an arena in which there are no rules restricting 
states in their relations with one another, or the notion that mankind is 
properly organised as a universal state based on cosmopolitan rights, or 
as a universal empire founded on the supremacy of a particular nation or 
race —establishes this particular realm of ideas as the determining one for 
human thought and action in the present phase, and so precludes the 
opening of questions without end and the eruption of conflicts without 
limit.38
As an instmment of international law, the Charter of the United Nations has 
immense importance for contemporary world affairs, though without the 
continuous recognition provided by the international community it could easily 
have become moribund. This Charter not only embodies respect for the mle of 
international law and, thereby, has an effect of entrenching the internationalist 
governance architecture, but also provides the mundane mechanism by which 
collective security can be practised. The UN Charter also grants rights and
for negotiating the terms of converting the collective aspiration into common program of 
action, and the principal international instruments for the realisation of the aspirations and 
the implementation of the plans." See Ramesh Thakur, "UN reforms and the use of force: The 
Secretary-General's report," A Public Lecture given on 11 April 2005 hosted by the Centre for 
Arab and Islamic Studies and the Asia-Pacific College of Diplomacy, Australian National 
University, 7. <http://www.apcd.anu.edu.au/events/2005/thakur.htm> (accessed 14 June 
2005).
38 Bull, 134-5.
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responsibilities to those who sign it, relying upon its members to cooperate in order 
to avoid, mitigate, or help resolve conflicts, many of which are fought with small 
arms and light weapons.
Even though Article 51 of the UN Charter, which recognises the rights of 
governments to act unilaterally if they are attacked, acknowledges that a belief in 
collective security does not always hold as a sole guarantor of international security, 
its inclusion in the Charter enabled this particular governance architecture to take 
hold in the inter-state system following the Second World War, even if it has been 
subsequently held hostage to superpower rivalry during the Cold War.39 This belief 
in the promise of collective security also persists in spite of the failure by UN 
founders to agree over the means of implementing Article 43, a disagreement 
precluding the establishment of a UN standing force. This disagreement, according 
to John Hillen, created a situation where "the entire policy structure set up by the 
UN Charter for the conduct of military operations has never fully been realised."40 
The inability of UN founders to agree over Article 43 resulted in the Security 
Council's adoption of its ad-hoc and highly improvised approach to pursuing its 
responsibilities during both the Cold War and its immediate aftermath. Although it 
has always been an imperfect solution in practice, collective security has serious bite 
in world affairs.
Since the Second World War, but more particularly since the end of the Cold 
War, the UN has played an important role in managing conflict. However, as 
Roland Paris points out, "peace-building missions are not merely exercises in
39 Article 51 of the United Nations Charter states the following: "Nothing in the present Charter 
shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack 
occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken 
measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by 
Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the 
Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the 
Security Council under the present Charter to take any time such action as it deems necessary 
in order to maintain or restore international peace and security." A copy of the Charter is 
available at <http:/Avww.un.org/aboutun/charter> (accessed 31 March 2007). All subsequent 
references to the Charter in this thesis are to this version.
40 John Hillen, Blue Helmets: The Strategy of UN Military Operations (Washington, D.C.: Brassey's,
2000), 12.
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conflict management, but instances of a much larger phenomenon: the globalisation
of a particular model of domestic governance—liberal market democracy—from the
core to the periphery of the international system / ' 41 For Michael Pugh, more
cynically, "modem versions of peacekeeping can be considered as forms of riot
control directed against the unruly parts of the world to uphold the liberal peace. " 42
In this sense, the grand vision of those architects responsible for the UN and Bretton
Woods institutions will endure as long as the internationalist governance
architecture can repair itself where it suffers from armed conflict. Yet these
interventions are more than exercises repairing the institutions of government into
(semi)functioning democracies, reforming the war-shattered economies into liberal
marketplaces, and reconfiguring traumatized communities into societies consisting
of vectors of individuals. Paris elaborates:
Without exception peacebuilding missions in the post-Cold War period 
have attempted to 'transplant' the values and institutions of the liberal 
democratic core into the domestic affairs of peripheral host states....[and] 
may be viewed as a modem rendering of the mission civilisatrice—the 
colonial-era belief that the European imperial powers had a duty to 
'civilise' their overseas possessions.43
There is a strong sense in which those policymakers responsible for these foreign 
interventions seek to remake the world on their own uni vers alising terms without 
engaging meaningfully with the plurality of customary practices and traditional 
hierarchies of the host societies. In effect, where the rule of international law has an 
entrenching effect for the internationalist governance architecture, interventions 
undertaken as conflict management can have a transformative effect, extending the 
reach of this architecture.
Whereas a belief in collective security asserts that, by cooperating, governments 
can mitigate the threat of serious interstate conflict, collective action does not 
necessarily manage state-based threats, though certain statemakers may be complicit
41 Roland Paris, "International peacebuilding as the mission civilisatrice," Review of International 
Studies 28 (2002): 638.
42 Michael Pugh, "Peacekeeping and Critical Theory," International Peacekeeping 11, no.l (Spring 
2004): 41.
Paris, "International peacebuilding as the mission civilisatrice," 638.43
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with the emergence and persistence of these threats. Since the Cold War's end, 
collective action has been used by the international community to respond to a 
plethora of so-called transnational issues gaining salience in an era of intensifying 
globalisation. Typically, these issues are unlikely to be eliminated by governments 
taking unilateral action. Ranking among the more prominent of these issues are: 
narcotics trafficking; human trafficking; money laundering; illegal fishing; 
deforestation; global warming; HIV/AIDS; endemic poverty; organised crime; and 
terrorism. Yet the international community's inability to respond effectively to these 
separate, but at times interconnected, transnational issues is especially disturbing 
given that "no country can afford to deal with today's threats alone, and no threat 
can be dealt with effectively unless other threats are addressed at the same time. " 44
Like those aforementioned transnational threats, the widespread availability and
ongoing use of small arms and light weapons is also perceived as a threat common
to most, if not all, governments, representing a threat best managed and mitigated
by intergovernmental cooperation. Indeed, where the international community
becomes involved in civil conflicts as conflict managers, the devastating role small
arms and light weapons play on the durability of the state cannot be denied.
Significantly, even though the threats posed by these weapons motivate and sustain
members of the international community to take action, these weapons were
important to the emergence of the interstate system. As Torbjom L. Knutsen notes:
Guns made battles more destructive and warfare more costly. And the 
rising costs of warfare in early sixteenth-century Europe had immediate 
political consequences. They made political power increasingly 
dependent upon national wealth, and pressured kings and princes to 
invent new ways of raising revenues. This, in turn, stimulated the growth 
of the modem states and the state system .45
Indeed, it is partly because these weapons are sought as security enablers by state 
and non-state actors alike that the international community's efforts to exert control 
over these weapons are seriously attenuated.
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Thakur, 7.
Torbjom L. Knutsen, A History of International Relations Theory, 2nd Ed. (Manchester and New 
York: Manchester University Press, 1997), 58.
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Despite its universalising tendencies, however, this internationalist notion of the 
political is far from attaining an absolute supremacy in contemporary world affairs. 
A range of challenges to its primacy emerge from those statemakers who are not 
fully convinced of the virtue, or indeed the necessity, of cooperation. Enjoying 
benefits such as permanent membership to the Security Council and its ancillary 
veto rights, powerful governments resist the structural restraints over their 
policymaking that are implicit in membership to intergovernmental organisations. 
Some governments7 zero-sum calculations of national interests outweigh the 
potential benefits of cooperation, as evidenced in the case of those governments 
involved in articulating resolutions calling for sanction regimes, but which 
nevertheless act as sanction busters. While sometimes authorised by the UN 
Security Council, so-called coalitions of the willing assume operational command of 
major peacekeeping operations, eroding the Security Council's ability to effectively 
manage these collective actions. Moreover, not all regional intergovernmental 
organisations authorise interventions or create instruments of international law as 
their primary response to the widespread availability and ongoing use of these 
weapons: the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the African Union 
(AU), the League of Arab States, and the Caribbean Community have each, for 
example, responded in terms of its trafficking aspect.46 Perhaps more significantly, 
there is, as Ramesh Thakur suggests:
...[a] strategic disconnect between the distribution of military, political, 
and economic power in the real world, and the distribution of decision­
making authority in the artificially constructed world of 
intergovernmental organisations. The most acute manifestation of this is 
the growing disparity between the soft as well as hard power of the USA 
and that of all others.47
Even though governments rely upon the existing internationalist governance 
architecture to legitimise their authority and, in turn, reinforce the key institutions
46
47
Peters, 4.
Ramesh Thakur, The United Nations, Peace and Security: From Collective Security to the 
Responsibility to Protect (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 4.
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comprising its governance architecture, their activities (and inactivity) can represent 
a challenge emerging from within the grand politico-strategic frameworks ordering 
contemporary world affairs.
At the same time, other challenges emerge from beyond the grand politico- 
strategic frameworks. A variety of (non-state) economic and social actors simply do 
not believe the state is the primary entity in world affairs. Transnational 
corporations, super-empowered individuals, ethnic minorities, and armed groups 
are some such non-state actors disregarding civil authority. Those who live at the 
margins of world affairs, that is, the poor, women, and many indigenous 
communities also feature among those who do not endorse the internationalist 
notion of the political. As this thesis demonstrates, some of the most aggressive 
challenges to this notion of the political emerge from those non-state actors who 
produce, transfer, possess, and use small arms and light weapons without official 
consent or authorisation.
While all world affairs cannot be characterised as internationalist, the major 
responses confronting the challenge of controlling small arms and light weapons are 
informed by, and help convey, an internationalist orthodoxy. Accordingly, the 
thesis situates these major responses within the ongoing negotiation between the 
international community and the internationalist governance architecture. But 
because the deadly and lasting impacts associated with the widespread availability 
and ongoing use of small arms and light weapons, alarming as their magnitude is, 
do not represent a serious threat to the core of this governance architecture, the 
prevailing world order remains largely undisturbed by these weapons. Conversely, 
members of the international community seize upon the challenge to control these 
weapons as an opportunity not only to strengthen its key institutions as the status 
quo, but also to further reinscribe internationalism as orthodoxy. In light of these 
complexities, it is a notion of the political that tries to determine who gets to decide 
who has access to these weapons: that is, internationalism predetermines an answer 
to the political question over who has access to and, therefore, the ability to use these 
tools of violence.
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The ensuing thesis posits two key findings: first, in spite of receiving more than a 
decade of the international community's attention and being subject to a number of 
decisive measures, small arms and light weapons continue to evade effective control. 
Consequently, where the problems relating to these weapons have not already 
manifested in an immediate and urgent lethality, the threat posed by them has not 
diminished. Second, in spite of the increasing prominence afforded to the activities 
of non-state actors by those analysts of world affairs (who may or may not be 
deliberately broadening the agenda of disciplinary international relations), there is 
no discernible shift towards new global governance methods in contemporary world 
affairs with respect to controlling small arms and light weapons. While 
intergovernmental organisations, which are major protagonists of contemporary 
arms control, rely upon governments as the primary means for exerting control, 
certain statemakers also figure as significant antagonists to these control efforts, 
though these governments are not alone as intransigent actors.
By way of an explanation for these findings, the thesis contends that these 
weapons elude the international community's control not merely because the 
varying impacts generated by small arms and light weapons have not yet reached a 
magnitude sufficient to radically reform the ordering of contemporary world affairs 
in the way that, say, a potential nuclear showdown between the US and the Soviet 
Union did in the forty or so years following the Second World War. These weapons 
prove elusive primarily because the current control strategies rely upon an 
internationalist governance architecture underpinned by assumptions that are 
contested by some international actors and, incidentally, by many analysts of world 
affairs. The thesis also contends that the challenge to control small arms and light 
weapons is not so much an international security problem in search of a permanent 
solution, as it is an opportunity for members of the international community to 
further strengthen, and extend the reach of, the internationalist governance 
architecture underpinning their roles in world affairs. Imposing effective control 
over these weapons therefore poses an intractable and insurmountable challenge to 
the international community as it is currently configured. Accordingly, this thesis
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eschews those simplistic explanations blaming the existence of insufficient political 
will and the provision of inadequate resources as prime reasons for the international 
community's failure to exert adequate control over these weapons, which continue 
to be widely available throughout the world, experiencing frequent and ongoing use 
with devastating consequences of disturbing magnitude. The thesis offers an 
insightful critique of a crucial problem in contemporary world affairs, revealing the 
problem-solvers themselves are deeply implicated in the actual problem they 
address.
Thesis Structure
This thesis is divided into three parts. Although it is primarily concerned with the 
nature, form, and efficacy of the international community's major attempts to exert 
control over small arms and light weapons, Part One (consisting of a single chapter) 
introduces the challenge of controlling these tools of violence by articulating a range 
of impacts generated by their widespread availability and ongoing use. It 
simultaneously discerns key dimensions of these consequences. Although 
awareness of these impacts helps motivate those responses by the international 
community examined in Part II of this thesis, there are difficulties inherent in 
acquiring and analysing this knowledge which, in turn, compromise any 
understanding of the topic-at-hand. Concerned as much with assigning meaning to, 
or making sense out of, the complex problems which small arms and light weapons 
pose to the conduct of contemporary world affairs, as it is with revealing the 
fragmented and provisional nature of any understanding of this topic, Part I 
functions as a prologue to ensuing chapters. Unfortunately for the millions of 
victims of these weapons, these grisly and macabre consequences so far appear 
sustainable for those who, wielding power within contemporary world affairs, 
occupy the best positions from which to confront this challenge.
Consisting of four chapters, Part II explores the major ways in which members of 
the international community respond to the widespread availability and ongoing 
use of small arms and light weapons. Although not the only international actors
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seeking to craft controls over these weapons, researchers, intergovernmental 
organisations, including specifically the UN Security Council, and civil society 
organisations have attained prominence over all others and each, therefore, receives 
their own chapter in Part II of this thesis. Despite each of these actors preferring 
particular types of major responses to the challenge of controlling small arms and 
light weapons, there is a high degree of interconnectivity among these responses, 
creating what Keith Krause describes as a "tangled web of multilateral diplomacy."48 
Importantly, although each major response is unique, it also provides the basis for, 
cooperates with, or builds upon, other actors' responses. The UN Security Council, 
for example, authorises Disarmament, Demobilisation, and Reintegration (DDR) 
programmes within peacekeeping operations while, in many cases, civil society 
organisations implement and manage these programmes, the United Nations 
Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) being a good example.49
To complicate matters however, not all of these actors wish to establish controls 
with equal vigour and the distinctions among these protagonists of arms control are 
inherently unstable. Researchers can become activists —Professor Edward Laurance 
of the Monterey Institute of International Studies, for example, was central to the 
establishment of IANS A —while researchers and activists can, at least hypothetically, 
become statemakers, just as statemakers can become researchers or activists, as did 
Oscar Arias Sanchez, the former President of Costa Rica who now heads the Arias 
Foundation. Perhaps most commonly, activists such as Laura Lumpe publish 
research.
Locating a call for international action to control these weapons in research 
emerging from the mid 1990s, Chapter Two does not merely present a review 
providing a catalogue and synopsis of this literature, nor does it convey a historical 
narrative accounting for this literature's emergence and subsequent development. It
48 Keith Krause, "Multilateral Diplomacy, Norm Building, and UN Conferences: The Case of 
Small Arms and Light Weapons," Global Governance 8, no.2 (April-June 2002): 249.
49 Ryan Nichols, "Disarming Liberia: Progress and Pitfalls," in Armed and Aimless: Armed 
Groups, Guns, and Human Security in the ECOWAS Region, ed. Nicholas Florquin and Eric G. 
Berman (Geneva: Small Arms Survey, 2005), 120.
28
begins by paying close attention to five major works published by civil society 
organisations, since those works first articulate this challenge. It concludes by 
considering the yearbooks published by the Small Arms Survey in Geneva, 
Switzerland, widely recognised by most informed analysts and policymakers as pre­
eminent among so-called independent research centres. Throughout the chapter, 
this literature is distinguished according to its disseminating institution.50 It then 
analyses this literature in terms of its treatment of proliferation, transfer, possession, 
and use. The chapter demonstrates that researchers identify these major aspects of 
the small arms and light weapons topic and then explore them in more depth 
against a plethora of local, state, regional, and even global contexts. The chapter also 
identifies a broad shift of the intent informing this pool of research, from signalling 
the emergence of a new topic for analysts of world affairs and providing a profile of 
this topic as a problem for policymakers, towards attempting to better understand, 
help shape, and assess the implementation of new intergovernmental measures of 
control. This shift roughly coincides with the turn of the millennium. The thesis, 
assuming a critical and self-reflective relationship to this literature calling for action 
to control small arms and light weapons, nevertheless contributes to it.
Chapter Three examines the major initiatives seeking to control small arms and 
light weapons undertaken by intergovernmental organisations, specifically treaties 
and soft law measures developed within the UN, as well as within other regional 
and sub-regional intergovernmental organisations, such as the Organization of 
American States (OAS) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC). 
Focusing first upon the circumstances in which these agreements were negotiated, 
this chapter discusses each control measure in terms of its current status, technical 
scope, participants, and, therefore, geographic coverage. By examining the texts of 
these measures, Chapter Three assesses the degree to which these strategic 
frameworks, when considered collectively as a mosaic of responsibilities, are
50 In so doing, Chapter Two avoids treating systemically other possible sources of information, 
such as media reports and individual journal articles, because these are not deemed major, 
and avoids treating classified government assessments because these are normally not made 
available to the public.
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sufficient to control these weapons. Although domestic circumstances in one
country can either facilitate or impede negotiations in multilateral settings, the
instruments of international law examined here represent the most significant
response by governments working collaboratively as members of the international
community. These multilateral attempts to control small arms and light weapons
form part of a system of mega-conferences held by the UN and, according to former
UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali:
[These] are something new and different. They are linked. They are 
cumulative. They foster global consensus on interlocking global issues. 
They generate specific commitments. And they provide a comprehensive 
framework for international action in fields that are drastically affected by 
the negative side of globalization.51
Enabling intergovernmental measures of control is not the only major response 
of the UN to the challenge of controlling small arms and light weapons. Building on 
the aforementioned discussion of international law, Chapter Four concerns arms 
embargoes contained in UN sanction regimes, and the DDR programmes of UN 
peacekeeping operations managed under the auspices of the UN Department of 
Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), both of which are authorised by the Security 
Council. In particular, the chapter examines the processes by which these arms 
embargoes and DDR programmes arise, exploring their strategic capability and 
operational efficacy as arms control methods which, in the first case, seek to prevent 
the transfer of weapons from reaching specific actors and, in the second case, 
attempt to remove these weapons from the immediate reach of belligerents. The 
chronological focus here is restricted to those activities authorised by the UN 
Security Council since the early 1990s. DPKO does not hold an exclusive right to 
undertake DDR programmes, as Nicole Ball and Dylan Hendrickson have recently 
shown in their assessment of thirty-six DDR programmes occurring between 1992
51 Boutros Boutros-Ghali, "Global leadership after the Cold War," Foreign Affairs 75, no.2 
(March-April 1996): 88-89, as cited in Laurance and Stohl, 2; see also Edward J. Laurance, 
"Shaping Global Public Policy on Small Arms: After the UN Conference," Brown Journal of 
World Affairs 9, no.l (2002): 194.
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and 2005, more than half of which "did not take place under the auspices of a UN- 
mandated peace agreement."52
Drawing upon the Report of the Secretary-General on The Role of United Nations 
Peacekeeping in Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (2000), this chapter 
defines DDR accordingly:
Disarmament is the collection of small arms and light weapons within a 
conflict zone. It frequently entails the assembly and cantonment of 
combatants; it should also comprise the development of arms 
management programmes, including the safe storage and their final 
disposition, which may entail their destruction. De-mining may also be 
part of this process;
Demobilization refers to the process by which parties to a conflict 
begin to disband their military structures and combatants begin the 
transformation into civilian life. It generally entails registration of former 
combatants; some kind of assistance to enable them to meet their 
immediate basic needs; discharge; and transportation to their home 
communities. It may be followed by recruitment into a new, unified 
military force;
Reintegration refers to the process which allows ex-combatants and 
their families to adapt, economically and socially, to productive civilian 
life. It generally entails the provision of a package of cash or in-kind 
compensation, training and job- and income-generating projects.53
This chapter does not, however, assess the level of success attributed to arms 
embargoes and DDR programmes as components of some wider objective. Nor does 
it consider the strategy of specific mandates, that is, the matching of appropriate and 
adequate military means to achieve particular political ends. It does not evaluate the 
effectiveness of these collective actions in achieving their mandated goals pursuant
52 Nicole Ball and Dylan Hendrickson, Review of International Financing Arrangements For 
Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration, Phase 1 Report to Working Group 2 of the 
Stockholm Initiative on Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration, 2. 
<http://www.sweden.gov.Se/sb/d/4809> (accessed 31 March 2007).
53 United Nations Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on The Role of United Nations 
Peacekeeping in Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration, UN Doc. S/2000/101 (New York: 
United Nations, 2000), paragraphs 6(a), (b), and (c). Paragraph 6(c) continues: "These 
measures frequently depend for their effectiveness upon other, broader undertakings, such 
as assistance to returning refugees and internally displaced persons; economic development 
at the community and national level; infrastructure rehabilitation; truth and reconciliation 
efforts; and institutional reform. Enhancement of local capacity is often crucial for the long­
term success of reintegration."
31
with Chapters VI and VII of the UN Charter because, as Gwinyayi Albert Dzinesa 
observes, "the success of peace operations hinge on country-specific political, 
military, and economic contexts. " 54 The same could, and indeed should, be said of 
the sanction regimes imposed by the UN Security Council.55
Chapter Five, the last of Part II, explores the ways in which civil society 
organisations bpth advocate for intergovernmental measures of control and monitor 
the activities of governments in relation to their responsibilities. The breadth of 
IANSA's membership demonstrates the enormous support among civil society for a 
campaign to improve controls over small arms and light weapons. The range of 
their activities, including focus-group meetings held at the grass-roots level among 
post-conflict societies, is testimony to the intensity of this ongoing commitment. 
While particular focus is given here to IANSA's engagement with the UNPoA — 
principally because it represents IANSA's most substantial investment in 
multilateral arms control negotiations to date—its engagement with a range of other 
instruments of international law receives consideration within this chapter. Given 
that IANSA's membership is broad and its range of undertakings is sweeping, this 
chapter does not pretend to offer a comprehensive treatment of its campaign, though 
comparisons with other civil society organisations involved in multilateral arms 
control negotiations are drawn very briefly in order to both illuminate and contrast 
IANSA's conduct.
Compared to the numerous profiles and assessments relating to the problems 
posed by small arms and light weapons use, the international community's response 
to the widespread availability and ongoing use of these weapons is relatively 
understudied as a topic. To the best of my knowledge, only one scholar examines 
the role of those researchers exploring the topic of small arms and light weapons as
54 Gwinyayi Albert Dzinesa, "A Comparative Perspective of UN Peacekeeping in Angola and 
Namibia," International Peacekeeping 11, no.4 (Winter 2004): 655.
55 For studies evaluating the success of sanction regimes, see David Cortright and George A. 
Lopez with Richard W. Conroy, Jaleh Dashti-Gibson and Julia Waglar, The Sanction Decade: 
Assessing UN Strategies in the 1990s (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner, 2000), particularly 
chap. 2; see also David Cortright and George A. Lopez, Sanctions and the Search for Security: 
Challenges to UN Action (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner, 2002).
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actors of contemporary world affairs; Denise Garcia's work meditates upon these 
researchers as norm entrepreneurs.56 I am unaware of any study assessing the 
collective capability of those strategic frameworks agreed to by many governments 
within intergovernmental organisations, though some studies pay attention to 
specific measures, while others consider a range of measures but only as an 
assortment of autonomous instruments. Although Owen Greene identifies, for 
instance, those international agreements existing at the turn of the millennium, he 
refers only to controls over illicit trafficking and does not assess these in terms of 
their collective capacity to exert control.57 Where studies such as those undertaken 
by International Alert treat multiple instruments, the focus is upon governments' 
progress towards fulfilling their obligations, as opposed to an assessment of the 
frameworks' strategic capability. Similarly, while much literature takes, as its topic, 
sanction regimes or peacekeeping operations authorised by the UN Security Council, 
the control exerted over small arms and light weapons by this collective action has 
rarely been critically examined, though important papers are emerging, as evident, 
for instance, in the recent work of Robert Muggah.58 Moreover, I am aware of only 
one scholar who deals specifically and significantly with the role of civil society in 
responding to the challenge of controlling small arms and light weapons; Holger 
Anders' work only deals substantially with the United Kingdom (UK)-based 
Saferworld and its relationship with the European Union (EU) . 59 Part II of this thesis 
addresses each of these broad themes and it is by demonstrating the nascent
56 Garcia, Analyzing the Issue of Curbing the Unrestricted Availability and Proliferation of Small Arms 
and Light Weapons; Denise Garcia, "Norm Building in the Evolution of the Control of Small 
Arms in the International Agenda," Security and Defence Study Review 2 (2005 Fall): 225-255; 
Making New International Norms: The Small Arms Case. Belfer Center for Science and 
International Affairs Discussion Paper 2004—12 (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard 
University, Kennedy School of Government, 2004); and Small Arms and Security: New 
Emerging International Norms (New York: Routledge, 2006).
57 Refer to Owen Greene, "Examining international responses to illicit trafficking," Crime, Law & 
Social Change 33 (2002).
58 Refer to fn.2.
59 Holger Anders, "The Role of Non-State Actors in the European Small Arms Regime,"
Working Paper No.6 <http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/peace/tmp/publications/papers/
psp6.pdf> (accessed 31 March 2007); and also "NGOs and the Shaping of the European 
Controls on Small Arms Exports," in Nezu Threats and New Actors in International Security, ed. 
Elke Krahmann (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 177-197.
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interconnectivity among the major strategies for, and approaches toward, controlling 
these weapons that the thesis reveals its originality.
Part IPs focus on the international community's major responses to this challenge 
is put into relief by Part III, shifting its focus towards those international actors who 
are able to mitigate, resist, and elude the intended effects of those intergovernmental 
measures of control and UN Security Council resolutions. While Peter Batchelor and 
Keith Krause observe that "documents themselves, no matter how well crafted, do 
not themselves destroy surplus weapons, secure stockpiles, punish illicit traffickers, 
or increase the security of vulnerable groups, " 60 the implementation of those 
measures and resolutions has also been as fragmentary as it has been sporadic. 
Moreover, despite some significant overlaps, gaps among the responses examined in 
Part II preclude sufficient geographic coverage of potential 'flashpoints' and actual 
conflict 'hotspots,' let alone global coverage. Certain international actors deliberately 
sustain the challenge of controlling small arms and light weapons by exploiting the 
operational weaknesses enshrined in these particular responses and the limitations 
inherent in the institutions from which these responses emerge. Even though it is 
not possible to provide an accurate and uncontested assessment of the quantities of 
weapons produced, traded, used, collected, and deactivated in the world over the 
past two decades, identifying the particular ways in which certain international 
actors evade existing major controls exposes some of the more pressing 
shortcomings of the international community's response to the challenge of 
controlling small arms and light weapons.
Chapter Six is concerned with the continued widespread availability of these 
weapons during an era when the processes of globalisation intensify. Sustaining the 
challenge of controlling small arms and light weapons by contributing to the 
availability of these weapons, firms and brokers help erode much of the potential 
impact of the international community's decisive responses. The chapter identifies 
particular ways in which the captains of small arms industry and arms brokers are
60 Small Arms Survey, Small Arms Survey 2002: Counting the Human Cost (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2002), 4.
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able to mitigate, resist, or elude an emerging set of interrelated frameworks 
comprising of treaties, soft law measures, and UN arms embargoes. These 
frameworks are designed specifically in order to help govern the proliferation and 
transfer of these weapons, including production from organised manufacture and 
informal craft, as well as the legal trade among governments, while combating 
black-market trafficking. From the various figures relating to weapons production 
and trade which are available, it seems that a killing is being made in more ways 
than one.
The chapter does not, however, speculate upon the specific reasons motivating 
individual producers and brokers to supply these weapons. Similarly, the following 
chapter does not consider the specific reasons motivating chief users of these 
weapons to retain their arms —a very significant area of further exploration which 
would, of course, require a much larger and far more complex set of research 
questions than those which inform this thesis—because, as an ICRC publication 
remarks, the "resort to arms is as ancient as many of the grievances over which some 
conflict are fought. " 61 They are, presumably, also as varied.
Concerned with the ongoing use of these weapons, Chapter Seven identifies 
particular ways in which these weapons' chief users react against the emerging 
controls over the possession of these weapons which find expression either as 
instruments of international law or as DDR programmes administered by UN 
peacekeeping operations. Because the previous chapter explores the various ways in 
which international arms transfers occur in spite of the emerging controls over them, 
this chapter gives focus to the local procurement of these weapons by non-state 
armed groups for immediate, ongoing, and future use, as well as those weapons 
held as government arsenals, civilian stockpiles, and informal caches. Although 
users of small arms and light weapons are, perhaps, heterogeneous, a number of key 
user-types are discernible for analytical purposes: militaries, constabularies, private
61 International Committee of the Red Cross, Arms Availability and the Situation of Civilians in 
Armed Conflict: a study presented by the ICRC (Geneva: International Committee of the Red 
Cross, 1995), 1.
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security firms, civilians, organised crime groups, and non-state armed groups — 
though these classifications are not exhaustive in themselves. In practice, however, 
these distinctions become blurred as, for example, combatants become criminals 
when the rule of law is established or restored. These chief users are, therefore, 
described here as 'brothers in arms' despite the sometimes competing interests each 
pursues.
Like Part II, elements of Part III of this thesis are innovative. Much literature, 
profiling the various roles that firms and brokers play in making small arms and 
light weapons widely available, has been conducted and circulated by various 
researchers.62 Similarly, the pool of published research elaborating a plethora of 
grisly, and often macabre, consequences following the ongoing use of these weapons 
is already extensive and continues to grow .63 Yet significantly less literature
62 In particular, see: Small Arms Survey, "Small Arms, Big Business: Products and Producers," 
Small Arms Survey 2001: Profiling the Problem (Geneva: Small Arms Survey, 2001), 7-57; Small 
Arms Survey, "Fuelling the Flames: Brokers and Transport Agents in the Illicit Trade," Small 
Arms Survey 2001: Profiling the Problem (Geneva: Small Arms Survey, 2001), 95-139; Small 
Arms Survey, "A Sick or Dying Industry? Products and Producers," Small Arms Survey 2002: 
Counting the Human Cost (Geneva: Small Arms Survey, 2002), 9-61; Small Arms Survey, 
"Workshops and Factories: Products and Producers," Small Arms Survey 2003: Development 
Denied (Geneva: Small Arms Survey, 2003), 9-55; Small Arms Survey, "Continuity and 
Change: Products and Producers," Small Arms Survey 2004: Rights at Risk (Geneva: Small 
Arms Survey, 2004), 7-41; Small Arms Survey, "Targeting the Middlemen: Controlling 
Brokering Activities," Small Arms Survey 2004: Rights at Risk (Geneva: Small Arms Survey, 
2004), 141-171; Small Arms Survey, "Unpacking Production: The Small Arms Industry," Small 
Arms Survey 2005: Weapons at War (Geneva: Small Arms Survey, 2005), 39-69; Small Arms 
Survey, "Sourcing the Tools of War: Small Arms Supplies to Conflict Zones," Small Arms 
Survey 2005: Weapons at War (Geneva: Small Arms Survey, 2005), 159-177.
63 In particular, see: Small Arms Survey, "After the Smoke Clears: Assessing the Effects of Small 
Arms Availability," Small Arms Survey 2001: Profiling the Problem (Geneva: Small Arms 
Survey, 2001), 197-249; Small Arms Survey, "Caught in the Crossfire: The Humanitarian 
Impacts of Small Arms," Small Arms Survey 2002: Counting the Human Cost (Geneva: Small 
Arms Survey, 2002), 155-201; Small Arms Survey, "Obstructing Development: The Effects of 
Small Arms on Human Development," Small Arms Survey 2003: Development Denied (Geneva: 
Small Arms Survey, 2003) 125-165; Small Arms Survey, "A Common Tool: Firearms, 
Violence, and Crime," Small Arms Survey 2004: Rights at Risk (Geneva: Small Arms Survey, 
2004), 173-211; Small Arms Survey, "Violent Exchanges: The Use of Small Arms in Conflict," 
Small Arms Survey 2005: Weapons at War (Geneva: Small Arms Survey, 2005), 179-203; Small 
Arms Survey, "Behind the Numbers: Small Arms and Conflict Deaths," Small Arms Survey 
2005: Weapons at War (Geneva: Small Arms Survey, 2005), 229-265; Cate Buchanan and 
Mireille Widmer, Putting Guns in their Place: A Resource Pack for Two Years of Action by 
Humanitarian Agencies (Geneva: Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, 2004); Cate Buchanan, 
Putting People First: Human Security Perspectives on Small Arms Availability and Misuse (Geneva:
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concerns the adverse effect that these international actors have on the international 
community's major responses. This is a topic which, in and of itself, ought to be an 
area of concern for analysts and policymakers alike because, while few firms are 
closely involved in the multilateral negotiation of various measures of control, the 
ongoing commercial practices of firms and brokers, and the ways in which chief 
users of these weapons retain their arms for immediate use, seriously erode the 
intended effects of those control measures. Part III also demonstrates that the 
distinction by which intergovernmental organisations, civil society organisations, 
and researchers are denoted as protagonists, and producers, brokers, and users of 
small arms and light weapons are denoted as their antagonists, is both naive and too 
simplistic.
This thesis concludes with a very brief chapter, resembling an epilogue, which 
contends that the challenge of controlling small arms and light weapons will prove 
intractable and insurmountable to the international community, at least as it is 
currently configured. While the international community's major responses to this 
challenge cohere around a particular notion of the political best understood as 
internationalism, this belief in internationalism is neither universal, nor absolute. In 
other words, there is no common consensus concerning the primacy of governments 
in contemporary world affairs, where governments cooperate in order to obtain 
collective advantage. Rather, the ongoing contest over the notion of the political not 
only sustains this challenge, but also informs the dynamics of international security, 
which itself stimulates contemporary world affairs. Because explanations blaming 
inadequate political will and insufficient resources construe this challenge in 
problem-solving terms without due regard to the deep complicity of the problem- 
solvers themselves, thereby serving the purposes of those seeking to strengthen the 
status quo, they are eschewed here as suspect.
Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, 2003); Cate Buchanan and Robert Muggah, No Relief: 
Surveying the Effects of Gun Violence on Humanitarian and Development Personnel (Geneva: 
Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue and the Small Arms Survey, 2005); Thomas Jackson, 
Nicholas Marsh, Taylor Owen, and Anne Turin, Who Takes the Bullet? The Impact of Armed 
Violence (Oslo: Norwegian Church Aid and the International Peace Research Institute, 2005.
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Before this thesis considers the major responses of the international 
community—namely, the burgeoning literature of the research community, the 
various measures of control negotiated multilaterally within intergovernmental 
organisations, the growing number of arms embargoes and DDR programmes 
authorised by the UN Security Council, and the sustained campaigning of civil 
society organisations—its prologue introduces the challenge of controlling small 
arms and light weapons by conveying the magnitude of violence these weapons 
bring to contemporary world affairs and by identifying the key dimensions of this 
violence. And this violence is of a magnitude that ought to disturb those analysts 
and policymakers concerned with contemporary conflict and international security.
PARTI
P rologue
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ENTER,
SUBALTERN KILLERS
This chapter describes a myriad of impacts associated with the widespread 
availability and ongoing use of small arms and light weapons. These impacts, which 
are manifest for reasons that are highly varied, dynamic, and historically contingent, 
visit devastation upon many communities in locales spread unevenly around the 
world. The legacies of armed violence will continue to haunt millions of victims for 
many years to come. Instead of presenting a series of case studies which focus 
exclusively upon a particular locale, country, or broader geographic region, this 
chapter draws its examples from across a broad range of settings, illustrating that 
the deleterious effects of these weapons register locally and regionally, affect affluent 
and developing societies, and have immediate presence and lasting affect. These 
effects demonstrate that small arms and light weapons can, moreover, promote 
security for some and enhance insecurity for others. While this chapter merely 
conveys one particular version of the countless impacts caused by these weapons, it 
is germane to analysts and policymakers alike because it discerns the key 
dimensions of this armed violence: the politico-strategic, politico-economic, and 
politico-social dimensions of these impacts attract differing degrees of attention from 
members of the international community as they respond to the challenge of 
controlling small arms and light weapons.
The chapter also argues that empirical analysis claiming to measure and compare 
the multifarious consequences following the availability and use of these weapons 
will, however, be just as provisional and fragmentary as empirical analysis exploring 
any of this challenge's major aspects, that is, the proliferation, transfer, possession, 
collection, and deactivation of this weaponry. Yet the epistemic anxiety surrounding 
this topic does not necessarily preclude high-level policy choices, as even a cursory 
awareness of these impacts helps motivate and sustain those responses of the 
international community explored in Part II of this thesis.
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Some important members of the international community remain untroubled by
their knowledge of these impacts' magnitude. (In fact, certain international actors
are, as Part III of this thesis demonstrates, directly responsible for the widespread
availability and ongoing use of these weapons.) The reasons for this have more to
do with the decisive efforts emboldening world order and less to do with attempts at
ameliorating the turbulence of world disorder, though both are obviously not
unrelated. According to Aaron Karp:
The small arms issue arose from a broad desire to do something to ease 
the carnage of global crime, ethnic strife, and secessionist warfare. It also 
emerged as part of a broader, mostly European project to change the rules 
of international security and international politics after the end of the 
Cold War, one that guided European foreign policy throughout the 1990s. 
Although this project was rarely articulated explicitly, its goals were clear 
enough. It sought to rid the world of old-fashion excesses of national 
interests and power politics, to open the policy process to the broadest 
and strongest possible consensus, and to elevate the sovereignty of the 
individual above the traditional sovereignty of the nation-state. In 
practical terms, this project stressed the role of universally accepted 
principles as the only legitimate basis for official action....The small arms 
process developed in this milieu but never fully become part of it.1
The grand project to reconfigure contemporary world order in the aftermath of the 
Cold War remains incomplete. In spite of all the violence, havoc, misery, and 
insecurity these tools of violence enable, their cumulative effects merely disturb the 
periphery of the existing internationalist governance architecture, without ever 
really threatening its core. These cumulative effects, moreover, not only remain 
insufficient to reorder contemporary world affairs, but also represent an ongoing 
opportunity for the international community to strengthen an internationalist 
orthodoxy asserted as a prime world-ordering principle through its major responses 
to the challenge of controlling these weapons.
1 Aaron Karp, "Laudable Failure," SAIS Review XXII, no.l (Winter-Spring 2002): 182.
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Epistemic Anxiety
An authoritative definition of small arms and light weapons has so far eluded the 
international community. A single definition of small arms and light weapons has 
not yet become authoritative among researchers, governments, intergovernmental 
organisations, and civil society organisations because, while largely consistent 
among treaty law, there are important differences in definitions used in soft law 
measures, sanctions regimes, and peacekeeping operations, as well as important 
nuances among the work of various researchers and members of civil society 
organisations using this term. Pro-gun lobbyists, furthermore, seek to distinguish 
military-style weapons from civilian sporting and hunting guns. Governments are 
often keen to distinguish legal weapons from illicit, that is, government-authorised 
weapons from those held without such authorisation. Some definitions draw upon 
the intended utility of these weapons, with certain types of weapons designated, for 
example, as military tools that can be carried by an infantryman, a pack animal, or a 
light vehicle.2 These weapons are distinguished from major military weapons, such 
as tanks and aircraft, because the latter 'Typically require an elaborate logistical and 
maintenance capability that can only be provided by professional military 
organizations with sufficient technical experience/ ' 3 Moreover, according to Pericles 
Gasparani Alves, further distinction occurs among illicit small arms and light 
weapons as:
some experts are concerned with the use of small arms in street crime as it 
relates to the safety of the public: theirs is the so-called nationalist 
approach which mostly excludes a discussion on light weapons and the 
security of States. Other experts look at firearms from the point of State 
security: these are the internationalists who consider illicit trafficking to be 
a threat caused by the access of guerrilla and insurgency groups to small
2 Aaron Karp, "Small Arms—The New Major Weapons," in Lethal Commerce: The Global Trade 
in Small Arms and Light Weapons, eds. Jeffrey Boutwell, Michael T. Klare, and Laura W. Reed 
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: Committee on International Security Studies, American 
Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1995), 23-4.
3 Michael T. Klare, "The Global Trade in Light Weapons and the International System in the 
Post-Cold War Era," in Lethal Commerce: The Global Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons, 
eds. Jeffrey Boutwell, Michael T. Klare, and Laura W. Reed (Cambridge, Massachusetts: 
Committee on International Security Studies, American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1995), 
33.
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arms and light weapons. The internationalists rarely address the 
consequences of illicit trafficking for the safety of a population, only 
considering them when they threaten the existence of States, or if they 
involve large-scale killing such as genocide.4
More often, however, definitions assert a technical classification based upon the 
weapons actually used during civil war and internal conflict.5 In any case, the 
definition ascribed to items subject to control not only has significance for analysts 
considering them, but also has important military, economic, and social implications 
for the policymakers agreeing to them.
Although contested, the following definition, cited by the UN Panel of
Governmental Experts on Small Arms, has increasingly gathered authority among
officials, activists, and researchers, and is, therefore, used to underpin this thesis:
Small arms: revolvers and self-loading pistols; rifles and carbines; 
submachine guns; assault rifles; and light machine guns.
Light weapons: heavy machine guns; hand-held under-barrel and 
mounted grenade launchers; portable anti-aircraft guns; portable anti­
tank guns; recoilless rifles; portable launchers of anti-tank missile and 
rocket systems; portable launchers of anti-aircraft missile systems; 
mortars of calibres of less than 100mm.
Ammunition and explosives: cartridges (rounds) for small arms; shells 
and missiles for light weapons; mobile containers with missiles or shells 
for single-action anti-aircraft and anti-tank systems; anti-personnel and 
anti-tank hand grenades; landmines; explosives.6
Ammunition is considered important here because it is, of course, a vital ingredient 
for ongoing use.7 Taking a broad and inclusive view, this thesis also considers 
archaic, crude, and homemade weapons of similar propulsion capability, but 
excludes newly developed non-lethal weapons because, instead of killing, these 
weapons are "explicitly designed and primarily employed so as to incapacitate 
personnel or material while minimising fatalities, permanent injury to personnel,
4 Pericles Gaspami Alves, Illicit Trafficking in Firearms: Prevention and Combat in Rio de Janeiro, 
Brazil: A National, Regional, and Global Issue (Geneva: United Nations Institute for 
Disarmament Research, 2000), 1.
5 Karp, "Small Arms—The New Major Weapons," 24.
6 United Nations General Assembly, Report of the Panel of Governmental Experts on Small Arms, 
UN Doc. A/52/298 (New York: United Nations, 1997), paragraph 26.
7 For a recent study on the importance of ammunition, refer to Stephanie Pezard and Holger 
Anders, Targeting Ammunition: A  Primer (Geneva: Small Arms Survey, 2006).
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and undesired damage to property and the environment. " 8 The qualified success of 
the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti- 
Personnel Mines and their Destruction (Ottawa Treaty) has discouraged, by and large, 
the inclusion of anti-personnel landmines in discussions of small arms and light 
weapons despite representing a sub-category in the abovementioned definition:9 
accordingly, this thesis also excludes treatment of landmines as either small arms or 
light weapons.
Notwithstanding the uncertainty surrounding the precise items subject to 
control, policymakers confronting the challenge of controlling small arms and light 
weapons must necessarily address the following major aspects, each of which are 
identified by those researchers whose work is examined in the following chapter: 
proliferation in terms of both organised manufacture and casual craft; transfers in 
terms of legal trade, grey transfers, and trafficking; possession in terms of existing 
stockpiles, civilian ownership, and informal caches; collection in terms of civic-based 
surrender campaigns and disarmament initiatives; and the deactivation of this 
weaponry. For this challenge to be overcome, all of these aspects must be addressed 
in a comprehensive, coordinated, and holistic manner. Enhanced collection 
processes will have limited effect if the production of weapons remains 
unrestrained, for example. Similarly, strict controls over stockpiles will have limited 
effect if the trafficking of these weapons continues unabated.
Any meaningful comprehension of the nature and extent of the challenge of 
controlling small arms and light weapons is, however, premised upon inconsistent, 
incomplete, and at times unreliable information. There are a number of significant 
impediments that frustrate attempts to obtain accurate, reliable, and timely sources
8 Small Arms Survey, Small Arms Survey 2003: Development Denied (Oxford, Oxford University 
Press, 2003), 25.
9 United Nations General Assembly, Report of the Panel of Governmental Experts on Small Arms, 
paragraph 31.
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of primary data regarding each of those major aspects of the small arms and light 
weapons challenge.10
Some governments are, for instance, reluctant to release detailed information 
relating to the quantities of weapons legitimately produced within their jurisdiction. 
Weapons produced either by manufacturers without licence or through informal 
craft elude capture by reporting processes covering industrial sectors. Where the 
criminialisation of weapons production without licence involves artisan practice, as 
in Ghana, guilds and associated networks become even more secretive.* 11 Armed 
groups possessing productive capacity, including insurgents, organised criminals, 
and terrorists,12 are even less likely to publicise the extent of the arsenals which they 
make. Knowledge of the proliferation of these weapons is, therefore, fragmented 
and provisional. The absence of both official and unofficial information relating to 
local guilds, companies, countries, and the value and volume of global production, 
greatly inhibits any meaningful analysis of this aspect.13 This does not appear, 
however, to curtail many highly varied "best estimates' of local, national, regional, or 
global proliferation.
Similarly, obtaining accurate, reliable, and comparable information relating to 
weapons transfers is made difficult by the absence of an international standard 
relating to the collection and compilation of official trade-related information. 
Although some international agreements with provisions for collecting and 
compiling transfer-related information exist, they lack universal membership. The 
Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods 
and Technologies (Wassenaar Arrangement), for example, involves only 33
10 Maria Haug, Martin Langvandslien, Lora Lumpe, and Nicholas Marsh, Shining a Light on 
Small Arms Exports: The Record of State Transparency, Occasional Paper no. 4 (Geneva: Small 
Arms Survey and the Norwegian Initiative on Small Arms Transfers, 2002), 2.
11 Emmanuel Kwesi Aning, "The Anatomy of Ghana's Secret Arms Industry," in Armed and 
Aimless: Armed Groups, Guns, and Human Security in the ECOWAS Region, eds., Nicholas 
Florquin and Eric G. Berman (Geneva: Small Arms Survey, 2005), 85.
12 David Capie, "Armed Groups, Weapons Avaliability and Misuse: An Overview of the Issues 
and Options for Action," Background Paper for a Meeting Organized by the Centre for 
Humanitarian Dialogue, in advance of the Sixth Meeting of the Human Security Network, 25 
May 2004, 6 <http://www.armedgroups.org/images/stories/pdfs/capiebamakopaper061004 
pdf> (accessed 26 August 2005).
13 Small Arms Survey, Small Arms Survey 2001, 8.
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governments, though this does include all major arms exporters except the Peoples' 
Republic of China (PRC). Moreover, although this agreement prompts participating 
governments to exchange trade-related information among officials, this information 
is not publicly available because some governments claim a privilege to withhold 
information in order to preserve their commercial-in-confidence relationships with 
captains of industry. Hence, most transfers occurring between governments as 
trade, aid, or gifts, and between a government and a non-state actor as clandestine 
transfers, routinely evade notice and elude scrutiny unless otherwise detected and 
publicised. Where trade-related information is made available to the public, its 
release can cast an unfavourable light upon those western democracies which have 
some provision for transparency. This bias of transparency renders the US arms 
trade an expedient subject of analysis and, by extension, target of criticism, 
especially when compared to, for example, the Chinese arms trade about which little 
is publicly known. To complicate assessments, "[virtually every illicit small arms 
that is used in conflict or criminal activity began its life as a legally produced and 
traded weapon, at some point slipping into the illicit circuit. " 14
As is common among analyses relating to trafficking and so-called black market 
activities, it is extremely difficult to ascertain precise flows of these weapons with 
any degree of accuracy and certainty, as professional brokers and their recipients 
deliberately conceal their commercial affairs. Klare and Anderson, for example, 
appreciate that their "ability to reach an understanding of the black-market trade 
requires [them] to rely on people's mistakes; since [they] do not know the ratio of 
successful to unsuccessful transactions, it is impossible to know the full extent of 
illegal gun-running . " 15 Loosely signalling the extent of trafficking, their approach 
cannot be regarded as authoritative because it does not transcend the limitations 
inherent in information that has been collected without the reporting and 
verification processes usually associated with regulated commercial trade. The 
unregulated recycling of these weapons from conflict to conflict also hinders
14 Krause, 249.
15 Michael T. Klare and David Andersen, A  Scourge of Guns: The Diffusion of Small Arms and Light 
Weapons in Latin America (Washington, D.C.: Federation of American Scientists, 1996), 58.
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accurate assessments of flows. While few governments maintain accurate and up-to-
date information on the legitimate trade of small arms and light weapons occurring
within or across their borders, the difficulty encountered when seeking accurate,
reliable, and timely information on the trafficking of these weapons is more intense.
Consequently, analysts like Klare and Anderson rely heavily upon guesswork,
sometimes based on elaborate extrapolation of known quantities, in order to
ascertain the correlation between those weapons detected during monitoring activity
and/or seized during enforcement operations, and the wider circulation of those
weapons available through black markets. These kinds of estimates, while
exhibiting great accuracy, at the same time lack verifiability, veracity, and, therefore,
a measure of reliability. For those dealing directly with the consequences of
weapons use, however, distinctions between legal and illicit transfers are
meaningless. Michael Crowley and Greg Puley, for instance, explain the following:
From the perspective of the triage doctor or the human rights monitor, 
there is no difference between a chest wound inflicted on a civilian by a 
bullet acquired through the so-called licit trade, and that caused by a 
bullet acquired through the so-called illicit trade. To those who mend 
tissues and remove bone fragments, a chest wound is a chest wound, and 
the distinction based on the administrative or legal status of the weapon 
used to cause it, is irrelevant to their fundamental concern for human 
rights, and to their dedication to an ethic of prevention.16
While initiatives towards global, regional, and national registers of small arms 
and light weapons have been proposed, governments have so far been reluctant to 
release publicly any specific details relating to their military and constabulary 
arsenals, presumably out of fear that such publicity might undermine either national 
security or the government's ability to enforce the rule of law within its area of 
jurisdiction; or perhaps because it might do both. In some countries, citizens have 
shown reluctance to register their weapons and, in many countries, there is little in
16 Michael Crowley and Greg Puley, "The Framework Convention on International Arms 
Transfers: Basis for an International Campaign?" Paper presented at the conference "Small 
Arms and the Humanitarian Community: Developing a Strategy for Action," held in Nairobi, 
18-20 November 2001, convened by the Humanitarian Coalition on Small Arms, 
<http://www.arias.or.cr/fundarias/cpr/armslaw/nairobi-speech.html> (accessed 20 June 2004).
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the way of licensing civilian possession of these weapons. Informal caches 
concealed from authorities in conflict theatres or post-conflict settings also evade 
accountability.
More crucially for this thesis, the absence of baseline information necessarily 
frustrates attempts to measure and evaluate the overall effectiveness of controls over 
small arms and light weapons. In circumstances where reporting of weapons 
collection occurs, the absence of baseline information relating to the availability of 
weapons in the immediate vicinity obscures, in a fundamental way, any sense of 
progress. It does so regardless of how impressive the reported rate of confiscation 
and aggregate number of weapons seized might first appear to be. Once baseline 
estimates have been established and disarmament programmes are underway, it 
remains very difficult to determine the quantity of weapons crossing porous borders 
and then used in other conflicts, though such recycling undoubtedly occurs. In some 
cases, such as exemplified by the buy-back scheme implemented in Northern 
Afghanistan, disarmament processes are not only easily undermined, but also 
contribute to deteriorating security conditions because they provide financial 
opportunities enabling combatants and criminals to re-arm, improving the quality, if 
not quantity, of their weaponry. This situation was not helped when the 
government “released scant information regarding the procedures and methodology 
utilized in the collection process, a lack of transparency that has generated 
scepticism . " 17 When inward weapons flows persist and are unrestrained, figures 
relating to disarmament are rendered less meaningful, if not meaningless. It is, 
therefore, difficult to know with any degree of certainty the extent to which DDR 
programmes included in UN peacekeeping operations are successful in collecting 
small arms and light weapons within their specific area of operations. Information 
gathered from those weapons collected by peacekeepers and their constabulary
17 Mark Sedra, Challenging the Warlord Culture: Security Sector Reform in Post-Taliban Afghanistan, 
Paper no.25 (Bonn: Bonn International Center for Conversion, 2002), 38.
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components is useful however, but only as an indicator of the weapons which are 
available and used in that immediate vicinity.18
Attempts to measure the effectiveness of an arms embargo at preventing 
weapons from reaching a specific actor might also be frustrated by the absence of 
baseline information, though quantifying the amount of weapon-transfers deterred 
is unfeasible in a practical sense. Attempts to measure the effectiveness of those 
instruments of international law designed to combat the illicit trafficking of these 
weapons are not immune from these concerns either. In this light, law-enforcement 
action proves somewhat less useful as a means by which the extent of illegal 
activities can be estimated, than it is a useful way of better knowing about these 
unauthorised dealings. However, in spite of the absence of baseline information 
regarding the total quantity of weapons available for immediate use obscuring the 
relative importance of those weapons collected and/or deactivated, members of the 
international community continue resorting to DDR programmes, arms embargoes, 
and intergovernmental measures of control as the primary methods of exerting 
control over these weapons. To be sure, the epistemic anxiety surrounding the 
challenge of controlling small arms and light weapons has not curtailed high-level 
policy choices.
Given the paucity of available data, and the lack of veracity concerning the data 
that is available, it is not yet possible—indeed, it might never be possible—to 
conduct a meaningful empirical analysis which accurately assesses the collective 
impact of the various attempts by the international community to exert control over 
small arms and light weapons. Furthermore, even if such data were available 
(which would, by necessity, include information relating not only to the quantities of 
weapons collected and deactivated, but also to the precise amounts of these weapons 
produced, transferred, and possessed both legally and illicitly), and even if that data 
could be compared over time —across, for instance, the duration of the Cold War up 
until the present day—fluctuations and shifts signalled by this data series could,
18 Anna Khakee and Nicolas Florquin, Kosovo and the Gun: A Baseline Assessment of Small Arms
and Light Weapons in Kosovo, Special Report no.3 (Geneva: United Nations Development
Programme and Small Arms Survey, 2003), 17.
49
perhaps, be attributed to factors that are not understood as direct or indirect 
outcomes of these controls attempts. For example, the intensification of 
globalisation and its effect on economic boom-and-bust cycles could plausibly 
account for a downturn in production rates, rather than attributing such a decline to 
controls negotiated at multilateral conferences. Plausible too is the suggestion that 
the tightening of international financial regulations through institutions, such as the 
Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD), in order to 
combat organised criminals, terrorists, and others who launder money, has a 
serendipitous effect on combating the nefarious activities of arms brokers. The 
empirical adventures required to support these alternative explanations lie well 
beyond the scope and competency of this thesis, however.
Yet the lack of data relating to the precise quantities of small arms and light 
weapons currently produced, transferred, possessed, collected, and deactivated, 
precludes neither exploring the major ways in which the international community 
seeks to control these weapons, nor identifying the particular ways in which these 
controls are deliberately weakened and sometimes undermined by certain members 
of the international community claiming to confront this challenge. Nor, for that 
matter, does this lack of available data preclude examining the ways in which the 
intended effects of those controls are easily mitigated, resisted, and eluded by those 
international actors sustaining this challenge. In fact, the lack of available, accurate, 
and reliable quantitative data makes these tasks all the more necessary and, as 
mentioned in the introduction, these tasks are undertaken in Parts II and III of this 
thesis, respectively.
Here, then, much of the information on the topic of small arms and light 
weapons collected by researchers, activists belonging to civil society organisations, 
and on behalf of governments and intergovernmental organisations, is often 
inconsistent, incomplete, and unreliable. Much of this information is also 
incompatible and cannot, therefore, be used as the basis for comparative analysis. 
Even the Small Arms Survey concedes that "the total number and global distribution 
of small arms remains one of the greatest enigmas in the field of international peace
5 0
and security/ ' 19 All this is not to say, however, that members of the international 
community cannot develop an understanding of the challenge through a 
consideration of its major aspects, but rather, that any meaningful comprehension 
ought to acknowledge the limitations of this sort of information and recognise the 
uncertainty —indeed, the epistemic anxiety —it provokes for those seeking to exert 
control over these weapons. This epistemic anxiety should concern not just 
government officials and representatives of intergovernmental organisations, but all 
those members of the international community helping to compose controls over 
these weapons.20 Without greater transparency of government-authorised activities, 
however, analysts will be precluded from better comprehending the topic they 
describe, and policymakers will be inhibited from effectively confronting the 
challenge posed by the widespread availability and ongoing use of these weapons. 
The latter is especially so since controlling these weapons requires an holistic 
approach simultaneously addressing each of its major aspects against the increasing 
geographic spread of these weapons, distributed not only in locations of intense use 
described as 'hotspots/ but also in those areas through which these weapons transit. 
Even though the contrast between Parts II and III of this thesis suggests that the 
international community's major responses to these major aspects are anything but 
comprehensive and somewhat less than well-coordinated, the strategies for, and 
approaches toward, controlling these weapons do, however, reveal a nascent 
interconnectivity as the relationships among certain members of the international 
community mature.
19
20
Small Arms Survey, Small Arms Survey 2001, 60.
Much of the empirical evidence informing this thesis is, for example, hearsay, since it is 
expressed in others' accounts and has not been collected first-hand.
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Carnival of Horror
The underreporting of crime involving small arms and light weapons to 
authorities, 21 and the poor recording processes of those authorities, hinders 
assessments of the impacts generated by these weapons. Similarly, many incidents 
of human rights violations involving these weapons probably go unreported 
because the victims are dead and witnesses fearful of recriminatory violence. 
Mortality rates provided by combatants are especially susceptible to inflation and 
deflation as figures are used as a means of political manoeuvring.22 Information 
relating to the use of firearms to incite violence is rarely collected by governments 
and, as Phillip Alpers and Conor Tywford recently discovered in the Pacific, 
"sometimes the only way to ascertain the relative level of firearms-related violence 
in a community is to prevail upon the institutional memory of the interviewee/ ' 23 
The indirect use of these weapons has serious consequences too, even if they are, as 
Muggah contends, "deeply entrenched and often difficult to discern. " 24 For 
example, while the most common tools of violence used during the Rwandan 
genocide were machetes and other farming implements, small arms and light 
weapons were ubiquitous companions to the human carnage.
Interstices among official data, and the anecdotal nature of data collected first­
hand by researchers and contained in media reports, undermine attempts to 
comprehensively map these impacts. The results of any attempt at such a mapping 
process will likely be incomplete, fragmented and, ultimately, futile, except as an 
indicator of weapons availability. Since the location and extent of the world's small 
arms and light weapons stockpiles remain unknown, it has so far proven unfeasible 
to establish precise linkages between the extent of their widespread availability and
21 William Godnick, with Robert Muggah and Camilla Waszink, Stray Bullets: The Impact of 
Small Arms Misuse in Central America, Occasional Paper no.5 (Geneva: Small Arms Survey, 
2002), vii.
22 Small Arms Survey, Small Arms Survey 2005: Weapons at War (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press), 229.
23 Phillip Alpers and Conor Twyford, Small Arms in the Pacific, Occasional Paper no.8 (Geneva: 
Small Arms Survey, 2003), 31.
24 Muggah, "No Magic Bullet," 241.
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the prevalence and intensity of their ongoing use, though most analysts and 
policymakers agree that such a link exists.
Measuring these various impacts also proves complicated. At the heart of this 
complexity lies a question of appropriate methodology. Quantitative statistics 
concerning morbidity rates, injury, and displacement are common, pervading the 
growing body of literature focusing on small arms and light weapons. The Small 
Arms Survey estimates, for example, that these weapons are implicated in about 
500,000 deaths each year, that is, more than 1,300 deaths per day.25 The UN 
estimates that, by 1996, 35 million people were confronted by internal conflict, most 
of which occur in the world's poorest countries.26 The epistemological approach to 
collecting these kinds of qualitative statistics is primarily distal, by which I mean 
"stepping back to look at world affairs in objectifying terms."27 However, this 
approach and, more significantly, the quantitative statistics it often produces, tend to 
mask the heterogeneous ways in which these deaths occur and the uneven 
geographic distribution of these deaths in locales throughout the world. Such an 
approach also often distorts so-called lived experiences because statistics cannot 
aptly portray the misery, horror, and squalor inflicted upon those who become the 
victims of those wielding these tools of violence.
On the other hand, a qualitative approach, sensitive to the personal experiences
of small arms victims, relies upon a proximal epistemology, by which I mean
engaging in world affairs, not as neutral observers, but as participants of the subject
under regard in the way that anthropologists do.28 According to Beatrice Pouligny:
an ethno-psychiatric approach is necessary in order to avoid frameworks 
and tools which may be totally alien to local forms and logics of social 
ties, their transformations, and above all, the cultural strategies of dealing 
with death, mourning, and suffering. As has been argued by some 
psychiatrists, it makes little sense to speak of trauma, in the psychiatric or 
diagnostic sense, outside precise historical cultural and social contexts. 
When violence and fear have become a way of life, when war has become
25 Small Arms Survey, Small Arms Survey 2001,1.
26 United Nations General Assembly, Report of the Panel of Governmental Experts on Small Arms, 
paragraph 15.
27 Pettman, 155.
28 Ibid, 13.
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an ordinary condition and no longer exceptional, everyday life has been 
changed. Such a devastating fragmentation of social ties and individual 
conscience may contribute to the paralysis of social rehabilitation as well 
as of peace building intervention, even after war is supposed to be over. 
In other words, it may obstruct the reconstruction of a possible everyday 
life in communities that have lived through a long siege of violence and 
poverty. It explains why it is normally not possible to think about 
reintegration of former combatants outside of the community 
frameworks.29
Like the distal approach, a proximal epistemology has limits too. Again Pouligny is 
instructive here not only when she warns of the difficulties presented "by 
contradictory memories and accounts that differ or are unspeakable or even 
impossible to reconstruct....When a field worker does not know what he is 
'witnessing/ he or she might tend to (re)present an undifferentiated round of 
suffering, a carnival of horror, that will exclude any consideration of its political or 
social dimensions," but also because she signals that field workers "may also be 
tempted to 'rework' the account in order to overlay her own 'authentic' version of 
the facts, or may quite simply construct her own narrative. There is also a risk that 
this version or narrative might 'simplify' situations that are highly complex. " 30
These approaches are not necessarily mutually exclusive, however. Martin 
Gilbert, writing specifically of the Holocaust, touches upon a point relevant here: 
"neither their suffering, nor their courage can be adequately conveyed in words. So 
little is known of the fate and reaction of individuals. Statistics can dull the mind, and 
examples numb it. Nevertheless, the historian must try, through the records and 
stories that have survived, to give an insight into the many different ways in which 
individuals met their death . " 31 More generally, Pettman commends to practitioners 
of disciplinary international relations the employing of both ways of knowing as a
29 Pouligny, The Politics and Anti-Politics of Contemporary 'Disarmament, Demobilization & 
Reintegration' Programs, 10.
30 Ibid, 22 (my emphasis added).
Martin Gilbert, The Holocaust: The Jewish Tragedy (London: Collins, 1986), 419 (my emphasis 
added).
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"double epistemological helix, " 32 an approach useful in conveying some of the 
magnitudes of consequences resulting from the widespread availability and ongoing 
use of these weapons. Having said that, however, a fully representative account 
proves elusive, especially since experiences of small arms use are seldom identical.
The selection of ontological referents is a further contentious issue confronting
those attempting to measure the impacts generated by the widespread availability
and ongoing use of small arms and light weapons. Notwithstanding the particular
referent(s) preferred for analysis, comparison among the impacts associated with
small arms and light weapons, including their prevalence and intensity, tends to
confound rather than clarify. Again, an extreme example of violence, the Holocaust
in particular and genocide in general, is instructive here, as Yehuda Bauer posits:
No graduation of human suffering is possible. A soldier who lost a leg 
and a lung at Verdun suffered. How can one measure his suffering 
against the horrors that Japanese civilians endured at Hiroshima? How 
can one measure the suffering of a Rom woman at Auschwitz, who saw 
her husband and children die in front of her eyes, against the suffering of 
a Jewish woman at the same camp who underwent the same experience? 
Extreme forms of human suffering are not comparable, and one should 
never say that one form of mass murder is "less terrible," or even "better," 
than another.33
Although comparing the prevalence and intensity among the varying impacts 
associated with these weapons is highly problematic, especially in situations where 
death by violent crime routinely goes unreported, or the scale of genocide goes 
under-recorded, the direct and indirect impacts attributed to these weapons deserve 
and receive some elaboration here, as do their key dimensions. Indeed, even an 
imperfect knowledge of the multifarious consequences helps motivate and inform 
the major responses of the international community, though Derghoukassian 
possibly overstates the case by suggesting "empirical evidence linking [small arms
32 Ralph Pettman, Reason, Culture, Religion: The Metaphysics of World Politics (New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 10; see also Pettman, World Politics, 4.
Yehuda Bauer, Rethinking the Holocaust (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 
2001), 13.
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and light weapons] proliferation and the loss of life has been crucial to bring 
international attention on the security threat of this lesser category of weapons/'34
Discerning Political Dimensions from the Barrel of a Gun
The widespread availability and ongoing use of small arms and light weapons 
produces effects that have an important politico-strategic dimension. Where existing 
institutions of government suffer political bankruptcy, small arms and light 
weapons enable the emergence of new informal governance arrangements. The 
violent transition to independence for the Republic of Georgia provides an 
instructive example of the increased militarisation of politics where government 
authority is absent. According to Spyros Demetriou, "[t]he sudden availability of 
weapons in late 1991 drastically altered the dynamics of political interaction and 
competition, leading to the militarization of politics, the narrowing of negotiating 
space, and the recourse to force to settle disputes."35 Following the indiscriminate 
distribution of small arms and light weapons to citizens by Russian military 
personnel responsible for their safe storage, civilians were able to use these weapons 
as a means of expressing power and were, therefore, better equipped to achieve their 
political ends. This so-called politics from the barrel of a gun contributed to a 
political climate in which more than 300,000 people were displaced and tens of 
thousands of people killed, providing conditions suitable for the further 
criminalisation of Georgian domestic affairs.36
Small arms and light weapons enable those contesting control over the 
institutions of government, which is particularly evident when such weapons are in 
the hands of armed non-state groups and terrorist organisations. All governments 
are vulnerable to the direct impact of these weapons, with heads of state the target of 
assassination attempts, though governmental representatives cannot claim a 
monopoly as victims. Rather, these weapons are more frequently used to wage
34 Derghoukassian, 7.
35 Spyros Demetriou, Politics from the Barrel of a Gun: Small Arms Proliferation and Conflict in the 
Republic of Georgia (1989-2001), Occasional Paper no.6 (Geneva: Small Arms Survey, 2002), 50.
36 Ibid, 29.
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protracted guerrilla war against governmental military forces, such as that 
undertaken by the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka. Conflict in the Solomon Islands, 
beginning in 1998, is a further example of a resort to arms as a way of articulating 
grievance directed at the government, as well as towards rival factions. By the 
middle of 1999, 50 people had been killed by local militia armed with small arms 
and light weapons, intensifying resentment and prolonging conflict resulting in the 
killing of a further 50 people by the end of 2000. These hostilities concluded with the 
Townsville Peace Agreement of August 2000, though incidents of armed violence 
persist.37
Sometimes governments fall after its elected representatives are taken as 
hostages by men brandishing small arms and light weapons. This, of course, 
occurred in 2000 when, led by businessman George Speight, seven armed men 
forcefully entered the Fijian Parliament, taking hostage Prime Minister Mahendra 
Chaudry, alongside most of his Cabinet. The associated trauma has both immediacy 
and longevity, for individuals directly involved as well as for Fijian society at large. 
Five people died from gunshot wounds inflicted during the hostage-taking. During 
the 56 days that the hostage situation lasted, rule of law was ignored in many 
locales, where violence and rioting prevailed.38 Consequences following this 
unseating of a democratic government are serious and lasting, and this coup d'etat 
has, as Brij Lai notes:
dislocated the process of political reconciliation, severely strained race 
relations, and shattered the foundations of the nation's economy just 
when Fiji was gradually emerging from the debris of 1987. The images of 
looting and burning, thuggery, and violence on the streets of Suva, the 
worst in the history of Fiji, will forever remain deeply embedded in the 
collective consciousness of its people, and the recovery from the wreckage 
and ruin will be long and hard.39
Here, lack of effective law enforcement combined with forced internal displacement 
engendered widespread violence, including looting, destruction of property, and
37 Alpers and Twyford, 39.
38 Ibid, 34.
39 Brij Lai, "The Sun Set at Noon Today", quoted in Phillip Alpers and Conor Tywford, Small 
Arms in the Pacific, Occasional Paper no.8 (Geneva: Small Arms Survey, 2003), 33.
57
arson, followed by longer-term affects upon emigratory flows, widespread 
unemployment and redundancy, inert key industries discouraging economic 
recovery, increases in sexual violence against women, and trauma experienced by 
many children that will, no doubt, continue to haunt them for many years to come.40 
In fact, Commodore Frank Bainimarama has tried to justify Fiji's most recent coup as 
a response to the former government's unsatisfactory handling of the previous coup 
plotters.41
Even authorised small arms and light weapons are prone to misuse. Some 
weapons have been stockpiled by, or on behalf of, candidates campaigning for 
public office, and are used to intimidate voters and ballot monitors alike, thereby 
undermining the democratic electoral process. Such intimidation occurred in Papua 
New Guinea (PNG) during 1997,42 signalling the further politicisation of the 
constabulary and military. Incumbent officials seeking re-election do not hold 
monopoly over ballot-box intimidation, as supporters of opposition candidates take 
up arms with similar intentions to influence democratic processes. According to Bill 
Standish, by August 2002, 30 people died in violence associated with PNG's electoral 
process, many directly from firearms use.43 Overenthusiastic responses from the 
constabulary to increases of violent crime also demonstrate the misuse of authorised 
force, which in PNG includes human rights violations, arbitrary raids on homes, 
rape, property theft and damage.44 The ill-fated millennium bank heist in 1999 at 
Port Moresby ended when police disabled a moving helicopter containing five 
armed robbers before gunning down these men as each emerged from the 
wreckage.45 This excessive use of force is not isolated: claims persist that suspected
40 Alpers and Twyford, 35-7.
41 BBC News, "Profile: Fiji's Military Leader" <http://www.news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/--/2/hi/asia- 
pacific/769527.stm> (accessed 23 March 2007).
42 David Capie, Under the Gun: The Small Arms Challenge in the Pacific (Wellington: Victoria 
University Press in association with the Peace and Disarmament Education Trust, New 
Zealand Department of Internal Affairs, 2003), 94.
43 Alpers and Tywford, 54.
44 Ray Anere, Ron Crocombe, Rex Horoi, Elise Huffer, Morgan Tuimaleali'ifano, Howard Van 
Trease, and Nikenike Vurobaravu, Security in Melanesia: Fiji, Papua Neiu Guinea, Solomon 
Islands & Vanuatu (Suva: Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat, 2001), 28.
45 Capie, Under the Gun, 91 & 93.
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criminals, some of them unarmed, have been summarily executed by the
constabulary.46 The UN estimates that the PNG Defence Force murdered (or as
euphemistically used in one UN report, 'extra-judicially executed') at least 64 people
between 1991 and 1995.47 As authorities encounter increasing difficulty when
enforcing domestic law relating to weapons misuse, the inclination to deploy
military forces, rather than the constabulary, gathers momentum, though in many
cases officials have been hesitant to do so.48 As Chris Smith observes of Central Asia:
The availability of weapons of increasing firepower has facilitated a 
warlike situation as militants become increasingly able to mount 
operations more akin to insurgency than to militancy or terrorism. 
Consequently, the response of the security forces—which are themselves 
poorly trained and even more poorly disciplined—has been excessive. As 
both sides have become progressively brutalised, so the incidence of rape, 
torture, and murder has increased.49
Here, misuse is not merely tolerated or condoned by governments, but is 
encouraged at the same time as legal obligations to comply with international 
humanitarian law are violated and concepts of human rights find little currency. 
These weapons, providing the means by which inter-communal rivalries are fuelled 
and exploited, articulate and create grievances, escalate disputes with civil 
authorities into full-scale conflict, and are used to wage and prolong civil war 
against the government.
The rise of intra-state conflict following the Cold War's end was accompanied by 
an increase of peacekeeping operations managed by intergovernmental 
organisations. During UN operations in Albania, Angola, Bosnia, Cambodia, 
Rwanda, Somalia, and more recently East Timor, to name just a few, the widespread 
availability of small arms directly threatened the security of peacekeepers. 
Following the unravelling of the Lome Peace Agreement in 2000, UN Peacekeepers
46 Ibid, 93.
47 Alpers and Tywford, 47.
48 Alves, 36.
49 Chris Smith, "Light Weapons and Ethnic Conflict in South Asia," in Lethal Commerce: The 
Global Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons, eds. Jeffrey Boutwell, Michael T. Klare, and 
Laura W. Reed (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Committee on International Security Studies, 
American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1995), 76-77.
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were abducted and murdered in Sierra Leone by members of the Revolutionary 
United Front (RUF).50 The number of UN peacekeepers killed during operations 
conducted in the 1990s represents half the total reported number of casualties since 
the UN's inception.51 Even where these weapons are consigned for deactivation, 
they continue to kill: two explosives experts died during a demobilisation 
demonstration in El Salvador, with the blast injuring four other soldiers, as well as a 
journalist and cameraman also in attendance.52 Inexperienced peacekeepers 
operating in Afghanistan as part of the International Security Assistance Force have 
also received criticism for not shouldering weapons during patrols in post-conflict 
settings, thereby enhancing insecurity: even where intent to use force might be 
absent, the perception of armed capability diminishes faith in security.
Closely related to that politico-strategic dimension of the various impacts 
generated by the widespread availability and ongoing use of small arms and light 
weapons is a significant politico-economic dimension. Conflicts sustained by these 
weapons help debilitate the infrastructure enabling and regulating domestic 
economies, displace and scatter labour forces, and prevent easy access to natural 
resources where these are not wrecked. According to the UNDP, "[t]he threat and 
use of small arms touches both formal and informal commercial transactions, 
including trading patterns, and household and national agricultural production. In 
many situations, small arms availability can be a direct cause of declining food 
security."53 The report goes on to note the high medical costs associated with 
treating firearms-related injuries, the rise of armed banditry, and high transport 
costs, each of which contribute to declining economic activity.
Beyond conflict zones, small arms and light weapons also gain currency as 
commodities, sometimes forming the basis of a lucrative trade whereby corrupt
50 Eric G. Berman, Re-Armament in Sierra Leone: One Year After the Lome Peace Agreement, 
Occasional Paper no.l (Geneva: Small Arms Survey, 2000), 12.
51 Capie, Under the Gun, 16.
52 Godnick with Muggah and Waszink, 17.
53 Robert Muggah and Peter Batchelor, "Development Held Hostage": Assessing the Effects of Small 
Arms on Human Development. A Preliminary Study of the Socio-Economic Impacts and 
Development Linkages of Small Arms Proliferation, Availability and Use (New York: United 
Nations Development Programme, 2002), 30.
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members of the constabulary or armed forces steal weapons from armouries, 
transferring these to criminal groups, as occurred in PNG during the 1990s.54 
Experienced in exploiting weak or corrupt authorities, organised crime groups 
transfer these weapons, as they do with other commodities such as narcotics, 
diamonds, and timber, generating revenue contributing to their profitability. At the 
same time, officials forgo opportunities to collect tax revenues, further impeding 
governmental capabilities to administer human development projects.55
Where governments desire to quell unrest, restore order, or at least assert a 
competitive claim for the legitimate use of force over a contested area of jurisdiction, 
mercenariness is sometimes invoked. Executive Outcome, a South African private 
security firm, was hired in 1995 by the government of Sierra Leone, making 
immediate military gains against the RUF, led by Foday Sankoh. However, 
following an agreement between the hostile parties, which included a provision 
requiring the government to terminate its contract with the private security firm, 
officers of Executive Outcome left the country and armed hostilities quickly 
resumed.56 Although the mercenaries from Sandline International, hired in 1997 by 
the PNG government, were never active in an operational sense, they played a 
minor role in prompting a peace process leading toward the Lincoln Agreement.57 
Here, introducing corporate armed actors into conflict zones intends to reinforce the 
contracting government's politico-strategic capability, though as Muggah and 
Batchelor point out, the "costs of private security for businesses, including 
government agencies, in countries such as South Africa, Brazil, Nigeria and the US 
have reached alarming proportions. In many of these countries, the value of the 
private security industry often exceeds national expenditure on policing."58
The possession of, or easy access to, small arms and light weapons by 
combatants hinders conflict resolution, squandering economic development
54 Capie, Under the Gun, 101.
55 Muggah and Batchelor, 33.
56 Berman, 11.
57 Alpers and Twyford, 45. In fact, Sandline's activities played a major role in precipitating the 
constitutional crisis in PNG, after which the peace process lead to the Bougainville 
settlement.
58 Muggah and Batchelor, 26.
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opportunities offered by external actors. Involvement in contemporary conflicts, in 
which small arms and light weapons are used, consumes a significant quantity of the 
UN's resources. According to the UN Report of the Panel of Governmental Experts on 
Small Arms, "[i]n one way or another, virtually every part of the United Nations 
system is dealing with the direct and indirect consequences of recent armed conflicts 
fought mostly with small arms and light weapons."59 The Inter-American 
Development Bank estimates that the government of El Salvador spent 25 percent of 
its annual Gross Domestic Product responding to armed violence,60 signalling that 
governments too foot the bill. Donor states such as New Zealand redirect funds 
initially intended for development aid into humanitarian assistance and specific 
disarmament processes, seeking to help resolve conflicts erupting in places such as 
the Solomon Islands.61
Perhaps the most readily identified effects produced by these weapons' 
widespread availability and ongoing use, are those with a politico-social dimension. 
Civilians, especially women and children, rather than combat personnel, now incur 
the highest proportion of casualties inflicted by these weapons during conflict as 
both government-run militaries and undisciplined irregular forces tend to ignore the 
distinction between combatants and civilians; or worse, such forces may deliberately 
target civilians. As Mary Kaldor points out, "[bjehaviour that was proscribed 
according to the classical rules of warfare and codified in the laws of war in the late 
nineteenth century and early twentieth century, such as atrocities against non- 
combatants, sieges, destruction of historic monuments...now constitutes an essential 
new mode of warfare."62
Individuals belonging to affluent societies also suffer from the illegal use of 
legally-held small arms and light weapons. In recent years, schools and shopping 
malls in the US have hosted isolated incidences of gun-related violence: the high-
59 United Nations General Assembly, Report of the Panel of Governmental Experts on Small Arms,
paragraph 20.
60 Godnick with Muggah and Waszink, 13.
61 Alpers and Twyford,.42.
62 Mary Kaldor, New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era (Stanford: Stanford
University Press, 1999), 8.
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profile shootings carried out by Eric Harris and Dylan Klebold at Columbine High 
School, Colorado, for example, not only register as personal trauma for the relatives 
of victims, but also as violent images engraved upon the collective psyche of 
Americans viewing media coverage of, or popular documentaries focusing on, this 
incident, or the many others similar to it. This is not only an American social 
problem, however. In 1996 at Dunblane, Scotland, 16 primary school students and 
their teacher were shot dead by Thomas Hamilton.63 Martin Bryant, a lone gunman 
embarking upon a shooting spree at Port Arthur, Tasmania, killed 35 people and 
injured a further 19 in 1996. Harris and Klebold, Hamilton, and Bryant represent 
only three of the many high-profile shootings using small arms and light weapons 
reported in the media over the past decade.64 These weapons also play a prominent 
role in suicides with approximately 75 percent of Australia's firearms-related 
mortalities in 1999 determined as suicides.65 In Costa Rica, firearms are used in 
about 20 percent of all reported suicides.66 Unintentional injuries and accidental 
death also result from the illegal use of these weapons. According to Wendy Cukier 
and Victor W. Sidel, "[wjhile conflicts and wars are fuelled by the arms trade, the 
shocking reality is that more people are killed with guns each year in countries not 
at war."67
The armed violence occurring in cities such as Rio de Janerio and Säo Paulo are 
so intense as to blur the distinction between areas under the rule of law and those 
locations deemed as conflict zones, especially given that "non-fatal outcomes of 
firearm-related violence represents a largely unknown—and likely very large —
63 Sami Faltas, Glenn McDonald, Camilla Waszink, Removing Small Arms from Society: A Review 
of Weapons Collection and Destruction Programmes, Occasional Paper no.2 (Geneva: Small Arms 
Survey, 2001), 3.
64 For an online database containing media reports, see Gun Policy News, administrated by 
Phillip Alpers <alpers(« gunpolicy.org>.
65 Alpers and Twyford, 54.
66 Godnick with Muggah and Waszink, 9.
67 Wendy Cukier and Victor W. Sidel, The Global Gun Epidemic: From Saturday Night Specials to 
AK 47s (Westport, Connecticut and London: Praeger Security International, 2006), 3. For a 
more nuanced appreciation of the victims of firearms use from a public health perspective, 
refer in particular to chap. 2 , entitled "The Firearms Epidemic."
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dimension of the problem/'68 Brazil, of course, does not hold a monopoly over 
urban violence; a recent WHO report begins by explaining that "[violence is a 
universal scourge that tears at the fabric of communities and threatens the life, 
health and happiness of us all. Each year, more than 1.6 million people worldwide 
lose their lives to violence. For everyone who dies as a result of violence, many 
more are injured and suffer from a range a physical, sexual, reproductive and mental 
health problems/'69
Criminal intent can generate the use of unauthorised weapons. Although law 
enforcement agencies often directly link weapons trafficking to organised narcotics 
trafficking, the criminal use of unauthorised weapons is much broader and includes 
poaching, cattle-rustling, armed robberies, banditry, kidnapping for ransom, 
hostage-taking, hijacking, homicide, and bank heists. Media reports from countries 
such as PNG and the US routinely report shootouts between gangs and 
constabulary, and also among gangs.70 Isolated, not to mention widespread or 
endemic, violent crime represents a serious threat to the safety of ordinary citizens 
and the constabulary, undermines the rule of law, and weakens the authority and 
legitimacy of some governments.71 In Rio de Janeiro, for instance, there are reports 
suggesting these weapons can be hired, and that area exist, particularly in \hefavelas 
and morrows, where law-enforcement teams cannot enter at night out of fear for their 
own safety.72 In Central America, social violence and armed crime have increased 
following the ending of the Cold War and the cessation of its proxy conflicts, with 
organised crime and civilian militias inheriting surplus weapons. Although 
homicide rates appear stable in the region, the use of small arms and light weapons 
in perpetrating homicides has increased.73 In Kosovo, organised criminals
68 Maria Fernanda Tourinho Peres, Firearm-related violence in Brazil: Country Report (Säo Paulo: 
Centre for the Study of Violence, University of Säo Paulo, 2004), 17.
69 World Health Organization, World Report on Violence and Health: Summary (Geneva: World 
Health Organization, 2002), 1.
70 Alpers and Twyford, 52.
71 Alves, 2.
72 Ibid, 15.
73 Godnick with Muggah and Waszink, vii.
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intimidating politicians and administrators alike use unauthorised weapons to blend 
criminal activity with political violence.74
In some cases where the rule of law is disregarded in favour of traditional or 
customary protocol, small arms and light weapons are used in order to violently 
articulate grievances caused by intra-communal rivalry and inter-tribal dispute. Tire 
Eastern Highland Province of PNG, for example, hosted two tribal clashes involving 
small arms and light weapons resulting in 25 people being murdered in 1999, and 
clashes occurring in the Southern Highlands resulted in a further 120 people 
murdered.75 The availability of these modem weapons, including hand-grenades 
and rocket launchers, as opposed to traditional weapons of bows and arrows or 
spears and shields in locales where tribal or ethnic tensions persist not only increases 
mortality rates, but also enables lethal retributive justice as an informal extrajudicial 
dispute resolution to prevail as an accepted norm of behaviour.76 In Afghanistan, 
local warlords use small arms and light weapons to maintain control over areas 
outside Kabul, showing that the rule of law in urban settings functions contiguously 
with might-is-right logic dominating rural hinterlands. According to Mark Sedra, in 
northern Afghanistan the "lawlessness, which pervades the region, has seriously 
hindered the efforts of the UN and the international aid community to deliver 
humanitarian assistance, arousing fears of an impending humanitarian disaster."77
Lack of public confidence in the maintenance of the mle of law follows 
knowledge of such circumstances, prompting civilians to stockpile weaponry. In the 
highlands of PNG, tens of thousands of homemade weapons abound,78 while in 
urban settings, such as in Port Moresby, some women are forced to sleep in so-called 
rape cages, or in bedrooms protected by steel bars and barbed wire.79 Weapons, held 
in order to facilitate the resolution of community disputes, for reasons of self- 
defence where perceptions of inadequate and ineffective police protection abound,
74 Khakee and Florquin, 7.
75 Capie, Under the Gun, 92.
76 Ibid.
77 Sedra, 14.
78 Capie, Under the Gun, 93.
79 Alpers and Tywford, 52.
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or as a means of overthrowing abusive regimes, simultaneously enhance and 
undermine perceptions of security. In corollary with increased perceptions of 
personal insecurity and diminished respect for law-enforcement capabilities, 
weapons are sought by citizens for self-defence, and private security firms are hired 
by fearful citizens, as occurred in Central America during the aftermath of the Cold 
War. Yet many weapons carried by private security officers, themselves often 
inadequately trained, are carried illegally, signalling that the emergence of these 
firms not only indicates increased perceptions of insecurity, but also contributes to 
the intensification of that insecurity.80 Affluent individuals arming themselves for 
protection in poverty-stricken areas sometimes undertake social cleansing using 
small arms and light weapons. In some instances, these purges of desechables 
(disposable ones) occur as sport for affluent, wanton boys.81
In East Timor, Indonesian-backed militia were supplied with a lethal 
combination of weapons and stimulants, producing crazed, drug-induced killers, 
which complicated the reintegration of these combatants back into their societies.82 
This reintegration process is necessary in order to prevent increased resort to violent 
crime in post-conflict societies. Without adequate means of reintegrating into their 
previous societies, ex-combatants often turn to criminal use of unauthorised 
weapons for reasons of financial security, prestige, or lack of viable alternatives.
If they are not killed outright, then victims of small arms and light weapons in 
conflict zones are often denied immediate access to a range of social services, 
including healthcare and education, as related infrastructure is damaged, rendered 
inoperable, or prevented by staff shortages created, in many instances, by fear of gun 
violence: hospitals and schools without staff function only as shelter. In 
Bougainville, the destruction of both hospitals and the blockade of medical supplies
80 Godnick with Muggah and Waszink, 15.
81 Daniel Garcia-Pena Jaramillo, "Light Weapons and Internal Conflict in Colombia," in Lethal 
Commerce: The Global Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons, eds. Jeffrey Boutwell, Michael T. 
Klare, and Laura W. Reed (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Committee on International Security 
Studies, American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1995), 101; see also Klare and Andersen, 7.
82 Robert Muggah and Eric Berman, Humanitarianism Under Threat: The Humanitarian Impacts of 
Small Arms and Light Weapons, Special Report no.l (Geneva: Small Arms Survey with Support 
from the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, 2001), 35.
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did little to assist combating and treating outbreaks of whooping cough among 
children, malnutrition, and malaria, as well as a resurgence of both leprosy and 
tuberculosis.83 Post-conflict societies seldom evade tight fiscal budgetary restraints 
over social services due to retarded economic recovery following periods of intense 
instability, as reflected in Fiji's 2001 government budget.84 Furthermore, during 
recent conflict in Bougainville, staff belonging to NGOs were targeted for theft, 
intimidation, and armed violence, which encouraged aid agencies to withdraw from 
the area.85 A similar exodus of foreign aid agencies operating in the Solomon Islands 
occurred following the crisis unfolding there in 2000.
Although the causes of contemporary conflict are many, varied, and contestable, 
not to mention historically contingent, small arms and light weapons are rarely the 
main cause of conflict, crime, or terror. And, as Godnick, Muggah, and Waszink 
point out, '"[p]ost-conflict' does not necessarily mean 'post-violence.'"86 In fact, the 
distinction between conflict zones and post-conflict settings might be significant to 
the donor community, but rings hollow for victims of these weapons. Pouligny 
elaborates:
Human security—defined as the real and perceived safety of people — 
often remains precarious and even deteriorates in the troubled period 
after wars are officially declared over. If the barometer of a 'post-conflict' 
situation is greater security and guarantees of 'protection' for the civilian 
population, then it is a rare apple indeed. Post-conflict environments 
often bear little resemblance on the ground to what is implied in their 
definition. Rather, epidemiological evidence from studies carried out by 
the ICRC, the IRC, the Small Arms Survey, and others indicate that death 
and injury rates often stay high (as in Afghanistan, El Salvador, or Iraq). 
This is particularly the case when the issue of widely circulated small 
arms, light weapons, and unexploded ordinance is not effectively 
addressed as an integral part of peace processes or as a component of 
cross-border 'interventions.' Armed violence is part of the new political 
landscape, and civilians often make rational decisions to possess weapons 
because security is not ensured.87
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Violence using small arms and light weapons has engendered conditions of forced 
migration, as occurred in East Timor during 1999 where "[m]ore than half of the East 
Timorese population were forcibly displaced from their homes in the days and 
weeks following the elections."88 In addition to internal displacement, forced 
migration takes place across international borders, as the aftermath of the Rwandan 
genocide illustrates. According to the UN Refugee Agency, "[m]ore than 200,000 
people crossed into Tanzania in one 24-hour period. Hurtling in the opposite 
direction, one million Rwandans crashed into the tiny lakeside town of Goma in 
what was then Zaire and today has been renamed the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo."89 Refugee camps seldom afford sanctuary to those having fled intense 
violence, however. Again, in the aftermath of the Rwandan genocide, Interahamawe 
militiamen continued to harass refugees by taking control of the camps and 
"[government authorities who were responsible for security either refused or were 
unable to control the gunmen who used the sites as rear bases, recruited young 
people to their cause, and intimidated and sometimes murdered civilians who 
showed an interest in returning to Rwanda under its new government."90
Finally, the spectre of child soldiering looms large on the landscape of recent and 
contemporary conflict as inherent characteristics of these weapons invite use by 
children. Governmental forces active in conflict have recruited children under the 
age of 16 but as young as seven, often relying upon dubious methods including 
forceful abductions, often administered through beatings, followed by coercion to 
force children to remain and fight for the cause. Schools and refugee camps are 
specifically targeted for recruitment. Those joining voluntarily do so for reasons of 
fear, survival, and revenge, with some having witnessed the murder of relatives and 
members of their community, while others acknowledge the lack of any viable 
alterative. Once in combat service, child soldiers are used for a variety of tactical 
military purposes, such as deploying or detonating explosives, for gathering
88 Muggah and Berman, 28.
89 UN High Commissioner for Refugees, "Crossing the Rubicon," Refugees 2, no.139 (2005): 18
90 Ibid.
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intelligence, as informants, and for logistical support as porters of weapons and 
supplies. Child soldiers also commit sexual torture, rape, and inflict beatings upon 
civilians. However, this use of terror is also used introspectively as female child 
soldiers are often harassed and exploited sexually by their male colleagues, forced to 
take contraceptives or undertake abortions if they fall pregnant, and, in Colombia, 
frequently become a 'girlfriend' to an older, male soldier. In Cote d'Ivoire, 
permission to loot was given to child soldiers in lieu of promised salaries.91 Where 
child soldiers exist in large numbers in military forces, there is often little in the way 
of a demobilisation strategy or, if such a strategy exists, little in the way of effective 
concrete processes. In circumstances where demobilisation strategies are effective, 
females are often disadvantaged. In Angola, for example, the reintegration phase of 
the DDR programme dealt only with combatants belonging to the National Union 
for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), neglecting women and girls 
abducted and taken as 'wives.'92
The abuse of children operating in combat scenarios is not restricted to their 
involvement in governmental military forces: state-sponsored militias, often acting 
under informal command structures and directed by government officials or 
military leadership, similarly recruit and employ children as irregular troops. 
Moreover, forces opposing governmental military forces not only deploy children as 
part of their fighting ranks, in some cases representing up to 40 percent of the 
group's combat capability,93 but also forcefully recruit children, inflating their 
fighting numbers as a means of enhancing the group's political bargaining power 
during peace and post-conflict settlement negotiations, as occurred in Burundi 
during 2003.94 Children, identified and pursued as targets vulnerable to exploitation 
as sources of intelligence are, at times, (though somewhat less plausibly) considered 
as agents of influence within their families, and by extension, communities.
91 Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, Child Solider Use 2003: A  Briefing for the 4th UN 
Security Council Open Debate on Children and Armed Conflict, 
<http://www.hrw.org/reports/2004/drildsoldiers0104> (accessed 31 March 2007), 17.
92 Ibid, 6.
93 Ibid, 14.
94 Ibid, 8.
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The prevalence of child soldiering in contemporary conflict frequently results in 
the deaths of children as combatants, severe physical and psychological injuries 
sustained during combat service, and the social dislocation caused by movements 
required by war and, less frequently, by their capture and detention by hostile forces 
(as at least three children held by the US military at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba 
demonstrates).95 Not simply collateral bystanders or combatants, children are 
viewed as targets during war. Lamenting the consequences following conflicts since 
1995, Grac'a Machel writes:
more and more of the world is being sucked into a desolate moral 
vacuum. This is a space devoid of the most basic human values; a space in 
which children are slaughtered, raped, and maimed; a space in which 
children are exploited as soldiers; a space in which children are starved 
and exposed to extreme brutality. Such unregulated terror and violence 
speak of deliberate victimisation. There are few further depths to which 
humanity can sink.96
The lack of educated youth will likely only further hinder the longer-term 
development of post-conflict societies. There is a sense in which the fate of the child 
solider functions as a synecdoche for victims of small arms and light weapons use 
more generally.
Conclusion
Since experiences of small arms and light weapons use are rarely identical, this 
chapter deliberately refrains from examining a set of highly selective examples 
drawn from particular conflict zones or post-conflict settings: yet it does not claim 
that its examples offer a comprehensive, exhaustive, or fully representative account 
of the consequences of these weapons where they find use. Where selections 
inevitably occur—and the various examples cited above are only a few of the very 
many possible examples—they were determined in order to illuminate a broad 
range of impacts currently registering across the globe, without bias deliberately 
favouring any particular culture, region, country, economy, or society. This is not to
95 Ibid, 4.
96 United Nations General Assembly, Promotion and Protection of the Rights of Children: Impact of 
Armed Conflict on Children, UN Doc. A/51/306 (New York: United Nations, 1996), paragraph 3.
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imply, however, that there are no common features or shared experiences among 
victims of small arms and light weapons use, but to suggest only that no single case 
study can fully demonstrate the differing magnitudes and dynamic contours of these 
impacts and their violent consequences. Because the chapter describes various 
impacts generated, at least in part, by the widespread availability and ongoing use 
of these weapons in terms of their key dimensions, it deliberately constructs a 
'carnival of horror' (to use Pouligny's phrase).
This 'carnival of horror,' dispersed unevenly among locales throughout the 
world, illustrates that the widespread availability and ongoing use of small arms 
and light weapons generate direct and indirect impacts of disturbing magnitude. 
These impacts continue to register upon a diverse range of victims: official and 
nonofficial combatants, including child soldiers; civilians, including those referred to 
as internally displaced persons and as refugees; and employees of development 
agencies that operate in post-conflict settings. Where human rights violators 
successfully target entire communities, these genocides, by definition, threaten the 
existence of specific communities and the societies these communities represent. 
Conflicts sustained by, and violent crimes perpetrated with, these weapons 
devastate local markets and national economies, as well as threatening the viability 
of governments. A wider range of impacts manifest, moreover. Where such conflict 
and crime is unrestrained, significant impediments confront regional development 
and regional security. The seriousness of these politico-strategic, politico-economic, 
and politico-social ramifications speak forcefully for themselves, not only 
highlighting the powerful transformative effects which these weapons can have over 
the institutions of government, the economy, and society, but also revealing why the 
challenge to control small arms and light weapons attracts the attention of various 
members of the international community, despite their competing interests and 
sometimes diverging values.
"In every case," according to Krause, "small arms and light weapons are 
implicated in complex causal pathways with these various problems, although little 
work has yet been done to trace systematically these pathways to assess the relative
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weight of small arms (compared to other factors) or to evaluate the effectiveness of 
particular policy measures/'97 While not the primary cause of internal conflict, the 
availability of these weapons may help trigger, intensify, and prolong the conflicts in 
which they figure.98 Despite the under-assessed link between the widespread 
availability and ongoing use of these weapons and the impacts most commonly 
associated with them, awareness of these impacts prompts major responses from the 
international community: hence, epistemic anxiety relating to the major aspects of 
this challenge, and to these weapons' impacts, does not necessarily preclude action.
However, whereas these subaltern killers have immense resonance on the 
ground, the noisy effects of these weapons are not so easily amplified in the 
conference halls of diplomats, as Part II of this thesis demonstrates. Although the 
international community discerns these impacts as a serious issue deserving 
sustained attention, the nature and extent of these varying consequences do not 
directly threaten the vital interests of those who wield power in contemporary world 
affairs. In fact, it is precisely because small arms and light weapons do not hinder 
policymakers in the way that, say, the balance of power involving nuclear weapons 
did during the Cold War, that the consequences following the availability and use of 
these weapons remain insufficient, in and of themselves, to reconfigure the ordering 
of world affairs. In other words, terrible as those multifarious consequences are, 
these subaltern killers do not trouble the core of the internationalist governance 
architecture maintaining contemporary world order. Conversely, it is regularly in 
the interest of certain actors to sustain the widespread availability and ongoing use 
of these weapons, while the responses seeking to exert control over small arms and 
light weapons emerging from the international community since the early 1990s help 
consolidate the current configuration of world affairs.
Each of the following four chapters of Part II explores a major response by the 
international community while, at the same time, considering the maturing 
relationships among those members of the international community, and the nascent
97 Krause, 251.
98 United Nations General Assembly, Report of the Panel of Governmental Experts on Small Arms,
paragraph 38.
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interconnectivity among their strategies for, and approaches toward, controlling 
these weapons. There is, however, little recognition in these responses that the 
various consequences outlined in this chapter are, in many cases, by-products of the 
kind of world affairs that are being sustained by a coherent but contested body of 
ideas which promotes a particular notion of the political and, by extension, favours 
certain types of policy choices, activities, and practices that inform the international 
community's major responses to this challenge. Well aware of the disturbing 
magnitude of problems caused by these weapons, policymakers do not know well 
themselves, or care to know well themselves, the full force of these dire arms.
PART II
D ram atis P ersonae, and the composition of control
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2. RESEARCHERSAND THE CALL FOR ACTION
Researchers, specifically those whose work connects to various arms-control 
negotiations occurring within intergovernmental organisations, can sustain a 
marginal role as members of an international community confronting the challenge 
of controlling small arms and light weapons. Since about the mid-1990s, 
researchers have published literature as a means of attracting attention towards an 
increasingly urgent problem that was previously absent from the international 
security agenda, often with a view to inciting decisive action at the governmental 
level. From about the turn of the millennium, researchers have, moreover, 
published literature as a means of shaping the negotiation and implementation of 
control measures developed by intergovernmental organisations. More recently, 
research has been one of the major means by which civil society organisations 
prosecute their arms control campaign (and this use of research as a tool for 
monitoring governmental behaviour is dealt with in Chapter Five of this thesis). 
Representing researchers' primary response to the widespread availability and 
ongoing use of small arms and light weapons, this literature has, more 
importantly, also proven useful to those analysts of world affairs seeking to better 
comprehend this topic and to those policymakers seeking to better control these 
weapons.
This chapter analyses this literature's treatment of four of the topic's major 
aspects, that is, the proliferation, transfer, possession, and use of these weapons. It 
demonstrates that, once identified by this literature, these major aspects are 
explored further against various local, state, regional, and global contexts. Some of 
this literature goes as far as to illustrate the dynamic nature of these aspects, 
identifying specific production rates and volumes of weapons flows.
Because civil society organisations, the policy divisions of governments and 
intergovernmental organisations, and so-called independent research centres are
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the main institutions hosting researchers and/or disseminating their work, they 
serve this chapter as appropriate demarcations distinguishing the literature. These 
demarcations are compatible with the three main models of think tanks proposed 
by R. Kent Weaver—advocacy tanks, contract researchers, and universities without 
students—though these categories are destabilised by researchers, especially 
academics based in universities, who treat host institutions merely as publishing 
outlets without committing themselves fully to the political programmes of any 
particular institution. Notwithstanding the porosity of these categories and the 
sometimes competing policy prescriptions expressed in their literature, where a 
call for action has been articulated by these researchers, it has, by and large, been a 
call for governments to cooperate within an internationalist governance 
architecture which provides for instruments of international law and, to a lesser 
degree, opportunities for collective action.
Civil Society Organisations
Resulting from a workshop hosted in February 1994 by the American Academy of 
Arts and Sciences (AMACAS), the first major publication focusing specifically on 
the topic of small arms and light weapons was Lethal Commerce: The Global Trade in 
Small Arms and Light Weapons (1995), edited by Jeffrey Boutwell, Michael T. Klare, 
and Laura W. Reed.1 Although a few articles dealing with this topic appeared in 
serials during 1993 and 1994, Lethal Commerce includes chapters written by some of 
those articles' authors.2 Building upon those earlier articles, Lethal Commerce 
presents small arms and light weapons as an important, emerging topic for the 
consideration of arms trade analysts and policymakers alike. It does so by 
focusing upon the prevalence of, and intense consequences following, the ongoing
1 For further information relating to AMACAS, please refer to its website located at 
<http://www.amacad.org>.
2 As Denise Garcia has shown, Aaron Karp published work in Arms Control Today and the 
The Washington Quarterly, Tara Kartha in Strategic Analysis, Chris Smith in Defense Studies, 
and Michael T. Klare in Harvard International Review. Refer to Garcia, Analyzing the Issue of 
Curbing the Unrestricted Availability and Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons, 14-15.
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use of these weapons. As its editors remark in their preface, the "project's aim has 
been to survey the state of current knowledge on the growing international 
proliferation of small arms and light weapons, assess the impact of such weapons 
on ethnic and national conflicts around the world, and explore possible avenues 
for controlling this lethal trade . " 3
Dissatisfied with an arms control literature dominated by concerns over major
conventional weapons and weapons of mass destruction, Karp argues that, while
so far neglected as a topic, small arms and light weapons deserve analytic attention
as vital ingredients in contemporary conflict. In particular, Karp observes that:
Major weapons such as tanks and aircraft that determined the balance of 
power between states and symbolised international alliances are scarce 
on modem battlefields. The weapons of mass destmction that still 
dominate strategic thinking and international diplomacy remain even 
further in the background of actual combat. Instead it is the flow of 
small arms and light weapons that is most relevant to the incidence of 
internal conflicts and the outcome of recent wars. Though minor in 
physical terms, these weapons are major in effect.4
Also noting that the apparent neglect of small arms and light weapons in the 
broader arms control literature reflects a disproportionate preoccupation with 
major conventional weapons, Klare comments that "while recent changes in the 
international system may be responsible for a decline in the trade in major weapons 
systems, they appear to be stimulating an increase in the trade in small arms and 
other light weapons. " 5 For Klare, the former continues to dominate the minds of 
arms control analysts, whereas the latter has emerged largely unnoticed, inferring 
that most researchers have been slow to notice and respond to important shifts in 
contemporary world affairs. These authors assert that a new security agenda, 
reflecting these important shifts within contemporary world affairs, ought to be 
accompanied by a refreshed security literature. Put simply, this collection of
3 Jeffrey Boutwell, Michael T. Klare, and Laura W. Reed, "Preface," in Lethal Commerce: The 
Global Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Committee on 
International Security Studies, American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1995), 5.
4 Karp, "Small Arms—The New Major Weapons," 17.
5 Klare, "The Global Trade in Light Weapons and the International System in the Post-Cold 
War Era," 33.
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essays represents the first significant attempt by researchers to present these 
weapons as a very serious topic that had hitherto been neglected within the more 
general arms control literature.
Published after the first International Pugwash Workshop on the Proliferation 
of Small Arms and Light Weapons, held near New Delhi, India in late 1995, Light 
Weapons and International Security also seeks to signal the importance of this 
emerging topic and to contribute to this refreshed security literature. Its opening 
chapter goes further, suggesting "the need for a new paradigm that better 
describes the nature and impact of the conventional arms trade in the post-Cold 
War era."6 This new paradigm, suggested by Klare, comprises of two parts: 
'diffusion/ preferred ahead of proliferation "because it better describes the spread 
of arms throughout the world and at all levels of society"; and 'global violence,' 
preferred ahead of 'arms race' because it emphasises "the growing worldwide 
incidence of armed violence within and between groups, tribes, and 
communities."7 In essence, the proposed paradigm coheres around the nexus of 
the widespread availability of small arms and light weapons and their ongoing 
use, though its focus is confined to the role played by these weapons in 
contemporary conflict and the related effects on international security.
As the twentieth century drew to a close, few works accompanied Lethal 
Commerce and Light Weapons and International Security as major publications 
focusing specifically on small arms and light weapons. A Scourge of Guns: The 
Diffusion of Small Arms and Light Weapons in Latin America by Michael T. Klare and 
David Anderson was published in 1996, followed in 1998 by Lora Lumpe's and Jeff 
Donarski's The Arms Trade Revealed: a guide for investigators and activists.8 Both are 
publications of the Federation of American Scientists (FAS), a non-profit 
organisation established in 1945 by the atomic scientists involved in the Manhattan
6 Michael T. Klare, "Light Weapons Diffusion and Global Violence in the Post-Cold War 
era," in Light Weapons and International Security, ed. Jasit Singh (Delhi: Indian Pugwash 
Society and British/American Security Information Council, 1995), 3.
7 Ibid.
8 Although this volume deals with conventional arms in the broad sense, small arms and 
light weapons receive frequent, significant, and particular treatment.
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Project.9 Like Lethal Commerce, these two studies raise awareness of the small arms 
and light weapons topic, the former taking a regional approach, the latter 
scrutinising the activities of a single government—albeit the world's largest arms 
producer and source from where, in 1996, more than 160 of the world's 190 
governments received either some kind of weapons or military training.10
Focusing upon the region of Latin America, A Scourge of Guns begins with an 
endorsement by Nobel Prize winner Oscar Arias Sanchez, emphasising the gravity 
of this book's central concerns. Attempting to promote the issues surrounding 
small arms and light weapons onto the evolving security agenda of the 
international community in general, and of the OAS in particular, the book appeals 
to a comparison with narcotics trafficking as a newly established security issue 
which has already been the subject of decisive collective action, specifically active 
border protection and law-enforcement investigations. The main similarity, 
according to the Nobel Laureate, is that "both the arms trade and drug trafficking 
constitute a sinister quid pro quo in a market of death and suffering for millions of 
human beings,"* 11 though central differences, including the official trade of small 
arms and light weapons, and the lawful use of these weapons as tools of external 
security and internal policing, do not evade the attention of Klare and Andersen.
By informing their readership of the official processes underpinning the US 
legal arms trade within "a "pragmatic 'how to' handbook,"12 Lumpe and Donarski 
encourage US citizens to bring pressure to bear on their policymakers. According 
to The Arms Trade Revealed, even after the First Persian Gulf War had demonstrated 
that unrestrained and unregulated arms trade allows accumulations of weapons 
that present very real threats to regional stability and seriously undermine the
9 Its purpose is to lobby US lawmakers on the responsible use of science and its related 
technology on behalf of the US public. For further information relating to FAS, please refer 
to its website located at <http://www.fas.org>.
10 Lora Lumpe and Jeff Donaski, The Arms Trade Revealed: a guide for investigators and activists 
(Washington D.C.: Federation of American Scientists, 1998), 6.
11 Oscar Arias Sanchez, "Foreword," in A Scourge of Guns: The Diffusion of Small Arms and 
Light Weapons in Latin America, Michael T. Klare and David Andersen (Washington D.C.: 
Federation of American Scientists, 1996), i.
12 Lumpe and Domaski, 3.
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prospects of peace, some US policymakers assume the international community 
can:
manage crises that erupt as a result of excess arms production and 
exporting (including diplomatic tensions among themselves, wars 
among importers, massive refugee flows and financial insolvency) 
better than they can manage the alternative. The alternative would 
involve challenging major arms corporations and labor unions by 
reining in domestic arms production; reducing reliance on arms trading 
as the principal diplomatic currency; and decreasing reliance on arms 
exports for perceived strategic gains.13
A grassroots advocacy utilising bureaucratic windows of transparency, which 
demonstrates that communities within the US are concerned, organised, and active 
over this issue, is the approach favoured in this book. Although drawing upon the 
success of grassroots movements used during the campaign against the 
manufacture and use of anti-personnel landmines, which resulted in the Ottawa 
Treaty, the authors do not mention key differences between landmines and other 
types of weapons. Attention is given instead to the applicable acts of legislation 
and amendments, the location of useful documents containing details of transfers 
published by US government departments, and the addresses of websites 
monitoring and reporting on this trade. The Arms Trade Revealed not only functions 
as a practical guide facilitating further research into the topic of small arms and 
light weapons, but also encourages an activism prompting policymakers to act 
differently, presumably in accordance with a code of conduct devised by Lumpe. 14 
Put bluntly, the book calls to action those who will, in turn, call others to action.
Here, then, some researchers have signalled the urgency with which the 
widespread availability and ongoing use of small arms and light weapons ought to 
be treated by the international community. Their literature describes this issue as a 
serious topic to be considered by analysts of world affairs and by policymakers 
with responsibilities for international security. The four major works published
13 Ibid, 1.
14 For details pertaining to this code of conduct, please refer to 
<http://www.fas.org/asmp/campaigns/code/uscodeon.html> (accessed 31 March 2007).
80
under the auspices of civil society organisations portray this topic as having at 
least four major aspects; that is, proliferation, transfer, possession, and use. 
Identifying these major aspects of this topic, this literature situates these aspects in 
various local, state, regional, and global contexts. In some cases, the research 
illustrates the dynamic nature of this topic by providing details of production 
trends and weapons flows.
Lethal Commerce was the first of these publications to introduce 7proliferation7 
as a major aspect of the small arms and light weapons topic. In particular, Ksenia 
Gonchar and Peter Lock identify a manufacturing over-capacity within the former 
Soviet Union, resulting in firms either developing new weapons technologies and 
marketing them abroad or closing down production, as did the Degtyarev plant in 
Kovro. Other firms continue producing weapons for sale, but do so without 
official approval.15 Also identifying the small arms production capability within 
certain countries (including brief histories of firms manufacturing these weapons), 
A Scourge of Guns illustrates its dynamic nature: the production of specific weapon 
types, either those licensed from abroad or those of indigenous design, are 
identified, and precise figures indicating production rates are given.16 However, A 
Scourge of Guns confines its assessment of proliferation to the domestic arms 
manufacture within the region of Latin America, without considering the 
production capabilities contributing directly to the massive flows into the region.
Identifying 'transfer7 as another major aspect of the small arms and light 
weapons topic in Lethal Commerce, Klare discerns four main channels of supply for 
these weapons: govemment-to-govemment transactions, authorised commercial 
sales, government covert operations, and clandestine black-market sales.17 (Klare 
elaborates these channels in his chapter in Light Weapons and International
15 Ksenia Gonchar and Peter Lock, "Small Arms and Light Weapons: Russia and the Former 
Soviet Union," in Lethal Commerce: The Global Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons, eds. 
Jeffrey Boutwell, Michael T. Klare, and Laura W. Reed (Cambridge, Massachusetts: 
Committee on International Security Studies, American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 
1995),117.
16 See, in particular, chap. 2 entitled "Domestic Arms Production," 15-25.
17 Klare, "The Global Trade in Light Weapons and the International System in the Post-Cold 
War era," 34.
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Security.18) Distinguishing the black market from the corruption of regulated 
channels, which often rely upon bid-rigging, bribing officials, and fraudulent end- 
user certificates, R.T. Naylor explains in more detail its structure, which operates 
through an elaborate, though necessarily concealed, network. According to 
Naylor, although some trafficking operations are vulnerable, most of these 
networks are well-established and competent in moving a diverse range of illicit 
goods and are no longer sensitive to government enforcement action. 19 Although 
Naylor gives some examples of this trafficking, there is no significant illustration of 
its dynamic, as specific weapon flows are neither considered nor assessed.
Identified as a major aspect of this topic, the analysis of "transfer7 is enlarged. 
The Arms Trade Revealed identifies, with greater precision than its two predecessors, 
the different ways in which weapons transfers occur as legal trade from the US, 
including an overview of the relevant frameworks through which US 
policymaking, lawmaking, and trade oversight occur. US legal weapons trade, 
according to Lumpe and Donarski, occurs as foreign military sales handled by the 
Pentagon, direct commercial sales involving US weapon-producing firms, the 
leasing of surplus US military stockpiles, gifts to other governments under aid 
programmes, and the presidential provision of weapons abroad in situations 
deemed an emergency, 20 though small arms and light weapons are also transferred 
under the aegis of anti-narcotics trafficking measures. Due to the different 
characteristics of these transfer methods, the US government's published figures 
on its weapons transfers are often unreliable, significantly under-representing their 
volume, value, and quality.
A Scourge of Guns also identifies 'transfer7 as a major aspect of the small arms 
and light weapons topic with more refined attention than Lethal Commerce. Small
18 See, in particular, Klare, "Light Weapons Diffusion and Global Violence in the Post-Cold 
War Era."
19 R.T. Naylor, "The Structure and Operation of the Modem Arms Black Market," in Lethal 
Commerce: The Global Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons, eds. Jeffrey Boutwell, Michael 
T. Klare, and Laura W. Reed (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Committee on International 
Security Studies, American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1995), 49.
20 Lumpe and Donarski, 8.
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arms transfers are distinguished, for example, as entering the region through legal
government trade, covert transfers, in which there is some official involvement,
though the transaction is not known or consented to by all affected parties (most
likely without the knowledge of the destination government), or through
clandestine trafficking, each of these previously identified by Klare as generic
channels of supply. However, Klare and Anderson go further in the following
passage to discuss the diffusion of these weapons within the region:
Indeed, it is not sufficient to speak of the arms trade (in the traditional 
sense of arms transfers from one nation to another) when referring to 
the flow of weapons in Latin America, as the phenomenon is much 
more complex. It is more useful to speak of the diffusion of arms, 
suggesting the dispersion and recirculation of arms through multiple 
channels to all levels of society.21
Flows of small arms and light weapons into the region occurring through these 
channels of supply, the circulation of these weapons within the region, the 
recycling of weapons for different purposes, and the leakage from government- 
held stockpiles, are each understood as important elements of the 'transfer7 aspect 
of the small arms and light weapons topic.
Klare and Anderson also illustrate the dynamic nature of these 'transfer' 
activities into Latin America: military aid in the form of subsidised sales or grants 
from the US between 1950 and 1993 are quantified in US dollar values; transfers of 
specific weapons to particular governments between 1960 and 1979 are identified; 
and the quantity of specific weapons delivered to Latin America between 1980 and 
1993 are given. Soviet military assistance to governments within this region, 
details of which are scarcer than its US counterpart because the Soviets "did not 
enact a Freedom of Information Act or publish statistics of the sort available from 
US government agencies,"22 is estimated at about US$15 billion. Commercial sales 
into the region are estimated at US$100 million per annum between 1991 and 1993, 
and US firms are differentiated from other major exporters based in countries such
21 Klare and Anderson, 4.
22 Ibid, 35.
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as Germany, France, and Britain, with country of import and US dollar value 
provided for sales occurring between 1950 and 1993. Covert transfers and black 
market trafficking are both dealt with by way of examples of discovered, 
intercepted, or seized transfers in order to offer a glimpse of this dynamic nature 
which, for most researchers not directly involved in the particular transfer, 
remains invisible, or at best highly obscured: hence, a summary of trafficking- 
related convictions of US citizens between 1980 and 1995, and an account of those 
transfers organised covertly by Major General Richard Secord and Lieutenant 
Oliver North to anti-Sandinista rebels in Nicaragua, commonly referred to as the 
Iran-Contra Affair, are provided.23
By considering official stockpiles, civilian possession, and unauthorised caches 
of these weapons, Lethal Commerce identifies 'possession' as another major aspect 
of this topic. Daniel Gracfa-Pena Jaramillo goes someway towards illustrating its 
dynamic nature, though "[rjeliable figures on this haemorrhaging of government 
weapons are impossible to come by, as both army and guerrilla estimates are either 
inflated or downplayed for political purposes"24 and "a constant change in 
regulations and poorly kept records meant that no one really knows how many 
[civilian] guns were actually registered."25 While precise details are given on the 
types of weaponry held by military and constabulary forces, by criminal 
syndicates and insurgents groups, and by civilians, the geographic focus here is 
restricted to Colombia.
Lethal Commerce identifies the 'use' of these weapons as another major aspect of 
this topic. Chris Smith cites examples where these weapons are used to prolong 
and intensify ethnic or civil conflict, especially where these conflicts spread to 
adjacent areas, undermining the rule of law and eroding order. He also cites 
examples where these weapons are used by military and constabulary forces in 
brutalising ways as a means of responding to increasing militancy among
23 Ibid, 76-81.
24 Jaramillo, 107.
25 Ibid, 108.
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insurgents in areas, for example, of Jammu, Kashmir, and the Punjab. Annual 
statistics of civilian mortality in the Punjab area are compared against quantities of 
AK-47 assault rifles seized by authorities as evidence of explicit causation, 
enabling Smith to speculate that the "growing proliferation of and access to small 
arms is increasing both the communal polarization and the incidence of 
violence/'26 In Colombia, moreover, the use of these weapons, vital to the 
enduring conflict among authorities, guerrilla groups, and drug cartels, coincides 
with intra-social violence, as social cleansing takes place as a purge of desechables. 
Mortality is quantified here by statistics comparing combat casualties to political 
murders.27 This treatment of weapons 'use' within Lethal Commerce is, however, 
narrow, focusing as it does upon conflict zones, without illustrating its dynamic 
nature.
Primarily concerned with examining weapons 'use' in contemporary conflict, 
Light Weapons and International Security is equally narrow in its treatment of this 
major aspect. However, exploring the linkage between trafficking narcotics and 
light weapons, Tara Kartha concludes that what "was perhaps once perhaps the 
domain of the sly black marketeer and superpower strategy, the business of 
moving weapons seems to have taken a life of its own. As it merges with the drug 
mafia, the sheer volume and profits involved are enough to classify it as an 
industry—well organised and obeying its own rules."28 Jacklyn Cock usefully 
contextualises ongoing weapons use against a social setting, highlighting that the 
"demand for light weapons is socially constructed; the supply is socially 
organised."29 Giving regional focus to the nexus of the widespread availability of 
these weapons and the prevalence and deadly intensity of their use, Klare and 
Anderson similarly broaden the relevance of use, as a major aspect, beyond the
26 Smith, 76.
27 Jaramillo, 101.
28 Tara Kartha, "Southern Asia: The Narcotics and Weapons Linkage," in Light Weapons and 
International Security, ed. Jasit Singh (Delhi: Indian Pugwash Society and British American 
Security Information Council, 1995), 81-2.
29 Jacklyn Cock, "A Sociological Account of Light Weapons Proliferation in Southern Africa," 
in Light Weapons and International Security, ed. Jasit Singh (Delhi: Indian Pugwash Society 
and British American Security Information Council, 1995), 95.
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locales representing 'trouble spots' or the countries regarded as experiencing 
emerging or full-blown ethnic, civil, or internal conflict. Problems associated with 
small arms and light weapons can, and frequently do, spill over international 
borders, contributing to increases in criminal behaviour, widespread lawlessness, 
and the weakening of regional stability. Such problems are not confined merely to 
distant locales and remote conflict zones where international media 
representatives and policymakers demonstrate little in the way of discernible 
genuine concern.
Here, then, identifying the proliferation, transfer, possession, and use of small 
arms and light weapons as major aspects of this topic, situating these aspects in 
various contexts, and occasionally illustrating their dynamic nature, enables 
researchers to connect their work to governmental policy dealing with 
international security. However, the quality of the research published by civil 
society organisations is frustrated by the lack of reliable data, leaving its authors to 
rely upon anecdotal information found in newspapers and other broadcast media, 
and upon evidence received from obliging government departments or collected 
first-hand. Given this is, of course, an inevitable consequence of the epistemic 
anxiety explored in the previous chapter, the lack of available, relevant, and 
reliable information is unsurprising since these authors are publishing 'pioneering' 
literature on a topic often cloaked in official secrecy, obscured by commercial-in­
confidence protection, or deliberately concealed as clandestine activities 
undertaken by black-market brokers. As such, literature published by researchers 
hosted by civil society organisations ought not to be judged in terms of its 
provision of highly limited existing information, but rather, this limited provision 
should be viewed only as an inevitable weakness in an admirable task establishing 
legitimacy for an important new topic for analysts of world affairs.
Conceding that the elaboration of this topic within their book signals "the 
enormous gaps in our current understanding of the nature and scope of the
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topic/ ' 30 the editors of Lethal Commerce imply that identifying such gaps is an 
important first step towards facilitating a longer-term process in which subsequent 
research will eventually collapse the intellectual interstices. The hope here is that 
such a collapse will, in turn, ideally realise a complete and knowable profile of this 
topic from which decisive responses can be formulated and implemented. In fact, 
the editors of, and contributors to, this volume deliberately describe a problem in 
search of a solution; the topic of small arms and light weapons is problematised. By 
writing about this topic as a problem to be managed or solved by policymakers, 
researchers not only inform subsequent research into this topic, but can also shape 
the ways in which analysts of world affairs attempt to make sense out of this issue. 
In so doing, researchers aspire to influence the ways in which policymakers 
attempt to control these weapons. The final section of Lethal Commerce, for 
example, explores the prospects of establishing multilateral controls over small 
arms and light weapons, differentiating these prospects from past or existing 
controls over major conventional weapons, while identifying weaknesses inherent 
in diplomatic arms embargoes directed at particular governments.
Much of the research published before the turn of the millennium includes 
recommendations for possible future international action, with some, for example, 
quick to point to the expansion of the United Nations Register of Conventional 
Arms (UNROCA) as a remedy.31 Other recommendations include: introducing 
domestic arms censuses and regional arms trade registers; strengthening and 
harmonising governmental import and export controls; increasing the 
governmental efforts to suppress arms trafficking; reducing official stockpiles and 
the arsenals belonging to non-state armed groups; and establishing a 'weapons 
buyback' fund administered by the UN or other intergovernmental organisations.32 
For Jo L. Husbands, "a focus on the stages and processes of conflict provides a way
30 Boutwell, Klare, and Reed, 5.
31 Susannah L. Dyer and Natalie J. Goldring, "Analysing Policy Proposals to Limit Light 
Weapons Transfers," in Light Weapons and International Security, ed. Jasit Singh (Delhi: 
Indian Pugwash Society and British American Security Information Council, 1995), 128.
32 Klare and Andersen, 95-99.
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to array a wide variety of potential policy tools. Such an approach illuminates the 
problem of light arms proliferation and could simplify the task of identifying, 
assessing, and ultimately implementing different arms control strategies/'33 
(However, this particular approach, which is selective rather than ad-hoc, would 
rely, in any case, upon a broader framework through which to exert control.)
Published in 1999, Jeffrey Boutwell's and Michael T. Klare's Light Weapons and 
Civil Conflict: Controlling the Tools of Violence specifically reviewed existing and 
emerging multilateral attempts to control transfers of small arms and light 
weapons, though some chapters of this volume also deal with prospective controls. 
As its editors remark, this book:
surveys the wide range of policy options open to the international 
community. From local initiatives in countries such as South Africa to 
regional agreements in West Africa to international polices being 
proposed by the United Nations, the authors take a critical look at the 
feasibility of various types of instruments for controlling the trade in 
small arms and light weapons.34
Opening with a useful summary of the major literature dealing with this topic, its 
core chapters review and evaluate unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral control 
measures emerging from various regions, including Europe, North and South 
America, Africa, and Central Asia. In particular, the Inter-American Convention 
Against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, 
Explosives, and other related materials (OAS Convention),35 the Declaration of a 
Moratorium on the Importation, Exportation, and Manufacture of Light Weapons in West
33 Jo L. Husbands, "Controlling Transfers of Light Arms: Linkages to Conflict Processes and 
Conflict Resolution Strategies," in Lethal Commerce: The Global Trade in Small Arms and Light 
Weapons, eds. Jeffrey Boutwell, Michael T. Klare, and Laura W. Reed (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: Committee on International Security Studies, American Academy of Arts 
and Sciences, 1995), 133.
34 Jeffrey Boutwell and Michael T. Klare, "Introduction," chap, in Light Weapons and Civil 
Conflict: Controlling the Tools of Violence (New York: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 
1999), 3.
35 Refer to James P. McShane "Light Weapons and International Law Enforcement," in Light 
Weapons and Civil Conflict: Controlling the Tools of Violence, eds. Jeffrey Boutwell and Michael 
T. Klare (New York: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 1999), 173-182.
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Africa (ECOWAS Moratorium) , 36 the European Union's Programme for Preventing and 
Combating Illicit Trafficking in Conventional Arms (EU Programme) and the European 
Union's Code of Conduct for Arms Exports (EU Code of Conduct) ,37 as well as various 
UN efforts, such as Security Council arms embargoes, Disarmament Commission 
guidelines for international arms trade, and the Economic and Social Council 
(ECOSOC) Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice, are each 
identified and treated by researchers in Eight Weapons and Civil Conflict. The 
domestic restraints on US exports receive special attention here "not because U.S. 
laws are typical but because U.S. weapons production and weapons exports 
constitute such a major part of the world weapons market. " 38 In short, this 
collection of essays recognises that the existing controls under review are weak, 
limited, and easily undermined, if not simply ignored for the frequently-claimed 
reasons of inadequate resources and insufficient political will.
Since the turn of the millennium, the focus of research published by civil 
society organisations has broadened from identifying an urgent problem for 
policymakers managing the international security agenda, to also examining 
established multilateral controls over these weapons. This research seeks not only 
to reflect the nature and scope of the problem, but also to help prompt, shape, and 
construct responses to it.39 In their concluding essay, for instance, Boutwell and 
Klare convey a strong sense of leading the way towards a better practical solution, 
offering a range of policy options for consideration, particularly evident in the 
following passage:
36 Refer to Joseph P. Smaldone, "Mali and the West African Light Weapons Moratorium," in 
Light Weapons and Civil Conflict: Controlling the Tools of Violence, eds. Jeffrey Boutwell and 
Michael T. Klare (New York: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 1999), 129-145.
37 Refer to Paul Eavis and William Benson, "The European Union and the Light Weapons 
Trade," in Light Weapons and Civil Conflict: Controlling the Tools of Violence, eds. Jeffrey 
Boutwell and Michael T. Klare (New York: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 1999), 89- 
100.
38 Natalie J. Goldring, "Domestic Laws and International Controls," in Light Weapons and Civil 
Conflict: Controlling the Tools of Violence, eds. Jeffrey Boutwell and Michael T. Klare (New 
York: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 1999), 102.
39 Research seeking to help monitor the implementation of intergovernmental measures of 
control is explored in more depth by Chapter Five of this thesis as a significant part of civil 
society's arms control campaign.
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Ultimately, what is needed is the establishment of a multilayered regime 
covering the international transfer of small arms and light weapons, 
similar to the existing regimes covering nuclear, chemical, and 
biological weapons. Such a regime should consist of a matrix of 
national, regional, and international control measures —acting like a 
series of dams or filters —to screen out illicit sales and narrow the 
allowable scope for legal transfers.40
From this, it appears the book's contributors consider their comprehension of this 
topic to be significantly developed and advanced from the initial markings of its 
contours and partial illumination of its dynamic nature.
Like Lethal Commerce, Light Weapons and Civil Conflict resulted from a workshop 
held by AMACAS. Although both AMACAS and FAS are civil society 
organisations, AMACAS tends more toward scholarly work, though its 
conferences included participants from government departments and policy 
advocacy groups, while FAS is primarily a policy advocating think tank, 
institutions which, according to Weaver, typically "combine a strong policy, 
partisan or ideological bent with aggressive salesmanship and an effort to 
influence current policy debates. " 44 However, to complicate matters, "the 
boundary between objective policy evaluation and policy advocacy has become 
blurred . " 42 This is especially the case where advocacy groups cite a wide range of 
research to justify their policy recommendations. Yet, for the most part, where a 
call for action has been articulated by researchers hosted by civil society 
organisations, it prefers instruments of international law and, to a lesser extent, 
opportunities for collective action whereby governments cooperate within the 
broader internationalist governance architecture.
40 Jeffrey Boutwell and Michael T. Klare, "Light Weapons and Civil Conflict: Policy Options 
for the International Community," chap, in Light Weapons and Civil Conflict: Controlling the 
Tools of Violence (New York: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 1999), 221.
41 R. Kent Weaver, "The Changing World of Think Tanks," PS: Political Science and Politics 22, 
no.3 (September 1989): 567.
42 Ibid, 564.
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Intergovernmental Organisations
The research published by civil society organisations before the turn of the 
millennium was accompanied by research undertaken by some intergovernmental 
organisations. In particular, two UN reports, both of which were requested by 
resolutions of the UN General Assembly, stand out from a multitude of writings: 
first, the Report of the Panel of Governmental Experts on Small Arms (1997) and, 
second, the Report of the Group of Governmental Experts on Small Arms (1999). 
Intergovernmental organisations, however, did not necessarily respond to the call 
for action articulated by those civil society organisations hosting researchers 
publishing work on this topic. To be sure, this research conducted and 
disseminated under the auspices of the UN was requested by UN General 
Assembly Resolution 50/70 B in 1995.
By the same reasoning, the UNPoA, as one of the key instruments of
international law negotiated under the auspices of the UN, can be understood as a
consequence of the former Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, identifying
the problems associated with these weapons in his "Agenda for Peace."
Addressing the UN Security Council on 25 January 1995, Boutros-Ghali made the
following, and now much quoted, statement:
These issues [disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction] are of paramount importance both to the 
security of humankind and to the release of economic, scientific and 
technological resources for peace and human progress. In the present 
paper, however, devoted as it is to the Organization's recent experience in 
handling specific conflicts, I wish to concentrate on what might be called 
"micro-disarmament." By this I mean practical disarmament in the 
context of the conflicts the United Nations is actually dealing with and of the 
weapons, most of them light weapons, that are actually killing people in 
hundreds of thousands.43
In so doing, the then-Secretary-General acknowledged the increasing importance 
of small arms and light weapons to questions of international security, conceiving
43 United Nations General Assembly, Supplement To "An Agenda for Peace": Position Paper of the 
Secretary-General on the Occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations, UN Doc. 
A/50/60 (New York: United Nations, 1995), paragraph 60 (my emphasis added).
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these weapons as a threat alongside, if not ahead of, the long-standing concerns 
over weapons of mass destruction. (Care is taken, however, not to relegate those 
weapons as mere relics of a Cold War legacy.) Although not the first individual to 
draw attention to this topic, Boutros-Ghali was the first high-profile figure in 
contemporary world affairs to do so.44 The status of the forum in which the 
Secretary-General delivered his report not only formally introduced the challenge 
of controlling small arms and light weapons onto the international community's 
security agenda, but also ensured its ongoing priority as an item on that agenda. 
The "Agenda for Peace" helped prompt the 1997 panel of experts report, preceded 
the emergence of a body of international law, and contextualised this issue within 
the UN Security Council's peacekeeping operations.
While the former Secretary-General assumes a high degree of professional
responsibility on behalf of the international community, he was responding to a
call for action from President Alpha Oumar Konare of the Republic of Mali, an
African state experiencing conflict prolonged by the availability of small arms and
light weapons. Boutros-Ghali revealed as much when he stated the following:
A pilot advisory mission I dispatched to Mali in August 1994 at the 
request of that country's Government has confirmed the exceptional 
difficulty of controlling the illicit flow of small arms, a problem that can 
be effectively tackled only a regional basis. It will take a long time to 
find effective solutions. I believe strongly that the search should begin 
now.. .and I intend to play my full part in this effort.45
In other words, rather than the call for action analysed earlier in this chapter, 
Mali's diplomatic overtures to the UN in 1994 resonated among intergovernmental 
organisations, helping prompt some of those decisive responses to control small 
arms and light weapons examined in the following chapter. Furthermore, 
according to Graciela Uribe de Lozano, the UN General Assembly recognised the
44 Laurance and Stohl, 4.
45 United Nations General Assembly, Supplement To "An Agenda for Peace,"paragraphs 63 & 
65.
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topic of small arms and light weapons as deserving the international community's 
attention in its discussions dating as far back as its forty-third session in 1988.46
The 1997 "Foreword by the Secretary-General" foreshadows a pair of 
assumptions recurring throughout both reports: non-state actors bear a high 
degree of culpability for the problems caused by small arms and light weapons, 
and the preferred solutions to these problems are state-based. Kofi Annan 
emphasises that, when in "the hands of irregular troops operating with scant 
respect for international and humanitarian law, these weapons have taken a heavy 
toll of human lives" and that some "of the most protracted armed conflicts in the 
world at present are those in which a recurring cycle of violence, an erosion of 
political legitimacy and a loss of economic viability deprive a State of its authority 
to cope with either the causes or the consequences of an excessive accumulation, 
proliferation and use of small arms."47 The report's recognition of government 
culpability is mentioned only once, and is expressed rather timidly in the 
following passage:
States have the right to export and import small arms and light 
weapons. The misuse of that right and the relatively recent awareness of 
the problems caused by the accumulation of small arms and light 
weapons have resulted in insufficient recognition being accorded to the 
need to better control the transfer of such weapons.48
Such assumptions are deeply embedded in the internationalist institution from 
which they disseminate.
The 1997 report recognises proliferation, transfer, possession, and use as major 
aspects of the challenge of controlling small arms and light weapons, though it 
concedes that the "full extent of the destabilizing consequences of excessive 
accumulation, proliferation, transfer and use of small arms and light weapons is
46 Graciela Uribe de Lozano, "The United Nations and the Control of Light Weapons," in 
Light Weapons and Civil Conflict: Controlling the Tools of Violence, eds. Jeffrey Boutwell and 
Michael T. Klare (New York: American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1999), 164.
47 United Nations General Assembly, "Foreword by the Secretary-General," in Report of the 
Panel of Governmental Experts on Small Arms, UN Doc. A/55/298 (New York: United Nations, 
1997), 2.
48 United Nations General Assembly, Report of the Panel of Governmental Experts on Small Arms, 
paragraph 45.
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only beginning to be assessed."49 Accordingly, the report explores the 
consequences associated with the widespread availability of these weapons in 
regional contexts: Africa, Central America, South Asia, and Europe each receive 
attention as the "effects and consequences [are] unique to specific regions, 
subregions, and States."50 At the same time, the report helped restrict the scope of 
this challenge by noting that the issue of anti-personal landmines was being dealt 
with in another forum. In so doing, and by noting the progress of the UN 
Commission on Crime Prevention and Public Health and Safety towards the UN 
Firearms Protocol, the General Assembly's call for multilateral controls over small 
arms and light weapons avoided duplicating work undertaken elsewhere.51
The 1997 report also makes 24 recommendations in order "to reduce the 
excessive and destabilizing accumulation and transfer of small arms and light 
weapons in specific regions of the world where such accumulations and transfers 
have already taken place [...and] to prevent such accumulations and transfers 
from occurring in future."52 Included among these recommendations for the 
consideration of UN members is the use of domestic legalisation, regulation, and 
administrative procedures in order to determine conditions of civilian possession, 
help exercise effective control over this legal possession, and prevent trafficking. 
According to the report, the UN should help strengthen the capability of 
governments to confront this issue by supporting disarmament, demobilisation, 
and disposal programmes in post-conflict scenarios, by including weapons control 
elements in peace settlements which UN peacekeeping operations help implement, 
and by encouraging intergovernmental cooperation, specifically information 
exchange, at subregional and regional levels. The UN should also initiate studies 
dealing specifically with the marking and tracing of weapons, reducing legal
49 Ibid, paragraph 21.
50 Ibid, paragraph 62.
51 Gracia, Analyzing the Issue of Curbing the Unrestricted Availability and Proliferation of Small 
Arms and Light Weapons, 16.
52 United Nations General Assembly, Report of the Panel of Governmental Experts on Small Arms, 
paragraph 78. The 24 recommendations are contained in paragraphs 79 and 80 of the 
report.
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proliferation and transfer, and the closely related issue of ammunition. Most 
importantly, the report recommends that the UN "should consider the possibility 
of convening an international conference on the illicit arms trade in all its aspects, 
based on the issues identified in the present report."53 It refers to the OAS 
Convention as a possible model for a UN instrument of international law.
The 1999 report's purpose was to follow-up progress on each of the Panel of 
Experts' 24 recommendations, to propose further recommendations (whereby the 
Group of Experts note the relevance of Security Council arms embargoes), and to 
further prepare for the UN Small Arms Conference. The Group of Experts found 
that:
most of the recommendations in the 1997 report were in the process of 
being implemented. A few recommendations had been almost 
completely implemented, while for a few others implementation had 
not yet begun. The degree of progress with respect to most of the 
recommendations was encouraging as a whole, but differed according 
to the nature of each recommendation and to whom it was addressed.54
The legacy of these two reports, especially as the latter builds upon the diplomatic 
momentum generated by the former, is evident in the UNPoA, as the following 
chapter reveals. Here, then, the UN's contribution to the pool of research 
concerning the topic of small arms and light weapons occurred as a way of 
preparing, organising, and directly informing the decisive collective action of its 
members. This research recommends a series of particular measures to exert 
control over small arms and light weapons which will, in turn, help secure the 
existing internationalist governance architecture through instruments of 
international law and, to a lesser degree, collective action. Significantly, when the 
UN began preparing to take action, some researchers broadened their focus to 
include these preparations, suggesting that research disseminated by civil society 
organisations was the tail trying, unsuccessfully, to wag the intergovernmental 
dog.
53
54
Ibid, paragraph 80(k).
United Nations General Assembly, Report of the Group of Governmental Experts on Small 
Arms, UN Doc. A/54/258 (New York: United Nations, 1999), paragraph 58.
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Governments
As mentioned, the research published by civil society organisations sought to
establish a new topic for analysts of world affairs and to place issues associated
with these weapons on to the international security agenda. It encouraged other
members of the international community to negotiate and adopt controls over
these weapons, while aspiring to help shape those controls. At the same time,
intergovernmental organisations conducted their own research projects, but did so
as a means of prompting, informing, and coordinating collective responses. In the
shadow of this research, some governments further explored this topic against
certain geographic regions with particular relevance to their own foreign policy.
The US Defence Intelligence Agency, for example, commissioned the RAND
National Defence Research Institute to undertake a study entitled Arms Trafficking
and Colombia. Released in 2003, the report concludes that the Revolutionary Armed
Forces of Colombia (FARC) "has the resources and ability to strategically manage
its weapons supplies and could pose a threat to the United States should it choose
to do so." It continues, more broadly, that:
small-arms transfers have had a negative impact on regional stability in 
Latin America. Ready access to weapons has helped to both entrench 
and empower guerrilla and paramilitary forces in Colombia. Not only 
has this situation threatened the security of the fourth-largest economy 
in Latin America, it has also triggered highly deleterious cross-border 
flows of refugees, drugs, and violence that have already had a negative 
impact on Panama, Venezuela, Brazil, Peru, and Ecuador.55
Of course not all governments are equally active in this regard, as few 
disseminate research on this issue. And the research that is disseminated by 
governments is by no means the only response of those governments, nor is it their 
most decisive. Yet such research is important because it intends (or perhaps more 
aptly pretends) to shape aspects of that government's own foreign, defence, and 
trade policy, including any subsequent engagement with decisive control 
measures negotiated within intergovernmental organisations. Of those few
55 Kim Cragin and Bruce Hoffman, Arms Trafficking and Colombia (Santa Monica: RAND 
National Defense Research Institute, 2003), xxi.
96
instances where governments disseminate research, the research is most often 
commissioned to researchers external to the government and its bureaucracy. As 
Weaver points out, "[t]he research product of contract researchers more often 
consists of reports for specific government agencies than books or monographs for 
an academic audience....The research agenda for contract researchers is set 
primarily by what the agency is willing to pay for."56
David Capie's Small Arms Production and Transfers in Southeast Asia (2002) and 
Under the Gun: The Small Arms Challenge in the Pacific (2003) were commissioned in 
close consultation with the New Zealand government. (Even though in both books 
Capie explicitly acknowledges the Public Advisory Committee on Disarmament 
and Arms Control (PACDAC) for commissioning his research, the Peace and 
Disarmament Education Trust (PADET), a trust entity operating under its own 
deed, provided the funding and set the terms of reference.57) The New Zealand 
government can, therefore, claim part adherence to its international commitments 
by citing Section III, paragraph 18 of the UNPoA, which urges governments "to 
develop and support action-orientated research aimed at facilitating greater 
awareness and better understanding of the nature and scope of the problems 
associated with the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects."
The aims of both studies are very similar, notwithstanding their different
geographic focus. The 2002 study specifically:
seeks to make a contribution to the growing literature on the subject by 
offering the first comprehensive study of small arms production and 
transfers, both licit and illicit, in Southeast Asia...[and] contains some 
policy suggestions that decision makers in ASEAN and regional
56 Weaver, 566.
57 According to these terms of reference, "PADET wishes to engage a qualified researcher to 
write a report on the domestic production and transfers, legitimate and illicit, of small arms 
in the Southeast Asian region" and "PADET wishes to contract research into the legal and 
illegal transfers of small arms in South Pacific countries." For this research, Capie received 
over NZ$106,000 from PADET to meet contractual obligations, research-related expenses, 
and publishing assistance. This information was obtained through a request for Official 
Information, the correspondence of which is held by me. Copies of this information are 
available upon request.
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institutions such as the ASEAN Regional Forum might wish to consider 
to meet the small arms challenge.58
The 2003 study "offers an introduction to the problems presented by small arms 
and light weapons in the Pacific Islands. It seeks to fill an analytical and policy 
gap."59 This consistency in approach is not, in and of itself, necessarily a liability in 
terms of describing this topic in a meaningful way for analysts, or in terms of 
describing this problem in a useful way for policymakers. But because this 
commissioned research tends to merely reiterate the major aspects of the challenge 
to control small arms and light weapons, its analytic contribution to the pool of 
research on this topic is, at best, marginal.
Whereas Under the Gun does not consider 'proliferation' as a major aspect of 
this topic because no Pacific Island government possesses a manufacturing 
capability (though informal crafting of homemade weapons is acknowledged in a 
footnote), Small Arms Production and Transfers in Southeast Asia considers the 
production capability within Southeast Asia. In spite of omitting a definition of 
'proliferation/ even though its introduction clearly defines 'transfer/ the 2002 
study provides a brief historical account of the origins of Southeast Asia's 
manufacturing capability, and of the rationale informing this manufacturing. It 
refers specifically to the desire by some governments to obtain a greater sense of 
autonomy in pursuing their national security, though important economic 
incentives are not absent from such calculations either.60 However, Capie's 
concept of proliferation is much narrower than that used by Gonchar and Lock in 
their assessment of the former Soviet Union, as Capie deals only with 
manufactured arms licensed, authorised, or tolerated by authorities, without 
concerning himself to any great extent with black-market manufacture and 
informal production.
58 David Capie, Small Arms Production and Transfers in Southeast Asia (Canberra: Australian 
National University, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, 2002), 2.
59 Capie, Under the Gun, 17.
Capie, Small Arms Production and Transfers in Southeast Asia, 8.60
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Capie provides details of the production capability of Indonesia,61 Myanmar,62 
the Philippines,63 Singapore,64 and Thailand,65 as the only active manufacturers of 
these weapons among members belonging to ASEAN. More specifically, the types 
of weapons manufactured are identified and some estimates of quantities 
produced are provided. Rather than examining cumulative production trends, 
Capie employs a snapshot approach on a govemment-by-govemment basis and, 
therefore, falls short of illustrating a dynamic unfolding over time. Hence, 
although Capie's research contributes to the growing pool of research on this topic, 
and does so with a regional focus on Southeast Asia, its treatment of proliferation 
is not as advanced as Klare and Andersen's earlier study with its regional focus on 
Latin America.
In Small Arms Production and Transfers in Southeast Asia, Capie defines 'transfer' 
to include any transaction resulting in the change of ownership or control, 
including "not only direct sales of small arms, but also exchanges, barter- 
arrangements, gifts, thefts, loss, loans and transactions conducted for foreign aid or 
credit."66 Although this definition develops nuance from the structural 
distinctions articulated in Klare's earlier work, Capie then goes on to simplify 
these, perhaps for analytical convenience, into a "three-part typology...(1) clearly 
lawful transfers; (2) 'black market' or illicit transfers; and (3) 'grey market' 
transfers."67 With respect to transfers, then, Capie's 2002 work merely identifies 
the legal weapons flowing into the Southeast Asia from, for example, the PRC and 
the US. These flows are distinguished from illicit weapons flowing into and within 
Southeast Asia, as well as from those weapons legally held, produced, and traded 
among governments.68
61 Ibid, 78-87.
62 Ibid, 88-97.
63 Ibid, 34-46.
64 Ibid, 50-56.
65 Ibid, 67-77.
66 Ibid, 3.
67 Ibid, 4.
68 Ibid, 10.
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Capie's treatment of transfers focuses upon ten members of ASEAN, in which 
suppliers, specific weapon types, and quantities are identified. Cambodia, for 
example, is noted for becoming the largest supplier of small arms and light 
weapons in Southeast Asia, after receiving most of these weapons during its civil 
war .69 Capie concedes, however, "it is impossible to quantify just how many 
weapons were transferred to the various military factions. " 70 As with his 
treatment of proliferation, transfers are dealt with by way of a snapshot approach. 
Similar treatment is given to 'transfers' in Under the Gun, as numerous examples 
illuminate the existence and relevance of his 'three-part typology/ rather than 
demonstrate its dynamic nature. Moreover, the chapter entitled 'Licit Trade' 
commences with "a description of the inventories of the principal armed forces 
and armed police units in the Pacific, " 71 but does go on to identify supplying 
governments (of which the US, Israel, and South Korea are considered most 
important), weapons types, volumes, and in some cases values in US dollars.72
Transfers occurring as leakage from government stockpiles in the Pacific 
receive Capie's attention. In particular, he notes poor security surrounding 
military armouries and constabulary arsenals due to inadequate reporting 
processes and the corruptibility of personnel either with access to these weapons 
or responsibility for their safe storage. According to Capie, the impacts relating to 
weapons caches abandoned during the Second World War are over-emphasised by 
media reports, though abandoned ammunition, most of which probably remains 
buried and undisturbed, finds use in homemade weapons.73
In a very brief chapter, Under the Gun links weapons availability to their actual 
use in PNG, particularly their role in fostering incidents of violent crime, 
engendering wider cultures of lawlessness and impunity, encouraging human 
rights abuses and violations, and undermining democratic electoral practices. This
69 Ibid, 28.
70 Ibid.
71 Capie, Under the Gun, 63.
72 Ibid, 69.
73 Ibid, 110.
100
brief exploration of 'use' echoes the earlier approach adopted in Lethal Commerce, 
but does so with new geographic focus.
Here, then, in terms of the concepts used to make sense of the small arms and 
light weapons topic, Capie's work adds little, if anything, of intellectual value as it 
displays no innovative advances or radical departures from the earlier research 
published by, for instance, Klare and Andersen. Reiterating the established major 
aspects of the topic, Small Arms Production and Transfers in Southeast Asia and Under 
the Gun signal an intellectual reliance upon derived convention, rather than 
original invention. Both works engage a relatively new regional focus, however, 
dealing first with Southeast Asia and second with the Pacific. In this instance, the 
relationship between the research disseminated by civil society organisations and 
research commissioned by governments is not merely a common approach 
obtained in isolation, but one of endogenous development. Although this research 
commissioned by a government contributes to the literature dealing with small 
arms and light weapons after the turn of the millennium, it fails to re-cognise the 
problem it sought to describe, analyse, and help solve; that is, these two works fail 
to treat critically, and therefore re-conceptualise, this topic.
Just as Capie's work offers very little in terms of an analytic contribution to this 
pool of research, its policy utility is not self-evident and is, probably, non-existent. 
Following the lead of Light Weapons and Civil Conflict, existing legislative controls 
within the Pacific region are identified in Under the Gun, with a particular focus 
upon the various definitions of key terms, such as 'firearms' and 'possession,' 
though more emphasis is given to the inadequate resources provided for 
administering and enforcing this legislation.74 Cataloguing existing domestic 
legislation belonging to Pacific governments highlights the limited regional 
coordination over this problem, exposing "loopholes and inconsistencies" in 
licensing procedures, weapons-marking, storage, and penalties for non- 
compliance, each mentioned as specific issues needing improvement.75 As a
74 Ibid, 60.
75 Ibid, 116-122.
101
region, Southeast Asia is noteworthy for the absence of such coordinated controls 
or even a shift towards harmonising approaches to strengthening domestic 
legislation within ASEAN.
Both of Capie's studies, each concluding with a chapter providing policy 
recommendations, intend to help solve the problem of small arms and light 
weapons, as if answering the call to collapse the intellectual interstices proclaimed 
by the editors of Lethal Commerce. However, much of Capie's policy 
recommendations dealing specifically with Southeast Asia and the Pacific were 
already articulated in general terms by the UN reports of 1997 and 1999, with 
many of the 1997 report's recommendations having already been converted into 
international commitments under the UNPoA, negotiated in 2001. I quote briefly 
here just five examples in order to convey the degree of similarity between Capie's 
2002 and 2003 recommendations, and between both works and the UN's 1997 
report. (The extent of this comparison is not exhaustive, however.)
First, Capie writes that there "is no state in ASEAN that does not need to take 
at least some national action to address weaknesses in its regulation of arms 
production, possession, brokering or transfers,"76 and "the legal framework for the 
control of firearms and ammunition in the [Pacific] region needs attention in 
several areas."77 Compare his advice to that contained in paragraph 80(c) of the 
UN report: "All states should ensure that they have in place adequate laws, 
regulations and administrative procedures to exercise effective control over the 
legal possession of small arms and light weapons and over their transfer."
Second, according to Capie, "[wjhere there is political will [among ASEAN 
members] but a clear lack of resources to enforce laws, aid donors and institutions 
can play a role,"78 and "[w]hile law reform is an important and worthwhile 
objective, major questions remain about the ability of some Pacific states to enforce
76 Capie, Small Arms Production and Transfers in Southeast Asia, 103.
77 Capie, Under the Gun, 117.
78 Capie, Small Arms Production and Transfers in Southeast Asia, 108.
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the laws that are already on their books."79 Again, compare these
recommendations against paragraphs 79(a) and (b) of the UN report:
The United Nations should adopt a proportional and integrated 
approach to security and development, including the identification of 
appropriate assistance for the internal security forces initiated with 
respect to Mali and other West African states, and extend it to other 
regions of the world where conflicts come to an end and where serious 
problems of the proliferation of small arms and light weapons have to 
be dealt with urgently. The donor community should support this new 
approach in regard to such regions of the world;
The United Nations should support, with the assistance of the donor 
community, all appropriate post-conflict initiatives related to 
disarmament and demobilization, such as the disposal and destruction 
of weapons, including weapons tum-in programmes sponsored locally 
by governmental and non-governmental organizations.
Third, Capie writes that "[w]hile national level measures are important, 
tackling the illicit trade in small arms [in Southeast Asia] will also need to be 
supplemented with greater levels of regional cooperation,"80 referring specifically 
to information-sharing at the desk level, and a "bigger question is whether larger 
regional governments, in particular New Zealand and Australia, should rethink 
the focus of their defence assistance policies in the Pacific."81 Compare these 
recommendations against paragraphs 79(e) and (f) and paragraph 80(h) of the UN 
report, which read, respectively: "States and regional organizations, where 
applicable, should strengthen international and regional cooperation among 
police, intelligence, customs and border control officials in combating the illicit 
circulation of and trafficking in small arms and light weapons and in suppressing 
criminal activities related to the use of these weapons," "[t]he establishment of 
mechanisms and regional networks for information sharing for the above- 
mentioned purposes should be encouraged," and "[a]ll States and relevant 
regional and international organizations should intensify their cooperative efforts
79
80
81
Capie, Under the Gun, 117.
Capie, Small Arms Production and Transfers in Southeast Asia, 109. 
Capie, Under the Gun, 120.
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against all aspects of illicit trafficking mentioned in the present report that are 
related to the proliferation and accumulation of small arms and light weapons."
Fourth, Capie notes the significance of existing international agreements, such 
as the UnPoA82 and the Legal Framework for a Common Approach to Weapons Control 
Measures (Nadi Framework)83 So too does the UN report in paragraph 80(j): "Other 
regional organizations should take note, and make use, as appropriate, of the work 
of the Organisation of American States in preparing a draft inter-American 
convention against the illicit manufacturing of and trafficking in firearms, 
ammunition, explosives and other related materials."
Fifth, Capie suggests the potential usefulness of more research: "While there 
can be no simple way," he suggests, "to control weapons that are crafted out of old 
water pipes and bits of wood, understanding the nature of the problem in greater 
detail and in comparative perspective would be a useful first step....This is a 
subject that might usefully be taken up by research groups like Small Arms Survey 
and supported by regional governments."84 Paragraph 80(1) of the UN report also 
recommends: "[T]he United Nations should initiate studies on the following: (i) 
The feasibility of establishing a reliable system for marking all such weapons from 
the time of their manufacture; (ii) The feasibility of restricting the manufacture and 
trade of such weapons to the manufactures and dealers authorized by States, and 
of establishing a database of such authorized manufactures and dealers." 
Paragraph 80(m) goes on to state: "The United Nations should initiate a study on 
all aspects of the problem of ammunition and explosives."
By formally acknowledging both of these reports in his work, Capie reveals his 
work is not merely consistent with the UN reports which were published in the 
preceding decade, but that his recommendations are probably, at least in part, 
derived from them despite his lack of an appropriate acknowledgement. That the 
international community had, by the time of his works' publication, not only
82 Capie, Small Arms Production and Transfers in Southeast Asia, 110.
83 Capie, Under the Gun, 117.
84 Ibid, 121.
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begun to favour the problem-solving recommendations of the UN reports, but was 
also designing and implementing practical measures derived from these reports 
and in accordance with an instrument of international law, further illustrates the 
lack of independent thought in this commissioned research.
Capie's research, in and of itself, does not appear to have encouraged New 
Zealand's government to sign the UN Firearms Protocol, despite New Zealand 
officials being involved in its negotiation and New Zealand having ratified the 
protocol's parent convention, the United Nations Convention Against Transnational 
Organized Crime (UNCATOC). (New Zealand's accession to this protocol is, 
however, currently before its parliament.) Nor has the government changed its 
position regarding the UNPoA, with which New Zealand only "substantially 
complies, " 85 because its domestic laws do not require civilians to register their 
firearms unless these firearms are pistols, military-style semi-automatic firearms, 
or other restricted weapons.86 That Capie's research is more shaped by existing 
policy than it shapes future policy is unsurprising given this research was 
contracted on behalf of the government. For this reason, nothing in this chapter 
should be taken as a criticism of Capie's abilities as a researcher, but rather, as 
evidence illuminating the significant limitations of research contracted by 
governments. New Zealand's foreign policy is, nevertheless, in tune with an 
underlying consensus that government-based action, under the leadership of
ß
intergovernmental organisations, represents the preferred means of confronting 
the challenge of controlling small arms and light weapons.
85 New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, "Small Arms, Light Weapons:
Background Information," <http://www.mfat.govt.nz/foriegn/dis/smallarms/
salwbackground.html> (accessed 21 September 2006).
86 New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, "Disarmament," 
< www.mfat.govt.nz/FOREIGN-RELATIONS/l-Global-Issues/Disarmament> (accessed 5 
July 2007).
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Independen t Research Centres
The burgeoning of small arms and light weapons literature during the first five
years of the twenty-first century was congruent with both the proliferation of so-
called independent research centres and the better harnessing of the World Wide
Web through which these researchers disseminate much of their literature. For
example, the Institute for Security Studies (ISS), based in Pretoria, South Africa; the
Bonn International Center for Conversion (BICC); and the Stockholm International
Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) each maintains websites containing research on a
range of contemporary security issues, including the topic of small arms and light
weapons.87 These are, effectively, what Weaver calls "universities without
students." For Weaver, these think tanks:
tend to be characterized by heavy reliance on academics as researchers, 
by funding primarily from the private sector (with varying mixtures of 
foundation, corporate and individual funding), and by book-length 
studies as the primary research product. Although these organizations 
often address specific legislative proposals, their horizons have 
traditionally been long-term, focused on changing the climate of elite 
opinion.88
Flowever, writing in 1989 and focusing on US domestic politics, Weaver's 
definition needs updating here, as some newly-emerging independent research 
centres source funding from members of the international community, including 
various governments. More than a technical fiscal difference, this can strongly 
influence the type and scope of research activities undertaken.
Established in 1999, the Small Arms Survey, based in Geneva, Switzerland, and 
attached to the Graduate Institute for International Studies of the University of 
Geneva, is widely regarded as the pre-eminent research centre currently 
publishing literature on the topic of small arms and light weapons. Although 
other research centres, such as ISS, BICC, and SIPRI, continue publishing high 
quality research on this topic, the Small Arms Survey is the only institute dealing
87 For further information about these research centres, refer to the following websites, 
respectively: <http://www.iss.co.za>; <http://www.bicc.de>; and <http://www.sipri.org>.
88 Weaver, 564.
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exclusively with questions regarding these weapons. The Survey states its key 
objectives as follows:
to be the principal source of public information on all aspects of small 
arms; to serve as a resource centre for governments; policy makers, 
researchers, and activists; to monitor national and international 
initiatives (governmental and non-governmental) on small arms; and to 
act as a clearing house for the sharing of information and the 
dissemination of best practises. The Survey also sponsors field research 
and information-gathering efforts, especially in affected states and 
regions.89
Since its inception, it has released 19 Occasional Papers and 6 Special Reports, each 
of which are available on its official website, as are a range of relevant official 
documents.90 And since 2004, three book-length studies have been published.91 
The website also contains hyperlinks to other relevant research institutions. Not 
yet available online, however, are the many background reports which inform 
important chapters of the Small Arms Survey yearbooks.
Each year since 2001, the Small Arms Survey has disseminated a yearbook as 
its flagship publication. An evolving research agenda, enabling each publication 
to explore a particular theme, underpins these yearbooks, though major aspects of 
this topic—proliferation, transfer, possession, and use — consistently receive 
chapters in each annual edition. The inaugural Small Arms Survey (2001) identifies, 
for example, world production trends over time, provides estimates of both the 
volume and value of global small arms and light weapons production occurring in 
2000, and explores changes to the internal composition of this industrial sector. It 
notes a decline in overall production capability, an increase in the number of firms 
involved in producing these weapons, and a shift away from governmental control 
towards privatisation. Ammunition is acknowledged as representing an
89 Small Arms Survey, Small Arms Survey 2001, ii.
90 Figures given here are as at March 2007. For more up-to-date figures on publications, and 
further information on the Small Arms Survey, please refer to its website at 
<http://www.smallarmssurvey.org>.
91 Pezard and Anders; Florquin and Berman; Robert Muggah, ed., No Refuge: The Crises of 
Refugee Militarization in Africa (Geneva: Small Arms Survey and Bonn International Center 
for Conversion by Zed Books, 2006).
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increasingly important element of overall production output as "the value of 
global ammunition production was almost double the value of global small arms 
production."92 The other major aspects receive comparable treatment. Chapters in 
ensuing yearbooks build upon these profiles, revising them where new 
information comes to hand.
Put simply, the research published as yearbooks by the Small Arms Survey 
represents the single most comprehensive source of information and analysis on 
this topic, even though its sophisticated and wide-ranging treatment is 
geographically uneven and, like all major research on this topic, it is unable to 
overcome its epistemic anxiety.
Intergovernmental measures of control also receive regular attention in these 
yearbooks. The 2001 edition, providing a general survey introducing "recent 
multilateral action," distinguishes these measures as either global or regional and 
subregional. Although useful as a catalogue of responses, that chapter does not 
engage in comparative analysis, nor does it express an appreciation that these 
measures emerge as a suite of controls despite acknowledging that "progress at 
one level [is] spurring progress at another."93 As such, twelve major measures are 
regarded, in turn, as autonomous instruments. The 2002 yearbook devotes one 
chapter to describing the UN Small Arms Conference and the UNPoA, though the 
contributions of other initiatives to the UNPoA also receive attention,94 while 
another chapter examines prospective ways of strengthening elements of existing 
measures. The subsequent yearbooks—Development Denied (2003) and Rights at 
Risk (2004)—discuss emerging norms of governmental behaviour in international 
law and international politics, and the importance of monitoring international 
agreements, respectively. The yearbooks7 ongoing treatment of these measures of 
control, complemented by its occasional case studies dealing with the operation of
92 Small Arms Survey, Small Arms Survey 2001,14.
93 Ibid, 251.
94 Small Arms Survey, Small Arms Survey 2002, 209-210.
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specific measures in particular locales, sheds light on this major response by the 
international community.
Yet, the Small Arms Survey is itself an important part of the international 
community's response to the challenge of controlling small arms and light 
weapons, as well as a by-product of the negotiation between the international 
community (as arms control protagonists) and the existing international 
governance architecture, receiving funding support from some governments and 
intergovernmental organisations.95 The project managers of the Survey recently 
proposed broadening its mission statement to include itself as "a support 
mechanism for international, regional, and national initiatives/' which they 
describe as "a logical extension of the original core mission. " 96 This broadening of 
function will further embed this so-called independent research centre in the 
governance architecture underpinning contemporary world order, curtailing its 
ability to engage critically with this challenge. Moreover, the decision to release 
the yearbooks during significant international meetings suggests the project's 
managers are less concerned with changing policy positions than they are with 
providing a resource for those members of the international community 
responding decisively to this challenge as arms control protagonists. Like 
contracted research, these yearbooks are less a call for international action, as they 
are instruments to help shape intergovernmental policy guiding decisive action.
95 According to the Small Arms Survey 2005, its editors "are extremely grateful to the Swiss 
Government for its generous financial and overall support of the Small Arms Survey 
project....Financial support for the project was also provided by the Governments of 
Australia, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, 
Sweden, and the United Kingdom. The project has also received financial support for the 
various research projects from the Geneva International Academic Network (GIAN), the 
Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie, the United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP), and the South Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of Small 
Arms and Light Weapons (SEESAC). The project further benefits from the assistance and 
support of a number of governmental and international agencies, including the 
International Committee of the Red Cross, the UN Department for Disarmament Affairs, 
the UN Institute for Disarmament Research, and the World Health Organization." Refer to 
Small Arms Survey, Small Arms Survey 2005, vii.
96 Small Arms Survey, "The Small Arms Survey: Towards the Next Five Years," Unpublished 
memo prepared for the International Programme Council Meeting, 13 July 2005, New York, 
2 .
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The Small Arms Survey shares much in common with Weaver's university
without students. As Weaver explains in the following passage:
The label "universities without students" naturally raises a question: if 
these places are doing the same thing as university faculties, why 
should they exist at all? The answer is that research from the two types 
of organizations is usually somewhat different, for several reasons. First, 
university-based researchers face a different set of incentives; interests 
in substantive policy issues and in the policy process is rarely rewarded 
as much in the university as are theoretical contributions to the 
researcher's discipline. At think tanks, these priorities are reversed. A 
second reason university-based research may differ from that at think 
tanks is that university-based researchers are less likely to have contact 
with policy activists and other policy researchers than those at think 
tanks. For both of these reasons, the "studentless universities" are more 
likely than universities to produce research that is attuned to current 
policy debates. This research is also likely to take a different form— 
more likely books and monographs than articles in refereed academic 
journals. And it is more likely to include conclusions about how current 
policy should be modified, even if those conditions are grudgingly 
tacked on by the researcher in the last chapter.97
Compared to researchers hosted by civil society organisations, the policy divisions 
of governments and intergovernmental organisations, and independent research 
centres, academics based in universities have, until recently, published little 
scholarly work concerning the topic of small arms and light weapons. Since 2002, 
however, three prominent academic journals — Brown Journal of World Affairs, SAIS 
Review, and Contemporary Security Policy—have published special editions dealing 
with this topic.98 Numerous papers dealing specifically with this topic have been 
delivered at conferences of the International Studies Association,99 signalling the
97 Weaver, 566.
98 Please refer to Brown Journal of World Affairs 9, no.l (2002), SAIS Review XXIII, no.l (Winter- 
Spring, 2003), and Contemporary Security Policy 27, no.l (April 2006). These peer-reviewed 
scholarly journals differ from serials, such as The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists and Arms 
Control Today, which are published by nongovernmental organisations with specific policy 
advocacy goals.
99 See, for example, the Archived Papers of the ISA Conference in 2007, which include: Bob 
Clifford "Gunning for the Globe: Movement and Countermovement in the Small Arms 
Control Process"; Miranda Alison, "Gender and Small Arms: Where to from here?"; Anne- 
Kathrin Glatz, "Norm Diffusion: Top-Down or Bottom-Up? Small Arms Norms in South 
Africa, El Salvador, and in the International Level"; Marie Olson Lounsbery, Suzette
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increasing currency that this emerging topic enjoys among academics. Following 
Lora Lumpe's Running Guns: The Global Black Market in Small Arms (2000), Denise 
Garcia's Small Arms and Security: Nezo Emerging International Norms (2006) and The 
Global Gun Epidemic: From Saturday Night Specials to AK47s (2006) written by Wendy 
Cukier and Victor W. Sidel are two recent book-length academic studies dealing 
specifically with this topic, while other book-length academic studies devote 
chapters to the topic, such as Alley's Internal Conflict and the International 
Community: Wars without End? (2004) and Elke Krahmann's New Threats and New 
Actors in International Security (2005).
The direct impact of academic research is, however, less apparent in 
comparison to the research disseminated by civil society organisations, 
governments and intergovernmental organisations, or independent research 
centres. Where academics, such as Owen Greene of Bradford University, 
contribute research to civil society organisations, they do so, for the most part, not 
primarily to educate their students, but in order to pursue specific policy 
objectives.100 For Garcia, "[ajwareness-raising regarding the problems caused by 
small arms and light weapons proliferation on the international agenda happened 
in two parallel processes during the 1990s: one was a 'knowledge-generation 
process' and the other was an 'acknowledgement of the problem' process that took 
place within the United Nations General Assembly."101 Flowever, the processes 
overlap as academics, such as Edward Laurance, act as consultants to the various
Grillot, and Frederic Pearson, "Controlling the Flow of Small Arms and Light Weapons: 
The Role of Official and NGO Sanctions"; Indra de Soysa and Christin Ormhaug, "Death 
Wish? Globalization and the Demand for Small Arms"; Katchik Derghoukassian, "Security 
Governance in Europe and Latin America: Controlling the Flow of Small Arms and Light 
Weapons"; and Kai Michael Kenki, "Small Arms Control: A Prerequisite for 
Peacebuilding?"
100 Along with Mike Bourne, Owen Greene of the Department of Peace Studies at the 
University of Bradford is a member of the Biting the Bullet team, which is responsible for 
writing the Implementing the Programme of Action 2003: Action by States and Civil Society 
(London: International Action Network on Small Arms, 2003); International Action on Small 
Arms 2005: Examining Implementation of the UN Programme of Action (London: International 
Action Network on Small Arms, 2005); and, Reviewing Action on Small Arms 2006: Assessing 
the First Five Years of the UN Programme of Action (London: International Action Network on 
Small Arms, 2006).
101 Garcia, Making New International Norms, 6.
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UN panels, as well as contributing research to civil society organisations, 
independent research centres, and scholarly journals.102 The 1997 and 1999 UN 
reports also consulted a wide range of researchers, including some academics.
Finally, a recent initiative attempts to bring the diverse array of researchers 
dealing with this topic closer together, at least in cyberspace. The Research 
Initiative on Small Arms (RISA) has an overarching goal "to enlarge the global 
epistemic community that provides the evidence-based knowledge needed to 
achieve the policy goals of the global effort to prevent and reduce the negative 
effects from small arms and light weapons."103 Since its emergence in mid 2004, 
RISA has published a special edition of the HFG Review, entitled Small Arms: A Call 
for Research, that includes five chapters which, collectively, pose a further set of 
research questions.104 The influence of this very recent harnessing of the global 
epistemic community remains to be seen however, but merits a brief mention here, 
especially as the call for action by researchers has now given way to a call for more 
research guided by a renewed research agenda.
Despite this flurry of scholarly attention, most researchers neglect the literature 
on small arms and light weapons as a topic of enquiry in its own right, which is 
surprising given that researchers were among the first to identify and respond, by 
calling for action, to the problem of the widespread availability and ongoing use of 
small arms and light weapons. It is also surprising because researchers continue to 
seek to inform policies developed by governments and within intergovernmental 
organisations that, if implemented, will both guide and restrain decisive action. In
102 Mitsuro Donowaki, Chairman of the Panel of Governmental Experts on Small Arms, 
expressed the panel's appreciation of Laurance's contribution to their work as consultant. 
Laurance, who helped establish I ANS A, has also authored research published by 
AM AC AS—in both Lethal Commerce and Light Weapons and Civil Conflict—by the Small 
Arms Survey—as an Occasional Paper with Rachel Stohl in 2002 and as a principle author 
of a chapter in the 2002 yearbook, while every yearbook to date acknowledges his 
contribution—and in 2002 in the Brown Journal of World Affairs.
103 For the announcement of this new project, dated 3 October 2004, presumably by Edward 
Laurance, please refer to <http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/files/sas/about/RISA.pdf> 
(accessed 9 September 2006).
104 Small Arms and Light Weapons: A Call For Research (New York: The Harry Frank 
Guggenheim Foundation, 2005).
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fact, as this chapter demonstrates, the literature written by researchers constitutes 
a major response to the widespread availability and ongoing use of small arms and 
light weapons.
Conclusion
Hosted by civil society organisations, the policy divisions of governments and 
intergovernmental organisations, and independent research centres, researchers 
were among the first to identify this topic as a serious issue for contemporary 
world affairs, deserving sustained treatment as a topic for analysts of world affairs 
and as an urgent problem for policymakers addressing the security agenda. 
Indeed, the literature produced by researchers constitutes a major response to the 
widespread availability and ongoing use of these weapons, sustaining a marginal 
role for researchers as members of the international community confronting the 
challenge of controlling small arms and light weapons.
The topic of small arms and light weapons was first conceived as a problem for 
policymakers within four major works published by civil society organisations but 
was, in turn, developed by other researchers. The identification of major aspects of 
this topic—in particular, the proliferation, transfer, possession, and use of these 
tools of violence—the placing of these aspects in various contexts, and the 
illustration of these aspects' dynamic nature, each demonstrates cognitive 
continuity among researchers. Yet their cartography is, and must always be, 
incomplete. This is self-consciously signalled by these researchers' ubiquitous 
concern over the quality and extent of their sources of information; that is, their 
epistemic anxiety. This is not to negate the important differences among this pool 
of research, but rather, to emphasise the common treatment of the major aspects of 
the small arms and light weapons topic among these works as both consistent and 
uncritical, even in research conducted by the Small Arms Survey, widely regarded 
as currently publishing literature par excellence on this topic.
Largely, if not exclusively, driven by policy-advocating civil society 
organisations—in particular, AMACAS and FAS—the literature describing the
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topic of small arms and light weapons published between 1995 and 2000 called for 
international action. And this call has been, by and large, a call for governments to 
cooperate within existing grand politico-strategic frameworks —or what this thesis 
describes as the internationalist governance architecture. Calling for action to be 
taken under UN leadership and, consequently, preferring instruments of 
international law and collective action, researchers underscore, strengthen, and 
reinscribe an internationalist orthodoxy as the predominant world-ordering 
principle. There is, however, little available evidence suggesting this call to action 
resonated with, was even seriously regarded by, or provided any motivation to, 
other members of the international community. More likely, the decisive action 
examined in Chapters Three and Four were triggered as responses to other events 
and trends, including the armed violence occurring in places like Mali and its 
African neighbours.
Following the turn of the millennium, research published as an attempt to 
shape the international community's decisive action, even where particular 
governments commissioned this research, has had a negligible influence on 
shaping policy. Compared to other members of the international community 
considered in Part II of this thesis, researchers' responses to the challenge of 
controlling small arms and light weapons are less powerful, despite the extensive 
amount of research published on this topic. This is unsurprising given researchers 
are primarily discursive agents, rather than decisive actors. This does not mean 
that their response is unimportant; it does mean, however, that while research 
might be policy orientated it does not necessary drive or influence policy 
formulation in immediate ways. It also suggests researchers are in serious 
conversation, but mostly among themselves. While researchers might correctly 
argue that, "reliable information and research go hand in hand with effective 
policy-making,"105 policymakers need not necessarily share this belief, nor act in 
ways consistent with it.
105 Small Arms Survey, Small Arms Survey 2003, 4.
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Q  INTERGOVERNMENTAL ORGANISATIONS 
\D  .  AND MEASURES OF CONTROL
The international community's most significant response to the widespread 
availability and ongoing use of small arms and light weapons manifests as 
various attempts to impose regulatory controls over the manufacture and 
transfer of these weapons. As an intergovernmental organisation with global 
reach, the UN in particular strongly encourages the implementation of these 
attempts and their auxiliary processes, though regional and subregional 
intergovernmental organisations, including the OAS, EU, and the Economic 
Community of West African States (ECOWAS), have taken important initiatives 
too.
This chapter introduces the major instruments of international law that have 
been negotiated multilaterally within intergovernmental organisations as a 
means of providing frameworks for regulatory regimes controlling small arms 
and light weapons. In a few cases it also notes briefly the historical 
circumstances from which these measures of control emerge, indicating reasons 
for obstacles and trade-offs occurring during their negotiation. These measures 
are distinguished here as either treaties or soft law measures. Each is then 
analysed in terms of its current status, technical scope, participants and, 
therefore, geographic coverage. No single instrument is favoured as a panacea, 
however. By scrutinising the texts of these measures, this chapter assesses the 
degree to which these strategic frameworks, when considered collectively as a 
mosaic of responsibilities comprising of obligations and commitments, are 
capable of controlling small arms and light weapons. This kind of collective 
assessment is necessary given the challenge these measures seek to confront is, as 
the work of the research community illustrates, multifaceted—and by that I 
mean it comprises of major aspects which each need to be addressed in order for 
the challenge to be overcome —and geographically vast, with its major centres of
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production, weapons flows, hotspots of intense use, and myriad of deleterious 
varying impacts each spread unevenly throughout the world.
Treaties
Before the turn of the millennium, there was very little in the way of an 
established international legal basis from which to draw guidance for 
establishing controls over small arms and light weapons.1 Indeed, referring to 
international controls in general, Andre Stemmet notes, "it has to be conceded 
that international law is a weak regime."2 Nevertheless, treaty law serves as a 
basis for some measures of control developed by intergovernmental 
organisations and, according to Glenn McDonald and Silvia Catteneo, "treaties 
are the clearest expression of states' consent to be legally bound."3 Since the late 
1990s, four treaties seeking to foster regulatory controls over small arms and 
light weapons have emerged: first, the OAS Convention entered into force on 1 
July 1998; second, the Protocol on the Control of Firearms, Ammunition, and other 
Related Materials in the Southern African Development Community Region (SADC 
Firearms Protocol) entered into force on 8 November 2004; third, the UN Firearms 
Protocol entered into force on 3 July 2005; and fourth, the Nairobi Protocol for the 
Prevention, Control and Reduction of Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Great Lakes 
Region and the Horn of Africa (Nairobi Protocol) entered into force on 5 May 2006.4
1 Erwin Dahinden, "Foreword," in Small Arms and Light Weapons: Legal Aspects of National 
and International Regulations, eds. Erwin Dahinden, Julie Dahlitz, and Nadia Fischer, 
Volume IV, Arms Control and Disarmament Law (Geneva: United Nations, 2002), xix.
2 Andre Stemmet, "Learning from field experience," in Small Arms and Light Weapons: Legal 
Aspects of National and International Regulations, eds. Erwin Dahinden, Julie Dahlitz, and 
Nadia Fischer, Volume IV, Arms Control and Disarmament Law (Geneva: United 
Nations, 2002), 27.
3 Small Arms Survey, Small Arms Survey 2003, 216.
4 For a full text of the OAS Convention, refer to <http://www.oas.org
/juridico/english/treaties/a-63.html> (accessed 29 April 2004); for a full text of the UN 
Firearms Protocol, refer to <http://www.rmodc.Org/i.modc/en/-ime cicp resolutions.html> 
(accessed 7 November 2005); for a full text of the SADC Firearms Protocol, refer to 
<http://www.sadc.int/index.php?action=al001&pageid ^protocols firearms> (accessed 14 
December 2004); for a full text of the Nairobi Protocol, refer to
<http://www.saferafrica.org/DocumentsCentre/NAIROBI-Protocol.asp> (accessed 3 May 
2004).
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For Greene, these kinds of treaties break new ground because "[international 
norms, rules and institutions are being developed in a range of issue areas where 
there is little history of substantial international co-ordination."5
The OAS, first considering small arms trafficking in 1990 as an issue relating 
to narcotics trafficking and other organised criminal activities occurring in South 
America, held at least three Group of Experts meetings between October 1993 
and May 1996. These meetings led to the development of common import, in­
transit, and export authorisations among its members, codified in the Model 
Regulations for the Movement of Firearms, their Parts and Components, and 
Ammunition. As James P. McShane recalls, during these meetings and their 
intervening periods "[a] consensus developed that to both comprehend and 
effectively combat illicit firearms trafficking, there had to be a greater 
understanding of how the legal trade occurred. There was also a growing sense 
that loose controls over the legal trade were the real problem when it came to 
illicit trafficking."6 The OAS Convention, drafted by a few governments 
describing themselves as the Rio Group,7 was adopted on 13 November 1997 
and, following its ratification by the Bahamas and Mexico, entered into force on 1 
July 1998.
As a regional organisation comprising of 35 member-states, the OAS spans 
two continents and has an almost hemispheric scope, though only 26 of its 
members have ratified the OAS Convention: Canada and the US are two members 
featuring among the ranks of those yet to ratify.8 Even though the US played a 
significant role in articulating the convention's text, signing the convention in
5 Greene, 152.
6 McShane, 174.
7 At that time, the Rio Group comprised the following members: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, 
Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela.
8 As at 1 April 2007, the following states have ratified the OAS Convention: Antigua and 
Barbuda, Argentina, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa 
Rica, Dominica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, 
Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, Trinidad and Tobago, 
Uruguay, and Venezuela. <http://www.oas.org/DIL/treaties and agreements.htm> 
(accessed 1 April 2007).
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November 1997,9 by mid 2006 it had yet to ratify the treaty despite its 
compatibility with relevant US policies and domestic regulations. In fact, this 
non-ratification of the CMS Convention has recently been contextualised among 
other treaties, including the Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change, the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 
and the Verification Protocol to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, 
Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on 
their Destruction, which the US has also failed to ratify.10 Although the effects of 
the US' failure to ratify the OAS Convention are, in part, mitigated because the US 
continues to act in ways consistent with the OAS Convention, the efficacy of the 
instrument is inhibited because the US, as the OAS' most powerful member, has 
only observer status at the Consultative Committee meetings and cannot exercise 
a vote. As Matthew Schroeder points out, "[e]xhortations by American 
diplomats to comply with the Convention ring hollow when their own country 
has not ratified it."* 11
Developed as a component of UNCATOC, the UN Firearms Protocol refers 
specifically to its parent convention and could only enter into force after 
UNCATOC itself had entered into force, that is, after 29 September 2003. This 
protocol, a draft of which was requested by the UN Commission for Crime 
Prevention and Criminal Justice in 1998, has its origins in a study on firearms 
regulation conducted in 1995 by the Vienna-based Centre for International Crime 
Prevention.12 On 31 May 2001, the UN General Assembly adopted the protocol, 
opening it for signature. The opening for signature of this protocol was, 
however, somewhat retarded in comparison to its two complementary 
protocols—supplementing UNCATOC are the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and 
Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children and the Protocol 
Against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Air and Sea—both of which were
9 Matthew Schroeder, Small Arms, Terrorism and the OAS Firearms Convention, Occasional
Paper no.l (Washington D.C.; Federation of American Scientists, 2004), 32.
10 Ibid, 34.
11 Ibid, 33.
12 Brem and Rutherford, 176.
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agreed and signed in 2000. (However, relative to many other non-'arms control' 
treaties, its negotiation could be considered expedient.13) The protracted 
negotiation of the UN Firearms Protocol was due, in part, to disagreement over 
defining key terms, the applicability of weapons-marking requirements, and the 
status of non-commercial transfers of these weapons. In particular, the 
involvement of the US National Rifle Association (NRA), opposing domestic 
regulation of civilian ownership, complicated negotiations: however, since the 
NRA involved itself so closely in the negotiation phase, its future opposition to 
this protocol could be subject to charges of hypocrisy.14 (Such charges could also 
be targeted at any NRA opposition to the OAS Convention.) During its 
negotiation, the draft text of the protocol was weakened in its technical scope, 
excluding controls over arms brokers, govemment-to-govemment transfers, and 
weapons-marking standards.15
This treaty entered into force on 3 July 2005 after 45 of its 60 signatories had 
ratified it.16 Unlike the 'hemispheric' OAS Convention, the UN Firearms Protocol is 
global in its potential geographic coverage. Although it represents an important 
development towards controlling small arms and light weapons through 
regulation, the primary purpose of the UN Firearms Protocol is to provide 
governments with a means of combating organised criminals by seeking to 
restrict the scale and conduct of their illegal activities. On this basis, it seeks to 
combat and reduce the illicit manufacture of, and trafficking in, these weapons 
across international borders; however, Article IV specifically limits its application
13 Small Arms Survey, Small Arms Survey 2002, 237'.
14 Ibid, 238.
15 Ibid, 237-240.
16 As at 1 April 2007, the following states have ratified the UN Firearms Protocol: Algeria,
Argentina, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Belgium, Benin, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Cape 
Verde, Central African Rupublic, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, El Salvador, Estonia, 
Grenada, Guatemala, Italy, Jamaica, Kenya, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Latvia, 
Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Lithuania, Mali, Malawi, Mauritius, 
Mexico, Moldova, Montengro, Mozambique, Netherlands, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, 
Panama, Peru, Poland, Rwanda, Romania, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Sao Tome and Principe, 
Senegal, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Tanzania, Turkey, Turkmenistan, 
Uganda, and Zambia. <http://www.unodc.Org/i.modc/en/crime cicp
signatures firearms.html> (accessed 1 April 2007).
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to "where those offences are transnational in nature and involve an organized 
criminal group."17
Developed contemporaneously with the UN Firearms Protocol, the SADC 
Firearms Protocol did not rely upon the diplomatic momentum generated from 
within the UN, but rather, was often ahead of discussion facilitated by the UN in 
terms of its technical focus, even if it was not as far advanced in its negotiation 
phase.18 Established in 1980 and, for the following twelve years, operating 
without the guidance of a formal framework or foundational charter, SADC 
enlarged its membership and in 1992 formalised the organisation under a 
Memorandum of Agreement concerning development integration, the promotion 
of security, and the defence of peace within its subregion.19 The subregion was, 
of course, struggling to overcome the legacies of conflict in Namibia and 
Mozambique during the late 1980s, as well as the increasing lawlessness 
resulting from widespread and ongoing small arms and light weapons misuse in 
post-apartheid South Africa. The origin of the SADC Firearms Protocol can be 
traced to a SADC Council of Ministers meeting held in 1999 at Maputo, 
Mozambique, which called for a regional policy on small arms and light 
weapons that would include a non-legally binding declaration, adopted in 2001, 
the protocol, and a plan of implementation.20 The treaty was signed by 13 
Southern African governments on 14 August 2001. Entering into force on 8 
November 2004, the SADC Firearms Protocol has been ratified by nine of SADC's 
14 members, leaving Angola as the only member not to have signed this treaty.21
17 United Nations General Assembly, Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and 
Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and Components and Ammunition, supplementing the 
United Nations Convention against Transnational Orgabized Crime, Article 4(1).
18 Noel Stott, Implementing the Southern Africa Firearms Protocol: Identifying challenges and 
priorities, Institute for Security Studies Paper no.83 (Pretoria: Institute for Security 
Studies, 2003), 3.
19 Hussein Solomon, "Controlling Light Weapons in Southern Africa," in Light Weapons and 
Civil Conflict: Controlling the Tools of Violence, eds. Jeffrey Boutwell and Michael T. Klare 
(New York: American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1999), 151.
20 Stemmet, 23.
21 As at 1 April 2007, the following states have ratified the SADC Firearms Protocol: 
Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Tanzania,
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The most recently negotiated treaty providing a framework for regulatory 
regimes controlling small arms and light weapons is the Nairobi Protocol which, 
like the SADC Firearms Protocol, is subregional in scope. Building upon a 
declaration by the foreign ministers of ten governments located within the Great 
Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa on 15 March 2000,22 the Second Ministerial 
Review Conference of the Nairobi Declaration on the Problem of Illicit Small 
Arms and Light Weapons in the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa 
opened the Nairobi Protocol for signature on 21 April 2004. This protocol, 
designed by a panel of governmental experts, was immediately signed by eleven 
governments of the subregion.23 Somalia, a key source of unregulated weapons 
since its government ceased to function in 1991, followed suit by signing the 
protocol in June 2005.24 This subregion is, of course, notable for its recent 
conflicts, and the international dimensions of these conflicts are illustrated by the 
UN sanction regimes targeting Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Rwanda and by the UN 
peacekeeping operations hosted by Burundi, Democratic Republic of the Congo, 
Ethiopia, Eritrea, Rwanda, Sudan, and Uganda. The protocol entered into force 
on 5 May 2006 after it was ratified by eight signatories,25 its ratification no doubt 
expedited by the international attention given to the subregion's prolonged and 
intense conflicts and by the external support received from the UK Department 
for International Development, Saferworld, SaferAfrica, and the Security 
Research and Information Centre.
and Zambia. <http://www.sadc.int/english/documents/legal/protocols/status.php> 
(accessed 1 April 2007).
22 UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, "Great Lakes: Light arms, a 
scourge for peaceful development," 4. <www.irinnews.org/print.asp?ReportID=39356> 
(accessed 13 September 2006).
23 The signatories were Burundi, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Ethiopia, 
Eritrea, Kenya, Rwanda, Seychelles, Sudan, Uganda, and Tanzania.
24 Regional Centre on Small Arms, Progress: Implementing the Nairobi Declaration to Tackle 
Small Arms in the Great Lakes region and the Horn of Africa 6 (Nairobi: Regional Centre in 
Small Arms, 2006): 4.
25 As at 8 March 2007, Burundi, Djibouti, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Eritrea, 
Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda and Uganda had ratified this agreement. The Seychelles, 
Sudan, and Tanzania had signed but not yet ratified it. For more up-to-date information, 
please refer to <http://www.iansa.org/regions/cafrica/nairobi-protocol.htm> (accessed 8 
March 2007).
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Despite each treaty emerging from within different intergovernmental 
organisations and framing its justification for responding to the challenge of 
controlling small arms and light weapons in terms reflecting its own unique 
historical circumstances, all four treaties have in common a belief in collective 
security and embody an ongoing commitment to the existing internationalist 
governance architecture, though this commitment is neither absolute nor 
uncontested. Given that most governments belong to more than one 
intergovernmental organisation, causing the geographic coverage of these 
treaties to converge, and given that these treaties interrelate at a technical level, 
creating a mosaic of obligations, these instruments of international law ought to 
be considered collectively as a suite of strategic frameworks, rather than 
separately as autonomous instruments. As mentioned, this kind of assessment is 
also pertinent since the problem these measures seek to confront is multifaceted 
and geographically vast.
The stated objectives of these treaties reflect their common purpose, revealing
a shared but implicit assumption that governments, by cooperating, have a better
chance of managing and/or mitigating the threats posed by these weapons,
including the threat posed to their monopoly over the legitimate use of force
within their respective jurisdictions. The OAS Convention, as the first of these
treaties to undergo negotiation, states its objective as:
to prevent, combat, and eradicate the illicit manufacturing of and 
trafficking in firearms, ammunition, and other related materials; to 
promote and facilitate cooperation and exchange of information and 
experience among State Parties to prevent, combat, and eradicate the 
illicit manufacturing of and trafficking in firearms, ammunition, and 
other related materials.26
Following the OAS Convention, the UN Firearms Protocol states its almost identical 
objective with more concision: "to promote, facilitate and strengthen cooperation 
among State Parties in order to prevent, combat and eradicate the illicit
26 Organization of American States, Inter-American Convention Against The Illicit 
Manufacturing O f And Trafficking In Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives, And Other Related 
Materials Article II.
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manufacturing of and trafficking in firearms, their parts and components and 
ammunition / ' 27 The stated objectives of the SADC Firearms Protocol extend 
beyond preventing, combating, and eradicating illicit manufacturing and 
trafficking of small arms and light weapons by addressing also "their excessive 
and destabilising accumulation...possession and use in the Region. " 28 This does 
not, prima facie, preclude government-authorised manufacture and trade. The 
stated objectives of the Nairobi Protocol are as wide-ranging as the SADC Firearms 
Protocol, but also "encourage accountability, law enforcement and efficient 
control and management of small arms and light weapons held by State Parties 
and civilians. " 29 This evolution, whereby the objectives of each subsequent treaty 
cumulatively builds upon that of its predecessor(s), signals interrelatedness, a 
general broadening of technical scope, and an increasing acknowledgement of 
the role played by governments in sustaining this challenge, specifically as 
ongoing users of these weapons.
The definitions articulated by each of these four treaties also reflect their 
commonality. Firearms, small arms, and light weapons are defined by these 
treaties as, more or less, any barrelled weapon which will, or is designed to, or 
may readily be converted to, expel a bullet or projectile by the action of an 
explosive. Antique firearms manufactured before the twentieth century or their 
replicas are, without qualification, excepted from these definitions. For the most 
part, these definitions — as well as the definitions of parts and components, and 
of ammunition—are interchangeable among these treaties, except for where both 
the OAS Convention and the Nairobi Protocol extend their definitions to cover "any 
other weapon or destructive device such as an explosive bomb, incendiary bomb, 
or gas bomb, grenade, rocket launcher, missile, missile system or mine. " 30 
Furthermore, these treaties define illicit manufacturing and trafficking along
27 UN Firearms Protocol, Article 2.
28 Southern African Development Community, Protocol on the Control of Firearms,
Ammunition and Other Related Materials in the Southern African Development Community
(SADC) Region, Article 3(a).
29 The Nairobi Protocol for the Prevention, Control and Reduction of Small Arms and Light
Weapons in the Great Lakes Region and the Florn of Africa, Article 2(e).
30 OAS Convention, Article I(3)(b) and the Nairobi Protocol, Article 1.
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much the same lines, as the following definitions could be used in any of these 
treaties:
the manufacturing or assembly of firearms, their parts and 
components or ammunition from parts and components illicitly 
trafficked, or without a licence or authorization from a competent 
authority of the State Party where the manufacture or assembly takes 
place; or without marking the firearms at the time of manufacture.
And as:
the import, export, acquisition, sale, delivery, movement or transfer of 
firearms, their parts and components and ammunition from or across 
the territory of one State Party to that of another State Party if any one 
of the State Parties concerned does not authorise it .31
Each of these four treaties creates obligations for parties to use, as the 
primary method of control, the licensing, permitting, or authorising of weapons 
transfers as either imports or exports; the marking of weapons at the time of their 
manufacture or import into their territory; and the efficient keeping of records 
pertaining to known weapons inventories, including their location. 
Concomitantly, these treaties create obligations for parties to criminalise certain 
activities relating to small arms and light weapons that do not have official 
approval or consent. Since regulating this sector necessarily relies upon the 
enactment of criminal offences for breaches of these regulations, governments 
are obliged to develop the capability to maintain effective control over the people 
and goods transiting their international borders, as well as to administer and 
enforce these laws upon those who act contrary to its provisions within their 
respective areas of jurisdiction.
In order to strengthen the domestic regimes regulating the manufacture and 
transfer of small arms and light weapons, these treaties seek to facilitate 
cooperation among governments by improving information flows, enabling the 
more timely and accurate identification of legal operators, thereby increasing the 
likelihood of detecting, apprehending, and prosecuting illegal operators. For this
31 Please refer to the OAS Convention, Article I; the UN Firearms Protocol, Article 3(d) and (e);
the SADC Firearms Protocol, Article 1; and the Nairobi Protocol, Article 1.
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reason, the OAS Convention, the SADC Firearms Protocol, and the Nairobi Protocol 
each call for engagement with the International Criminal Police Organisation 
(Interpol), while the latter two also call for engagement with the World Customs 
Organisation (WCO).32 Cooperation among law enforcement agencies, especially 
through combined enforcement operations, is promoted by all four treaties, as is 
the exchange of training, technologies, and other forms of assistance among these 
agencies.33 In so doing, these treaty obligations, and the control regimes they 
foster, create a plausible deterrent to would-be offenders, though whether or not 
this deterrence is sufficient remains highly contestable given the probable extent 
of contemporary trafficking.
Building upon the provisions for exchanging information among 
governments, these treaties also strengthen formal links with non-state actors. 
Article XX 1(d) of the OAS Convention, for example, calls for relevant academic 
studies to be undertaken, while Article 13(3) of the UN Firearms Protocol invokes 
the support of the small arms industry. Article 5(2) of the SADC Firearms Protocol 
and Article 3(b) of the Nairobi Protocol both call for arms embargoes, authorised 
as part of the UN Security Council's sanction regimes, to be better implemented 
and more vigilantly observed. The SADC Firearms Protocol, the Nairobi Protocol, 
and the UN Firearms Protocol each call for cooperation with other 
intergovernmental organisations,34 while the latter was specifically open for 
signature to regional economic integration organisations where at least one 
member is party to the protocol. The OAS Convention spurred participants of the 
Southern Cone Common Market (MERCOSUR) to establish a registry of buyers 
and sellers of small arms and light weapons, as well as a database of transit 
points used to transfer these weapons across borders.35
32 Refer to the preamble of the O AS Convention, Article 15(c) of the SAD C  Firearms Protocol, 
and Article 15(iv) of the Nairobi Protocol.
33 Refer to Articles XIII-XVIII of the O AS Convention-, Articles 14, 15, & 16 of the SADC  
Firearms Protocol; Articles 14, 15, & 16 of the Nairobi Protocol; and Articles 12, 13, & 14 of 
the UN Firearms Protocol.
34 Refer to Article 3(c) of the SAD C Firearms Protocol; Article 2(d) of the Nairobi Protocol; and 
Article 12(1) of the UN Firearms Protocol.
35 Schroeder, 26; see also Greene, 178.
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Noticeably absent from these treaties, however, are explicit calls for 
strengthening formal links with civil society organisations, though both the 
SADC Firearms Protocol and the Nairobi Protocol contain reference to enhancing 
public involvement in, and support for, arms control regimes.36
The preambles of both the UN Firearms and Nairobi Protocols refer explicitly to 
Article 51 of the UN Charter which, as the introduction mentions, recognises the 
rights of governments to act unilaterally if they are attacked. This explicit link is 
significant because it seeks to legitimise the manufacturing, transfer, possession, 
and use of small arms and light weapons for the purposes of securing 
governments from external threats. Underpinning these two treaties, then, is a 
process by which small arms and light weapons are securitised by governments 
reaffirming them as legitimate tools of providing security. By securitisation, I do 
not mean here the more commonly referred to process whereby threats are 
constructed and enter the realm of so-called high security issues through speech 
acts, even where the "speech-act of securitization is not reducible to a purely 
verbal act or a linguistic rhetoric [because] it is a broader performative act which 
draws upon a variety of contextual, institutional, and symbolic resources for its 
effectiveness."37 Rather, I mean here the slightly more complex paradox whereby 
small arms and light weapons are recognised by governments not only as threats 
to security, but also as necessary security-enabling tools.
Small arms and light weapons are recognised, then, as threats to 
governmental security that also undermine the rule of law, and as security­
enabling tools of governments that also help maintain the rule of law: the process 
of securitisation, therefore, mutually supports the process of criminalisation. 
Given the complementary processes of securitisation and criminalisation, it is not 
surprising that the threat posed by small arms and light weapons, which had 
been traditionally dealt with by SADC as a foreign policy issue relating to other
36 Refer to Article 13 of the SADC Firearms Protocol and to Article 13 of the Nairobi Protocol.
37 Michael C. Williams, "Words, Images, Enemies: Securitization and International 
Politics," International Studies Quarterly 47 (2003): 526.
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arms control measures, more recently gained currency as a crime prevention 
issue for SADC members.38
Although activities undertaken by governments in a manner consistent with 
Article 51 of the UN Charter can be distinguished from those of individuals 
engaging in criminal enterprise, the distinction between securitisation and 
criminalisation is blurred by governments relying upon the versatility of small 
arms and light weapons as a means of providing defence from external military 
threats and of maintaining the rule of law within their areas of jurisdiction. It is a 
particularly cruel irony that the official misuse of small arms and light weapons, 
a significant factor motivating the call for international action explored in the 
previous chapter, is partly perpetuated and entrenched by the current efforts to 
exert control over these weapons. It enables, for example, human rights 
violations to occur through official misuse: according to Amnesty International, 
"[sjustained by the easy availability of small arms, war crimes, crimes against 
humanity, and other human rights violations have been committed in eastern 
[Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)].,/39 In spite of peace agreements, 
"large-scale unlawful killings of civilians by armed forces continue to be 
committed on a regular basis."40 DRC is by no means an exception in this regard, 
however. In fact, the US' prosecution of the so-called war on terror has resulted 
in its "exports of these weapons hav[ing] now increased to some states that are 
known to be violators of human rights [and in turn]... many states have begun to 
export and misuse these weapons in the name of combating terrorism."41
In spite of all their commonality, significant technical differences exist among 
these treaties, particularly where treaties seek to establish controls over varying 
aspects of the small arms and light weapons problem. The OAS Convention is the 
only treaty that does not oblige its parties to destroy those weapons seized as 
evidence of illegal manufacturing or trafficking and confiscated through
38 Stott, 1.
39 Amnesty International, Democratic Republic of Congo: arming the east (London: Amnesty
International, International Secretariat, 2005), 12.
40 Ibid, 15.
41 Laurance, "Shaping Global Public Policy on Small Arms," 199.
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successful prosecution.42 Only the SADC Firearms Protocol and Nairobi Protocol 
oblige parties to establish and maintain inventories of government-held arsenals 
and to destroy those weapons deemed surplus to requirement.43 At the same 
time, only these two treaties prohibit unrestricted civilian access to light weapons 
while providing for voluntary weapon-surrendering initiatives and public 
awareness campaigns.44 Three of these treaties are unique in terms of technical 
provisions: only the UN Firearms Protocol obliges parties to prevent deactivated 
weapons from reactivation;45 only the OAS Convention provides for extradition 
among its parties;46 and only the Nairobi Protocol addresses corruption within 
governments.47
Thus, even though these treaties interrelate, technical differences render this 
treaty framework an incoherent response to the multifaceted challenge of 
controlling small arms and light weapons. As Part III of this thesis demonstrates, 
the intended effects of this incoherent response are easily mitigated, resisted, and 
eluded by those international actors who produce, transfer, and use these 
weapons. These arms control antagonists circumvent these instruments of 
international law not only because they are technically incoherent, but also 
because these treaties, even when assessed collectively, have pronounced 
limitations as strategic frameworks.
Once a treaty is in force, governments that are signatories to it should refrain 
from acting in any way that either undermines the intent of that treaty or is 
inconsistent with its articles, while those articles bind governments that have 
ratified the treaty: however, that treaty applies only to those governments that 
have signed and ratified it, and confers neither rights nor duties on any
42 Refer to Article 11 of the SAD C Firearms Protocol, Article 9 of the Nairobi Protocol; and to 
Article 6 of the UN Firearms Protocol.
43 Refer to Articles 8 & 10 of the SADC Firearms Protocol; and to Articles 6 & 8 of the Nairobi 
Protocol.
44 Refer to Article 5(3)(b) and Articles 12 & 13 of the SAD C Firearms Protocol; and to Article 
3(c)(ii) and Articles 12 & 13 of the Nairobi Protocol.
45 Refer to Article 9(a) of the UN Firearms Protocol.
46 Refer to Article XIX of the OAS Convention.
47 Refer to Article 17 of the Nairobi Protocol.
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government until it enters into force.48 Where governments are obliged to abide 
by treaty provisions, specific activities undertaken by these governments face 
constraints: in spite of these constraints, however, these governments do not 
surrender the power to act in ways contravening their obligations. Instead, 
governments violating their treaty obligations do so aware that those actions 
may carry consequences, some of which are perceived and calculated in advance.
Although there is no single, universally accepted, central authority regulating 
all affairs among governments, officials can enter into binding arrangements 
regarding their government's conduct. While governmental consent is required 
for such an obligation to exist, the authority to observe and cast judgement upon 
any government's actions relating to this consent remains decentralised, 
dispersed, albeit unequally, among actors of contemporary world affairs. "States 
may have many reasons, both political and economic," Ted Legget suggests, "for 
wishing to appear to be in line with global trends on arms control, while actually 
fostering illicit commerce."49 These treaties contain no formal mechanism 
through which parties can find assurance that other parties abide by those 
articles and provisions; that is, there is little oversight of the administration of 
other governments' activities relating to these treaties. Aside from Article 16 of 
the UN Firearms Protocol, which explicitly directs parties to resolve disputes 
through the International Court of Justice, there is no compulsion to seek 
recourse from a higher authority in order to derive judgement on a government's 
activity or its interpretations of certain provisions. Consequently, there are no 
indications of the shape a penalty for non-compliance might take, if one was 
detected.
48 There any, moreover, many derogations and reservations relating to these treaties. See, 
for example, the reservations and declarations relating to the UN Firearms Protocol, 
<http://www.unodc.org/en/crime cicpp signatures firearms.html> (accessed 2 April 
2007). Of course, any such reservation does not evade the non-derogable jus cognens 
peremptory international rules admitting of not exception, by way of exercising 
sovereign prerogative, as to the prohibition of acts of genocide and/or crimes against 
humanity.
49 Ted Legget, "Law Enforcement and International Gun Trafficking," in Running Guns: The 
Global Black Market in Small Arms, ed. Lora Lumpe (London: Zed books, 2000), 210.
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While all four treaties have entered into force, the rate of ratification limits 
their collective geographic coverage. In sum, there are nearly 50 governments 
which are signatories to any one of these treaties, but which have failed to ratify 
the relevant instrument. More specifically, eight of the 34 signatories to the OAS 
Convention have yet to ratify; 27 of the 52 signatories to the UN Firearms Protocol 
have yet to ratify; three of the 13 signatories to the SADC Firearms Protocol have 
yet to ratify; and three of the twelve signatories to the Nairobi Protocol have yet to 
ratify.50 Among those governments that have signed but not yet ratified treaties, 
Austria, Brazil, PRC, Germany, India, Italy, South Korea, UK, and the US are 
considered by the Small Arms Survey to be either major or medium-sized 
producers of small arms and light weapons. In addition, there are almost one 
hundred governments under no treaty obligations whatsoever, including the 
Czech Republic, Egypt, Hungary, Israel, Pakistan, Russian Federation, 
Singapore, Spain, and Switzerland, countries which are also considered as either 
major or medium-sized producers of these weapons.51 Significantly, much of the 
world's capability to produce small arms and light weapons remains outside this 
treaty framework.
Because they seek to restore or preserve governmental monopoly over the 
legitimate use of force, hints of government culpability in instances of small arms 
misuse are rare, if not wholly absent, in both the preambles and the texts of these 
treaties. Although there are provisions calling for the exchange of criminal- 
related information and law-enforcement expertise among parties to these 
treaties, this information will remain concealed from the public for reasons of 
strategic and operational security: the cloak of official secrecy continues to shield 
governmental enforcement activities from citizens' view as provision for either 
domestic public oversight or civil society scmtiny are absent—as are, therefore,
50 These figures given here are as at September 2006. For more up-to-date figures, please 
refer, respectively, to <http://wwvv.oas.org/juridico/english/Sigs/a-63.html> (accessed 19 
September 2006), <http://www.sadc.int/english/documents/legal/protocols/status.php> 
(accessed 19 September 2006), <http://www.unodc.org/imodc/en/crime cicp signatures
firearms.html?print=ves> (accessed 19 September 2006) <http://www.iansa.org/ 
regions/cafrica/nairobi-protocol.htm> (accessed 19 September 2006).
51 Small Arms Survey, Small Arms Survey 2001, 16.
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transparency and accountability. The process of securitisation underpinning 
these treaties, moreover, not only fails to check the impunity often associated 
with official small arms and light weapons misuse and renders governmental 
abuses within its jurisdiction less visible to the international community, but also 
enables the easy concealment of covert arms transfers intended deliberately to 
destabilise other governments. Such destabilising transfers are unlikely to help 
(unwitting) recipient governments exert effective control over small arms and 
light weapons.
Where governments are party to a treaty, inadequate infrastructure perverts 
attempts to act in accordance with international obligations. As Stemmet notes, 
"the ideal of addressing the small arms/light weapons problem by means of 
regulation, namely to reach legally binding agreements at bilateral, regional and 
global levels, will be ill served if effective national measures are lacking/ ' 52 The 
fulfilment of multilateral objectives depends upon governments possessing a 
domestic capability that can operationalise their obligations through the active 
detection, investigation, and prosecution of illegal operators, accompanied by 
imposing penalties sufficient to deter other would-be offenders. This capability 
is not always present, however: for example, although SADC includes a 
subcommittee consisting of representatives at the ministerial, which shares 
intelligence on a broad range of transnational matters, as well as that relating to 
the prevention of coups d'etat, most of its conflict-wary members have limited 
access to the scarce resources necessary to fully implement and effectively 
operate the SADC Firearms Protocol, including very limited access to basic 
technologies such as computer databases and weapon-destruction tools.53
The domestic regimes underpinning these treaties are, moreover, 
geographically restricted to each government's territory, as there are no 
provisions specifically controlling nationals operating illegally beyond a
52 Stemmet, 27.
53 Stott, 7.
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government's jurisdiction. And if such legal provisions did exist, administrative 
capacities are limited and enforcement resources scarce.
Where governments do act in accordance with their treaty obligations, 
progress has been uneven. For example, whereas Costa Rica and Trinidad and 
Tobago have increased the penalties for firearms-related offences, Colombia 
continues to complain that it receives very limited law-enforcement cooperation 
from other parties. In April 2002, many OAS members were not yet in full 
compliance with the OAS Convention, with less than half having nominated a 
central point of contact for the exchange of information, while even fewer 
governments had enacted the domestic laws enabling the exchange of 
information, or having the necessary record-keeping processes in place.54 
Interpretations of government behaviour differ, as it remains difficult to know if 
this uneven progress results from either a lack of sufficient political will or the 
inadequate provision of resources, or perhaps some combination of the two.
Even though these treaties encourage and enable governments to coordinate 
those administrative and enforcement activities which they may wish to 
undertake, little is offered in the way of restricting governments' freedom of 
action when authorising small arms and light weapons proliferation, transfer, or 
possession. In other words, there is no effective means enshrined in these 
treaties by which to regulate and control parties' activities, including restraining 
production volumes, deterring destabilising transfers, or preventing excessive 
accumulations. The UN Firearms Protocol, in particular, specifically excludes 
consideration of govemment-to-govemment transfers and there is little in the 
other treaties that create legal constraints on governments when transferring 
weapons to other governments. Consequently, as parties to treaties, 
governments continue authorising transfers to countries involved in conflict.
All this is not to suggest that governments have been prevented from taking 
action in accordance with the provisions of these treaties, or deterred from going 
beyond these provisions by enacting stricter controls, but rather, to signal that
54 Schroeder, 26-7.
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any such government does so under no treaty obligation and without prejudice 
to either future inactivity or foreign policy reversals. Signatories already 
respond in ways that might create norms, if not for the purposes of customary 
international law, then at least in setting precedents for government behaviour in 
contemporary world affairs. Given the significance of these technical and 
strategic limitations however, much doubt exists over the current treaty 
framework's capability to exert control over small arms and light weapons. And 
the dismal record to date, in which small arms and light weapons continue to be 
widely available and subject to ongoing use, does little to suggest otherwise.
Soft Law Measures
Treaties are not the only instruments of international law through which 
intergovernmental organisations respond to the widespread availability and 
ongoing use of small arms and light weapons. Since the late 1990s, at least a 
dozen major soft law measures relating to small arms and light weapons have 
undergone negotiation and achieved consensus, though one of these has failed to 
take hold. Soft law measures constitute a commitment by governments, usually 
belonging to an intergovernmental organisation, to cooperate for a common end 
and to refrain from acting in any way undermining the intent informing a 
particular measure.55 The operative verb in such instruments of international 
law is 'should' rather than 'shall.' Hence, soft law measures are not legally 
binding instruments whereby governments explicitly consent to be bound by a 
series of articles. Consequently, a government's behaviour relating to these 
measures cannot be the subject of a legal dispute among governments.
While soft law measures are "not Taw' in the sense of producing legally 
binding rights and obligations...[they can and do] spur the development of new 
rules of customary international law and/or lay the foundation for new treaty
55 Nadia Fischer, "Outcome of the United Nations process: the legal character of the United 
Nations Programme of Action," in Small Arms and Light Weapons: Legal Aspects of National 
and International Regulation eds. Erwin Dahinden, Julie Dahlitz and Nadia Fischer, Vol.IV, 
Arms Control and Disarmament Law (Geneva: United Nations, 2002), 159.
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law /'56 In other words, where a treaty binds those governments that have 
ratified the instrument and proscribes certain activities to those governments that 
have signed it once it enters force, governments neither sign, nor ratify soft law 
measures. Instead, these measures apply to all those governments involved in 
their negotiation.
The power of a soft law measure lies, therefore, in the norms it creates which, 
in turn, influence and prescribe, to a limited degree, the conduct of governments 
except where a government has "consistently and persistently" objected to the 
rule or to the expression of that rule.57 In this respect, the conduct of 
governments relating to soft law measures is just as, if not more important than, 
the instrument's text, providing the basis from which to develop norms which 
could inform customary international law with respect to controlling small arms 
and light weapons, but only after a sufficient period of time has elapsed (though 
that which constitutes 'sufficient' is a highly contestable matter).
While most of these measures focus upon specific regions and subregions, 
some engage co-called developed nations possessing significant weapons- 
producing capability. The potential for global geographic coverage renders the 
UNPoA unique among these soft law measures. And as a recent Biting the Bullet 
publication notes: "As a general rule, where a sub-region has developed 
substantial regional agreements and programmes of action to address [small 
arms and light weapons] issues, the states within that sub-region have made 
more progress towards national implementation [of the UNPoA]."58
The Bamako Declaration, adopted in March 1997 by members of the 
Organization of African Unity (OAU), was among the first attempts to express a 
multilateral response to the challenge of controlling small arms and light 
weapons at a continental level. Calling upon non-state actors to assume an 
important role in providing a workable and durable solution to this challenge, 
this declaration, a single page in length, obscures the role played by some
56 Small Arms Survey, Small Arms Survey 2003, 219.
57 Ibid, 218.
58 Biting the Bullet, Reviewing Action on Small Arms 2006, 4.
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governments in creating, intensifying, and prolonging many of the problems 
associated with small arms and light weapons. This declaration, for example, 
seeks to "[ljaunch an appeal to the various actors in society: women, young 
people, elected representatives, members of the armed forces, communicators 
and educators, to work for the building of peace and democracy, and for 
development in a spirit of solidarity and tolerance/'59 There is a strong sense in 
which this declaration seeks to justify any and all action towards combating the 
problems associated with small arms and light weapons in the name of, say, 
respecting human rights, but offers little in the way of practical measures 
enabling the actual exertion of control over these weapons. While commendable 
for promoting the urgency of responding to this challenge and useful for 
diplomatic posturing, the Bamako Declaration is moribund as a strategic 
framework.
The OAU followed up its 1997 declaration with a more robust declaration in 
2000: the African Common Position on the Illicit Proliferation, Circulation and 
Trafficking of Small Arms and Light Weapons (African Common Position).60 Since 
the emergence of this declaration, the AU has replaced the OAU and, to date, 
much of the AU's effort appears directed towards fulfilling its members' 
obligations under the UNPoA. At the AU Summit held in Khartoum in January 
2006, for example, the "Windhoek Position" was endorsed as "a basis for the 
African common position, and for debate and negotiation at the UN Review 
Conference in June/July 2006."61 As a regional organisation, the AU's response to 
the challenge of controlling small arms and light weapons signals a partial shift 
away from a preference for regional internationalism towards a preference for
59 The full text of the Bamako Declaration is available at <http://www.unesco.org/ 
cpp/uk/declarations/bamako.pdf#search=%22bamako%20declaration%201997%22> 
(accessed 15 September 2006).
60 The full text of this instrument is available at <http://www.disarmament.un.org/ 
rdb/Meetings,%20Conf%20and%20Events/LASconf/bamakosaaf01.pdf#search=%22QAU 
%20African%20Common%20Position%20on%20the%20Illicit%20Proliferation%2C%20Cir 
culation%20and%20Trafficking%20of%20Small%20Arms%20and7o201ight7o20Weapons% 
22> (accessed 29 September 2006).
Virginia Gamba, "Africa Leads in Small Arms Control," Pax Africa (February-May 2006): 
3.
61
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global internationalism; yet, at the same time, crucial subregional responses have 
taken shape within the continent. "In turn," according to Monica Kathina Juma, 
"these developments have influenced and shaped international trends in terms 
of the development of desirable governance frameworks for dealing with [small 
arms and light weapons]."62
A regional response has also emerged from within the Pacific where 
members of the Pacific Island Forum (PIF) adopted the Nadi Framework in March 
2000.63 Building upon the Honiara Initiative: Agreement in Principle on Illicit 
Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives, and Other 
Related Material (Honiara Initiative), which outlines a regional approach, the Nadi 
Framework seeks to establish new, and harmonise existing, domestic legislation 
dealing with small arms and light weapons among PIF members.64 Under the 
Nadi Framework, PIF members involved in transferring small arms and light 
weapons are supposed to inform other members whose territory the 
consignment is transiting.65 PIF members are also expected to share information 
relating to the identity of any authorised dealer and user of these weapons, any 
relevant criminal intelligence, and any useful operational, enforcement, and 
legislative experiences.66 Progress towards implementing the Nadi Framework 
has, furthermore, sought to incorporate PIF members' obligations under the 
UNPoA, including "any substantive issues arising out of the [2001 Small Arms] 
Conference."67
Unlike all other measures discussed in this chapter, an individual's right to 
possess and use a small arms or light weapon as a civilian is inscribed here as a
62 Monica Kathina Juma, "Editorial Comment," Pax Africa (Febraary-May 2006): 2.
63 The PIF comprises of the following members: Australia, Cook Islands, Federated States of 
Micronesia, Fiji, Kiribati, Nauru, New Zealand, Niue, Palau, PNG, Republic of Marshal 
Islands, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu. The full text of the Nadi 
Framework is available at <http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/smallarms/regional/ 
nadi.rtf> (accessed 15 September 2006).
64 Alpers and Twyford, 108.
65 Refer to Article 6.1(b) of the Legal Framework for a Common Approach to Weapons Control 
Measures.
66 Refer to Article 9.1(g) of the Legal Framework for a Common Approach to Weapons Control 
Measures.
67 Alpers and Twyford, 109.
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privilege conditional upon community safety, signalling the residual force of 
customary practice in the Pacific's traditional ways of life. The Nadi Framework 
refers specifically to governmental possession of these weapons—justifiably 
given the recent crises unfolding in Bougainville, the Solomon Islands, and Fiji, 
each facilitated, in part, by the relaxed security controls over government 
arsenals.
Another regional response has emerged from within the EU,68 comprising of 
three separate but interrelated instruments which, according to Anders, 
represent "a framework for multilateral arms policies that, while still containing 
serious shortcomings, is, at present, undoubtedly the most sophisticated 
approach to conventional and small arms control."69 First, the EU Programme, 
which encourages cooperation among law-enforcement agencies targeting illicit 
manufacture and trafficking of small arms and light weapons, was adopted by 
the EU Council in June 1997. Second, the EU Code of Conduct, providing a 
framework for restraining transfers of conventional weapons by EU members 
into locations where there is a risk that these weapons will facilitate internal 
repression, international aggression, or constitute a threat to regional security, 
was established by the EU Council in June 1998. Third, the EU Joint Action on 
Small Arms, which is a legally binding measure promoting support to those 
countries negatively affected by the widespread availability and ongoing use of 
these weapons where those countries request assistance, was adopted in 
December 1998.70 The negotiation of this framework occurred as the European 
arms-manufacturing industry underwent restructuring and trans-nationalisation
68 As at July 2005, EU membership included: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Czech Republic, 
Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, 
Sweden, and the UK. For the full text of the EU Programme for Preventing and Combating 
Illicit Trafficking, EU Code of Conduct, EU Joint Action on Small Arms, refer to, respectively: 
<http://www.sipri.org/contents/expcon/eu illicit.html>,<http://www.fas.org/asmp/campa 
igns/ code/eucodetext.htm>,<http://www.nisat.org/EU/EU%20Toint%20Action%20on%20 
Small%20Arms%20and%20Light%20Weapons/EU Toint Action.htm> (accessed 26 
September 2006).
69 Anders, "The Role of Non-State Actors in the European Small Arms Regime," 12.
70 Ibid, 7-8.
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following the ending of the Cold War, a time when economic competitiveness 
replaced superpower interests as the primary factor informing arms exports 
decisions. At the same time, however, policymakers were acutely attentive to the 
role played by European arms transfers in the 1991 Gulf War and to the potential 
benefit of restraining future destabilising transfers.71
Like the EU, members of the Organization for the Security and Cooperation 
in Europe (OSCE) have agreed to abide by a tripartite framework.72 First, the 
OSCE Principles Governing Conventional Arms Transfers, adopted in November 
1993, commits members transferring arms to consider various factors pertaining 
to the recipient government and discourages exports that might be used to 
commit human rights violations or threaten governmental security. Second, the 
OSCE Document on Small Arms and Light Weapons, adopted in November 2000, 
consists of six sections which devote specific attention to combating illicit 
activities, introduce common export criteria and controls over government-held 
stockpiles and, unlike most measures, provides for disarmament processes in 
post-conflict settings. Third, the OSCE Document on Stockpiles of Conventional 
Ammunition, adopted in November 2003, provides for the destruction of 
ammunition which is surplus to requirement. The focus on disarmament here 
reflects that much of South Eastern Europe—Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia,
71 Sibylle Bauer and Mark Bromley, The European Union Code of Conduct on Arms Exports: 
Improving the Annual Report, SIPRI Policy Paper no.8 (Stockholm: Stockholm International 
Peace Research Institute, 2004), 2.
72 The OSCE include the following members: Albania, Andorra, Armenia, Austria, 
Azerbaijan, Belarus, Belguim, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, 
Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finlnd, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, 
Holy See, Hungary, Ireland, Iceland, Italy, Kazakhstan, Kyrgystan, Latvia, Liechtenstein, 
Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Moldova, Monaco, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, 
Portugal, Romania, Russian Federation, San Marino, Serbia and Montenegro, Slovak 
Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Tajikistan, the former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia, turkey, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, UK, US, and Uzbekistan. For a 
full text of the OSCE Principles Governing Conventional Arms Transfers, refer to 
<http://www.osce.org/documents/fsc/1993/ll/460 en.pdf> (accessed 15 September 2006), 
for a copy of the OSCE Document on Small Arms and Light Weapons, refer to 
<http://www.sipri.org/contents/ expcon/QSCE2000.html> (accessed 15 September 2005), 
and for a copy of the OSCE Document on Stockpiles of Conventional Ammunition, refer to 
<http://www.osce.org/documents/fsc/2003/ll/1379 en.pdf> (last accessed 15 September 
2006).
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and Serbia and Montenegro, for example—suffered intense conflict during the 
1990s, though the "activities of established criminal networks coupled with 
porous borders and weak arms exports controls has in the past resulted in 
weapons being trafficked to Western Europe and beyond, including in some 
cases to conflict zones."73
The ECOWAS Moratorium, adopted on 31 October 1998, shapes government
controls over small arms and light weapons, and has been especially significant
in Nigeria, Ghana, and Senegal.74 Subregional in geographic coverage, 15 West
African governments declared this voluntary measure. This measure does not
discriminate between government and civil activities, aiming instead to promote
confidence-building among its participants and their neighbours by choosing to
not manufacture, import, or export light weapons, though participants can apply
for exemptions, particularly when replacing damaged and obsolete weaponry
that will be destroyed.75 The ECOWAS Moratorium has been effective despite
finding expression in, as Stemmet puts it:
the weakest possible language: it merely "declares" a moratorium, 
without focusing on any specific measures of implementation: more 
than half of the one-page text consists of the Preamble. It therefore 
amounts merely to a voluntary political decision by the heads of state: 
no provision is made for the movement towards implementation of 
the moratorium in national legislation or for an institution that could 
monitor and effect implementation.76
73 South Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons, 
South Eastern Europe SAEW Monitor 2005 (Belgrade: South Eastern Europe Clearinghouse 
for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons, 2005), 1.
74 Christiane Agboton-Johnson, Adedeji Ebo, and Laura Mazal, Small Arms Control in Ghana, 
Nigeria and Senegal, West Africa Series no.2 (London: International Alert, 2004), 9.
75 These 15 states are as follows: Benin, Cape Verde, Cote d'Ivoire, Burkina Faso, Guinea, 
Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, 
and the Togolese Republic. For a full text of the moratorium, refer to <http://www.wcc- 
coe.org/wcc/what/intemational/ecowas.html> (accessed 27 September 2006). For details 
on exemptions, see Adedeji Ebo, Small Arms Control in West Africa, West Africa Series 
no.l (London: International Alert, 2003), 20.
76 Stemmet, 22. In spite of being 'politically binding' and lacking an oversight mechanism 
for member-state activity, this moratorium restrains member-state activities and makes 
transparent member-state use of discretion; and, although there is no independent body 
to ensure state compliance, self-policing, underpinned only by the good faith of its 
participants, has not provided any publicly available evidence suggesting that any
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Awash with these weapons for reasons linked to the Cold War and to the 
continent's decolonisation,77 West Africa was host in the 1990s to most of the 
world's small wars and intra-state conflicts and, as Herbert pointed out in 2000, 
"no less than half a dozen of the 16 regimes governing in West Africa are still 
products of military coups. A good many others are maintained in office as a 
front for military power holders."78 Hence, the apparent success of the 
moratorium lies not in spite of, but quite possibly because of, a subregional 
context that witnessed circumstances nearing endemic civil war. This is 
promising for all those confronting the small arms and light weapons challenge, 
though, more sceptically, it also implies that elsewhere nothing much will be 
done until the situation is as bad as parts of Africa during the 1990s. Not all 
assessments have been so rose-tinted, however. According to Greene, for 
instance, "[i]n several ECOWAS countries, the military and the arms transfer 
licensing authorities were apparently unaware that their government had 
declared the moratorium."79
More recently, another subregional soft law measure has emerged. On 25 
June 2003, Foreign Ministers from Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru adopted 
the Andean Plan to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate Illicit Trade in Small Arms and 
Light Weapons in all its Aspects (Andean Plan).80 The plan itself was largely derived 
from the UNPoA, articulated with technical support and financial resources from 
SaferAfrica, though the commitment to action can be traced back to the Lima 
Commitment, agreed in June 2002. In May 2005, government experts from the
member-state has acted in a manner inconsistent with their obligations under the 
moratorium.
77 Boh Herbert, "Introduction," in The Making of a Moratorium on Light Weapons (Lome, 
Togo: UN Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa, Norwegian Institute of 
International Affairs, and the Norwegian Initiative on Small Arms Transfers, 2000), 25.
78 Boh Herbert, "Instability and Insecurity in West Africa: State of the Art," in The Making of 
a Moratorium on Light Weapons (Lome, Togo: UN Regional Centre for Peace and 
Disarmament in Africa, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, and the Norwegian 
Initiative on Small Arms Transfers, 2000), 34.
79 Greene, 160.
80 For the full text of this measure, please refer to: <http://www.comunidadandina.org/ 
INGLES/normativa/D552e.htm> (accessed 26 September 2006).
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Andean community met, recommending "the preparation of Community 
legislation to regulate control of the importation, exportation and movement of 
firearms, explosives and related material in the subregion."81 Like the OAS 
Convention, the Andean Plan can be seen as a tool combating the subregion's 
organised criminals and narcotics traffickers, though "[a]ll of the Andean 
countries have been arms suppliers to the Colombian conflict at one or other of 
its stages."82
Described by Steffan Sohlman as "the first global multilateral agreement 
covering exports controls on both conventional weapons and sensitive dual-use 
goods and technologies,"83 the Wassenaar Arrangement was established in 
September 1996 in order to prevent destabilising accumulations of weapons by 
promoting the transparency of transfers of certain goods, materials, and 
technologies. In particular, it was envisaged that transparency would follow the 
exchange, among governments, of information relating to authorised transfers. 
The Wassenaar Arrangement consists of two major lists, one dealing with dual-use 
goods and technologies, the other with munitions, including small arms and 
light weapons. Like participants of the Ell Code of Conduct, the 40 participating 
governments of the Wassenaar Arrangement are expected to exercise restraint in 
exporting items described on its agreed lists where these items might be used for 
military purposes, either by a government that behaves in a manner causing 
concern to the international community, which presumably includes internal 
repression and international aggression, or to a region experiencing 
circumstances causing concern to the international community.84
81 Andean Community, "Press Release: Andean experts propose a common arms control 
regime." <www.comunidadandina.org/INGLES/press/press/np20-5-05.htm> (accessed 26 
September 2006).
82 William Godnick and Helena Väsquez, Small Arms Control in Latin America, Latin 
America Series no.l (London: International Alert, 2003), 20.
83 Steffan Sohlman, "The Wassenaar Arrangement and the Proposed Moratorium for West 
Africa" <http://www.nisat.org/publications/the%20west%20africa%20book/wassenaar
arrangement (accessed 06 June 2004).
84 As at March 2007, partidpants of the Wassenaar Arrangement include the following states: 
Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Czech Republic, 
Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan,
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Participating governments, most of which are considered to be so-called 
developed nations, meet at least once each year and both lists are subject to 
regular review and are revised on an as-required basis, though consensus is 
required to revise any item on these lists. Although originally focused upon 
weapons of mass destruction, in December 2002 the participating governments 
agreed to intensify their sharing of terrorism-related information, adopting Best 
Practice Guidelines for Exports of Small Arms and Light Weapons.85 (The adoption of 
these guidelines echoes the guidelines implicit in the UNPoA and the OSCE 
Document on Small Arms and Eight Weapons.86) This reflects a shift in
contemporary perceptions of security threats following the terrorist attacks in the 
US on 11 September 2001 and the legacy of the 1991 Gulf War, both of which 
register concurrently in the minds of policymakers.
As mentioned in the previous chapter, following a recommendation by the 
UN Panel of Governmental Experts on Small Arms, the UN General Assembly 
announced on 15 December 1999 its decision to hold a conference focusing on the 
illicit trade in small arms and light weapons at New York between 9 and 20 July 
2001.87 The resulting UNPoA has been proclaimed "the centrepiece of 
multilateral efforts/'88 "a milestone achievement in multilateralism,"89 "a
Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, 
Republic of Korea, Romania, Russian Federation, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, South Africa 
Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, UK, and the US. For a full text of the Wassenaar 
Arrangement, refer to <http://www.wassenaar.org> (accessed 31 March 2007).
85 US State Department, 'Tact Sheet," 22 March 2004 <http://www.state.gov/t/np/rls/is/ 
30957pf.htm> (accessed 6 June 2004).
86 Michael von Tangen Page, William Godnick, and Janani Vivekananda, Implementing 
International Small Arms Controls: Some Lessons from Eurasia, Latin America and West Africa 
(London: International Alert, 2005), 12.
87 United Nations General Assembly, General and Complete Disarmament, UN Doc. 
A/RES/54/54 (New York : United Nations, 1999), section V, paragraph 1.
88 Krause, 248.
89 United Nations General Assembly, Report of the United Nations First Biennial Meeting of 
States to Consider the Implementation of the Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and 
Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects, UN Doc. 
A/conf.l92/bms/2003/l (New York: United Nations, 2003), paragraph 5. For a full text of 
the UNPoA, refer to <http://www.disarmament.im.org/cab/poa.html> (accessed 27 
September 2006).
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watershed event/'90 and "the central global agreement on preventing and
reducing trafficking and proliferation"91 of small arms and light weapons. Over
150 governments reached consensus on the UNPoA. But among those
governments developing this soft law measure, some would have preferred an
instrument legally binding governments to its provisions.92 And the conference
has not been without its critics. For Karp:
It is no exaggeration to say that efforts to deal with the issue would be 
more aggressive today if the conference had never taken place. Even 
worse than the underwhelming final document was the climate of 
hopelessness it left behind. The whole issue has acquired a bad taste 
that will take some time to wear off.93
Nevertheless, the UNPoA is the broadest-ranging and most inclusive of all the 
measures devised by intergovernmental organisations as a means of providing 
frameworks for regulatory regimes controlling small arms and light weapons. It 
perceives the challenge of controlling these weapons in terms beyond the nexus 
of securitisation and criminalisation to include issues such as the introduction 
and development of conflict prevention methods, the abolition of child 
soldiering, and humanitarian recovery. In other words, the UNPoA is not merely 
an arms control measure, but also responds to varying impacts created, at least in 
part, by the widespread availability and ongoing use of these weapons. The 
UNPoA has, moreover, built upon and overtaken some regionally-focused soft 
law measures, while other instruments of international law have been informed 
by the UNPoA as it gathers momentum.
Here, then, soft law measures emerge from within particular 
intergovernmental organisations, responding to the challenge of controlling 
small arms and light weapons from within unique historical circumstances, as 
does treaty law. The common belief in collective security as a prime source of 
international security is again underscored by these measures though, at the
90 Brem and Rutherford, 181.
91 Biting the Bullet, Implementing the Programme of Action 2003, 4.
92 Fischer, 158.
Karp, "Laudable Failure," 178.93
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same time, some significant weaknesses inherent in the existing internationalist 
governance architecture are exposed, as they are in the cases of the 
abovementioned treaties.
Like treaties, soft law measures interrelate. The UNPoA encourages 
governments to strengthen existing moratoria, as well as any other regional and 
subregional attempts to prevent and combat small arms trafficking.94 More 
specifically, the EU Code of Conduct refers to the Wassenaar Arrangement,95 the EU 
Joint Action on Small Arms welcomes the ECOWAS Moratorium,96 and the Andean 
Plan refers to the UNPoA97 The linkage between the ECOWAS Moratorium and 
the Wassenaar Arrangement has proven valuable because the moratorium has 
been supported by those weapons-producing governments participating in the 
Wassenaar Arrangement98 as well as by former Cold War opponents, former 
colonial masters, and major arms-producing firms.99 Soft law measures also 
interrelate with treaties. Whereas the EU Code of Conduct refers to treaties 
regarding weapons of mass destruction, the Andean Plan refers to the OAS 
Convention.100 Adopting definitions of key terms appearing in treaties, the 
UNPoA builds upon an emerging mosaic of obligations by selecting standards 
and identifying norms from those treaties: paragraph 20 of its preamble 
recognises, for example, that the UN Firearms Protocol "establishes standards and 
procedures that complement and enforce efforts to prevent, combat, and 
eradicate the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects." 
Paragraph 25 of the UNPoA also encourages governments to conclude, ratify, 
and implement other "legally binding instruments aimed at preventing,
94 United Nations, Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in 
Small Arms and Light Weapons in All its Aspects, paragraph 26.
95 Refer to the European Union's Code of Conduct for Arms Exports, Criterion One (e).
96 Refer to the European Union's Joint Action on Small Arms, "preamble."
97 Andean Community, Andean Plan to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate Illicit Trade in Small 
Arms and Light Weapons in all its aspects, Section C(2).
98 Herbert, "Introduction," 26.
99 Ibid, 29.
100 Refer to OAS Convention, "preamble." Also, Article 2 of the EU Joint Action on Small Arms 
"shall enhance efforts to build consensus in the relevant regional and international 
forum....as the basis for regional and incremental approaches to the problem and, where 
appropriate, global international instrument on small arms."
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combating and eradicating the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons." 
The Biting the Bullet project deems this to be a "web of mutually reinforcing 
commitments."101
Like treaties, soft law measures also strengthen connections among 
intergovernmental organisations. In particular, the UNPoA seek to strengthen 
links with Interpol,102 while the ECOWAS Moratorium seeks support from the AU 
and the UN.
The nascent interconnectivity among the international community's major
responses to the challenge of controlling small arms and light weapons is evident
in, and further enshrined by, intergovernmental measures of control referring
explicitly to Security Council resolutions authorising collective action. The EU
Code of Conduct, for example, refers to the importance of supporting UN sanction
regimes,103 whereas the OSCE Document gives focus to UN peacekeeping
operations.104 Section II, paragraph 15 of the UNPoA also encourages
governments "to take appropriate measures, including all legal or administrative
means, against any activity that violates a United Nations Security Council arms
embargo." As Kirkham and Flew observe:
Whilst it is recognised that the UNPoA contains measures that relate 
only to the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons, if 
implemented fully, many of these would serve to strengthen the 
international apparatus of control, information exchange and 
provision of assistance relating to arms proliferation and misuse as a 
whole. In turn, this would greatly enhance the implementation of UN 
arms embargoes.105
101 Biting the Bullet, Implementing the Programme of Action 2003, 4.
102 Refer to UNPoA, paragraph 37.
103 Refer to EU Code of Conduct, Criterion One (a).
104 Refer to OSCE Document, Section 1, paragraph 3(ii).
105 Elizabeth Kirkham and Catherine Flew, Strengthening Embargoes and Enhancing Human 
Security, Briefing Paper no.17 (London: Biting the Bullet, 2003), 8.
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The Security Council reciprocated this interconnectivity when it "welcomed the 
results of the conference and expressed the council's support for the actions that 
were agreed upon."106
Even though governments are its primary authors, the UNPoA calls for the 
participation of non-state actors, casting them in the role of arms control 
protagonists. Referring specifically to the potential role to be played not only by 
regional and subregional intergovernmental organisations, the UN Security 
Council, the WCO, and Interpol, but also by researchers and civil society 
organisations, this measure seeks to develop relationships among key arms 
control protagonists. Of particular relevance is paragraph 18 of Section III, which 
states the following:
States, regional and subregional and international organizations, 
research centres, health and medical institutions, the United Nations 
system, international financial institutions and civil society are urged, 
as appropriate, to develop and support action-orientated research 
aimed at facilitating greater awareness and better understanding of 
the nature and scope of the problems associated with the illicit trade in 
small arms and light weapons in all its aspects.
The UNPoA is not the only soft law measure invoking the involvement of these 
non-state actors: the Andean Plan seeks the "active involvement of civil society in 
formulating and implementing a national program of action"107 while the EU 
Joint Action provides for financial and technical assistance to the International 
Committee of the Red Cross in particular.108
While the negotiation of soft law measures may foster willingness among 
governments to undertake action against illicit small arms and light weapons 
manufacture and transfer, enabling the better coordination of their activities 
exerting control over these weapons, these measures also prove useful for 
identifying those governments experiencing delays or difficulties implementing
106 Camilo Reyes Roderiguez, "The UN Conference on Small Arms: Progress in 
Disarmament through Practical Steps," Brown Journal of World Affairs 9, no.l (Spring 
2002): 175.
107 Refer to the Andean Plan, Section A, paragraph 4(g)
108 Refer to the EU Joint Action on Small Arms, Article 6(1).
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them. The adoption of soft law measures encourages members of the 
international community—other governments, members of civil society 
organisations, and researchers—to use them as a touchstone from which to 
scrutinise governments' conduct. Indeed, the BMS occurring in 2003 and in 2005 
in New York, along with the UN Small Arms Review Conference held in 2006 
also in New York, are pertinent to this undertaking. By creating a further source 
of external pressure upon those governments displaying hesitancy or reluctance 
to follow through with, and deliver on, their commitments, soft law measures 
interconnect the major responses to the widespread availability and ongoing use 
of small arms and light weapons. Here, then, while treaties and soft law 
measures are interrelated at a technical and strategic level, these instruments of 
international law also seek to formally interconnect the strategies for, and 
approaches towards, controlling these weapons, while helping develop maturing 
relationship among key arms control protagonists as they confront this 
challenge.
Unlike those treaties obliging state-parties to regulate the relevant industrial 
and commercial sectors —as a means of distinguishing illicit activity from the 
regulated manufacture and trade receiving official consent, and of enabling 
cooperation among governments through improved information flows and the 
timely identification of suspected illegal operators—soft law measures tend to 
encourage restraint over official transfers. Whereas the ECOWAS Moratorium 
prohibits the import and export of these weapons by its participants, the EU Code 
of Conduct, the OSCE Document, and the Wassenaar Arrangement each provide a 
set of criteria against which participants ought to assess proposed transfers. The 
Eli Code of Conduct, for example, comprises eight criteria against which potential 
exports are to be assessed before they can be authorised for transfer.
Not all attempts to restrain officially-authorised transfers are expressed so 
strongly, however. Whereas the UNPoA calls for governments to assess export 
applications in light of "the risk of diversion of these weapons into the illegal
147
trade / ' 109 the Nadi Framework merely urges members to "notify one another when 
firearms, explosives, other related materials and prohibited weapons are in 
transit through their respective territories. " 110 The OSCE Document, Andean Plan, 
and the UNPoA also call for brokers of small arms and light weapons to be 
regulated , * 111 and for their professional activities to be authorised, a measure 
which would further enhance the government's ability to control and, by 
extension, restrain transfers.
Beyond restraining officially-authorised transfers of small arms and light 
weapons, soft law measures address other major aspects of the challenge of 
controlling these weapons, some of which have been addressed by some treaties, 
but neglected by others. While not all measures encourage better stockpile 
management and improved security of government-held stockpiles, the OSCE 
Document, Andean Plan, and the UNPoA do so explicitly, 112 as do the SADC 
Firearms Protocol and Nairobi Protocol. Moreover, these measures call for 
cooperative law-enforcement operations targeting illegal production and 
trafficking, as well as public awareness campaigns and weapons-surrendering 
initiatives aimed at civilian users, as do the SADC Firearms Protocol and Nairobi 
Protocol. 113 Each of these measures provides for the destruction of surplus 
government-held weaponry, as well as of those weapons seized and confiscated 
from criminal users. This technical commonality between soft law measures and 
treaties, which creates a mosaic of responsibilities comprised of obligations and 
commitments, is further strengthened where governments belong to more than 
one of these frameworks.
Focusing upon such commonality among soft law measures, however, tends 
to obscure the extent to which technical inconsistencies abound among these
109 Refer to the UNPoA, Article 11.
no Refer to the Nadi Framework, Article 6.1(b).
111 Refer to the OSCE Document, Section 111(d); the Andean Plan, Section A, paragraph 4(f);
and the UNPoA section II, paragraph 14.
112 Refer to the OSCE Document, Section IV(b); the Andean Plan, Section A, paragraph 4(c);
and the UNPoA, Section II, paragraph 10 and paragraph 17.
113 Refer to the OSCE Document, Section 111(e); and the UNPoA, Section II, paragraphs 27 &
28.
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frameworks. Indeed, technical inconsistencies pervading this mosaic of 
responsibilities threaten to undermine the objectives of these agreements. The 
UNPoA, representing a substantial range of commitments undertaken by 
governments to control small arms and light weapons, while also addressing 
some of the most disturbing associated impacts, is broader in technical scope 
than any of the treaties examined earlier in this chapter. However, as an 
autonomous framework, the UNPoA contains reference neither to restraining the 
volume of small arms and light weapons being produced, nor to reducing flows 
of small arms and light weapons. It does not contain provision for oversight 
over official discretion pertaining to authorised transfers.114 (A definition of 
small arms and light weapons is absent here too.115) The UNPoA is, moreover, 
limited by its neglect of regulating civilian ownership and Camilo Reyes 
Rodriguez, President of the 2001 UN Conference, expressed his "disappointment 
over the Conference's inability to agree, due to the concerns of one State, on 
language recognizing the need to establish and maintain controls over private 
ownership of these deadly weapons and the need for preventing sales of such 
arms to non-State groups."116 That single government withholding consensus 
was, of course, the US, though as is common in multilateral negotiations the
114 Transfers authorised by each of the Group of Eight of Industrialised States (G8), for 
example, have recently reached areas experiencing armed conflict, fallen into the hands 
of known human rights violators, and been delivered to states under EU embargoes: in 
particular, the following states have received weapons from G8 members; Sierra Leone, 
Colombia, Indonesia, India and Pakistan as states experiencing conflict or conditions 
approaching conflict; Egypt, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Malaysia, Mexico, Saudi Arabia, 
Thailand, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates as states in which human rights are 
violated; and finally Myanmar, Sudan, and the PRC, each the target of EU arms 
embargoes, have received weapons. The activities of the G8, six of which rank among the 
ten most significant exporters of small arms and light weapons, demonstrate both the 
inadequacy of existing national regulation and the weakness of current international 
obligations. For further details, please refer to Control Arms, The G8: Global Arms 
Exporters: Failing to prevent irresponsible arms transfers, Control Arms Briefing Paper, June 
2005, <http://www.controlarms.org> (accessed 13 September 2006).
115 Krause, 250.
116 United Nations General Assembly, “Statement by the President of the Conference after 
the adoption of the Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit 
Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All its Aspects."
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known position of one delegation may represent the views and positions held by 
others.
Because soft law measures are based on the consent of all parties, they are 
sometimes criticised as embodying little more than the lowest common 
dominators. The danger here is, of course, that "consensus is simply another 
name for allowing a reluctant state to impose its veto." For Peters, consensus is, 
therefore, a codeword for the "tyranny of the minority."117
Even though other soft law measures deal with important aspects neglected 
by the UNPoA, some of these measures have a very narrow technical focus. 
While most soft law measures seek to restrain officially-authorised transfers of 
small arms and light weapons in order to limit their misuse, only the ECOWAS 
Moratorium restrains authorised production. The Wassenaar Arrangement, 
ECOWAS Moratorium, and the Nadi Framework do not provide for better stockpile 
management or for weapons collection and destruction programmes. The 
Andean Plan, ECOWAS Moratorium, EU Code of Conduct, and the Wassenaar 
Arrangement do not place restraints on civilian ownership. There is a strong 
resemblance, therefore, between treaties and soft law measures as technical 
inconsistencies among these instruments of international law preclude a coherent 
response to the multifaceted challenge of controlling small arms and light 
weapons.
In addition to those technical inconsistencies, strategic limitations dog these 
agreements. Negotiated within the UN General Assembly, the UNPoA does not 
necessarily apply to all UN members as some governments—specifically, 
Comoros, DRC, Equatorial Guinea, Kiribati, Mauritania, Saint Vincent and the 
Grenadines, Sao Tome and Principe, Seychelles, Somalia, and Tuvalu—attended 
neither the 2001 Small Arms Conference, nor the 2006 Review Conference. 23 
other governments attended only one of these meetings.118
117 Peters, 8.
118 United Nations General Assembly, "List of Participants," United Nations Conference on the 
Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All its Aspects, New York, 9-20 July 2001, UN 
Doc. A/CONF.192/10 (New York: United Nations, 2001); United Nations General
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Excepting the UNPoA, soft law measures are undermined by their limited 
participants and, by extension, geographic coverage. Even though most 
governments participate in at least one of the major soft law measures 
introduced by this chapter, a number of key arms-producing governments do 
not. In particular, Brazil, PRC, Egypt, India, Israel, Pakistan, Singapore, South 
Africa and Taiwan, each considered by the Small Arms Survey to be either major 
or medium-sized producers of small arms and light weapons,119 do not belong to 
either the EU Code of Conduct, OSCE, ECOWAS Moratorium, Nadi Framework, 
Andean Plan, or the Wassenaar Arrangement. Moreover, because fewer than 40 
countries regulate brokering activities, transfers of small arms and light weapons 
persist regardless of the original production location.120
Where governments consent to soft law measures, they do not always behave
in accordance with their commitments, either acting in ways contravening their
commitments or making uneven progress toward fulfilling those commitments.
The implementation of the UNPoA is an instructive example in this regard.
According to the Biting the Bullet Project:
After four years since the [UNPoA] was agreed, we are obliged to 
emphasise how little has so far actually been achieved in many 
respects....The scale of the interventions is generally not sufficient to 
have more than a local or marginal impact on the problems of [small 
arms and light weapons] trafficking, proliferation, and misuse....Many
Assembly, "List of Participants," United Nations Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small 
Arms and Light Weapons in All its Aspects, New York, 9-20 July 2001, UN Doc. 
A/CONF.192/10/add.1 (New York: United Nations, 2001); United Nations General 
Assembly, "List of Participants," United Nations Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small 
Arms and Light Weapons in All its Aspects, New York, 9-20 July 2001, UN Doc. 
A/CONF.192/10/add.2 (New York: United Nations, 2001); United Nations General 
Assembly, "List of Participants," United Nations Conference to Review Progress made in the 
Implementation of the Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in 
Small Arms and Light Weapons in All its Aspects, New York, 26-7 July 2006, UN Doc. 
A/CONF. 192/2006/RC/INF/l (New York: United Nations, 2006); United Nations General 
Assembly, "List of Participants," United Nations Conference to Review Progress made in the 
Implementation of the Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in 
Small Arms and Light Weapons in All its Aspects, New York, 26-7 July 2006, UN Doc. 
A/CONF.192/2006/RC/INF/l/Add.l (New York: United Nations, 2006).
119 Small Arms Survey, Small Arms Survey 2001,16.
120 Biting the Bullet, International Action on Small Arms 2005, 6.
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States have not really even put in place the basic mechanisms and 
procedures for [UNPoA] participation.121
Just as treaties are undermined by parties failing to fully administer and enforce 
their obligations, soft law measures are compromised by those governments that 
are reluctant to fulfil their commitments. Regardless of the reasons behind such 
conduct (or, more precisely, the lack of such conduct), whether it is deficient 
infrastructure, insufficient resources, or inadequate political will, very limited 
means are available to compel governments to remedy their conduct in light of 
their commitments, especially since the so-called 'naming and shaming' of those 
governments not acting in full accordance with their commitments has so far 
done little to inspire remedial action.
Although most soft law measures aim to provide greater transparency 
surrounding transfers, information exchanged through diplomatic channels 
usually remains confidential to governments because it circulates within the 
classified domain of the diplomat, or the defence or trade official. As such, 
information pertaining to the quantity, type, and destination of officially- 
authorised small arms and light weapons transfers often falls outside the 
scrutiny of civil society organisations, remaining unavailable to commercial 
operators, arms control activists, and researchers. Furthermore, although 
guidelines encourage officials to consult with other governments, the decision to 
transfer any item covered by, for instance, the Wassenaar Arrangement, lies with 
the exporting authority, as it does with the EU Code of Conduct. Officials thus 
exercise discretion when judging what constitutes a destabilising accumulation 
and when authorising such transfers. Confidentiality provisions ensure that 
information relating to the justifications surrounding officially-authorised 
transfers of these weapons, or the denial of such transfers, will, as Article IX of 
the Guidelines and Procedures for the Wassenarr Arrangement puts it, "remain 
confidential and be treated as privileged diplomatic communications, " 122 thereby
121 Ibid, 10.
122 Refer to the Wassenaar Arrangement, "Initial Elements: Purpose," paragraph (4); See also 
the EU Code of Conduct "operative provisions" paragraph 3.
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limiting the effects of any improved transparency and accountability over 
participating governments. While the details of these soft law measures are 
publicly available, specific information relating to the proposed, authorised, and 
prevented arms transfers occurring under their auspices is not.
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Conclusion
In July 2001, six and a half years after Boutros-Ghali reported his "Agenda for 
Peace" to the Security Council, the then-Secretary-General Kofi Annan 
acknowledged that:
The world is flooded with small arms and light weapons numbering 
at least 500 million, enough for one of every 12 people on earth. Most 
of these are controlled by legal authorities, but when they fall into the 
hands of terrorists, criminals and irregular forces, small arms bring 
devastation. They exacerbate conflict, spark refugee flows, undermine 
the rule of law, and spawm a culture of violence and impunity. In 
short, small arms are a threat to peace and development, to democracy 
and human rights.123
Even though these particular remarks celebrate the consensus reached over the 
UNPoA, such rhetoric and its attendant gestures must have been all too familiar 
to the international community by the turn of the millennium. Well briefed 
about the seriousness of the impacts associated with the widespread availability 
and ongoing use of small arms and light weapons, and recognising the urgency 
to control these weapons, policymakers began to negotiate and establish various 
control measures. This is not to suggest that these weapons, or the impacts they 
generate, are under control, but rather, that in the late 1990s members belonging 
to intergovernmental organisations were appreciating the dynamic contours and 
extreme magnitude of the impacts generated by the widespread availability and 
ongoing use of small arms and light weapons, and have since agreed to various 
obligations and commitments. Taken together, these instruments of 
international law comprise a mosaic of responsibilities shaping policymakers' 
conduct in ways enabling regulatory regimes to exert control over these 
weapons.
In fact, by creating this mosaic of responsibilities to exert control over small 
arms and light weapons, these instruments of international law constitute the 
central effort of the international community's response to this urgent challenge.
123 Kofi Annan, "Small arms, big problems," <http://www.un.ord/Dept/dda/ 
CAB/smallarms/sg.html> (accessed 21 May 2002).
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In spite of the varying justifications for confronting this challenge which emerge 
from within different intergovernmental organisations, a common belief in 
instruments of international law as a prime source of collective security informs 
these responses which, in turn, help reinscribe the internationalist governance 
architecture.
As an interrelated suite of strategic frameworks, however, this mosaic of 
responsibilities has limited capability to exert control over small arms and light 
weapons. Despite all four treaties examined in this chapter being in force, the 
geographic coverage of this strategic framework is inhibited by the reluctance of 
many governments to ratify these agreements. Although this chapter introduces 
twelve soft law measures confronting this challenge, relatively few governments 
act in a manner fully consistent with these measures. And where these 
instruments of international law take hold and their provisions are realised as 
obligations and commitments, technical inconsistency precludes a coherent 
response to the multifaceted challenge of controlling small arms and light 
weapons.
In brief, the negotiation, development, and implementation of these treaties 
and soft law measures as strategic frameworks does not restrain those 
governments seeking to protect, pursue, and promote their interests and, as this 
occurs, the opportunity to control these weapons suffers from negligence, as do 
the ongoing security needs of millions of victims of these subaltern killers. As 
this occurs, the internationalist assumptions informing these multilateral 
responses undergo interrogation by the intransigence of certain governments. 
Even though insufficient resources and inadequate will might explain why some 
governments fail to act in full accordance with their international obligations and 
commitments, the mosaic of responsibilities is in itself a deficient mechanism for 
controlling small arms and light weapons, with its primary deficiencies rooted in 
its technical incoherence and strategic limitations. Significantly, much of the 
world's weapons manufacturing capability falls outside this framework, 
particularly where treaty obligations are concerned. Moreover, the intended
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effects of these responses are easily mitigated, resisted, and eluded by those 
international actors who produce, transfer, and use these weapons, as Part III of 
this thesis demonstrates.
But before the thesis considers those recalcitrant figures, the following 
chapter suggests the frustration caused by the widespread availability and 
ongoing use of these weapons to UN peacekeeping operations has not gone 
unnoticed by the UN Security Council and by those UN members either 
contributing resources and troops to these operations or working in concert with 
these operations. It explores the ways in which the UN Security Council exerts 
control over small arms and light weapons through its resolutions authorised 
under the UN Charter.
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A UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL 
4  • AND COLLECTIVE ACTION
The UN Security Council responds to the widespread availability and ongoing 
use of small arms and light weapons through some of its resolutions authorising 
sanction regimes and peacekeeping operations. Whereas sanction regimes 
containing arms embargoes seek to prevent transfers of these weapons from 
reaching targeted actors, peacekeeping operations administering DDR 
programmes seek to remove these weapons from the immediate reach of 
particular belligerents. Given that decisions taken under Chapter VII of the UN 
Charter by the Security7 Council's 15 members are to be respected by all 192 
members of the UN, these resolutions can generate responsibilities resonating 
throughout the interstate system, often with powerful effect. On the one hand, 
some of these resolutions can create obligations to implement, administer, and 
enforce sanction regimes, while on the other hand some of these resolutions can 
encourage commitments, typically in the form of troop deployments, logistical 
support, and other resources required to establish and maintain peacekeeping 
operations.
These particular forms of arms control are, however, administered in 
competition with other operational priorities: declining travel visas, prohibiting 
certain financial transactions, and restricting the international trade of lucrative 
commodities, most notably diamonds, timber, and oil in the case of sanction 
regimes, as well as monitoring ceasefire agreements, reforming security sectors, 
and helping run Tree and fair' elections in the case of peacekeeping operations. 
While distinguishable as arms control measures, arms embargoes and DDR 
programmes must, therefore, be considered as an integral component of a larger 
range of activities pursued for particular ends. Significantly, successful arms 
control measures do not necessarily translate into successful sanction regimes
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and peacekeeping operations, just as unsuccessful sanction regimes and 
peacekeeping operations do not necessarily follow the unsuccessful control of 
weapons. The question of 'what constitutes success7 is also highly contestable. 
Unlike those intergovernmental responses analysed in the previous chapter, 
controlling weapons is not directly pursued by these activities as an end in itself, 
but rather, occurs in the course of the Security Council discharging its core 
responsibility of maintaining international peace and security.
Commencing with a brief outline of the formal procedure by which arms 
embargoes and DDR programmes receive authorisation from the Security 
Council, this chapter analyses these two very different forms of arms control in 
terms of their strategic capability and, in corollary, operational efficacy. It 
describes, first, ways in which the negotiation of resolutions within the Security 
Council is sometimes subject to considerations removed from the immediate 
issue at hand and, second, ways in which the effects of these considerations 
continue to shape mandates for collective action, often manifesting as strategic 
limitations and as operational constraints. After identifying these and other 
relevant operational constraints evident in the administration of sanction regimes 
and in the conduct of peacekeeping operations, this chapter considers the UN's 
monitoring processes, as well as some of the many difficulties confronting the 
Security Council when enforcing its resolutions.
The chapter draws to a close by noting the resemblance between the measures 
of control negotiated multilaterally within various intergovernmental 
organisations and the collective action authorised by the Security Council, both of 
which create a mosaic of responsibilities comprising of obligations and 
commitments while reflecting a common belief in collective security. This 
resemblance is, moreover, brought into sharper focus by observing that the 
composition of international law by intergovernmental organisations constitutes 
a particular notion of the political and this notion is identical to that asserted (at 
times forcefully) by the Security Council's collective action.
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Authority, Purpose, and the Power of Veto
Founded in 1945 at the United Nations Conference on International Organisation 
held at San Francisco, California, the UN was designed, as Article 1(1) of the UN 
Charter illustrates, in order to "maintain international peace and security." 
Under Article 24(1) of the UN Charter, the Security Council is granted primary 
responsibility for maintaining international peace and security among UN 
members. The Security Council can recommend or introduce measures under 
Articles 41 and 42 in order to maintain or restore international peace and security 
when it determines a threat to the peace exists, or that a breach of this peace or an 
act of aggression has occurred. Such preventative or remedial measures include 
sanction regimes and peacekeeping operations. For Andrew Mack and Asif 
Khan, these measures lie on a continuum of policy responses available to the 
Security Council, suggesting that sanction regimes not only help build 
international support for the collective use of force, but also grant a certain 
amount of legitimacy to the use of that force by virtue of being "a crucial rung in 
an escalation ladder of coercive measures."1
In accordance with Article 35(1) and (2), potential breaches of the 
international peace are brought to the Security Council's attention by way of 
diplomatic representation by UN members, or by governments that are not 
members of the UN but consent to the obligations inherent in the pacific 
settlement of disputes. Once an item is on its agenda as a subject of discussion, 
the Security Council determines if a breach of the peace exists and, as a matter of 
course, encourages diplomatic solutions by inviting parties to the conflict to 
inform its deliberation. The Security Council's deliberation on the nature of the 
threat to international peace posed by conflict, as well as the appropriateness of a 
UN response, has, however, been far from consistent and unanimous throughout 
its sixty-year history.
i Andrew Mack and Asif Khan, "The Efficacy of UN Sanctions," Security Dialogue 31, no.3 
(2000): 286; see also Ame Tostensen and Beate Bull, "Are Smart Sanctions Feasible?" 
World Politics 54 (April 2002): 399.
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Reflecting the power distributed among governments during the
establishment of the UN in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War,
the five permanent members of the Security Council can veto measures
interfering with the pursuit of their interests.2 To be sure, the utility of the
Security Council was, to a large degree, held hostage by superpower rivalries
during the Cold War. However, by January 1992, the then US President George
Bush (Snr.) was able to enthuse the following view regarding the First Persian
Gulf War and the emergence of a new world order:
The U.N. was all too often paralysed by cruel ideological 
divisions and the struggle to contain Soviet expansion. And 
today, all that's changed. And the collapse of imperial 
communism and the end of the cold war breathe new life into 
the United Nations. It was just one year ago that the world saw 
this new, invigorated United Nations in action as this Council 
stood fast against aggression and stood for the sacred 
principles enshrined in the U.N. Charter.3
The frequency of Security Council resolutions authorising collective action has 
increased significantly since the end of the Cold War, signalling the power of 
veto no longer impedes the Security Council in the ways that it had during its 
first 45 years. Since 1947, the Security Council has authorised 60 peacekeeping 
operations, 42 of which it has authorised since 1991.4 The absence of mandatory 
embargoes during the Cold War, save for embargoes targeting Southern 
Rhodesia (1966-79) and South Africa (1977-94), also signals this disabling fracture 
of the Security Council along capitalist and socialist preferences, rather than any
2 The five permanent members of the Security Council are, of course, PRC, France, Russian 
Federation, UK, and the US. The fall of the Chinese mainland to Mao Zedong in 1949 and 
the ensuing communist experiment saw China's permanent seat at the Security Council 
retained by the Guamindong, which fled to Taiwan. PRC obtained its permanent seat 
after the Nixon administration granted diplomatic recognition to the communist regime 
in 1971. With the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, the Russian Federation obtained 
the permanent seat formerly occupied by the Soviet Union.
3 George Bush (Snr.), "Remarks to the United Nations Security Council in New York City, 
January 31, 1992 <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu> (accessed 18 August 2004).
4 All figures cited here, unless otherwise indicated, are as up-to-date as possible at the time 
of writing. For more up-to-date information, please refer to <http://www.un.org/Depts/ 
dpko/>.
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perceived weakness inherent in sanction regimes: since the end of the Cold War, 
16 sanctions regimes have been authorised.5 As Simon Chesterman and Beatrice 
Pouligny put it, the "sharp increase in the recourse to sanctions appears to have 
less to do with a consensus on their utility than with the more general political 
consensus that emerged within the [Security] Council after the Cold War."6
This is not to suggest, however, that the power of veto has become obsolete. 
Its use is, of course, evident in the self-immunisation of the Security Council's 
five permanent members against all UN enforcement action and, more 
specifically, in the retention of comprehensive economic sanctions against Iraq 
which the US proved reluctant to lift.7 Since the end of the Cold War, the US has 
also cast at least eleven vetoes regarding Israel, reflecting the so-called 
Negroponte doctrine.8
Nor does this suggest that the Security Council is now consistent and 
unanimous in its appraisal of contemporary conflict as a threat to international 
peace. According to Lotta Harbom and Peter Wallensteen, 16 locations hosted 17 
major conflicts during 2005.9 Yet only ten sanction regimes are currently in force 
and only 15 peacekeeping operations are currently deployed: sanction regimes
5 Office of the Spokesman for the Secretary-General, "Use of Sanctions Under Chapter VII 
of the UN Charter," <http://www.un.org/news/ossg/sanctions.htm> (accessed 2 March 
2006). Since this document was last updated in January 2006, sanctions targeting North 
Korea and Lebanon have been authorised.
6 Simon Chesterman and Beatrice Pouligny, "Are Sanctions Meant to Work? The Politics of 
Creating and Implementing Sanctions Through the United Nations," Global Governance 9, 
no.4 (October-December 2003): 504.
7 Cortright and Lopez with Conroy, Dashti-Gibson and Waglar, 18 & 56.
8 Refer to "Statement by Ambassador John D. Negroponte, United States Permanent 
Representative to the United Nations, on the situation in the Middle East, at the 
Emergency Special Session of the General Assembly, August 5, 2002," 
<http://www.usunnewyork.usmission.gov/02 112.htm> (accessed 26 October 2006), in 
particular the final paragraph. For more details concerning "The changing patterns of 
Security Council veto use, 1946-2004," see Table 13.1, in Thakur, The United Nations, Peace 
and Security, 308.
9 Lotta Harbom and Peter Wallensteen, "Patterns of Major Armed Conflicts, 1990-2005,"
SIPRI Yearbook 2006: Armaments, Disarmament, and International Security,
<http://www.yearbook2006.sipri.org/chap2/app2A> (accessed 4 October 2006). However, 
"[s]ince the end of the cold war, there have been 57 major armed conflicts. There has been 
a steady decline in the number of conflicts since 1999, and the figure for 2005 is the lowest 
for the entire post-cold war period."
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targeting Liberia, Cote d'Ivoire, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo 
overlap, respectively, with UNMIL, the United Nations Operations in Cote 
d'Ivoire (UNCOI), and the United Nations Organization Mission in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC); and seven of those 15 
peacekeeping operations are observer missions with little or no military force to 
project.10
Consensus surrounding the necessity of potential UN peacekeeping 
interventions in major armed conflicts occurring, for example, in Chechnya, 
Tibet, and until recently Northern Ireland, remains elusive among members of 
the Security Council primarily because these high-profile examples fall within the 
so-called spheres-of-influence of the Russian Federation, PRC, and the UK 
respectively.* 11 (Incidentally, Nigeria, Mexico, India and the Philippines have 
each similarly "resisted peacekeeping in their own civil wars, even as they have 
participated in peacekeeping missions elsewhere."12) The potential conflict of 
interest, between the responsibilities granted to the permanent members of the 
Security Council and their status as the five largest arms producers in the world, 
has not gone unnoticed.13
The selectivity of recent collective action is, moreover, often influenced by the 
perceived national interests of Security Council members and "[t]he letter of the 
law, as imbedded in the text of resolutions, loses prominence, while the most 
powerful states, especially the United States, interpret the spirit of the resolutions
10 United Nations Disengagement Observer Force, United Nations Interim Force in
Lebanon, United Nations Truce Supervision Organization, United Nations Peacekeeping 
Force in Cyprus, United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia, United Nations Interim 
Administration Mission in Kosovo, and the United Nations Military Observer Group in 
India and Pakistan each lack powerful military forces. Refer to "Security Council 
Sanctions Committees: An Overview," <http://www.un.org/Docs/committess/
INTRO.htm> (accessed 11 October 2006) and to <http://www.un.org/depts/dpko/ 
dpko/text.htm> (accessed 3 June 2005).
11 Paul D. Williams, "International peacekeeping: the challenges of state-building and 
regionalization," International Affairs 81, no.l (2005): 164.
12 Fortna, 281.
13 Kirkham and Flew, 12.
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to meet their own particular interests/'14 The ongoing sanctions against UNITA, 
for example, were in part encouraged by the importance of the Angolan 
government's oil exports to France, the UK, and the US, as well as Angola's 
importance as an arms market for Russia.15 At the same time, as Arne Tostensen 
and Beate Bull argue, in "anticipating the responses of domestic constituencies, 
government representatives in the Security Council may be guided more by 
shifting popular sentiments at home than by the merits of the case itself."16 To 
complicate matters, diplomatic objectives —and the interests upon which these 
objectives are based—vary among Security Council members,17 as they do 
between the Security Council and the General Assembly.
Since the early 1990s, the Security Council, acting under Article 41 authorising 
measures to "include complete or partial interruption of economic relations, and 
of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and 
the severance of diplomatic relations," has established resolutions calling for 13 
sanction regimes that refer, albeit only implicitly, to controlling small arms and 
light weapons.18 Arms embargoes almost always constitute a single element of a 
wider sanction regime and, therefore, accompany restrictions over the trade of 
other commodities and natural resources, and the prohibition of other activities,
14 Cortright and Lopez with Conroy, Dashti-Gibson and Wagler, 6.
15 Alex Vines, "Monitoring UN sanctions in Africa: the role of panels of experts," Verification 
Yearbook 2003 (London: Verification, Research, Training and Information Centre, 2003), 
252.
16 Tostensen and Bull, 396.
17 Ibid, 395.
18 Given the often evolving political conditions to which sanction regimes respond, sanction 
regimes are amended through further Security Council resolutions. The following 
international actors are targeted by sanction regimes which contain mandatory arms 
embargoes and the resolutions noted here refer to those establishing arms embargoes, 
rather than modifying or amending them: Afghanistan (S/RES/1333 (2000)), Angola 
(S/RES/864 (1993)), Cote d'Ivoire (S/RES/1572 (2004)), Democratic Republic of Congo 
(S/RES/1493 (2003)), Eritrea and Ethiopia (S/RES/1298 (2000)), Haiti (S/RES/841 (1993)), 
Iraq (S/RES/661 (1990)), Liberia (S/RES/788 (1992)) Libya (S/RES/748 (1992)), Rwanda 
(S/RES/918 (1994)), Sierra Leone (S/RES/1132 (1997)), Somalia (S/RES 733 (1992)), and The 
Former Yugoslavia (S/RES/713 (1991)). Sanction regimes targeting Sudan (S/RES/1556 
(2004)) and Cambodia (S/RES/792 (1992)) did not contain arms embargoes. More recently, 
a sanction regime has targeted North Korea (S/RES/1718 (2006)) but does not include an 
arms embargoes. The recent sanctions against Lebanon (S/RES/1701 (2006)) do, however, 
include an arms embargo.
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such as granting travel visas to targets or facilitating their international travel. As 
Angela Woodward explains:
Arms embargoes are intended to halt the flow of weapons and the 
provision of training and related services to the government, regime, 
or a named militia within the target state or states. They are often 
accompanied by sanctions regulating transportation, particularly 
aviation sanctions and naval blockade, which reduce the opportunity 
for cross-border movement of weapons through inspections as well as 
deter sanctions violations. Often they form part of a comprehensive 
sanctions regime including restrictions on trade in lucrative 
commodities, such as oil and diamonds, funds transfer and diplomatic 
representation . 19
The primary purpose of sanction regimes is not for a higher authority to inflict 
punishments for perceived wrongdoings as a way of distributing justice in world 
affairs. Nor are these regimes primarily imposed as a means of pursuing justice 
by ending human rights violations per se. (As a symptom of contemporary 
conflict, however, human rights violations may have, in part, prompted Security 
Council action in the first instance and may also undergo investigation in some 
peacekeeping operations.)
Rather, as David Cortright and George A. Lopez observe, sanction regimes 
"are often a biting and devastating tool of economic coercion and need to be 
understood as instruments of forceful diplomacy. " 20 Following agreement 
among Security Council members regarding the conduct of a particular 
international actor, coordinated action is taken as a means of encouraging the 
target to behave in accordance either with the Security Council's will in respect to 
a specific set of circumstances, or with the purposes and principles of the UN 
Charter; namely, the prevention of acts of aggression or breaches of the peace, or 
the restoration of peace where it has been compromised. Sanction regimes thus 
represent an economically coercive means of seeking to maintain, or restore order 
to, the interstate system, while arms embargoes in particular seek to limit
19
20
Angela Woodward, Verification of Mandatory Multilateral Arms Embargoes, Unpublished 
background paper for the Small Arms Survey, 2.
Cortright and Lopez with Conroy, Dashti-Gibson, and Wagler, 7.
163
targeted actors7 capability to wage war by restricting their access to weapons 
procurement. Hence, as Michael Brzoska puts it, sanction regimes that undergo 
periodic review also "become part of a wider negotiating process between the 
international community of states and a targeted elite."21
As an arms control measure, however, these embargoes necessarily have a 
very narrow conceptual focus, as they do not refer to exercising control over the 
proliferation of these weapons and are without provisions to disarm combatants, 
or to remove and disable those weapons already available in these locations. 
Consequently, an arms embargo is less likely to prove effective where its target is 
largely self-sufficient in its military production, as was the case with the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia in the early 1990s.22 And because arms embargoes cannot 
be applied retrospectively, they do little to deter those actors who have already 
procured and stockpiled a sufficient quantity of weapons for their intended 
purposes. (Incidentally, although most sanction regimes authorised by the 
Security Council impose embargoes on the supply of weapons to targeted actors, 
which include small arms and light weapons, embargoes do not, in and of 
themselves, expressly prohibit UN members from purchasing or otherwise 
acquiring arms exported by those actors.) Nevertheless, all of these embargoes 
seek to create geographic enclaves in which the transfer of weapons to a targeted 
party is impeded, curtailed and, at best, prevented.
Because sanction regimes create obligations to which all UN members must 
abide, these measures resemble treaty law which create obligations for its parties. 
However, unlike the conceptual incoherence of international law, arms 
embargoes are conceptually limited to confronting a single aspect of the 
challenge to control small arms and light weapons because this form of control 
exists only to serve the Security Council's wider responsibilities. Compared to 
the vast areas of jurisdiction covered by those instruments of international law
21 Michael Brzoska, "From Dumb to Smart? Recent Reforms of UN Sanctions," Global 
Governance 9, no.4 (2003): 522.
Peter Andreas, "Criminalizing Consequences of Sanctions: Embargo Busting and Its 
Legacy," International Studies Quarterly 49 (2005): 341.
22
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examined in the previous chapter, activities authorised by the Security Council 
often concentrate upon very specific locales, operating in some of the world's 
deadliest trouble spots, though not all trouble spots receive an equal share of the 
Security Council's attention, deliberation, and resources. And in contrast to the 
regulatory regimes fostered by governments' responsibilities under international 
law, this collective action is almost always temporary and, in many cases, very 
short-lived, especially when contextualised against the duration and intensity of 
many contemporary conflicts.
In addition to a narrow conceptual focus, arms embargoes have significant 
strategic limitations, some of which reflect concessions made by members of the 
Security Council during their negotiation of resolutions. Since May 2000, the 
Security Council's negotiation of various embargoes has been somewhat 
impeded by disagreement over the practical issue of their duration, for instance. 
On the one hand, France and Russia support the periodic review of an embargo's 
effectiveness and the regular assessment of its wider consequences while, on the 
other hand, the US and the UK oppose the inclusion of such 'sunset clauses' in 
embargoes. However, both the US and UK governments accept sanctions 
containing sunset clauses, but continue to protest against their inclusion. This 
disagreement has its roots in the contrasting perspectives taken on the 
humanitarian consequences following the imposition of the sanction regime 
targeting Iraq, "which is in a class by itself as the longest, most comprehensive, 
and most severe multilateral sanctions regime ever imposed."23
While this might appear to be a technical issue of little strategic importance, 
embargoes without sunset clauses can be imposed indefinitely by a permanent 
member exercising its veto in decisions regarding its termination. Conversely, 
all members must accept the need for sanction regimes with predetermined 
timeframes to be extended.24 Sunset clauses may, in principle, enable the target 
of a sanction regime to apply pressure upon a single member of the Security
23 Cortright and Lopez with Conroy, Dashti-Gibson and Wagler, 8.
24 Brzoska, 523; see also Chesterman and Pouligny, 508-9.
165
Council to withhold its consensus, thereby drawing the term of a sanction to a 
close. Furthermore, as Chesterman and Pouligny point out, "even when there is 
agreement to impose sanction on a state or other actor, this agreement may in 
fact stem from different reasons particular to the various states imposing the 
sanctions. This leads to problems when implementing sanctions, and, in 
particular, when evaluating whether sanctions should be modified or lifted."25
The formal deliberation of the Security Council, including the negotiation of 
its preventative or remedial course of action, can take considerable time. This 
lapse of time provides armed actors involved in conflict with notice to acquire 
weapons, and to do so expediently. The massacre which escalated into the 
Rwandan genocide stands as a powerful example of the efficacy of embargoes 
advertised and then belatedly applied (though this example is a-typical as 
Rwanda held a seat on the Security Council at that time). Embargoes directed at 
Yugoslavia following 1998 and at both Ethiopia and Eritrea in 2000 were 
similarly ineffective,26 while "the arms embargo against Liberia seems to have 
been effective in stopping arms shipments to that state, although this may be 
because Liberia has already obtained the weapons it needs and therefore is not 
seeking to acquire more."27
Not all of the Security Council's negotiations result in resolutions that are 
mandatory. The Security Council has authorised voluntary sanction regimes 
targeting Afghanistan, Azerbaijan and Armenia, Ethiopia and Eritrea, and 
Yemen.28 Just as the legally-binding nature of treaty law is a key distinction 
between it and its soft law counterpart, signalled by the use of the operative 
verbs "shall" in treaties and "should" in soft law measures, embargoes can be
25 Chesterman and Pouligny, 506.
26 Tostensen and Bull, 383.
27 Vanessa Shields, Verifying European Union arms embargoes (London: Verification Research, 
Training and Information Centre, 2005), 12.
28 Kirkham and Flew, 10. Non-mandatory sanctions targeted Afghanistan (S/RES/1076 
(1996)), Armenia and Azerbaijan (S/RES/853 (1993)), Eritrea and Ethiopia (S/RES1227 
(1999)), and Yemen (S/RES/924 (1994)).
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distinguished as being either obligatory or recommendatory in status.29 All 
resolutions made under Chapter VII are mandatory, however. This distinction 
becomes important when monitoring the implementation of sanction regimes 
because, where responsibilities are political rather than legal, 'The verification 
process can only assess states' adherence to, rather than compliance or non- 
compliance with, the obligation. " 30 The decision to observe a voluntary embargo 
and the differing interpretations of its precise scope can easily undermine the 
intent behind that embargo through its inconsistent application, leaving it in 
some cases "open to exporters to define what classifies as weapons and 
munitions, and there is considerable scope for the spirit of the embargo to be 
abused . " 31
Moreover, the technical scope of an arms embargo, as articulated in 
resolutions crafted by the Security Council, is often vague, leaving 
governments—including those targeted by it, alongside those under a 
responsibility to implement and administer it—with considerable latitude with 
which to determine precisely what constitutes a serious breach of the letter of a 
particular embargo, and which activities might be inconsistent with the intent of 
that embargo. Most frequently, embargoes refer only to the sale or supply "of 
arms and related materiel of all types, including weapons and ammunition, 
military vehicles and equipment, paramilitary police equipment and spare 
parts, " 32 without reference to the technical definitions used to underpin treaties 
negotiated multilaterally within the UN, as well as within regional and 
subregional intergovernmental organisations. The definition provided by the 
UN Report of the Panel of Governmental Experts on Small Arms has not gained 
currency among those crafting Security Council resolutions either. The criteria
29 Woodward, 6.
30 Shields, 4.
31 Kirkham and Flew, 11.
32 See, for example, United Nations Secuirty Council Resolution 1701 (2006), paragraph 15(a).
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by which sanction regimes are deemed sufficiently successful for their lifting are 
also absent.33
Like sanction regimes, UN peacekeeping operations receive their mandate
from, and are often amended through, Security Council resolutions. When
invoked under Article 42, such measures are usually undertaken only after
diplomatic efforts to ease tensions, invoke cessation of hostilities, or resolve
conflict have been exhausted. Unlike the sanction regimes which UN members
are obliged to implement and administer, peacekeeping operations are resourced
by contributions of members, with such contributions usually prompted by
appeals from the Secretary-General. While consistent with the Security Council's
responsibilities enshrined in the UN Charter, the particular objectives of each
peacekeeping operation vary according to the circumstances of its deployment.
Because the UN has continued to develop its capacity to deploy peacekeeping
operations since authorising its first large-scale enforcement operation in the
Korean peninsula in 1950,34 with its operations responding to increasingly
complex circumstances and with mandates that are increasingly ambitious, there
are now at least four discernible types of, or analytical distinctions drawn over,
UN peacekeeping operations. As Virginia Page Fortna explains:
Observer missions are typically small in size and involve unarmed 
monitors. Traditional peacekeeping missions are somewhat larger and 
involve lightly armed military units (often in addition to observers). 
They are usually authorized to use force only in self-defence. 
Multidimensional peacekeeping missions supplement traditional 
peacekeeping forces with large civilian components to monitor 
elections, train or monitor police, monitor human rights, and 
sometimes temporarily to administer the country. All three of these 
types of mission are based on the consent of the parties and are 
authorised under Chapter VI of the UN Charter. Enforcement missions 
are authorised under Chapter VII, and do not necessarily require the
33 Tostensen and Bull, 378.
34 Hillen, 226. Incidentally, as Hillen notes, "because the Soviet representative to the 
Security Council was boycotting its sessions (because of the issue over Chinese 
representation), the United States and her allies were able to push for a more explicit 
Security Council mandate."
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consent of the belligerents. Their forces are generally better armed and 
larger, mandated to impose peace by force.35
There are, however, a myriad of distinctions drawn over these operations by 
analysts and "[different analysts use different typologies to classify the many 
operations that have been mounted in five decades of UN experience," as 
Ramesh Thakur and Albrecht Schnabel observe.36 In practise, these analytical 
distinctions dissolve as many peacekeeping operations are perhaps more aptly 
described as 'Chapter VI-and-a-half actions/ a term coined by former UN 
Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld.37
The widespread availability of small arms and light weapons constitutes a 
situational threat to almost all contemporary peacekeeping operations, especially 
given that peacekeepers are sent "where they are most needed rather than where 
peace is easy to keep."38 And, as noted in the introduction to this thesis, the 
legacies of weapons availability help problematise the distinction between 
conflict zones and post-conflict settings, endangering those peacekeepers 
regardless of any formal recognition of war. Released in 2000, a UN report notes 
that although the UN's engagement in DDR programmes is "relatively recent, it 
has rapidly become a well-established feature of post-Cold-War peacekeeping."39 
However, while peacekeeping operations dating back to the United Nations 
Observer Group in El Salvador (ONUSAL) in 1989 had formal arms control 
components, more recent operations "have assumed responsibility for only some 
elements" of DDR processes.40 Since the release of that report, the term 'DDR' 
has become increasingly prevalent among Security Council parlance, especially 
in resolution texts. Of the 42 UN peacekeeping operations conducted since the
35 Fortna, 270 (my emphasis added).
36 Ramesh Thakur and Albrecht Schnabel, eds., United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Ad 
hoc Missions, Permanent Engagement (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2001), 9.
37 Simon Chesterman, "Blue Helmet Blues," Security Dialogue 34, no.3 (September, 2003): 
370.
38 Fortna, 281.
39 United Nations Security Council, The Report of the Secretary-General on the Role of the United 
Nations Peacekeeping in Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration, paragraph 9.
40 Ibid, paragraph 10.
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early 1990s, however, only 18 of those managed by the DPKO were authorised by 
resolutions referring explicitly to the administration of DDR programmes.41
DDR programmes are underpinned by a basic assumption: since these
weapons are used to articulate and create grievances, and can thereby engender
and exacerbate insecurity, removing these tools of violence from the hands of
particular belligerents will diminish conditions of insecurity in those locales.
However, even where most available weapons are believed to have been
surrendered, insecurity can persist as belligerents resort to alternative tools of
violence, such as knives, axes, and farming equipment, thus reigniting conflict.42
As Ball and Hendrickson explain, "in a post-conflict setting, DDR may be a
necessary component of improving security but it is by no means a sufficient
condition."43 Successful DDR programmes, according to Robert Muggah,
Philippe Maughan, and Christian Bugnion, function as:
a temporary intervention designed to reduce insecurity. In laying the 
basis for security, DDR is supposed to establish the preconditions for
41 The following countries hosted one or more peacekeeping operations with DDR 
programmes and the resolutions noted here refer to those which first endowed the 
respective mandates with DDR programmes: Angola ((S/RES/976 (1995) and (S/RES/1118 
(1997)), Burundi (S/RES/1545 (2004)), Central African Republic (S/RES/1159 (1998)), Cote 
d'Ivoire (S/RES/1528 (2004)), Democratic Republic of the Congo (S/RES/1291 (2000), 
Guatemala (S/RES/1094 (1997)), Haiti (S/RES/1542 (2004)), Liberia (S/RES/1020 (1993) and 
S/RES/1509 (2003)), Mozambique (S/RES/797 (1992)) Rwanda (S/RES/872 (1993)), Sierra 
Leone (S/RES/1187 (1998) and S/RES/1270 (1999)), Sudan (S/RES/1590 (2005)), Somalia 
(S/RES/751 (1993) and S/RES/814 (1993)), and Tajikistan (S/RES/968 (1994)). For further 
information, please refer to <http://www.im.org/Depts/dpko/dpko> (accessed 16 October 
2006). Please note in the case of Rwanda, a DDR programme was authorised by the 
Security Council, but overtaken by events on the ground. Please also note that "the role 
of [the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic (MINURCA)] in the 
disarmament process was limited to safekeeping the weapons and ammunition already 
collected by the Inter-African Mission to Monitor the Implementation of the Bangui 
Agreements and to monitor their final disposition. However, soon after its establishment, 
MINURCA found that the disarmament process was far from being completed. The 
Mission had therefore to continue with the programme of disarmament, with the 
financial support of UNDP." United Nations Security Council, Third report of the Secretary- 
General on the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic, UN Doc. S/1998/1203 
(New York: United Nations, 1998), paragraph 28.
42 Sarah Douglas and Felicity Hill, eds., Getting it Right, Doing it Right: Gender and 
Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (New York: United Nations Development 
Fund for Women, 2004), 24.
43 Ball and Hendrickson, 11.
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development to take hold. DDR is not a substitute for development.
Nor should it be carried out indefinitely....DDR includes a cluster of 
specific activities to reduce the number of weapons in the hands of ex­
combatants, to ensure short-term reintegration assistance, to reform 
the security sector and to ensure the repatriation of foreign ex­
combatants to their place of origin.44
This rationale is supported by the UN's experience in Angola during the early 
1990s, where UNIT A was not disarmed, refused to accept unfavourable election 
results, and reverted to paramilitary operations in order to pursue its politics.45 
In order to counter their suspicions that UNIT A had not disarmed, the Popular 
Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) had secretly established an elite 
paramilitary force, referred to as the ninjas, with troop strength estimated at 
between 1,500 and 10,000.46 This led to what Jaremey McMullin dubs an 'Angola 
Anxiety,' whereby the Security Council vigorously pursues DDR programmes in 
order to avoid similar scenarios that disrupt peace.47
Just as arms embargoes focus exclusively upon preventing transfers of small 
arms and light weapons from reaching targeted actors, DDR programmes focus 
exclusively upon removing these weapons from the immediate reach of 
particular belligerents. By focusing upon disarming combatants, DDR 
programmes do not exert control over the proliferation of small arms and light 
weapons, the transfer of these weapons beyond, or circulation within, areas of 
UN operations and, in most cases, do not cover government-held stockpiles even 
where large surpluses of these weapons might exist. The prospects of successful 
disarmament are easily undermined where weapons are collected and stored, but
44 Robert Muggah, Philippe Maughan, and Christian Bugnion, The Long Shadow of War: 
Prospects for Disarmament Demobilisation and Reintegration in the Republic of Congo, A Joint 
Independent Evaluation for the European Commission, UNDP and MDRP Secretariat 
(Geneva: European Commission, UNDP and MDRP Secretariat, 2003), 5.
45 Norrie MacQueen, "Peacekeeping by attrition: the United Nations in Angola," The Journal 
of Modern African Studies 36, no.3 (1998): 410; see also Chris Alden, "Making Old Soldiers 
Fade Away: Lessons from the Reintegration of Demobilized Soldiers in Mozambique," 
Security Dialogue 33, no.3 (2002): 343.
46 Dzinesa, 656.
47 Jaremey McMullin, "Reintegration of Combatants: Were the Right Lessons Learned in 
Mozambique?" International Peacekeeping 11, no.4 (Winter 2004): 626.
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not destroyed: for instance, while the collection of over 200,000 small arms and 
light weapons by the United Nations Mission to Mozambique (ONUMOZ) is 
commendable, none of these weapons were transferred to a centralised depot 
from the regions in which they were initially taken into custody and none of 
these weapons were deactivated or destroyed. While these weapons were not 
used to reignite the conflict in Mozambique, loose controls over stockpiles 
resulted in significant leakages whereby collected weapons became commodities 
for organised criminal groups, either for their illegal use or for trafficking 
purposes, slipping into the black market.48
As with arms embargoes, the technical mandates for DDR programmes are 
also frequently vague, sometimes referring to peace accords that are not attached 
to Security Council resolutions, with ONUMOZ being an example of this.49 In 
some cases, such as the United Nations Angola Verification Mission II 
(UNAVEM II), resolutions are informed by ceasefire agreements over which the 
Security Council exerted scant influence and played little role in articulating.50 
This is important because:
In the advent of a peace agreement, a large number of these armed 
groups are not officially considered as protagonists of the conflict, and 
therefore evade inclusion in programs. Similarly, a lack of emphasis 
on weapon holders not covered by DDR mandates (eg. civilians and 
militias) often constitutes a major flaw in many processes, especially in 
countries where 'everybody is armed' according to common belief.51
48 Ibid, 632.
49 United Nations Security Council Resolution 797 (1992), paragraph 2, for example: "decides 
to establish a United Nations Operation in Mozambique as proposed by the Secretary- 
General and in line with the General Peace Agreement for Mozambique."
50 MacQueen, 401-2; refer also to Dzinesa, 650. However, as McQueen elaborates, "[t]he 
dual status of the United States and Russia as permanent members of the Security 
Council and 'Observer States' to the Lusaka agreement and its implementation greatly 
facilitated the effective working of the complex of relationships encircling the Angola 
problem, despite their global diminution of their influence in the post-Cold War 
environment," 421.
51 Pouligny, The Politics and Anti-Politics of Contemporary 'Disarmament, Demobilization and 
Reintegration'Program, 7.
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The DDR programme in Tajikistan, for instance, "primarily lessened the 
appearance, rather than the volume, of illegal small arms," which are widely held 
by members of the public, as well as by political and criminal groups.52
Where DDR programmes are explicitly provided for in resolutions,
definitions of small arms and light weapons remain absent. Although this
approach allows force commanders operating on the ground the flexibility
necessary in order to achieve their mission's objectives, it does not always
translate into an effective arms control strategy. For the most part, DDR
programmes administered as part of UN peacekeeping operations rely heavily
on voluntary compliance. Former Secretary-General Annan instructively
articulates this point, when in early 2001 he wrote:
The tracking down of armed groups and their disarmament by force 
are not peacekeeping functions....Any recommendation I make 
concerning the assistance MONUC can provide to the disarmament, 
demobilization, reintegration, repatriation, or resettlement process 
will be based upon the assumption that MONUC will not be called 
upon to use enforcement action. In some cases, it is anticipated that 
armed groups/elements serving with allied forces may present 
themselves to MONUC for voluntary disarmament and 
demobilization. MONUC may be called upon to assist.53
Such an approach, if successful, is heavily indebted to other aspects of the 
peacekeeping operation, including security sector reform and post-conflict 
development.
A disconnect among the frameworks providing for the various collective 
actions authorised by the Security Council represents a lost opportunity to 
maximise control over small arms and light weapons. During the 1990s in 
particular, the Security Council responded to conflict in Angola, Cambodia, Cote 
d'Ivoire, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, and Somalia in such a way that sanction regimes
52 John Heathershaw, "The paradox of peacebuilding: peril, promise, and small arms in 
Tajikistan" Central Asian Survey 24, no.l (March 2005): 28.
53 United Nations Security Council, Seventh report of the Secretary-General on the United 
Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, UN Doc. S/2001/373 
(New York: United Nations, 2001), paragraph 103.
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and peacekeeping operations coincided: in Haiti, sanction regimes were followed 
almost immediately by the authorisation of a peacekeeping operation there. 
However, resolutions mandating these activities do not always explicitly connect 
arms embargoes with DDR programmes. UNMIL's mandate, for example, did 
not extend to enforcing the arms embargo targeting Liberia, not only exposing "a 
serious security gap that threatens the integrity of the mission as a whole/ ' 54 but 
also enabling weapons to flow to other combatants and criminals in the 
immediate region and beyond. Similarly, both the United Nations Angola 
Verification Mission III (UNAVEM III) and the United Nations Observer Mission 
in Angola (MONUA) in particular, and the UN in general, did little to ensure the 
sanction regime targeting UNIT A was impermeable, enabling UNIT A to generate 
revenue from the sale of diamonds, which it used to procure further weapons.55
More recently, UN peacekeeping operations have been deployed 
contiguously as a response to conflict in Liberia and Cote d'Ivoire, as well as in 
the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Sudan, Central African Republic, Angola, 
and Burundi. Yet as Festus B. Aboagye and Alhaji M. S. Bah explain, "at the 
operational level, disparities in the DDR processes between the contiguous 
missions in Liberia and Cote d'Ivoire provide a gap through which some of the 
deadly arsenal could fall into the hands of ex-combatants roving as regional 
mercenaries. " 56 Similarly, sanction regimes targeting Liberia and Sierra Leone, as 
well as Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Somalia, have undergone contiguous 
implementation without mandates referring explicitly to other sanction regimes. 
However, a nascent interconnectivity is evident in very recent resolutions which 
provide force commanders with the mandates to cooperate with contiguous 
deployments: ONUB and MONUC are instructive examples of such
interconnectivity in areas such as "deterring foreign combatants from infiltrating
54 Aboagye and Bah, 17.
55 Dzinesa, 657. 
Aboagye and Bah, 17.56
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the border, curtailing the flow of illegal weapons and assisting in the monitoring 
of the arms embargo against the Democratic Republic of the Congo/ ' 57
In short, the Security Council's negotiation and articulation of resolutions 
authorising sanction regimes and peacekeeping operations can negatively affect 
the strategic capability of their auxiliary arms embargoes and DDR programmes. 
In particular, considerations removed from the immediate issue at hand, 
including the superpower rivalry sustaining the Cold War and, more recently, 
permanent members' perceptions of their own national interests which include 
ongoing access to oil resources and shifting domestic public opinion, have either 
incited veto over, or encouraged consensus regarding, Security Council 
resolutions. Moreover, a disconnect among strategic frameworks does little to 
strengthen the emerging mosaic of responsibilities comprising of obligations to 
implement arms embargoes and of commitments to sufficiently resource 
peacekeeping operations. Hence, just as the influence of powerful governments 
both enables and impedes the multilateral negotiations occurring within 
intergovernmental organisations, it also enables and impedes the negotiations 
within the Security Council, shaping the resolutions which authorise these two 
particular forms of arms control.
Implementing Security Council Resolutions
An essential difference between those measures of control negotiated 
multilaterally within intergovernmental organisations and those arms embargoes 
authorised by the Security Council is evident in the exclusion of the target from 
the Security Council's deliberation and negotiation.58 Also excluded from the
57 United Nations Security Council, Fourth report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations 
mission in Burundi, UN Doc. S/2005/328 (New York: United Nations, 2005), paragraph 28; 
see also ibid, paragraph 32.
58 By target, I mean here the actor, or group of actors, at whom a particular embargo is 
directed. While the target of a proposed sanction might be present at deliberations— 
indeed, it ought to have been invited by the Security Council to appear before it to 
provide information, or to work through its own or nominated 'good offices'—it does not 
participate in the formation of the sanction regime. Similarly, while consent from
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Security Council's deliberation are most of the governments that, while 
sovereign, are obliged to respect the Security Council's will. Unlike treaties 
requiring ratification by signatories, and unlike soft law measures creating norms 
and standards to which governments ought to adhere (except where a particular 
government has consistently signalled its opposition), arms embargoes declared 
as mandatory by the Security Council must be adhered to by all UN members. 
This key difference has serious implications for a subject government's capability, 
not to mention desire, to administer and observe the terms of an arms embargo, 59 
especially since embargoes rely almost entirely upon governments for their 
implementation, ongoing administration, and enforcement.
Many of the administrative processes and enforcement procedures necessary 
to implement arms embargoes, such as controlling the import and export of 
goods at points of origin, during transit, and at destinations, are necessary to 
administer and enforce the regulatory regimes fostered by governments' 
responsibilities under international law .60 Some governments, however, lacking 
the infrastructure necessary to exert effective control over the activities of their 
nationals, nevertheless willingly accept the rights and privileges accompanying 
UN membership. These governments take all administrative care while 
authorising their nationals to undertake activities involving small arms and light 
weapons transfers, but assume no enforcement responsibility. They are flags of 
convenience. Unable to expediently establish domestic legislation reflecting 
Security Council resolutions, other governments exert little, if any, control over
belligerents party to conflict is sought, it is not a prerequisite for a Security Council 
resolution authorising peacekeeping operation.
59 Woodward, 3.
60 Moreover, as Shields points out, "A common law state must transform its international 
law obligations into national legislation in order for them to apply in its territory. This is 
often by adopting an Act to give effect to UNSCRs or sanctions generally, followed by 
secondary legislation (such as regulation) to give effect to a specific embargo. The 
regulation can establish the offences committed by breaking the embargo and consequent 
penalties. In contrast, civil law states have a 'monist' tradition, whereby the adoption of 
an international law instrument serves to automatically incorporate it into the state's 
domestic law. The monist tradition can be problematic as offences and penalties are 
found in the state's penal code and, consequently, may not be directly tied to that state's 
implementation and enforcement of each individual arms embargo," 8-9.
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transactions involving small arms and light weapons occurring within their 
territory or across international borders. Some governments claim that the 
national implementation of arms embargoes suffer unavoidable delays and 
refuse to prosecute known traffickers in order to shield their own international 
standing: in 1998, for example, the UK government admitted as much, as did the 
government of South Africa.61 In some circumstances, such transactions occur in 
accordance with domestic law, placing that government in violation of its 
international obligations.62
Furthermore, the more specific the terms of a sanction regime, the greater care 
required when administering it. This is especially significant given the Security 
Council's recent policy shift from comprehensive economic sanctions, predicated 
on broad-based restrictions, towards so-called smart sanctions. Broadly 
speaking, the former generate difficult economic, social, and humanitarian 
conditions for the general populations of targeted governments without applying 
meaningful pressure upon their political elite, while the latter intends to limit this 
harm to civilian populations by better targeting the appropriate decision-makers 
through prohibiting their travel visas, certain types of their financial transactions, 
and their trade of weapons, oil, diamonds and other lucrative natural resources. 
Since Resolution 917 (1994) on Haiti, the Security Council has not authorised any 
further comprehensive economic sanction regimes.63 Yet the danger here is, as 
Brzoska warns, "that the naive theory of 'political gain through economic pain' is 
substituted by a similarly naive theory of 'political gain through nauseating the 
powerful.'"64 Accordingly, it "is a fallacy to think that the smart sanctions 
concept will necessarily alleviate the cost problem of enforcement."65
Where governments are obliged to observe arms embargoes, but possess 
inadequate border control infrastructure and/or insufficient resources with which
61 Brian Wood and Johan Peleman, The Arms Fixers: controlling the brokers and shipping agents 
(Oslo: Norwegian Initiative on Small Arms Transfers, 1999), 35.
62 Chesterman and Pouligny, 506-7.
63 Ibid, 506.
64 Brzoska, 532.
65 Tostensen and Bull, 398.
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to control the vast volumes of trade and movement of people across international
borders, the efficacy of sanction regimes can be invigorated through Sanctions
Assistance Missions (SAMs). SAMs assist governments, especially those
immediately surrounding target actors' territory, by providing, for example,
latest communications technologies enabling front-line inspectors to verify
official documents and accompanying cargoes in real-time. When supported by
members of the international community, as in the case of the arms embargoes
targeting Yugoslavia during 1991-1995, SAMs help sanction regimes to become
"the most effective in history." Yet:
The requisite resources for establishing such arrangements, however, 
are likely to be available only in cases where the interests of the 
wealthiest states are at stake. In Africa, where Western efforts to 
resolve conflict have been minimal, such monitoring mechanisms have 
been nonexistent. In the cases of Liberia and Sierra Leone, for example, 
[ECOWAS] imposed sanctions and attempted to establish a regional 
monitoring system, but a lack of resources and the absence of 
assistance from the United States and Europe undermined the 
effectiveness of these efforts. If the SAMs system is to have relevance 
beyond Europe, a system for sharing resources and technical capacity 
will be necessary.66
Where governmental will to observe an embargo is wavering, or worse is largely
absent, the sanction's intent is easily undermined. According to Mack and Khan:
The level of resources allocated to monitoring, assessing, and 
enforcing sanctions is a function of the degree to which the perceived 
interests of major powers are engaged; it may be politically impossible 
to implement sanctions successfully when they are not. Thus 
implementation of UN sanctions directed against Rwanda, Liberia, 
and Somalia, where the major powers have only minor interests at 
stake, have generated so little effort that the regimes have been 
described by one UN insider as 'atrophic'. By contrast quite 
extraordinary efforts have been devoted to the sanctions imposed on 
Iraq where the perceived vital interests of major powers were 
engaged.67
66 Cortright and Lopez with Conroy, Dashti-Gibson, and Wagler, 70.
67 Mack and Khan, 283.
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As Gilbert Barthe points out, some governments of countries in the 
developing world, which were to a large extent defined by European 
imperialism, have long-standing tribal affiliations motivating them to refrain 
from fully implementing an embargo.68 In 1995, reports issued by Human Rights 
Watch and Amnesty International also pointed to several governments violating 
arms embargoes targeting the Rwandan conflict, identifying France, UK, and 
PRC, as well as South Africa, Albania, Bulgaria, and Israel as so-called sanction 
busters.69 As a former imperial power, France provided arms to the 
Habyarimana regime and the Sindikubwabo interim government in Rwanda, 
deliberately avoiding UN monitors operating at known points-of-entry, 
contravening the very sanction regime it authorised.70 hike France, PRC covertly 
contravened this embargo, rather than overtly veto the adoption of Resolution 918 
(1994). Rwanda, a non-permanent member of the Security Council between 1994- 
95, was the only dissenting vote cast during the adoption of this resolution on 17 
May 1994.71 It is sometimes more convenient for the Security Council's 
permanent members to deliberately contravene arms embargoes than it is to 
exercise their power of veto in order to either prevent resolutions or weaken the 
provisions of sanction regimes. The exact reasons for governments contravening 
arms embargoes are probably as varied as the instances of contravention, 
however.
Successfully implemented arms embargoes tend to preserve, reinforce, or 
exacerbate the asymmetric power relations characterising many contemporary 
conflicts, favouring a particular party to a conflict at the expense of neutrality.72
68 Gilbert Barthe, "The Impact of Arms Embargoes—a view from a UN Expert," as quoted 
in Elizabeth Kirkham and Catherine Flew, Strengthening Embargoes and Enhancing Human 
Security, Briefing Paper no.17 (London: Biting the Bullet, 2003), 19.
69 Amnesty International, Rwanda: Arming the Perpetrators of the Genocide, 13 June 1995 and 
Human Rights Watch, Rwanda/Zaire: Rearming zoith Impunity: International Support for the 
Perpetrators of the Rwandan Genocide 7, no.4. (May, 1995).
70 Woodward, 28-9; See also Peter Viggo Jakobsen, "Overload, Not Marginalization, 
Threatens UN Peacekeeping," Security Dialogue 31, no.2 (2000): 173.
71 Mel NcNulty, "French arms, war and genocide in Rwanda, Crime, Lazo & Social Change 33 
(2000): 117.
72 Tostensen and Bull, 384.
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(This logic holds too for the disarming of rival factions by peacekeepers, and 
where insecurity persists "demobilization may put at risk those who indeed 
agreed to disarm, and may create tremendous asymmetries between 
stakeholders, thereby undermining prospects for meaningful stability and 
security."73) Where a party is disadvantaged in this way, it becomes increasingly 
vulnerable to violent recriminations from rival forces, as was the case between 
1991 and 1995 when the embargo targeting Yugoslavia "had the effect of 
preserving a balance of military power that significantly favoured the 
Serbs...[and] tended to lock in place this imbalance and impeded the ability of the 
emerging Bosnian state to defend itself."74
Other impacts result where sanction regimes are implemented and prove 
effective. While primarily an economically-coercive instrument, sanction regimes 
can have conflict-like consequences, engendering human suffering on a massive 
scale, including civilian casualties and attendant social dislocation. When this 
occurs, tension is exposed between the ways in which the Security Council 
discharges its responsibilities and the commitment to respecting human rights 
enshrined in the UN Charter and its ancillary declarations, specifically the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1947).75 The government of Iraq, for 
instance, made the following statement to the UN, with respect to the sanction 
regime aimed at it:
The people of Iraq are today facing veritable destruction by a weapon 
that is just as dangerous as weapons of mass destruction; this has so 
far led to the death of 1 million persons, half of whom were children. 
This destruction, which is a form of genocide inflicted on the Iraqi
73 Pouligny, The Politics and Anti-Politics of Contemporary 'Disarmament, Demobilization and 
Reintegration' Programs, 5.
74 Cortright and Lopez with Conroy, Dashti-Gibson and Wagler, 65.
75 Mack and Khan, 284. For a discussion dealing with the institutional arrangements, and 
shortcomings therein, between peacekeeping operations with human rights components 
and the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, please refer to Todd 
Howland, "UN Human Rights Field Presence as Proactive Instrument of Peace and Social 
Change: Lessons from Angola," Human Rights Quarterly 26 (2004): 9-10.
180
people, is a crime punishable under international law regardless of 
whether it is committed in time of war or peace.76
Saddam Hussein's entourage thrived as the general population suffered 
hardship and "Baghdad was quite successful in blaming the UN for the 
humanitarian crisis in Iraq, both within the country and worldwide. " 77 Perverse 
effects emerge in cases where governments targeted by sanction regimes control 
domestic media organisations in such a way as to embolden its popular 
support.78 Furthermore, former Secretary-General Annan has warned of the 
dangers associated with the collateral impacts on third parties; often those 
"neighbouring countries that bear much of the economic and trading loss from 
compliance have not been compensated by the rest of the international 
community and, as a result, have allowed sanctions to become porous. " 79
More significantly for this thesis, sanction regimes also "harm those very 
social sectors within a targeted country that might be most supportive of the 
norms being protected by the UN Security Council, " 80 including those members 
of civil society who might otherwise have been in a better position to help 
organise and conduct local arms control campaigns, encourage and monitor 
military and constabulary use of small arms and light weapons, and encourage 
transparency over governmental stockpiles, official transfers, and weapons 
procurement.
76 Refer to note verbale, dated 29 January 1996, from the Permanent Mission of the Republic 
of Iraq to the United Nations Office at Geneva, UN doc. E/CN.4/1996/140, paragraph 19, 
as quoted in Tostensen and Bull: 376. Note, also, as Cortright and Lopez with Conroy, 
Dashti-Gibson and Wagler observe, "[t]he principle of civilian immunity applies no less 
in the application of sanctions than in the conduct of war. This suggests that sanctioning 
authorities bear the fundamental responsibly for mitigating unintended consequences 
and for ensuring that the measures enacted to uphold international norms do not cause 
suffering disproportionate to the ends served/' 26.
77 Brzoska, 520.
78 Mack and Kahn, 282; see also Tostensen and Bull, 376-7.
79 Kofi Annan, "Secretary-General Reviews Lessons Learned During "Sanctions Decade" in 
Remarks to International Peace Academy, 17 April 2000," <http://www.un.org/dos/ 
sc/committees/sanctions/sgstatement.htm> (accessed 12 July 2005), 2.
80 Cortright and Lopez with Conroy, Dashti-Gibson and Wagler, 4.
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Moreover, sanction regimes can encourage the informalisation and, in some
cases, the criminalisation of markets as "[c]risis economies under sanctions
develop close (or closer) linkages to the illegal spheres of the world market.
Those who wield political power may develop these linkages in order to ensure
the supply of goods that can no longer be obtained legally. " 81 Peter Andreas
demonstrates the ways in which governments targeted by a sanction regime
develop links to, cooperate with, and even encourage the activities of traffickers
and other organised criminals, emphasising the repercussions of this nexus
instead of disregarding these as unimportant legacies of sanction regimes.
Significantly, Andreas concludes that:
The imposition of comprehensive sanctions by the international 
community unintentionally encouraged much closer state-criminal 
ties and large-scale smuggling, and now in the post-sanctions period, 
the international community has blamed organized crime and 
corruption for blocking much needed reforms. Rarely is there any 
Western acknowledgement of having contributed to the problem in 
the first place.82
This kind of criminalisation—of the government, the economy, and society — not 
only depletes the resources available to the government enabling its adherence to 
any responsibilities to control small arms and light weapons which it might have 
under international law, and undermines any governmental will to support such 
obligations and commitments, but also empowers those international actors who 
are able to mitigate, resist, or elude the intended effects of the international 
community's attempts to exert control over these weapons. (And, as Chapter Six 
illustrates, sometimes embargoed governments rely upon the services of 
unauthorised brokers to procure weapons.) As Andreas also points out, 
strengthening sanction regimes might intensify this process of criminalisation, as 
well as proliferate and prolong its deleterious effects.
81 Chesterman and Pouligny, 511; See also Cortright and Lopez with Conroy, Dashti-Gibson 
and Wagler, 20.
82 Andreas, 357.
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DDR programmes are sometimes inhibited by the provision of insufficient 
resources. DDR programmes administered as part of peacekeeping operations 
managed by the DPKO receive funding from various sources, including the UN's 
assessed budget, the World Bank, and the UNDP, as well as from host 
governments and bilateral security-related funds.83 But despite occasional 
cooperation among these agencies, "they also regularly endorse competing and 
even contradictory philosophies and approaches. " 84 Moreover, specific 
constraints accompany funds. For example, when drawn from the UN's assessed 
budget, funds cannot be used to plan DDR programmes before the Security 
Council mandates collective action and cannot be used to assist reintegration 
initiatives perceived as development projects.85 Yet this funding stream is less 
vulnerable to those wider considerations to which the negotiation of resolutions 
is sometimes subjected because individual UN members cannot withhold their 
dues in order to prevent particular DDR programmes. By contrast, funding from 
development agencies and the World Bank tends to focus upon post-conflict 
development without engaging military (or pseudo-military) actors in 
disarmament activities.86 Ball and Hendrickson surmise that the 
"multidisciplinary nature of DDR processes militates strongly against any one 
type of organization (development, peace support, diplomatic) being able to 
manage all the necessary functions, [though] coordination of donor support for 
DDR processes needs to be improved . " 87
In addition to insufficient funding, inadequate troop contributions from UN 
members in many cases retard the establishment of entire operations, confining 
the geographic coverage of some DDR programmes. The deployment of ONUB, 
for example, was significantly delayed because UN members were "slow to 
respond to requests for specialized units and some troop contributors have
83 Ball and Hendrickson, 4-8.
84 Pouligny, The Politics and Anti-Politics of Contemporary 'Disarmament, Demobilization and 
Reintegration' Programs, 4.
85 Ball and Hendrickson, 17.
86 Ibid, 6.
87 Ibid, 18.
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requested delays in previously agreed deployment timelines, while others have 
deployed troops without necessary equipment."88 According to Phillip Sibanda, 
the Chief Military Observer of the UNAVEM III, the Security Council declined to 
authorise the 15,000 troops that UNAVEM III requested, opting instead to 
authorise only half this figure.89 Given the unusable road network in war-tom 
Angola, the difficulties encountered by UN personnel were compounded by the 
inadequate provision of aircraft. The number of troops and the technical 
resources available to them were, according to Gwinyayi Albert Dzinesa, 
"grossly insufficient to cope with the complex and rapidly deteriorating scenario 
in Angola, which would soon lead to a relapse of war."90 In some cases, too few 
personnel were available to monitor so-called secured weapons, resulting in 
leakages.91 A similar situation emerged in Mozambique where the "massive 
influx of Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO) troops has led to 
overcrowding in some areas (almost 221 per cent of capacity at one camp), 
resulting in shortages of food and other essential items, inadequate lodging and 
storage facilities and potential health hazards,"92 though a subsequent report 
from the Secretary-General notes that "some of the [assembly] areas are 
overcrowded, while others are virtually empty: capacity utilization ranges from a 
low of 3 per cent to a high of almost 420 per cent."93
88 United Nations Security Council, First report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations 
Operation in Burundi, UN Doc. S/2004/682 (New York: United Nations, 2004), paragraph 
38.
89 Phillip Sibanda, "Lessons From UN Peacekeeping in Africa: From UNAVEM to 
MONUA," in Jackie Cilliers and Greg Mills, eds., From Peacekeeping to Complex 
Emergencies: Peace Support Missions in Africa (Johannesburg: South African Institute of 
International Affairs, 1999), 119-20, as quoted in Gwinyayi Albert Dzinesa, "A 
Comparative Perspective of UN Peacekeeping in Angola and Namibia," International 
Peacekeeping 11 no.4 (Winter 2004): 654.
90 Dzinesa, 654.
91 Ibid, 653.
92 United Nations Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations 
Operation in Mozambique, UN Doc. S/1994/89, paragraph 8.
93 United Nations Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations 
Operation in Mozambique, UN Doc. S/1994/511 (New York: United Nations, 1994), 
paragraph 6.
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Deficient preparedness creates self-imposed handicaps. UNMIL, for example, 
offered a one-off cash payment of US$300 to those combatants willing to 
relinquish their weapons, but the collection sites, anticipating about a thousand 
combatants per day, where unprepared both financially and logistically for the 
12,000 combatants who appeared, most of whom bore arms. Widespread 
discontentment among belligerents at the collection sites resulted in riots and the 
DDR programme was suspended on 17 December 2003, resuming on 15 April the 
following year.94 According to Aboagye and Bah, the "lack of adequate facilities 
and personnel to process the large number of [Government of Liberia] 
combatants that turned up at Camp Scheffelin pointed to the unsuitable timing of 
the start of the DDR programme and the lack of preparedness of UNMIL and 
other stakeholders." The imminent arrival of the rainy season, combined with 
the lack of functioning infrastructure, only exacerbated the challenge of collecting 
weapons.95
Further operational constraints are exposed where DDR programmes are 
poorly coordinated. Civil society organisations regularly assist with the 
administration of DDR programmes under the auspices of some peacekeeping 
operations. However, in certain situations, such as occurred in Liberia, NGO 
staff have lacked the required training and necessary authority to identify and 
then exclude those individuals who did not qualify for inclusion within the DDR 
programme, rendering any subsequent screening activities largely superfluous.96 
Civil society support is not restricted to UN peacekeeping operations, however. 
Save the Children worked closely with UNICEF, implementing aspects of DDR 
programmes in Afganistan, where the intervention was under North Atlantic 
Treat Organisation (NATO) command. While these DDR programmes suffered 
from many of the same strategic limitations and operational hindrances as those 
directly managed by the DPKO, civil society organisations confront the
94 Douglas and Hill, 13-4.
95 Aboagye and Bah, 7.
96 Nichols, 120.
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additional complexity of managing relationships among civil society 
organisations with competing agendas, contested definitions and criteria, and 
overlapping funding streams.97
Likewise, further operational constraints are exposed where DDR 
programmes are poorly administered. Where the number of DDR programme 
participants are underestimated, weapons-storage facilities are placed under 
strain and in some cases, as occurred in Mozambique, weapons that are collected 
are secured poorly, placing ex-combatants and UN personnel in grave danger.98 
When peacekeepers lack a sophisticated understanding of local conditions, they 
mistakenly "sometimes tend to look for constitutional armies, a hierarchy, and 
officers with which to negotiate."99 At other times, traditional practices and 
customary rituals are not fully exploited within the context of DDR programmes, 
though of course respect for indigenous protocol "is no substitute for energetic 
commitment on the part of the international community."100
The selection of unsuitable and obscure collection sites can result in many 
unrealised collection opportunities. In Tajikistan, combatants registered for 
disarmament, but did not remain in assembly points, retaining their weapons.101 
Following the murder of staff-members in July 1998, the United Nations Mission 
of Observers in Tajikistan (UNMOT) withdrew from the capital and discontinued 
monitoring collection points.102 Furthermore, disarmament opportunities 
observed outside collection points were not always pursued, with UN troops 
aware of large quantities of weapons flowing across international borders: in
97 For an excellent account of the complexities surrounding the DDR programme in 
Afghanistan, please refer to Vera Chrobok, Demobilizing and Reintegrating Afghanistan's 
Young Soldiers: A  Review and Assessment of Program Planning and Implementation, Briefing 
Paper no.42 (Bonn: Bonn International Center for Conversion, 2005).
98 United Nations Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations 
Operation in Mozambique, UN Doc. S/1994/89, paragraph 7.
99 Pouligny, The Politics and Anti-Politics of Contemporary 'Disarmament, Demobilization and 
Reintegration' Programs, 7.
100 Alden, 353-4.
101 R. Grant Smith, "Tajikistan: the rocky road to peace," Central Asian Survey 17, no.2 (1999): 
245
102 rbid, 248-9.
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Mozambique, peacekeepers could only passively observe weapons trafficking— 
in some cases noting the licence plate numbers of vehicles conveying illicit 
weapons into neighbouring countries—because they were not authorised to seize 
weapons . 103 A similar scenario unfolded in Somalia, where US commanders 
operating in hostile conditions narrowly interpreted their mandate to disarm 
combatants, choosing only to disarm them where they directly interfered with 
the delivery of humanitarian aid, if they disarmed anyone at all. 104 This 
shortcoming, originating in the operation's mandate, is increasingly significant 
because many heavy weapons, including mortars and anti-aircraft guns, evade 
voluntary disarmament and are probably transferred to nearby conflict zones, 105 
signalling the necessity for peacekeepers "to embark on cordon and search 
operations to recover these weapons. " 106
Much has been made by the world's press of the allegations of sexual 
harassment within the UN Secretariat and within some peacekeeping 
operations.107 Less attention focuses, however, upon those DDR programmes 
demonstrating an institutionalised bias based on gender and professional 
background: the technical application of 'combatants' becomes a matter of some 
significance, therefore. Where the term 'combatants' is interpreted narrowly for 
DDR purposes, it tends to neglect women as targets for disarmament. UNMIL 
reported, for example, that women's involvement in DDR programmes did not 
correspond to the estimate of women's involvement in the conflict.108 While 
some women claim status as survivors of conflict and as victims of sexual 
violence, others must bear culpability as perpetrators of sexual violence targeting 
women, for some female soldiers deliberately sought to capture female prisoners
103 McMullin, 636.
Hillen, 218.
los Wolf-Christian Paes, "The Challenges of Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration 
in Liberia," International Peacekeeping 12, no.2 (Summer 2005): 256.
106 Aboagye and Bah, 17.
107 Refer to United Nations General Assembly, A comprehensive strategy to eliminate future 
sexual exploitation and abuse in United Nations peacekeeping operations, UN Doc. A/59/710 
(New York: United Nations, 2005).
108 Douglas and Hill, 14.
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as a means of providing an alternative target for rape and other acts of sexual 
violence by their male counterparts.109 Where women are neither targeted by 
DDR programmes as either combatants or as non-combatants contributing to 
ongoing hostilities in support roles, nor involved in the administration of DDR 
programmes, opportunities to identify hidden weapons caches are not fully 
realised. Moreover, disarmament initiatives based solely upon those in 
possession of weapons neglect those women who have handed weapons to men, 
as well as those, male and female, who have disarmed prior to the DDR 
programme's commencement.
The bias against professional backgrounds implicit in ONUMOZ's 
reintegration programme, in which officers who have received considerable 
education and attained relatively high levels of professional and management 
skills were not differentiated from those general combatants who, prior to taking 
up arms, found subsistence working as peasants in rural hinterlands, may have 
encouraged the criminalisation of Mozambique's post-conflict society. Former 
military officers utilised their command and control skills with their technical 
and operational expertise in leadership roles within organised criminal groups. 110 
The weapons used by such criminals are, as Muggah reveals, "often the very 
ones looted from the country's own arsenals and inventories to begin with . " * 111 
The criminalisation of post-conflict settings is a disturbing phenomenon not only 
because it resembles, and in some cases intensifies, the criminalising effects 
created and fostered by some sanction regimes, but also because peacekeeping 
operations are often deployed in order to secure long-term peace processes, not 
just to monitor short-term ceasefire agreements, important as these are.
Where combatants are excluded, for whatever reasons or biases, from DDR 
programmes, frustration and resentment can combine to produce 'spoilers' of the 
peace process. And by spoilers I mean, as does Stephen John Stedman, those
109 Ibid, 11.
110 Alden, 350.
111 Muggah, "No Magic Bullet," 241; and also in Muggah, "Emerging from the Shadow of
War,"193.
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"leaders and factions who view a particular peace as opposed to their interests 
and who are willing to use violence to undermine it. " 112 Again, in Mozambique, 
those who belonged to government-run militias were not considered to form part 
of the government's military forces, and were thereby excluded, without 
exception, from the DDR programmes and its associated benefits.113 In Liberia, 
ex-combatants were excluded from the DDR process because they were without 
weapons; some had surrendered arms to the previous (regional) peacekeeping 
operation, others had relinquished weapons to their former commanders while 
several combatants may have shared a single weapon .114 These so-called spoilers 
undermine security if they have access to, or knowledge of, weapons caches. 
Spoilers undermine economic recovery if they do not receive the assistance and 
benefits afforded to those able to take advantage of DDR programmes, turning 
instead to banditry and engaging in other criminal enterprises. Spoilers also 
undermine social cohesion if the ex-combatant's role as outcast is reinforced by 
the lack of available new roles, leaving them to rely upon weapons as their 
primary means of ensuring basic human security and economic survival, and, in 
some cases, of enhancing personal prestige within the community.
Like arms embargoes, when DDR programmes are successfully implemented 
they can generate adverse consequences for both local communities and the 
international community. Because DDR programmes focus upon disarming 
combatants, for example, they are seen by some as rewarding those who take up 
arms as a means of pursuing political ambitions while neglecting those who 
abstained from involving themselves in the conflict.115 Indeed, war criminals 
rank among these instigators of violence receiving 'rewards' and 'benefits. ' 116 
Successful DDR programmes not only run the risk of forging a culture of
112 Stephen John Stedman, "Peace Processes and the Challenges of Violence," in 
Contemporary Peacemaking: Conflict, Violence, and Peace Processes, eds., John Darby and 
Roger Mac Ginty (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 103.
Alden, 347.
114 Nichols, 134.
115 Faltas, McDonald, and Waszink, 7.
116 Pouligny, The Politics and Anti-Politics of Contemporary 'Disarmament, Demobilization and 
Reintegration' Programs, 7.
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dependency, or what Muggah describes as a "reintegration industry,"117 but also 
create weapons flows into collection points from beyond the local catchments 
areas, as occurred in Liberia where the financial inducements encouraged 
disarmament among belligerents and ex-combatants.118 As Ryan Nichols 
explains:
The lack of coordination and communication between UN officials in 
neighbouring countries was apparent when, in March 2004, Cote 
d'Ivoire announced the details of its forthcoming DDR programme— 
taking many UNMIL officials by surprise. Confounding Liberia's 
DDR, is the fact that in Cote d'Ivoire, ex-combatants will be receiving 
considerably more money than Liberians when (and if) the 
disarmament process finally takes place. This has prompted 
speculations that many Liberian fighters may be holding back 
weapons in order to cash them in next door. Cote d'Ivoire's DDR 
process, which had been scheduled for 15 October 2004 but was 
delayed indefinitely, originally called for a payment of USD900."119
The corresponding payment in Liberia was US$300. Importantly, when news of 
failing DDR programmes spreads beyond the specific area of operations, the 
reputation of DDR programmes suffers, as does the UN's reputation more 
generally.
The conceptual disconnect among the key components of DDR programmes 
jeopardizes their overall efficacy. Where reintegration projects fail to match 
expectations, benefits derived from disarming combatants are squandered when 
ex-combatants remobilise and reacquire arms. In Mozambique, for instance, the 
reintegration projects were remarkable more for their "dark comedy than for 
their success," as ex-combatants received training as electricians before returning 
to villages without electricity: however, in "raising expectations beyond what the 
market could offer,"120 ONUMOZ's experience is not unique as the increasing
117 Muggah, "No Magic Bullet," 247; and also in Muggah, "Emerging from the Shadow of 
War," 199.
118 United Nations Security Council, Report of the Panel of Experts pursuant to paragraph 2 of 
Security Council Resolution 1549 (2004) concerning Liberia, UN Doc. S/2004/955 (New York: 
United Nations, 2004).
119 Nichols, 128.
120 McMullin, 629.
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number of demobilised fighters was not reflected by a proportional increase in 
the number of reintegration opportunities offered by UNMIL.121 The poor 
coordination between UNMIL's disarmament and demobilisation programmes, 
and the UNDP's reintegration activities only exacerbated this disconnect.122 
Moreover, targeting ex-combatants for disarmament without addressing civilian- 
held stockpiles is a partial (and therefore potential dangerous) response to the 
widespread availability of small arms and light weapons.
While the Security Council's negotiation and articulation of resolutions 
authorising sanction regimes and peacekeeping operations may negatively affect 
their auxiliary arms embargoes and DDR programmes, the implementation of 
these resolutions also generates serious operational constraints, limiting their 
efficacy as arms control measures in some cases, while in others also enabling 
organised crime groups to flourish in some post-conflict settings.
UN Monitoring Processes
The Security Council first instigated sanction committees in 1996 as a means of 
monitoring the implementation and administration of sanction regimes. Tasked 
with collecting, compiling, and analysing reports issued by governments 
regarding their own conduct in relation to particular embargoes, these early 
committees proved somewhat ineffectual until the Security Council enlarged 
their tasks to include investigating suspected violations of non-compliance.123 
The first of these sanction committees with an investigative mandate was led by 
Canadian ambassador, Robert Fowler. Until the release of the Report of the Panel 
of Experts on Violations of Security Council Sanctions Against UNIT A (Fozuler Report) 
in 2000, which named Zaire, Togo, Burkino Faso, and Bulgaria as among those
121 Paes, 255.
122 Ibid, 259.
123 Shields, 10.
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responsible for undermining the sanction regime imposed upon UNIT A ,124 little 
official information was publicly available regarding the impact of embargoes 
upon their targets and the methods by which the regime's provisions are 
circumvented. While the Fozder Report was criticised by France for its bias 
against francophone countries, its findings disputed by those named within it, 
and few of its recommendations implemented by the Security Council, the 
Report's value lies in the new level of transparency accorded to sanction 
violations within the UN system.125 Since the release of the Fowler Report, the 
Security Council has established sanction committees for almost all of the 
regimes it authorises (Sudan and Cambodia are notable exceptions in this 
regard126) and these committees issue regular reports signalling implicit 
shortcomings inherent in arms embargoes.
The use of a panel of experts, as a means of providing independent reports to 
sanction committees, was another enduring initiative informing the Fowler Report, 
though the first panel was designed to monitor the 1995 arms embargo targeting 
the Hutus in Rwanda.127 These panels are significant since, according to Alex 
Vines, "[s]anction committees and the [Security] Council are normally bogged 
down by diplomatic procedure, protocol and consensus-seeking, but 
independent panels are not tied to these norms and can provide information that 
members of the Council may dissociate themselves from."128 The ongoing efforts 
of various civil society organisations exposing sanction violations and detailing 
the humanitarian consequences associated with the imposition of sanction 
regimes complement the work of these in-house committees.129 The overlap here 
signals another nascent interconnectivity among responses from particular
124 United Nations Security Council, Report of the Panel of Experts on Violations of Security 
Council Sanctions Against UNITA, UN Doc. S/2000/203 (New York: United Nations, 2000), 
paragraph 51; for a discussion of the Fowler Report, see Vines, 249-253.
125 Brzoska, 524.
126 Cortright and Lopez with Conroy, Dashti-Gibson and Wagler, 123 & 140.
127 Chesterman and Pouligny, 506.
128 Vines, 251.
129 Chesterman and Pouligny, 506.
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members of the international community, especially as sanction committees 
draw, at times, upon necessary expertise from outside the UN system.
However, even though the now routine establishment of these sanction 
committees compensates, to a limited extent, for the UN's insufficient monitoring 
capability, the "sanction committees established in each case to oversee 
implementation varied in effectiveness according to the degree of politicization 
of the particular episode, its relative priority for the major players, and the 
leadership provided by the committee chairs. " 130 In some cases, UN members 
suspected of violating arms embargoes deliberately delay and frustrate panels' 
investigations, which rely upon governmental collaboration for information.131 A 
recent sanction committee report, dealing with sanctions targeting Al-Qaida and 
the Taliban, speculates a few reasons for the non-reporting of over half of all UN 
members:
In addition to the possible lack of political determination to submit 
such reports, other possible factors were also identified, such as (a) 
reporting fatigue; (b) lack of resources and technical capacity; and (c) 
coordination difficulties at the national level. Recognition of the 
possible presence of Al-Qaida or those associated with the network 
within its territory furthermore appears to be a stigma to some 
states.132
Another recent development of particular significance is the establishment of 
an Analytical Support and Sanction Monitoring Team, which, like the panels of 
experts, informs sanction committees' work. 133 However, as with the Fowler 
Report, the Security Council has demonstrated its reluctance to pursue the 
recommendations of these reports, sometimes, as Brzoska notes, "for political
130 Cortright and Lopez with Conroy, Dashti-Gibson and Wagler, 5.
131 Kirkham and Flew, 17.
132 United Nations Security Council, Report of the Security Council Committee established 
pursuant to resolution 1267 (1999) concerning Al-Qaida and the Taliban and associated 
individuals and entities, UN Doc. S/2004/281 (New York: United Nations, 2004), paragraph 
19.
133 See, for instance, United Nations Security Council, Third report of the Analytical Support and 
Sanctions Monitoring Team appointed pursuant to resolution 1526 (2004) concerning Al-Qaida 
and the Taliban and associated individuals and entities, UN Doc. S/2005/572 (New York: 
United Nations, 2005).
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reasons, sometimes because their implementation would have required resources 
that member states were unwilling to mobilize. " 134
Regardless of the specific reasons why arms embargoes are vulnerable to 
lapses in their administration—which range from incompetence to corruption 
and wilful negligence—and notwithstanding these recent monitoring processes, 
monitoring and verifying government compliance with an embargo remains a 
difficult task for the Security Council. While the reports issued by sanction 
committees help illuminate suspected violations of these embargoes, the 
deterrence effect created by so-called naming-and-shaming of those contravening 
a sanction regime is difficult to measure and alternative punishments have not 
yet been routinely applied.
Although use of force, including naval blockades and border patrols, is 
sometimes used to ensure targets do not succeed in violating an embargo of their 
own accord, the collective use of force has not yet been used to enforce provisions 
of sanction regimes on those subject governments whose non-compliance is 
detected. Consequently, there is little in the way of penalties and, thereby, 
deterrence for so-called sanction busters. When Liberia was denounced for 
breaching a sanction regime, for instance, a secondary sanction regime was 
imposed upon it, though the impact of this sanction regime may well have been 
negligible, especially given Charles Taylor and "Liberia [were] on many 
governments7 list of culprits anyway, and there are few who have less power, 
money, and friends at the world organization. " 135 In general, however, such 
secondary sanction regimes are seldom applied.
Just as the Security Council establishes committees to review and report on 
particular sanction regimes, it requests the Secretary-General to provide regular 
reports detailing comprehensively the conduct of the peacekeeping operations it 
authorises. 136 Former Secretary-General Annan also initiated reviews in order to
134 Brzoska, 524.
135 Ibid, 531.
136 Refer to "Reports of the Secretary-General" at <http://vvww.un.org/Docs/sc> (accessed 1
April 2007).
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improve the conduct of peacekeeping operations. The Report of the Panel on United 
Nations Peace Operations (2000) (Brahimi Report), for example, produced many 
frank and far-reaching recommendations, including "that legislative bodies 
consider bringing demobilization and reintegration programmes into the 
assessed budgets of complex peace operations for the first phase of an operation 
in order to facilitate the rapid disassembly of fighting factions and reduce the 
likelihood of resumed conflict/'137 In doing so, however, the Brahimi Report took 
a "disproportionate focus on disarmament and demobilisation, at the expense of 
longer-term activities such as reintegration" much like those "[djonors and 
governments [that] continue to prioritize, even fetishize, the gathering of 
hardware."138 In contrast to the Fowler Report, however, the Brahimi Report had 
almost two-thirds of its recommendations acted upon in some way. Using this 
monitoring capability, the Security Council has, in particular, increased the speed 
with which its operations are deployed and, according to Mats Berdal, this 
represents "some evidence of a capacity on the part of the organisation to 
respond to criticism and adopt functionally to new tasks and changing 
circumstances."139
Unless the Security Council undergoes reform, however, little is likely to
change in the near-term to improve the drafting, implementation, and
enforcement of its arms embargoes, as well as the planning, execution, and
consequences of its peacekeeping operations. In any case, reform might entrench
existing constraints with respect to the collective action authorised by the
Security Council. Remarking upon the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and
Change: A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility (2004), Thakur laments:
...the report is itself state-centric in its approach to Security Council 
reform. The regions of the world are divided and grouped according 
to numbers of states. Yet India by itself has more people than all of
137 United Nations Security Council, Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, 
UN Doc. S/2000/809 (New York: United Nations, 2000), paragraph 47(c).
138 Muggah, "No Magic Bullet," 246; and in Muggah, "Emerging from the Shadow of War," 
197-8.
139 Mats Berdal, "The UN after Iraq," Survival 46, no.3 (Autumn 2004): 91.
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Africa with 53 countries, as well as the Americas with 35 states. To 
ignore population as a criterion of representation seems as odd as to 
insist on operationalising it mathematically to the exclusion of all 
other criteria.140
Of course, the extent of, and ramifications following, any major reform remains 
to be seen; as Brzoska observes, "[sjanction reform at the UN, like all UN reform, 
stops where major powers want it to stop."141
Asserting the Political
Those treaties and soft law measures negotiated within various 
intergovernmental organisations, and the Security Council's resolutions for 
collective action, create a mosaic of responsibilities comprising of obligations and 
commitments while sharing a common belief in collective security. This belief in 
the promise of collective security persists in spite of Article 51 of the UN Charter, 
which, not incidentally, is referred to by the UN Firearms Protocol and the Nairobi 
Protocol, as well as by the EU Code of Conduct, the Andean Plan, the OSCE 
Document, and the UNPoA. But whereas the current arms control treaties and 
soft law measures help reinscribe this internationalist governance architecture 
underpinning contemporary world affairs (despite their technical incoherence 
and strategic limitations), the Security Council's resolve for collective action is a 
powerful universalising form of world-making.
To be sure, this collective action not only reflects a commitment to a 
particular notion of the political, but also reinscribes this notion through various 
activities undertaken by arms control protagonists, helping extend the reach of 
the internationalist governance architecture essential to conducting politics on a 
global scale. In other words, drawing upon the resources of many governments, 
activities authorised by the Security Council not only strengthen these grand 
politico-strategic frameworks, but also project, at times forcefully, these 
frameworks to areas where governmental authority has been eroded and has, in
140 Thakur, "UN reforms and the use of force," 12.
141 Brzoska, 533.
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some cases, collapsed under the burden of conflict. As mentioned in the thesis' 
introduction, for Roland Paris peacekeeping operations, especially those 
authorised during the 1990s, embodied an ongoing experiment in liberalization, 
reforming the political and economic institutions of conflict-affected countries.142 
This thesis deliberately situates DDR programmes within these transformative 
peacekeeping operations, signalling that these programmes are an important 
mode of this transformative process, but are by no means a sufficient condition 
for effecting drastic change in their own right. Within this context of strategic 
and economic reform, DDR programmes are thus a further form of 'social 
engineering,'143 all the more significant too because these are now "something of 
a 'post-conflict reconstruction orthodoxy.'"144
By contrast, sanction regimes seek to alter an actor's behaviour in order to 
restore or maintain order, rather than refashion a particular component of the 
interstate system. Despite the advice of various sanction committees and panel 
of experts' reports, many of which imply arms embargoes are incapable of 
arresting flows of small arms and light weapons and have, by and large, proven 
futile in limiting target actors' capability to wage war,145 these measures continue 
to be invoked by the Security Council. And even though effective 
implementation, administration, and enforcement of sanction regimes proves 
elusive to the international community, sanctions remain, at a very minimum, an 
important means of posturing for the 15 members of the Security Council. After 
all, "[w]hen Sanctions are meant as a signal of disapproval or as a gesture of
142 In particular, as Paris elaborates in At War's End: "In the political realm, liberalization 
means democratization, or the promotion of periodic and genuine elections, 
constitutional limitations on the exercise of governmental power, and respect for basic 
civil liberties, including freedom of speech, assembly, and conscience. In the economic 
realm, liberalization means marketization, or movement toward a market-orientated 
economic model, including measures aimed at minimizing government intrusion in the 
economy, and maximizing the freedom for private investors, producers, and consumers 
to pursue their respective economic interests," 5.
143 Pouligny, The Politics and Anti-Politics of Contemporary 'Disarmament, Demobilization and 
Reintegration' Programs, 14.
144 Muggah, "No Magic Bullet," 242; also in Muggah, "Emerging from the Shadow of War," 
193.
145 Shields, 11.
197
support for international norms, the very fact of nations joining together to 
impose such sanctions is itself a manifestation of success."146
Instances of cooperation between the UN and regional and subregional 
intergovernmental organisations, such as the AU or ECOWAS, can help buttress 
the internationalist governance architecture, particularly where various 
peacekeeping operations are coordinated among authorising organisations. 
Although the Security Council's delegation of enforcement operations under 
Chapter VII of the UN Charter has, in the views of some analysts, exposed the 
UN's degree of irrelevance, exercising this policy choice represents "not the 
marginalization of the UN but the emergence of a new division of labour in the 
field of peace operations which will stretch existing UN capabilities to the limit," 
as Jokobsen contends. He goes on to write: "This division of labour limits the 
role played by the UN in Chapter VII operations to authorization, monitoring 
and civilian support, but leaves the UN in the driver's seat with respect to 
Chapter VI activities."147
The EU, furthermore, duplicates some of those arms embargoes imposed by 
the UN Security Council, though it also imposes arms embargoes autonomously 
from the UN, targeting, for instance, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Myanmar, China, 
and Zimbabwe. At times, EU embargoes can have wider conceptual scope, and 
the negotiation of embargoes have been quicker than similar negotiations 
occurring in the UN Security Council. EU arms embargoes are, however, 
voluntary. According to Vanessa Shields, as at 31 March 2005 there were 13 EU 
and UN embargoes in force, one of which is "an autonomous UN arms embargo, 
two are EU embargoes with wider scope than their UN counterparts, six are EU 
arms embargoes that duplicate UN arms embargoes, and four are autonomous 
EU arms embargoes."148 In effect, cooperation among intergovernmental
146 Cortright and Lopez with Conroy, Dashti-Gibson and Wagler, 16.
147 Jakobsen, 175.
148 Shields, 6.
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organisations authorising collective action reinforces the current configuration of 
world affairs.
Yet governments assisting embargoed actors implicitly challenge this 
configuration of world affairs, testing, in particular, the durability of its 
internationalist governance architecture by advancing their specific interests at 
the expense of cooperating with governments in a positive-sum game. The grand 
politico-strategic frameworks are also strained by those governments which are 
party to treaties while being targeted by sanction regimes: whereas Liberia has 
signed the UN Firearms Protocol, Rwanda, Somalia, Sudan, and the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo are each signatories to the Nairobi Protocol. This 
interconnectivity does little to strengthen the international community's response 
to the challenge of controlling small arms and light weapons, but does not 
seriously undermine it.
There is, moreover, a weak sense in which the Security Council diminishes 
the preference afforded to governments as the primary actors of world affairs. 
Although governments are the prime actors administering sanction regimes, non­
state actors —such as Usama Bin Ladin, Al-Qaida and insurgent groups in 
Rwanda, Sierra Leone, and Angola—are, or have been, targets of arms 
embargoes. By denying non-state actors unrestricted access to arms 
procurement, the Security Council necessarily grants a limited degree of 
recognition to them as significant international actors which are to be reckoned 
with, though they are not to be considered as members of the international 
community.149 A similar recognition is granted to those belligerent non-state 
actors involved in contemporary conflict to which the Security Council responds 
and with whom, in some cases, the Security Council helps to negotiate peace 
settlements. As Part III of the thesis contends, these non-state actors matter to the 
general pursuit of contemporary international security and in the particular 
challenge of controlling small arms and light weapons.
149 R.T. Naylor, "Gunsmoke and Mirrors: Financing the Illegal Trade," in Running Guns: The
Global Black Market in Small Arms, ed. Lora Lumpe (London: Zed Books, 2000), 178.
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Conclusion
Granted the primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and 
security among UN members, the UN Security Council relies upon sanction 
regimes and peacekeeping operations as the central tools through which it 
expresses and enforces its decisions. In so doing, and increasingly since the early 
1990s, the Security Council responds to the widespread availability and ongoing 
use of small arms and light weapons, preceding the major responses of 
researchers, intergovernmental organisations, and, as the following chapter 
demonstrates, civil society organisations.
Although often useful for diplomatic posturing, Security Council resolutions, 
and the collective action they mandate, are inadequate as arms control methods. 
The roots of this inadequacy lie in a conceptual narrowness, as arms embargoes 
and DDR programmes each address only a single aspect of the small arms and 
light weapons problem. The inadequacy of this conceptual narrowness is 
compounded by the temporary nature of these interventions and by their very 
limited geographic focus: interventions most frequently focus upon so-called 
trouble spots, though this 'fire-fighting' approach is almost insignificant when 
compared against both the volume of weapons which continue to be produced 
and the existing weapons (whether held legally or not) which flow quickly from 
one trouble-spot to another. This is not to deny the urgency demanded to 
address this challenge, but to signal an important limitation inherent in this 
specific form of collective response. In order to prove effective as arms control 
measures, these activities must necessarily be supported by controls over other 
major aspects, namely the proliferation, possession, use, and deactivation of these 
weapons.
At present, this conceptual narrowness does little to compensate for the 
conceptual incoherence of the various instruments of international law 
negotiated within intergovernmental organisations, though by fostering political 
will at the governmental level, highlighting improvements to governmental 
infrastructure, and encouraging the provision of sufficient resources, it may help
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strengthen the basis for effective international law. (That, however, is not to 
suggest that these are the only ingredients of an effective response.) Together 
with treaty law and soft law measures, arms embargoes and DDR programmes 
do help constitute an emerging mosaic of responsibilities.
Even in circumstances where the Security Council uses its monitoring 
processes as a means of improving the efficacy of the activities it authorises, such 
readjustments continue to suffer the limitations embedded in the existing 
internationalist governance architecture. Even if possible to mobilise, an increase 
in governmental will to support Security Council resolutions and a sufficient 
provision of resources would not necessarily enable the better control of these 
weapons through these means. Even deploying a standing UN military force, if 
such a force could be agreed upon, would not necessarily enable more effective 
arms control through arms embargoes and DDR programmes alone. Elowever, 
the ongoing effects of criminalisation resulting from sanction regimes and 
peacekeeping operations seriously undermines the rule of international law, 
amplifying many of the burdens facing current and future UN collective action. 
Further weaknesses are revealed by the ongoing intransigence of those 
governments deliberately contravening arms embargoes and the Security 
Council's inability to detect and punish such disobedience and disregard for its 
authority. Thus, although complementing treaties and soft law measures in some 
respects, the Security Council's activities sometimes produce side-effects which 
undermine, rather than strengthen, the international community's response to 
the challenge of controlling small arms and light weapons.
And, as Part III of this thesis demonstrates, these major responses are hotly 
contested by other international actors, as is the notion of the political informing 
those responses. But before Part III of this thesis explores ways in which 
weapons-producing firms, arms brokers and chief users of these tools of violence 
mitigate, resist, and subvert the intended effects of those responses from 
intergovernmental organisations and the UN Security Council, the following 
chapter, the last of Part II, explores ways in which civil society organisations
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respond to the widespread availability and ongoing use of small arms and light 
weapons, focusing in particular upon the arms control campaign led by IANSA.
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CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANISATIONS 
AND ARMS CONTROL CAMPAIGNS
The formal launch of IANSA's arms control campaign in May 1999 signalled the 
emergence of another major response by members of the international 
community to the widespread availability and ongoing use of small arms and 
light weapons. As a civil society organisation, IANSA seeks "to facilitate 
international NGO action that is fundamentally aimed at enhancing the security 
of persons by preventing the proliferation and misuse of small arms."1 In 
practice, IANSA attempts to coordinate the activities of its 700 or so member 
organisations, relying upon their ongoing engagement with a range of actors 
involved in contemporary world affairs and upon any leverage or momentum it 
can thereby generate and sustain. This approach is, as Cukier and Sidel recently 
describe, a "'campaign of campaigns' or 'network of networks/"2 Significantly, 
IANSA's membership includes many high-profile civil society organisations, 
including Human Rights Watch, OXFAM, and Amnesty International, though 
lesser known members include the Physicians for Social Responsibility, Comic 
Relief, People and Planet, and the Asian Brotherhood Concern.3 Located in over 
100 countries, these organisations give IANSA an extensive geographic reach, 
especially as many of these organisations have representatives based in the 
world's major capitals. Even though IANSA continues to position itself as the 
predominant civil society organisation engaging in gun control activism, its 
campaign does not formally direct the activities of its members. And, of course, 
not all civil society organisations campaign for comprehensive arms control.
1 International Action Network on Small Arms, "Founding Document of IANSA," 
<http://www.iansa.org/about/ml.htm> (accessed 31 March 2007).
2 Cukier and Sidel, 226.
3 For a full and up-to-date list of IANSA's members, refer to 
<http://www.iansa.org/about/members.htm> (accessed 6 November 2006). All of the 
examples of civil society organisations campaigning as arms control protagonists drawn 
upon in this chapter are members of IANSA at the time of writing.
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This chapter explores two elements of IANSA's arms control campaign. It 
begins by examining IANSA's advocacy for controls over small arms and light 
weapons, including some of those intergovernmental measures examined in 
Chapter Three of this thesis, before examining IANSA's monitoring of 
governmental behaviour vis-ä-vis the emerging mosaic of responsibilities 
derived from certain instruments of international law and Security Council 
resolutions. Of particular relevance here are two major reports assessing 
governments' progress towards implementing the UNPoA, disseminated by 
IANS A immediately prior to the first and second BMS in 2003 and in 2005, 
respectively. A further report was released by I ANS A in 2006, coinciding with 
the UN Small Arms Review Conference. While these reports, and others like 
them, seek to monitor the implementation of specific measures by governments, 
IANSA's members have also sought to: raise further awareness of the urgent 
need to control these weapons; lobby particular governments on improving 
domestic regulatory regimes; provide opportunities for officials to engage in 
informal discussions leading to intergovernmental agreements; inform those 
measures of control by contributing to multilateral discussions concerning their 
conceptual scope; and, in some cases, articulate draft texts.
However, by problematising IANSA's role in confronting the challenge of 
controlling small arms and light weapons, this chapter suggests that there might 
well be effects resonating from these two elements of its arms control campaign, 
but that this does not necessarily embody a direct or discernible impact upon the 
composition of arms control measures where these are negotiated multilaterally. 
Reflecting upon the character of those major responses examined in Chapters 
Two, Three, and Four, this chapter concludes Part II of this thesis by positing that 
I ANSA has refrained from contesting a particular notion of the political 
throughout its response to the challenge of controlling these weapons. 
Consequently, as arms control protagonists, IANS A has had little demonstrative 
political success to date. As the space for civil society campaigning, which 
expanded in the wake of the Cold War, continues to yield to a collective
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reassertion of sovereignty and national interest within grand politico-strategic 
frameworks which prioritise governments as prime actors of world affairs, 
further responses from these organisations are unlikely to increase in their own 
potency and resonance.
Advocacy
As Chapter Two demonstrates, arms control activists feature as prominent 
members of the research community, employing to good effect the publishing 
and disseminating opportunities presented by civil society organisations as a 
means of articulating and asserting a call for international action to control small 
arms and light weapons. This research has been used by activists, not only as a 
means of articulating the urgent need to control these weapons, but also as a 
means of enhancing their own credibility as experts when dealing with other 
social movements, governments, and intergovernmental organisations.4 Indeed, 
research connects members of the international community when it serves "to 
contribute to dialogue among researchers and users of researchers, such as NGO 
activists and diplomats, concerned with international security issues that states 
are either unwilling or unable to address."5
In addition to these literary endeavours, arms control activists organise 
grassroots movements, employing, for example, letter-writing campaigns and 
public protests in order to build a wide constituency upon an awareness of the 
deadly impacts generated by small arms and light weapons. The momentum 
generated by grassroots movements within one location can register in another, 
and even resonate throughout a wider region. The Global Week of Action 
Against Small Arms held during July 2004, for example, coincided with 
International Gun Destruction Day, with activities ranging from the destruction 
of weapons that were deemed surplus to military requirements and of weapons
4 Adele Kirsten, The Role of Social Movements in Gun Control: An international comparison 
between South Africa, Brazil and Australia (Durban: Centre for Civil Society, 2004), 18.
5 Brem and Rutherford, 170.
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confiscated by constabulary in South America, to a flame of peace ceremony held 
in Cambodia. In this week alone, activists from forty-five countries drew 
attention to the costs associated with the misuse of these weapons, and in eleven 
countries a total of 35,000 guns were destroyed.6 7 Although primarily focused 
upon mobilising citizens to pressure their governments into taking action, these 
sorts of awareness-raising activities necessarily forge new, and rely upon 
existing, transnational connections among other social movements and civil 
society organisations with shared concerns. Indeed, this convergence is a vital 
source of power for many social movements, and arms control activists are no 
exception.
However, some grassroots activities are often more decisive in a practical 
sense than protests—though, indeed, protests are important as much for their 
symbolism as for their potential to build and consolidate support among social 
groups with disparate interests—because they also include establishing and 
maintaining gun collection programmes for weapons surrendered voluntarily by 
members of the public. Weapons collection programmes organised by Gun Free 
South Africa, for example, were followed by the South African government's 
announcement of a twenty-four hour gun amnesty in late 19947 In 1996, Gun 
Free Zones were established in which 'No Gun' signs, resembling 'No Smoking' 
signs, were displayed in prominent areas where gun possession was no longer 
tolerated.8 In Brazil, moreover, Viva Rio forged relationships with local 
communities, encouraging them to assert control over those small arms and light 
weapons held by members of their communities within their immediate locales.9 
Here, then, arms control activists help broaden the onus of responsibly to control 
small arms and light weapons from the exclusive legislative and enforcement 
authority of governments to include local communities.
6 IANSA "IANSA's 2004 Review: the Year in Small Arms," 7. <http://www.iansa.org/ 
campaigns events/index.htm> (accessed 17 January 2005).
7 Kirsten, 4.
8 Ibid, 19.
9 Ibid, 14.
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Fostering ongoing relationships with those individuals and groups positioned 
within domestic political arenas proves useful for activists encouraging 
governments to adopt, as part of both domestic and foreign policy, tighter 
national and international controls over these weapons. Gun Free South Africa 
was directly involved in the South African government's formulation of its 
domestic gun policy and resultant legislative reforms.10 In Cambodia, the 
Working Group for Weapons Reduction, a coalition of local and foreign civil 
society organisations, was involved in the Royal government's weapons 
collection and destruction programme, encouraging officials to destroy those 
weapons considered surplus to requirements.* 11 Saferworld's liaison with the 
British Labour Party, while it was in opposition, engendered both parliamentary 
scrutiny over incumbent policy and a clear plan of action for the opposition if it 
were elected into power. The Labour Party's General Election victory in 1997 
coincided with the UK's presidency of the EU, enabling their tabling of the 
proposed Code of Conduct in 1998.12 Significantly, the work of arms control 
activists has also enabled certain policymakers to legitimise and expedite their 
intended legislative reforms. Australian Prime Minister, John Howard, for 
example, was quick to respond to the mass shootings occurring in 1996 at Port 
Arthur, Tasmania, by introducing legislative reform over existing gun controls. 
Yet, as Adele Kirsten observes, before the shootings the Australian-based 
Coalition for Gun Control "had largely been ignored."13
Although only governments can become signatories to treaties, arms control 
activists have identified and collaborated with like-minded governments in order 
to prompt and negotiate agreements; the successful and rapid conclusion of the 
recent campaign to ban anti-personnel landmines, which culminated in the 
Ottawa Treaty, is a case in point. The conclusion of this treaty demonstrates that
10 Ibid, 16.
11 Holger Anders, "Small Arms Control in Cambodia: A Field Report," Peace, Conflict & 
Development: An interdisciplinary Journal 3, no.3 (June 2003): 6.
12 Anders, "The Role of Non-State Actors in the European Small Arms Regime," 17.
13 Kirsten, 5.
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arms control activists can realise their vision, signalling the potency of a well- 
organised, coordinated campaign utilising civil society organisations, including 
the burgeoning networks underpinning them, in order to overcome opposition 
from some of the most powerful governments in contemporary world affairs, 
including the US, Russia, PRC, India, and Pakistan.14 Whereas Ramesh Thakur 
and William Maley suggest "any account of the Ottawa conference to sign the 
[anti-personnel landmine] convention will be grossly deficient if NGOs are not 
given prominent attention,"15 Jody Williams goes further, suggesting the coalition 
between nongovernmental organisations and like-minded governments could 
constitute a new global 'superpower/16 Here, coalitions of like-minded 
governments comprise mostly of so-called medium-sized countries, such as 
Canada, Norway, and Switzerland. Decisions within these coalitions are reached 
by majority vote, rather than on a consensual basis. In this respect, the 
achievement of the Ottawa Treaty signals an alternative diplomacy beyond the 
conventional UN frameworks for multilateral negotiation and it is significant, at 
least symbolically, that I ANSA formally launched its arms control campaign at 
the 1999 Hague Appeal for Peace Conference, which celebrated the entering into 
force of that treaty.17
IANSA's origins, however, can be traced back further than May 1999. 
According to IANSA's Founding Document, its strategic vision was forged 
during the two preparatory meetings leading to its establishment. Held in 
Canada in August 1998, the first preparatory meeting "explore[d] ways in which 
civil society groups and institutions around the world could work together more 
effectively to advance policies and actions to control the diffusion and misuse of 
small arms, and to respond to the devastating consequences of small arms for
14 Although each of these governments refrained from signing the Ottawa Treaty, each 
generally acts in a way that does not contravene its intents and purposes.
15 Ramesh Thakur and William Maley, //rThe Ottawa Convention on Landmines: A 
Landmark Humanitarian Treaty in Arms Control?' Global Governance 5, no.3 (1999): 285.
16 Brem and Rutherford, 181.
17 Ibid, 169.
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individuals, local communities, states, and the international community."18 The 
second preparatory meeting, held in Brussels in October 1998, "reachjed] 
agreement on the scope and nature of I ANSA amongst a wider international 
audience."19 Prior to this, in January of 1998, Edward Laurance of the Monterey 
Institute of International Studies organised the Preparatory Committee for an 
International Campaign on Light Weapons, the intention of which was to bring 
together individuals and groups interested in developing a campaign to control 
these weapons. So that research and ideas could be easily exchanged, a website 
was established in order to complement the Preparatory Committee's work. This 
initiative followed a working session that drafted a Proposed Convention on the 
Prevention of the Indiscriminate and Unlawful Use of Light Weapons, which took place 
during the signing ceremony for the Ottawa Treaty during early December 1997.20 
These various meetings produced a consensus among arms control activists 
which developed "around the need, not for one campaign, but rather for a 
network of campaigns under the umbrella of an International Action Network on 
Small Arms (IANSA)."21
Despite the innovative 'new diplomacy' enabling the Ottawa Treaty to enter 
into force within only six years of its inception, the challenge of controlling small 
arms and light weapons requires a more complex response, not only because 
these tools of violence are more varied in type, more widespread, and used more 
frequently than anti-personnel landmines, but also because many governments 
throughout the world authorise legitimate civilian possession of these weapons 
and UN peacekeepers rely upon these weapons in order to fulfil their mission's 
mandate.22 Furthermore, confronting this challenge requires IANSA to draw 
upon participants from many social movements and civil society organisations,
18 International Action Network on Small Arms, "Founding Document of IANSA," 2.
19 Ibid.
20 Brem and Rutherford, 177. See also Laurance and Stohl, 4; and Cukier and Sidel, 222.
21 Liz Clegg, "NGOs take aim," The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 55, no.l 
(January/February 1999): 50-1; For a more elaborative background to this emerging civil 
society campaign, see also Garcia, "Norm Building in the Evolution of the Control of 
Small Arms in the International Agenda," 243-47.
Clegg, 49.22
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including former members of the landmine ban campaign, making for a "more 
diffuse campaign than that of the [international campaign to ban landmines]."23 
Some of the governments with which these coalitions must engage have very 
powerful economic interests in the arms industry, moreover, while for others the 
arms trade has been an important dimension of foreign policy and a useful 
foreign exchange earner.24
The successful campaign to ban anti-personnel landmines not only 
encouraged activists to persist in their collective and coordinated efforts to help 
establish controls over small arms and light weapons, but also galvanised 
resistance to their anticipated influence in subsequent multilateral small arms 
control fora. The UN, for example, reasserted its claim as the pre-eminent 
institution through which to confront the most crucial issues on the international 
security agenda, reorganising its implementing agencies and establishing the 
Coordinating Action on Small Arms (CASA) during 1998 in order to better 
facilitate and coordinate its activities.25 Some governments were also reluctant to 
endorse the precedent set by the new diplomacy informing the Ottawa Treaty and 
limited civil society organisations' involvement in the UN Small Arms 
Conference to a more conventional role. In particular, civil society organisations 
were granted a morning in which to deliver presentations of no more than five 
minutes duration each, their public gallery access was limited to open sessions, 
and they were excluded from negotiation sessions. As Peter Batchelor suggests, 
it is likely that some governments, including Algeria and PRC, sought to deny 
the participation of those civil society organisations primarily concerned with 
publicising poor human rights records.26
23 Brem and Rutherford, 178.
24 Clegg, 50.
25 Brem and Rutherford, 175-176.
26 Peter Batchelor, "NGO perspectives: NGOs and the small arms issue," Disarmament 
Forum 1 (2002): 38-39; For further details, see also David Atwood, "NGOs and the 2001 
UN Conference on Small Arms," Unpublished background paper for the Small Arms 
Survey.
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These conference arrangements did not, however, preclude the usual 
informal opportunities in the so-called margins for civil society organisations to 
exchange information with governments and lobby for their positions, while 
delegations from Canada, Ireland, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, 
Switzerland, and the UK included civil society representatives seeking better 
controls over small arms.27 Nor did it prevent activists advocating outside the 
conference attracting media attention to the issues at hand. While the UN Small 
Arms Conference did not deny the rise of a new diplomacy it did, in part, curtail 
that rise as governments reasserted their primacy in arms control negotiations 
within a reinvigorated UN framework.
Although activists have proposed new intergovernmental measures of control 
over small arms and light weapons that policymakers could adopt, these have, 
broadly speaking, generated little interest and even less momentum on their 
own. In 1997, eight Nobel Peace Prize-winners, led by former President of Costa 
Rica, Oscar Arias Sanchez, expressed their collective concern over the devastation 
caused by the uncontrolled spread of military weapons. This declaration, 
entitled the Nobel Prize Laureates' International Code of Conduct on Arms Transfers 
(.Laureates' Code of Conduct), attempts to foster existing concern around the globe 
by calling upon "citizens of the world [to] demand that leaders support this Code 
as well as similar efforts on the national and regional level."28 Since its 
announcement, the Laureates' Code of Conduct has attracted support from a further 
ten Nobel Peace Prize recipients.29 Expressing their concern not only over the
27 Krause, 256; Refer also to Small Arms Survey 2002: Counting the Human Cost (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2002), 203-233. Details regarding proceedings in closed sessions 
were, of course, immediately given to those at the conference who were excluded from 
the sessions.
28 The full text of the Nobel Peace Laureates' International Code of Conduct on Arms Transfers is 
available on <http://www.arias.or.cr/fundarias/cpr/code2.htm> (accessed 7 ]une 2004).
29 The following laureates now support the Laureates' Code of Conduct: American Friends 
Service Committee, Amnesty International, Oscar Arias Sanchez, Norman Borlaug, Su 
Santidad el Dalai Lama, John Hume, International Physicians for the Prevention of 
Nuclear War, Mairead Maguire, Rigoberta Menchu, Adolfo Perez Esquivel, Jose Ramos 
Horta, Joseph Rotblat, Aung San Suu Kyi, Reverend Desmond Tutu, Lech Walesa, Elie 
Wiesel, Betty Williams, Jody Williams.
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uncontrolled spread of small arms and light weapons, but also over the ongoing 
proliferation of tanks, armoured combat vehicles, aircraft, encryption software, 
thermal-imaging equipment, and super computers, these activists encourage 
citizens from around the world to apply pressure upon their governments to take 
a specific course of action.
In particular, the Laureates' Code of Conduct suggests that governments 
supplying these weapons should ensure that any recipient is of a sufficient moral 
pedigree; that is, that recipients observe human rights, comply with international 
humanitarian law, and show respect for democracy. The Code also recommends 
a link to the UNROCA as a way of monitoring the arms trade among 
governments. In so doing, this measure proposes to hold governments 
accountable for the transfer of these weapons and for their deadly consequences, 
though, unlike the provisions of the four treaties examined in Chapter Three, it 
does so without distinguishing authorised trade from trafficking. The text 
expressing the Laureates' Code of Conduct is unclear as to where the onus of 
responsibility falls and to whom the burden of proof belongs. It also fails to set 
out the precise means by which an importing government's behaviour should be 
assessed. Although these Nobel Laureates might very well be high-profile 
opinion-makers with excellent intentions of improving the condition of 
humankind, their modest role as prominent actors of world affairs, signalled by 
the more hopeful than optimistic tone of the Code's language, is demonstrated by 
the limited outcomes it has so far achieved. An admirable call for collective 
action to arrest the devastation caused by the transfer of military weapons, the 
Laureates' Code of Conduct received little if any commitment from governments, 
none of which were involved in its articulation. However, as Alley points out, 
while governments did not accept the code, it did gain some publicity, 
influencing the articulation of the EU Code of Conduct.30
30 Alley, 49.
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More recently, arms control activists have proposed an Arms Trade Treaty
(ATT) which builds upon the norms articulated in the UNPoA. A  briefing paper
released by IANSA in June 2005 states the following:
The proposed Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) is a coherent response to the 
commitments in the Programme of Action by drawing together and 
consolidating states' current obligations under international law. It is a 
simple clear framework which provides a universal standard for 
international arms transfers to stop arms getting into the wrong 
hands. The ATT was inspired by Nobel Prize Laureates and 
developed by lawyers, human rights organisations, and humanitarian 
NGOs. It now enjoys the support of a growing number of 
governments, as well as more than 600 civil society organisations 
worldwide. In March 2005, following the lead of Costa Rica, Finland, 
Tanzania, Kenya, and others championing the ATT, the UK 
government pledged to promote the ATT during its presidencies of 
the G8 group of nations and the European Union in 2005.31
Here, then, a core group of governments supporting the proposed treaty have 
already been identified, suggesting that IANSA will attempt to replicate the 
Ottawa Process by further refining the treaty and by increasing the number of 
governments supporting its content, before engaging those governments likely to 
weaken or oppose it. There is discernible momentum for this initiative, 
culminating in a decision, made by the First Committee of the UN General 
Assembly on 10 October 2006, to commence work on such a treaty. However, 
while 139 governments voted to open negotiations on the treaty, 24 governments, 
including Russia and China, abstained from voting. The US was the only 
government voting against the motion.32 It remains to be seen if such a proposal 
can be realised as a robust and comprehensive instrument of international law
31 Control Arms, Towards an Arms Trade Treaty: Next Steps for the UN Programme of Action, 
Control Arms Briefing Paper, June 2005, 4. For a more recent report advocating for the 
proposed Arms Trade Treaty, refer to Control Arms, Arms Without Borders: Why a 
Globalised Trade Needs Global Controls, Control Arms Briefing Paper, October 2006. Both 
reports are available at <http://www.controlarms.org/find out more/reports/index.htm> 
(accessed 22 November 2006)
32 BBC News, "UN initiates arms trade agreement," <http://www.news.bbc.co.uk/go/ 
pr/fr//2/hi/americas/6088200.stm> (accessed 6 November 2006)
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and, if so, the extent to which necessary trade-offs and concessions will water 
down its provisions.
So far unsuccessful at prompting major measures of control, civil society 
organisations do, however, provide opportunities for officials to engage in 
informal discussions which may lead to negotiations of arms control measures. 
These organisations also seek to influence the character and, more specifically, 
the conceptual scope of these frameworks as these undergo negotiation and 
articulation within intergovernmental organisations. I ANSA's members have, 
for example, provided opportunities for officials to engage in informal 
discussions resulting in subregional soft law measures. The President of Mali, 
Alpha Oumar Konare, first raised publicly the idea of an ECOWAS Moratorium at 
a conference organised by the Norwegian Initiative on Small Arms Transfers 
(NISAT) in Oslo during April, 1998. Within six months, the 15 heads of state 
belonging to ECOWAS declared the moratorium.33 Furthermore, working under 
the auspices of a UN Regional Disarmament Centre in 1999, ISS helped raise 
awareness of small arms and light weapons control among governmental 
representatives belonging to the OAU. It also helped develop a mutual 
understanding on small arms by leading a series of workshops culminating in the 
Bamako Declaration which, in turn, informed the UN Small Arms Conference.34
At a regional level, the Ottawa Process was faithfully followed by a member 
of I ANS A. Saferworld identified a core group of European governments
sympathetic to their vision, facilitated informal meetings among these 
governments during which it circulated research, fostering a consensus for an EU 
Code of Conduct without directly confronting the opposition of those governments 
deemed unsympathetic. The consensus emerging among these core governments 
made it easier to enlist the support of other European governments.35 Reflecting 
the vision of many civil society organisations in general and of Saferworld in
33 Brem and Rutherford, 179.
34 Krause, 254.
35 Anders, "NGOs and the Shaping of the European Controls on Small Arms Exports," 185.
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particular, the provision for a confidential consolidated annual report of all EU 
members' transfers in the EU Code of Conduct is an important step toward greater 
transparency. Although this reporting process remains classified by EU member 
states, thereby evading the ongoing scrutiny of civil society, some governments, 
such as Sweden, publish their reported transfers. However, other governments, 
such as France, continue to oppose the publication of these reports outside 
diplomatic channels.36 According to Sibylle Bauer and Mark Bromley, a 
summary of national reports has been published since 1999 even though no 
obligation exists for the EU to make available such information. "The agreement 
to publish a consolidated report," they contend, "can be attributed to successful 
pressure from the European Parliament and non-governmental organizations as 
well as the insistence of the 1999 Finnish EU Presidency."37 As important a 
development as this is, this is not to suggest, however, that all of Saferworld's 
agenda translated into tangible outcomes from these intergovernmental 
negotiations.
I ANS A has also been heavily engaged in the multilateral processes leading to 
the UNPoA, the only small arms-specific soft law measure of global reach. At the 
UN Small Arms Conference, for example, IANS A claimed a membership of over 
320 organisations drawn from 70 countries,38 signalling that it was an actor with 
which to be reckoned. According to Laurance and Stohl, the contributions of 
civil society organisations could not be ignored by those managing the 
conference because "[i]ts members had been conducting extensive research for 
several years, and as a result had produced a wide body of knowledge on the 
causes and consequences of the proliferation and misuse of small arms, as well as 
extensive policy recommendations on how to solve the problems associated with 
these weapons."39 The significance of this contribution is enshrined in the 
instrument itself: paragraph 16 of its preamble, for example, recognises "the
36 Anders, "The Role of Non-State Actors in the European Small Arms Regime," 19.
37 Bauer and Bromley, 5.
38 Krause, 256.
39 Laurance and Stohl, 18.
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important contribution of civil society, including non-governmental 
organizations and industry in, inter alia, assisting Governments to prevent, 
combat and eradicate the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its 
aspects/' Notably, the UNPoA is the only intergovernmental measure of control 
both acknowledging the role of, and seeking support for, civil society, 
empowering them under Section III (2), Section III (18), and Section IV (2)(c).40
Various members of I ANSA also participated in a series of meetings held by 
the UN Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice, which led to the 
UN Firearms Protocol. As Cukier and Sidel explain, the "focus of these meetings 
was examining the current status of and standards for national legislation, 
import/export controls on commercial shipments of firearms, as well as marking 
and tracing standards. Regional meetings provided an opportunity to expand 
international cooperation among gun control organizations."41
Here, then, IANSA's advocacy for instruments of international law extends to 
both soft law measures and treaties, though its contribution varies from case to 
case. Civil society organisations can form issue-based policy coalitions with 
particular governments where their policy interests converge, while also seeking 
to influence those governments' perception of its policy interests, encouraging 
the pursuit of those interests in multilateral settings. Such a 'winning' coalition is
40 Section III, paragraph (2) reads "States undertake to cooperate and to ensure 
coordination, complementarity and synergy in efforts to deal with the illicit trade in small 
arms and light weapons in all its aspects at the global, regional, subregional, and national 
levels and to encourage the establishment and strengthening of cooperation and 
partnerships at all levels among international and intergovernmental organizations and 
civil society, including non-govemmental organizations and international financial 
institutions." Section III (18) reads "States, regional, and subregional and international 
organizations, research centres, health and medical institutions, the United Nations 
system, international financial institutions and civil society are urged, as appropriate, to 
develop and support action-orientated research aimed at facilitating greater awareness 
and better understanding of the nature and scope of the problems associated with the 
illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects." And, Section IV, 
paragraph (2)(c) reads that states should consider to "further encourage non- 
govemmental organizations and civil society to engage, as appropriate, in all aspects of 
international, regional, subregional, and national efforts to implement the present 
Programme of Action."
41 Cukier and Sidel, 221.
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attractive to both civil society organisations and officials because it promotes an 
ongoing dialogue in which ideas and information can flow between activists and 
policymakers. Each becomes familiar with the other's position and aware of the 
other's potential negotiating flexibility which, in turn, increases the standing of 
both within the wider international community when each claims the support of 
the other.42
Notwithstanding IANSA's active presence at these various intergovernmental 
meetings (and in some cases even arranging them), assessing their influence over 
the negotiation and articulation of these soft law measures, including their 
conceptual scope, remains problematic. One reason for this is that officials' 
calculations include, among other things, not only considerations of activists' 
proposals but also, and possibly more importantly, other governments' positions 
and, in the case of subregional instruments, the regional implications of any 
agreements reached. In light of these complexities, IANSA's members may 
provide important negotiating opportunities, though their input is a single factor 
in a complex negotiating process. Moreover, keen to celebrate negotiating 
outcomes, officials are prone to exaggerating the role of civil society 
organisations in shaping instruments of international law, especially where the 
provisions are not legally binding upon governments, as a means of bolstering 
impressions of support for agreements.
Some civil society organisations engage the processes of European
governmental policymaking with respect to small arms controls to an
unprecedented degree. Some of these governments appear sensitive to the
concerns and recommendations offered by arms control activists, in some cases
even recognising their contributions as helping strengthen potential arms control
measures.43 However, as Anders correctly concludes:
the existence of nongovernmental advocacy by itself or even if 
coupled with support by sympathetic governments, is clearly not 
sufficient to achieve policy change. This is particularly so where
42
43
Anders, "The Role of Non-state Actors in the European Small Arms Regime," 14-5. 
Anders, "NGOs and the Shaping of the European Controls n Small Arms Exports," 190.
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specific policy elements are concerned rather than the general 
acceptance of the need for controls in certain areas of the arms trade .44
In fact, policy developments are most easily discerned in those cases where the 
policy positions of civil society organisations and governments coincide.
Assessing the extent of IANSA's influence over the negotiation of the UNPoA 
is equally problematic. Indeed, as one observer of the process maintains, "[i]n a 
slow pantomime, governments began looking to non-governmental 
organizations for good ideas, while the NGOs looked to the governments for a 
sense of what was feasible. " 45 Besides suggesting that all small arms and light 
weapons are marked at the time of their manufacture, "the NGO agenda 
consisted almost exclusively of taking ideas from governments and parroting 
them back. " 46 Significantly, the text of the UNPoA did not reflect IANSA's key 
positions which, if incorporated, could have helped prevent many weapons from 
reaching belligerent users of these weapons.
According to Krause, who is generally reliable in his assessments, the 
"experience of the UN conference suggests that NGO influence was perhaps 
more important at the national than at the global level, and that it was more 
effective in agenda setting than in achieving particular outcomes. " 47 Moreover, 
IANSA's members "appear to have exercised their influence by broadening the 
stakeholder base at the national and regional levels, by pushing governments to 
develop policies where none exist, and by raising the level of awareness and 
expertise that states can bring to the negotiating table. " 48 Endorsing Krause's 
assessment, Batchelor concludes, "[although they had been able to exert some
44 Ibid, 193. See also Anders, "The Role of Non-State Actors in the European Small Arms 
Regime," in which he writes "although non-state actors have played important roles in 
the creation of the EU regime on arms, governmental interests and governmental 
leadership have remained key to achieving policy change on the level of the 
EU...[consequently] there is not sufficient evidence for claiming a shift towards the 
governance of European arms controls," 20.
45 Karp, "Laudable Failure," 180.
46 Ibid, 181.
47 Krause, 257.
48 Ibid, 258.
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influence over other negotiation processes at the sub-regional and regional levels, 
and at the PrepCom meetings, the NGO community had a fairly limited impact 
on the Conference negotiations, as delegations focused on following instructions 
from their capital/ ' 49
In short, while I ANS A attracts attention to the urgent need for governments 
to take action to control small arms and light weapons, and its members have 
been involved in building support for subregional, regional, and global measures 
of control, it is somewhat problematic to assert that it has made a discernible 
difference in negotiating or articulating soft law measures. This is especially so 
given the extent to which IANSA's engagement with instruments of international 
law varies, and that nongovernmental organisations unaffiliated with IANS A 
were also present at some of these meetings, including the UN Small Arms 
Conference.
To be sure, not all civil society organisations engaged in composing 
intergovernmental measures of control advocate within the policy bounds 
prescribed by I ANSA. The inclusion of US congressman and swerving member 
on the NRA Board of Directors, Robert Barr, as an offical delegate to the UN 
Small Arms Conference demonstrates "the US position on civilian possession of 
firearms was clearly linked to the importance of these domestic lobby groups for 
the Bush government. " 50 Barr's participation in the conference reduced the 
UNPoA's conceptual scope to aspects other than those relating to regulating both 
civilian possession of these weapons and transfers to non-state actors. The 
incorporation of the NRA's views into the text of the UNPoA reflects a more 
general US policy on multilateral arms control agreements. Immediately prior to 
the conference, the then US Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and 
International Security Affairs, John Bolton, identified both the longstanding 
recreational use of these weapons enjoyed by US citizens and the right to bear
49 Batchelor, 39.
50 Krause, 258.
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arms enshrined by the Second Amendment of the US Constitution as informing
the official US position. Bolton expressed the position in terms of its reservations:
We do not support measures that would constrain legal trade and the 
legal manufacturing of small arms and light weapons....We do not 
support the promotion of international advocacy activity by 
international or non-governmental organizations, particularly when 
those political or policy views advocated are not consistent with the 
view of all member states....We do not support measures that prohibit 
civilian possession of small arms....We do not support measures 
limiting trade in SALW solely to governments....the United States also 
will not support a mandatory Review Conference.51
In so doing, at least in the view of one observer, "he stripped the conference of its 
agenda, its goals, and any trace of hope. When he stepped down from the 
speakers' podium, the conference was, for all practical purposes, completely 
over. " 52
The official US position is similarly reflected in the major treaties controlling 
small arms and light weapons, specifically the OAS Convention and the UN 
Firearms Protocol, which the US helped negotiate, but has yet to ratify. Enduring 
throughout multilateral negotiations, this position underscores the relative 
bargaining power of the US as a global hegemon where it pursues its interests 
among the international community. It also signals the powerful influence of the 
NRA, as a civil society organisation, in formulating US foreign policy. The 
nature and extent of this influence emerges from the NRA's close relationship 
with the domestic arms industry, from which it receives funds enabling it to 
finance certain politicians' election campaigns. When elected, these politicians in 
turn ensure the ongoing defence of gun-users' rights and the advancement of
51 As cited in Derghoukassian, 4. And, as Batchelor points out in "NGO Perspectives," US 
opposition to NGO advocacy seemingly excludes the NRA members included in the US 
delegation, 40.
52 Karp, "Laudable Failure," 177. Karp elaborates beyond his hyperbole by suggesting that 
the conference's failure was underpinned by "the inherent intractability of the issue, the 
lack of a unifying normative principle to guide international consensus, the reassertion of 
the primacy of the national interest in international politics, and the ambivalence of small 
arms activist and their supporters," 179.
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certain corporate interests in Washington.53 The NRA was also responsible for 
establishing the World Forum on the Future of Sport Shooting Activities (WFSA), 
a coalition of nearly 30 organisations located in over 13 countries, each sharing a 
common interest in preserving civilian gun-ownership rights.54 In terms of both 
its objectives and its political efficacy, the NRA is an exceptional civil society 
organisation involved in the composition of controls over small arms and light 
weapons.
Significantly, there is no single, effective gun-control organisation within the 
US whose influence on US foreign policymaking remotely compares to the 
NRA's. For Derghoukassian, "the gun control movement [is best seen] as the 
societal countermovement to the gun market's expansion,"55 and he explains that 
"[wjith an agenda too much dispersed, a focus on narrowly local issues or 
communities and unable to assume a leading role in transnational advocacy 
groups, the U.S. gun control community were unable to globalize."56 The 
multiple layers of jurisdiction covering firearms legislation, specifically at the 
federal, state, and municipal levels, discourage cohesion among domestic gun 
control movements which, in any case, are more preoccupied with local impacts 
of weapons misuse than with any of the international effects.57 Without a 
domestic lobby contesting the NRA's influence, the US is unlikely to alter its 
foreign policy position with respect to controlling small arms and light weapons 
through multilateral means.
Despite their contending purposes, both IANSA and WFSA recognise the 
importance of maximising the official role granted to civil society organisations
53 Derghoukassian, 20. According to Cukier and Sidel, US Senator Jesse Helms blocked 
financial aid requested by members of ECOWAS to help implement its moratorium and 
opposed disarming Iraqis on the grounds that taxpayers' money should not be used to 
"promote policies in foreign countries that may very well be a violation of the Second 
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution," 224.
54 Batchelor, 38.
55 Derghoukassian, 15.
56 Ibid, 17.
57 Cukier and Sidel, 208.
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within the UN Small Arms Conference and during its follow-up meetings.58 In 
fact the NRA was, for a time, the only firearms-related nongovernmental 
organisation accredited with consultative status at ECOSOC.59 While the NRA 
demonstrates a powerful influence over the formulation of US foreign policy, 
specifically with respect to multilateral efforts to control small arms and light 
weapons, there is little available evidence suggesting that IANSA's campaign has 
an appreciable and comparable impact on the negotiation and articulation of 
intergovernmental arms control measures. Since IANSA's policy 'success' occurs 
mostly, if not exclusively, in those 'winning' policy coalitions where IANSA's 
objectives coincide with governmental interests, serious doubt must necessarily 
persist regarding its ability to either enable or curtail government decision­
making within intergovernmental organisations; this is highlighted where 
governmental interests are at odds with, and prevail over, the objectives of 
IANSA's arms control campaign. This, in turn, calls into question any claims 
asserting that IANSA's arms control campaign is politically effective when 
contextualised against the other major responses to the challenge of controlling 
small arms and light weapons.
Monitoring
Civil society organisations not only advocate for establishing instruments of 
international law, but also seek to enhance existing intergovernmental measures 
of control by monitoring governmental behaviour in relation to the emerging 
mosaic of responsibilities described by Chapters Three and Four. This 
monitoring sometimes occurs endogenously, that is, within formalised processes 
assessing controls with a view to improving them. At other times, it occurs 
exogenously, usually in the form of publicly available reports scrutinising the 
gap between specific responsibilities and a government's arms control policies 
and practices.
58 Batchelor, 39; see also Atwood.
59 Cukier and Sidel, 223.
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As an example of endogenous monitoring, IANSA has been involved with the
UNPoA review process by giving various presentations during both BMS. At the
first BMS, side-events staged by civil society organisations were significant in
maintaining a sense of enthusiasm for the UNPoA, fostering momentum built
since the 2001 conference. According to one observer, these side-events enabled
interaction among officials, representatives from intergovernmental
organisations, and members of civil society organisations, strengthening
relationships among these actors.60 At the second BMS, IANSA formally
presented to delegates a series of personal testimonies which were both horrific
and emotionally moving. However, the sentiment was, perhaps, misplaced, at
least from a strategic perspective. As Stephanie Koorey accurately describes:
the arms control NGOs, co-ordinated through IANSA, confused 
delegates by showing a presentation on machete victims, leaving its 
main adversary, the US National Rifle Association which represents 
the interest of sporting shooters and self-defence advocates, 
wondering if IANSA was re-visiting the definition of small arms that 
had been established eight years before. IANSA failed to take the 
opportunity to elaborate its position on small arms availability and 
misuse, instead spending most of the morning session pointing out to 
delegates that being shot is unfortunate and largely preventable, and 
that firearms can be used coercively. This told the conference nothing 
new, and many considered the presentation to be unhelpful.61
Put crudely, these presentations implied that because small arms and light 
weapons feature as a vital ingredient in perpetuating violence, they ought to be 
controlled. Yet this key message merely endorses the existing objectives of the 
UNPoA without contributing to the utility of the BMS itself, the purpose of which 
was to evaluate progress towards fulfilling the objectives of the agreement. In its 
session, IANSA provided very little evidence of its progress towards assisting 
governments with their implementation of the instrument; in any case, many
60 Peter Batchelor, "The First Biennial Meeting of States on Small Arms: Building 
Momentum for Global Action," Disarmament Diplomacy no.72 (August-September 2003): 
3.
Stephanie Koorey, "The UN Small Arms Control Process: What if this is as good as it 
gets?" Security Challenges 2, no.2 (July 2006): 4.
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officials were absent from the conference room during that particular session. 
Although a spectacle in every sense, it was also, and more importantly, a high- 
profile opportunity squandered by I ANS A, damaging its credibility in the eyes of 
some witnessing its performance.
While the UN Security Council exclusively declares resolutions authorising 
arms embargoes, some of the panels of experts assisting Sanction Committees in 
their tasks of monitoring particular sanction regimes include members of civil 
society organisations, as Chapter Four notes. The formalised processes 
reviewing sanction regimes in more general terms also incorporate input from 
members of the research community and of civil society organisations. For 
example, in collaboration with government officials, but under the leadership of 
the UN, researchers and members of civil society organisations have undertaken 
a series of studies described as the Interlaken (1998-99), Bonn-Berlin (1999-2001), 
and Stockholm (2001-03) Processes.62 The purpose of these studies was to review 
the efficacy of sanction regimes with two broad aims in mind: first, to increase 
the effectiveness of these regimes in altering the behaviour of its target; and 
second, to limit adverse collateral impacts on non-target populations, who are 
predominantly civilian.
Various outcomes of the Interlaken Process include "a consensus on the 
potential advantages of financial sanctions over comprehensive economic
62 Whereas the Interlaken Process was convened by the Swiss Federal Office for Economic 
Affairs, the Bonn-Berlin Process and the Stockholm Process were organised by non-state 
actors: BICC and the Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University, 
respectively. Besides government and intergovernmental officials, private bank 
representatives and academics from institutions, such as The Watson Institute for 
International Studies of Brown University, Harvard University, and The Graduate 
Institute of International Studies (Geveva), the University of Notre Dame, and the Free 
University of Amsterdam, attended the Interlaken Process. The Bonn-Berlin Process 
included participants from universities as well as from so-called independent research 
centres and civil society organisations, including SIPRI, NISIT, BICC, the Centre for 
Conflict Resolution, Saferworld, and International Alert. The Stockholm Process also 
included representatives from the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red 
Crescent Societies, Amnesty International, and Human Rights Watch.
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embargoes" 63 and a recognition that, although financial sanctions are unlikely to 
be effective as autonomous measures, they "may offer additional valuable tools 
to demonstrate the determination of the international community and to support 
a growing sense of individual accountability of targeted elites for the unlawful 
acts of states by seeking control over their financial assets and transactions. " 64 
Moreover, this process identified and elaborated the practical means by which 
credible financial sanctions could be targeted, assisted in part by: the better 
harnessing of technologies; the intensification of cooperation among 
governments; the further developing of those frameworks through which 
governments share information and expertise; and the improved formulation and 
application of domestic law.
Focusing upon arms embargoes and travel-related sanctions, the Bonn-Berlin 
Process identified key "deficits and deficiencies" resulting from poor 
implementation and administration, provided a broad range of potential 
solutions to these deficits and deficiencies, and identified from among these 
potential solutions a few areas for further consideration.65 Predictably, non­
governmental participants of this process suggested important monitoring roles 
played by civil society organisations should be expanded and strengthened .66
The Stockholm Process explored particular ways in which sanction regimes 
might be better implemented, including the routine establishment of sanction 
committees and an in-house database containing relevant and timely 
information, wider involvement among governments in the sanctioning
63 Swiss Federal Office for Foreign Economic Affairs in cooperation with the United Nations
Secretariat, Report of the 2nd Interlaken Seminar on Targeted United Nations Financial 
Sanctions, 29-31 March, 1999, 5. The full report is available at
<http://www.un.org/docs/sc/committees/sanctions/initiatives.htm> (accessed 20 
November 2006).
64 Ibid, 6.
65 Michael Brzoska, ed., Design and Implementation of Arms Embargoes and Travel and Aviation 
Related Sanctions: Results of the 'Bonn-Berlin Process' (Bonn: Bonn International Center for 
Conversion with the Germany Foreign Office and United Nations Secretariat, 2001), 10- 
11.
66 Laura Norris, "Arms embargoes: making sanctions smarter," Ploughshares Monitor, 
(March 2000), 2. <http://www.ploughshares.ca/CONTENT/MONITOR/monmOOg.html> 
(accessed 7 January 2005).
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procedure whereby it is made clear that "sanctions regimes are 'owned' by the 
international community/ ' 67 and assistance to those governments lacking 
effective administrative infrastructure, as well as model domestic legislation for 
those governments without it.68 The increasing involvement of multiple actors in 
these formalised review processes signals a nascent interconnectivity among their 
various approaches towards controlling small arms and light weapons.
As was also mentioned in the previous chapter, some civil society 
organisations manage and implement certain aspects of DDR programmes, as 
does Save the Children in Afghanistan. There is, however, no comparable multi­
actor review process for those DDR processes authorised as part of UN 
peacekeeping operations, though some insightful reports, expressing lessons 
learned, are available from the UN DPKO Best Practises Unit.69
While some of IANSA's members seize upon opportunities connecting their 
response to the widespread availability and ongoing use of small arms and light 
weapons with those major responses belonging to intergovernmental 
organisations and the UN Security Council, others seek to develop relationships 
with these actors by providing reports scrutinising the distance between 
particular governments' policies and practices and their emerging mosaic of 
responsibilities derived from international law. These reports exist beyond the 
formalised review processes.
Resembling researchers' call for international action explored in Chapter Two 
of this thesis, these reports are of analytic significance, specifically as 
contributions exploring an aspect of this topic against various subregional, 
regional, and global contexts. Yet these reports potentially serve a more decisive 
function: first, these reports might be used by policymakers seeking to improve 
the ways in which they evaluate, observe, or implement their arms control
67 Peter Wallensteen, Carina Staibano, and Mikael Eriksson, ed., Making Targeted Sanctions 
Effective: Guidelines for the Implementation of UN Policy Options, Results from the Stockholm 
Process on the Implementation of Targeted Sanctions (Uppsala: Department of Peace and 
Conflict Research, Uppsala University, 2003), v.
68 Ibid, vi.
69 See <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/lessons> (accessed 16 November 2006).
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responsibilities; and, second, these reports might embarrass those policymakers 
whose will to take action in accordance with their responsibilities is insufficient, 
if not entirely absent. More than a call for action, then, these reports present 
information, analysis, and assessments primarily as a means of monitoring the 
conduct of certain governments responding to the challenge of controlling small 
arms and light weapons, the effects of which might help to indirectly improve 
weapons' controls.
Since March 2003, International Alert has published a series of reports under
its Security and Peace Building Programme: Monitoring the Implementation of
Small Arms Control (MISAC). The objective of these reports is:
to better implement international and national small arms control 
measures. By working with governments, donors and NGOs its 
intention is not only to develop a better level of understanding 
regarding the scope and nature of international and regional small 
arms control but to directly assist stakeholders in working towards the 
full implementation of small arms controls.70
Focusing upon the subregions of Central and Eastern Europe, Central Asia, the 
Black Sea, Central America, MERCOSUR, and West Africa—though the series 
broadens its focus to a regional perspective of Eurasia and Latin America—these 
reports compare domestic regimes against multilateral obligations and 
commitments.71 In particular, these reports assess governments in terms of the 
weapons manufactured under their jurisdiction, the basis of their domestic 
regulation of trade and possession, and their law enforcement capabilities.
The findings of the MIS AC reports inform the analysis of a 'cross-regional' 
report, entitled Implementing International Small Arms Controls: Some Lessons from 
Eurasia, Latin America, and West Africa (2005), concluding this three-year initiative. 
The report, revealing the differing regional experiences implementing the
70 Suzette Grillot, Small Arms Control in Central and Eastern Europe, Eurasia Series no.l 
(London: International Alert, 2003), 6.
71 Godnick and Vazquez; Grillot; Agboton-Johnson, Ebo, and Mazal; Pablo Dreyfus, 
Carolina Lotty de Paiva Dias, Benjamin Lessing, and William Godnick, Small Arms 
Control in MERCOSUR (London: International Alert and Viva Rio, 2003). Each of these 
reports, and others, are available at <http://www.intemational-alert.org/publications/ 
subjectb.php?sub=arms> (accessed 20 November 2006).
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emerging mosaic of responsibilities, notes that although the "motivation of 
joining NATO or the EU has been a positive factor in getting governments to 
modernise SALW legislation and practice in South Eastern Europe...in Latin 
America and Africa, there is no similar motivation."72 Helpful for maintaining 
momentum towards improving controls, the report links inducements with 
various key impediments to the full adherence to the responsibilities of the 29 
countries analysed. A constant refrain pervading many of the reports' various 
conclusions suggests that insufficient resources is one of the main obstacles 
hindering the matching of official governmental policy to its practices; 
unsurprisingly, the limited role played by civil society organisations is presented 
here as another common obstacle which ought to be removed.
Given the large extent to which the UNPoA's provisions overlap the 
provisions of other soft law measures examined in Chapter Three, reports 
monitoring the implementation of this agreement are germane to assessments of 
governments' compliance with other responsibilities. In fact, one report 
recognises that "it is neither possible nor desirable to distinguish between efforts 
to implement the POA and these other associated regional and international 
agreements."73 (Of course, this only applies where these responsibilities are 
neither more onerous than those expressed by, nor extend beyond the scope of, 
the UNPoA.) Even though most governments attending the UN Small Arms 
Conference agreed to participate in two further meetings as a means of reviewing 
their progress towards full implementation of this instrument, the UNPoA does 
not specifically delegate to civil society organisations the task of monitoring 
governmental activities. Nevertheless, the Biting the Bullet project, comprising of 
researchers from International Alert, Saferworld, and the Department of Peace 
Studies, Bradford University, has produced for IANSA three major reports 
focusing exclusively upon the UNPoA.
72
73
von Tangen Page, Godnick and Vivekananda, 36.
Biting the Bullet, Implementing the Programme of Action 2003, 4.
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Often referred to as the 'Red Books' (reflecting the colour of their covers), the 
first of these reports assesses the extent to which 156 governments uphold their 
commitments under the UNPoA in terms of each government's control over: the 
ongoing proliferation of these weapons in terms of both organised manufacture 
and casual craft; transfers of these weapons in terms of legal trade, grey transfers, 
and illicit trafficking; weapons possession in terms of both existing stockpiles and 
informal caches; and, lastly, any disarmament processes, disposal techniques, 
and reintegration efforts undertaken by the government in question. The second 
and third volumes examine the relevant progress by over 180 governments. The 
similarity between the information contained in the MISAC reports and the 
information contained in the Red Books signals the cooperative working 
relationship among some members of civil society organisations.
Whereas the first two reports, entitled Implementing the Programme of Action 
2003: Action by States and Civil Society, and International Action on Small Arms 2005: 
Examining Implementation of the UN Programme of Action, were published in order 
to contribute to the BMS process, the third report focuses instead upon "thematic 
examinations of progress towards implementation of the PoA in a way that aims 
to be of the most use to inform debates at the Review Conference."74 According 
to its authors, the timing of IANSA's first report deliberately precedes the first 
BMS held at New York in July 2003 so that it might assist officials to "identify 
strengths, weaknesses, and priorities for the future."75 Yet the timing of the 
report compromises the extent of its information and, by extension, the quality of 
its analysis because some governments, complying with the letter of their 
commitments, only released their official information during the BMS process.
More problematic, however: the first report's tone is as overly optimistic as its 
findings are largely uncritical. The authors' preference to suggest the "glass has 
been slightly filled," rather than remaining "over 95 per cent empty,"76 reflects a
74 Biting the Bullet, Reviewing Action on Small Arms 2006, 4.
75 Biting the Bullet, Implementing the Programme of Action 2003, 4.
76 Ibid, 5.
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tone which does not easily reconcile with its central findings; that is, first and 
foremost, there was "little evidence to suggest any overall success so far in 
reducing the scale and impacts of SALW trafficking and proliferation."77 
Furthermore, the report's tone appears inconsistent with its recommendation that 
"NGO and other civil society groups should take opportunities for constructive, 
even if sometimes critical, relationships with governments to promote inclusive 
social engagement in efforts to implement the POA and related agreements."78 
This, in turn, suggests the report's conclusions are held hostage to IANSA's 
ambition of becoming politically relevant through its ongoing involvement in 
multilateral arms control negotiations, particularly in any formalised review 
processes. Understood in this light, the reasons informing the authors' optimism 
have less to do with the respecting verisimilitude and more to do with 
establishing, and then maintaining, a readership consisting of diplomats, 
government officials, and arms control practitioners, as policymakers confronting 
the challenge of controlling small arms and light weapons.
The tone of the second report is less rose-tinted, however. Its authors, for
example, acknowledge that they "are obliged to emphasise how little has so far
actually been achieved in many respects," before admitting the:
scale of the interventions is generally not sufficient to have more than 
a local or marginal impact on the problems of SALW trafficking, 
proliferation and misuse. Our examination shows that there are 
indeed some countries and sub-regions that have achieved substantial 
progress in more than one of these areas. These were already 
emerging by 2003, and have in several cases maintained their 
momentum. In many other countries and regions, promising early 
indicators of imminent action have proved misleading: they have not 
been properly followed-up. Many States have not really even put in 
place the basic mechanisms and procedures for PoA participation.79
The third report similarly distances itself from the first report's tone by 
suggesting, "[w]hile it is important to recognise some positive developments
77 Ibid.
78 Ibid, 7 (my emphasis added).
79 Biting the Bullet, International Action on Small Arms 2005, 10.
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("the glass has begun to be filled"), it is at least as important to face the fact that 
implementation is not on track towards overall effective action ("the glass 
remains almost empty) . " 80
While each of these three reports analyses governmental progress towards 
fulfilling commitments under the UNPoA, none consider whether or not the 
programme itself is effective in, or even capable of, exerting control over small 
arms and light weapons. In other words, while much of the Red Books focus 
upon policymakers making good on their international commitments, the hard 
work of analysing the strategic capability of the UNPoA to stem the problems at 
hand is not confronted here by IANSA.
IANSA's ability to monitor the UNPoA depends largely upon the availability 
of official information. Because official information is often kept confidential by 
governments, where such information exists, IANSA relies in part upon their 
own information-gathering activities. Accordingly, the transparency-related 
responsibilities introduced during the framing and negotiation rounds of some 
measures are, therefore, of particular salience for civil society organisations. The 
benefits derived from this improved degree of transparency—which remains 
both limited and partial—would prove useful not only to civil society 
organisations, but also to those statemakers, intergovernmental organisations, 
members of the UN Security Council, and researchers seeking to better control 
small arms and light weapons. Equipped with this information, each of these 
actors, as arms control protagonists, could improve the efficacy not only of the 
UNPoA, but of all the responses considered in Part II of this thesis.
Notwithstanding the value of these various publications as a useful 
compilation of data, the analysis and conclusions drawn by these reports' authors 
are of limited policy utility to the international community and the effects of their 
recommendations are not easily discerned. This is not to say that some 
governments will not endorse a report's findings as a means either of enhancing 
their own international prestige or of diminishing that of another government.
80 Biting the Bullet, Reviewing Action on Small Arms 2006, 4.
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There is, however, a lack of strong evidence suggesting governments have 
altered their policies and practices in accordance with the wishes of civil society 
organisations, particularly I ANS A, where those wishes do not already coincide 
with existing governmental interests. As previously noted in Chapters Three and 
Four, the diplomatic tactic of naming-and-shaming has proven a weak and 
ineffectual deterrent, even when it has been deployed by the Security Council. 
Monitoring governmental progress towards fulfilling the objectives of the 
UNPoA from beyond the UNPoA's formal review process, the Red Books 
produced for IANSA do not appear to bear upon that review process in any 
significant way, especially as they do not necessarily compel governments into a 
specific course of action that those governments would not otherwise take.
Here, then, the nascent interconnectivity among these approaches and the 
maturing relationships among these actors of world affairs demonstrate an 
international community confronting the challenge of controlling small arms and 
light weapons. This sense of solidarity was momentarily enhanced on 16 March 
2006 when IANSA addressed the Security Council, presenting a series of papers 
to the council, encouraging its members to assist in establishing international 
legal frameworks controlling small arms and light weapons, to strengthen its 
enforcement of arms embargoes, and to emphasise the importance of DDR 
programmes in its peacekeeping operations.81 However, the major ways in 
which civil society organisations monitor governments' adherence to the 
emerging mosaic of responsibilities derived from international law—that is, by 
engaging endogenous processes reviewing measures and by reporting from 
beyond those formalised review processes—uncritically endorse contemporary 
world order. In particular, IANSA's involvement in the BMS process and in 
reviewing sanction regimes authorised by the Security Council, as well as its 
major reports examining progress towards implementing the UNPoA, reveal an 
enduring but uncritical commitment to internationalism as a primary means of
81 For copies of the presentations, refer to <http://www.iansa.org/im/secuirty-council- 
presentations-htm> (accessed 7 November 2006).
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securing and maintaining international peace and collective security. And, as the 
remainder of this chapter contends, IANSA's unwillingness to disturb, let alone 
contest, this notion of the political can help explain why its arms control 
campaign has been, at least so far, a relatively ineffectual response to the 
challenge of controlling small arms and light weapons, especially when 
compared against the successful landmine ban campaign and against other actors 
responding to this challenge.
Reinforcing an Orthodoxy
Put very briefly, the preceding three chapters of Part II of this thesis argue: first, 
researchers describe the topic of small arms and light weapons as a local, 
national, regional, and global problem for policymakers to solve, calling upon 
governments to cooperate in order to take the action necessary to control the 
proliferation, transfer, possession, and use of these weapons; second, 
policymakers negotiate measures of control within intergovernmental 
organisations and, as products of a grand politico-strategic framework, 
instruments of international law strengthen this existing governance architecture; 
and third, the collective action authorised by the Security Council under the UN 
Charter extends the reach of this governance architecture, often forcefully, to 
areas where governments no longer exercise a monopoly over the use of force. 
Unsurprisingly, these members of the international community tend to prefer 
those responses which consolidate or improve their positions within 
contemporary world affairs.
Despite the diversity of those major responses, these central actors share a 
common notion of the political; as each of these responses to the challenge of 
controlling small arms and light weapons prefers governments cooperating 
together in the pursuit of collective security, internationalism has become a kind 
of orthodoxy. And this orthodoxy takes hold as the nascent interconnectivity 
and maturing relationships among actors devolop.
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IANSA's arms control campaign reinforces this internationalist orthodoxy,
drawing, to a large extent, upon governments to provide its sense of legitimacy
as a member of the international community. Some governments, for example,
provide funds, not just for domestic, but also for transnational civil society
organisations. According to Stefan Brem and Ken Rutherford:
Over the last few years, committed states have strengthened their 
cooperation with interested NGOs and acknowledged the importance 
of NGOs in conducting and disseminating research, educating the 
public, and providing advice to government on small-arms issues. In 
sum, a core group of states decided that it was in their hands to strengthen 
the collaboration with interested NGOs in order to build a solid 
coalition to situate the SALW crisis at the top of the international 
political agenda .82
This is not to say, however, that governments prescribe the range of issues for 
which civil society organisations must necessarily campaign. Rather, it is to 
acknowledge, as does Krause, that "the NGO network 'maps onto' the concerns 
of like-minded states (usually middle-powers) that provide support for it. " 83 
While all this does not deny IANS A a role in multilateral arms control efforts, it 
does, however, acknowledge that such a role depends upon widespread 
governmental consent and it is with, for the most part, medium-sized 
governments that arms control activists have established productive working 
relations. In other words, medium-sized governments, especially those with a 
vested interest in a substantive and ongoing commitment to internationalism, be 
it on a global, regional, or subregional scale, benefit from the engagement of civil 
society organisations which, at least in appearance, contribute to countering the 
influence of powerful statemakers in world affairs. And while IANSA's 
members might develop their responses, enlarge the scope of their involvement, 
and improve the sophistication of their approach, these developments do not 
necessarily influence the behaviour of policymakers in discernible ways, 
especially in non-trivial matters.
82 Brem and Rutherford, 181 (my emphasis added).
83 Krause, 259.
234
Significant too, is the emergence, before IANS A was established, of that 
coalition of like-minded and action-orientated governments. As Garcia correctly 
asserts:
The wealth of initiatives promoted by governments during the period 
1995—99 within the UN and through the coalition of like-minded 
states is an indicator that states had a stronger sponsorship role in the 
advancement of the issue of small arms within the international 
agenda than non-governmental actors in that period. They acted as 
agenda setters and elevated the small arms issue to a position of 
prominence within the international agenda. The role of some states, 
like Canada and Norway, was key in the making of a coalition of like- 
minded states that played a central role in advancing the global efforts 
to control small arms.84
Furthermore, the literature published by researchers, an emerging body of 
international law, and the collective action authorised by the UN Security 
Council, each occurring before the establishment of I ANS A, underscores the 
limited extent to which civil society organisations exercised leadership over the 
international community's emerging response to the challenge of controlling 
small arms and light weapons.
In this respect, IANSA's campaigning does not signal a shift from 
internationalism towards a form of global governance in which a range of actors, 
including but by no means limited to statemakers, play important roles in 
addressing problems recognised as being of global scope. As Laurance and Stohl 
observe, "[a] broader range of actors, especially those from civil society, will need 
to be more involved if the emerging global public policy framework on small 
arms is to take full flight."85 The actors, in addition to being involved, will need 
to be politically effective. Even though Laurance and Stohl concede the concept 
of a global public policy framework for these weapons is in its "infancy,"86 the 
evidence they provide, particularly the increased level of engagement by non­
state actors within intergovernmental organisations, does not necessarily signal
84 Garcia, "Norm building in the Evolution of the Control of Small Arms in the International 
Agenda," 243.
85 Laurance and Stohl, ix.
86 Ibid, 41.
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the emergence of such a framework. In other words, the case for an emerging 
global public policy framework around the control of small arms and light 
weapons is not entirely convincing because mere participation does not 
necessarily equate to effective political engagement, as this chapter demonstrates. 
Similarly, despite Derghoukassian's observation that "[t]he landmine case 
inaugurated a novel modality of 'new internationalism' centered on the 
collaborative process of NGOs and moderate states, " 87 no such new 
internationalism is evident with respect to controlling small arms and light 
weapons. Much the same can be said of Krause's concept of a 'new 
multilateralism . ' 88 While these developments may indeed be novel, they make 
little impact on the major responses to this challenge.
As this chapter demonstrates, IANSA's campaign does not make a significant 
discernible difference to the ways in which intergovernmental organisations 
function in non-trivial matters; civil society organisations do not feature here as 
agents representing the emergence of a new form of global governance, despite 
being important members of the international community. The case of I ANS A 
appears to support Pouligny's claim that "although they often criticise the actions 
of governments and international organisations on specific aspects of their 
policies, NGOs rarely challenge the broader notion of political and economic 
principles which constitute the framework of their actions. " 89 Rather than 
emerging in opposition to the state, the relationship is more complex and 
dynamic, signalled by the ease with which experts shift between civil society 
organisations and the policy division of governments and intergovernmental 
organisations. Understanding the complex and dynamic nature of this 
relationship reveals that "[t]he contemporary increase of the discourse on 'civil 
society/ as something opposed to the state, functions as if there was a clear, 
universal, and intangible frontier between what refers to politics and what does
87 Derghoukassian, 3.
88 Krause, 259.
Pouligny, NGOs as transnational forces? 34.89
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not/ ' 90 Rather than signalling the emergence of a specific global public policy in 
particular, or a form of global governance in general, Part II of this thesis 
illuminates the ways in which the international community's response to the 
challenge of controlling small arms and light weapons reinscribes 
internationalism. In fact, it serves to highlight the entrenchment of 
internationalism and its ability to remain the predominant notion of the political 
in contemporary world affairs.
This entrenchment of internationalism is also evident far from the diplomatic 
conference halls. In post-conflict settings, international civil society organisations 
working closely with peacekeeping operations are seen by some local 
nongovernmental organisations as acting in "collusion" and by local actors as 
part of the "invasion by international NGOs arriving in their countries with UN 
soldiers. " 91 Furthermore, the strategies employed by these international civil 
society organisations are informed by their own 'universalist' principles which 
do not necessarily easily transplant into war-tom post-conflict settings. In fact, 
existing social organisations are often neglected, quite possibly because they are 
"insufficiently understood and widely marginalised. " 92 While there might be 
significant interaction between international civil society organisations and local 
actors, there is often little in the way of meaningful and sustained negotiation 
and few genuine cultural transactions, resulting in frameworks informed more 
by the ideologies of the west with its 'best practices', than by the concrete 
practices permeating host societies.
While the belief in internationalism underpins the international community's 
response to the challenge of controlling small arms and light weapons — 
determining who should control these weapons and in what circumstances they
90 Ibid, 7.
91 Beatrice Pouligny, "UN peace operations, INGOs, NGOs, and promoting the rule of law: 
exploring the intersection of international and local norms in different postwar contexts," 
Journal of Human Rights 2, no.3 (September 2003): 363.
92 Ibid, 372.
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are to be used—these responses are, for the most part, problem-solving attempts.
And by problem-solving, I mean here what Cox means when he writes:
It takes the world as it finds it, with the prevailing social and power 
relationships and the institutions into which they are organised, as the 
given framework for action. The general aim of problem-solving is to 
make these relationships and institutions work smoothly by dealing 
effectively with particular sources of trouble. Since the general pattern 
of institutions and relationships is not called into question, particular 
problems can be considered in relation to the specialised areas of 
activity in which they arise.93
Relying upon this internationalist governance architecture without disputing the 
key philosophical assumptions underpinning those control strategies, I ANS A 
neglects advancing other key philosophical assumptions commonly held by 
many social movements. It contests neither the primacy of the state, nor the 
assumption that human nature is calculating, for example. Since those arms 
control activists following IANSA's guidance avoid contesting the particular 
notion of the political deeply embedded in the structures informing 
contemporary world affairs, IANSA's campaign endorses the legitimacy enjoyed 
by statemakers, supporting the existing governance architecture, as it is in turn 
supported by it.
Noticeably absent from the international community's major responses to this
challenge is what Cox describes as critical theory, which is:
critical in the sense that it stands apart from the prevailing order of the 
world and asks how that order came about. Critical theory, unlike 
problem-solving theory, does not take institutions and social and 
power relations for granted but calls them into question by concerning 
itself with their origins and how and whether they might be in the 
process of changing. It is directed towards an appraisal of the very 
framework for action, or problematic, which problem-solving theory 
accepts as its parameters. Critical theory is directed to the social and 
political complex as a whole rather than to the separate parts .94
93 Cox, 261.
94 Ibid, 262.
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While civil society organisations, such as Human Rights Watch, can gain some 
leverage over governments by linking, for example, human rights records to 
potential EU membership, I ANS A has not. Similarly, whereas the "[v]iolent 
antiglobalization demonstrators in Seattle in 1999 totally eclipsed the meeting of 
the Word Trade Organization they came to protest....[the UN Small Arms 
Conference] never rose above analytic sobriety/'95
I ANS A does not, therefore, resemble what Walker describes a 'critical social 
movement,' which he defines as:
distinguishable in part by their capacity to recognize and act creatively 
upon the connection among structures, processes, and peoples that do 
not enter significantly into the calculations of conventional political 
actors or that are denied by movements of a more reactionary 
character. Recognizing connections, critical social movements are able 
to engage not only in struggles around specific problems but also in 
struggles that recognise the emancipatory potential inherent in certain 
kinds of connections and solidarities. Acting on such connections and 
forging new solidarities, critical social movements have the capacity to 
extend the horizons of our political imagination. Reacting to the 
intolerable, they extend the boundaries of the possible.96
Against this criterion and compared against the efforts of intergovernmental 
organisations and of the UN Security Council, IANSA's performance to date as 
an arms control protagonist has been ineffectual. Partly an indictment of 
IANSA's leadership, it also signals the limits of what is possible for non-state 
actors to achieve when engaged with issues on the contemporary security agenda 
which have important economic and social dimensions.
Even though involvement in various multilateral processes, and the formal 
recognition of this involvement by certain instruments of international law, does 
not necessarily signal political efficacy, such recognition has, however, had a 
profound impact upon arms control activists. This official recognition not only 
provides necessary resources and a sense of legitimacy to activists as members of 
the international community, but also enables a broader civil society constituency
95 Karp, "Laudable Failure," 181.
96 Walker, 3.
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to be cultivated while sustaining their collective identities as fervent campaigners 
with, at times, very public demonstrations of utopian-like zeal. In these terms, 
IANSA can claim success in consolidating support for controls over small arms 
and light weapons among fellow individuals. Its 'collective' urge finds 
expression as a social movement and legitimises its purpose as an organisation, 
but is essentially a reaction against the alienation from the mainstream which 
informs many of the most vibrant contemporary social movements.
In this light, the UN Small Arms Conference was particularly important in 
fostering interest and further consolidating civil society support for arms control 
activism. According to Batchelor, "[i]t mobilised new organizations to join the 
NGO community and help build relationships between NGOs from different 
parts of the world and from different sectors...The Conference was also useful 
for building better relations between the NGO community and governments. " 97 
The meetings preceding and following the conference also offered IANSA 
opportunities to develop policy recommendations, nurture partnerships, and 
improve their capability for future campaigning. As a civil society organisation, 
"IANSA is significant, in part because it represents the coming together of a 
range of groups from many countries concerned about the problems of small 
arms and firearms from a variety of perspectives. " 98 The conference also enabled 
relationships among researchers and civil society organisations to mature. For 
Laurance, it was an:
occasion for the creation, dissemination, and sharing of knowledge 
that firmly established the SALW problem as global in nature....and 
has set in motion a host of post-Conference studies and conferences 
designed to connect the knowledge on small arms problems with that 
of international law, human rights, and public health, to name a 
few . " 99
All this is not to imply, however, that activists do unimportant work: IANSA's 
campaign is broad, and it probably makes a difference in multiple ways, yet
97 Batchelor, "NGO Perspectives," 40.
98 Cukier and Sidel, 228.
99 Laurance, "Shaping Global Public Policy on Small Arms: After the UN Conference," 197.
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IANSA's impact on the negotiation, implementation, and monitoring of those 
mosaic of responsibilities examined in Chapters Three and Four, which this thesis 
argues are the central responses of the international community, has so far been 
faint at best and coopted at worst.
It remains a core contention of this thesis, however, that the appalling impacts 
associated with the widespread availability and ongoing use of small arms and 
light weapons—which were described as a 'carnival of horror' in the thesis' 
prologue—are in and of themselves insufficient to reform the internationalist 
governance architecture. To be sure, those impacts present an opportunity for 
governments, especially as members of intergovernmental organisations, to 
further consolidate their prime positions in contemporary world affairs. 
Focusing here upon the disappointment of the UN Small Arms Conference, 
Karp's reasoning is highly germane to all of the major responses to the challenge 
of controlling small arms and light weapons examined in Part II of this thesis. He 
writes:
The UN Small Arms Conference had the misfortune of being 
conceived in the last light of an era when it seemed possible to 
redesign international affairs, minimizing the role of squabbling states.
By the time the conference convened the climate had changed. 
Strengthening the state was the order of the day. With their own 
particular needs foremost in mind, jealous of their prerogatives as 
states, there was no longer any chance for agreement, least of all 
within the UN. African governments arrived at the conference bent on 
keeping weapons out of the hands of rebels. Islamic governments 
were determined to sustain the flow of support to the Palestinians and 
Kashmiri Muslims. Delegates from Latin America sought to stymie the 
flow of guns to rebels and narcotics traffickers. China and Russia just 
wanted to keep prying eyes out of their own affairs. Meanwhile some 
European countries and the United States were striving to protect 
domestic liberties. The search for agreement took the only path left 
open, accepting the lowest common denominator and adopting 
diluted recommendations.100
As governments reassert sovereignty and national interest within the grand 
politico-strategic frameworks ordering world affairs, the space for civil society
100 Karp, "Laudable Failure," 187-88.
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campaigning continues to narrow, despite a brief but very apparent expansion in 
the wake of the Cold War.
Conclusion
First mobilising in 1998, and then formally established in the following year,
IANSA's campaign is the most recent major response by members of the 
international community to the challenge of controlling small arms and light 
weapons. Although there is much evidence suggesting civil society organisations 
have become increasingly involved in the composition of controls—and at times 
this involvement has been welcomed, and even facilitated, by government 
representatives within intergovernmental organisations—there is less evidence 
suggesting this involvement necessarily demonstrates an effective political 
engagement at the global level. This is not to discount the important impact they 
might have on individuals and communities in local contexts. As arms control 
protagonists, these organisations have also been unable to prompt major 
measures of control, be they either treaties or soft law measures, or of global, 
regional, or subregional scope. The record to date suggests that civil society 
organisations under IANSA's direction have yet to demonstrate an ability To get 
and use power over others for non-trivial purposes/
Because IANSA's campaign deliberately maps onto the concerns and interests 
of certain governments and, for the most part, onto the existing security agendas 
of those intergovernmental organisations to which these governments belong, 
those organisations following IANSA's leadership have not always fully 
exploited the power available to them as social movements. Other civil society 
organisations not affiliated to I ANS A have, however, proven politically effective 
in pursuing their objectives during multilateral negotiations occurring at 
intergovernmental organisations: more specifically, the NRA, as members of the 
US delegation to the UN Small Arms Conference, to the UN meetings preceding 
the UNCATOC, and to the OAS, prevented consensus over regulating both 
civilian possession and transfers to non-state actors. As argued in Chapter Three,
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this conceptual neglect seriously impairs the efficacy of those specific measures 
as effective arms control measures.
As Part II of this thesis demonstrates, there is a high degree of nascent 
interconnectivity among the literature published by researchers, the measures of 
control negotiated within intergovernmental organisations, the collective action 
authorised by the UN Security Council, and the campaigning of civil society 
organisations. Despite such interconnectivity among these members of the 
international community, a particular notion of the political remains uncontested 
by these actors as each response evolves. Broadly speaking, statemakers 
collaborating within intergovernmental organisations continue as the prime 
actors composing controls over these weapons, and their commitment to the 
internationalist governance architecture is further justified, embedded, projected, 
and uncritically endorsed by these major responses. While awareness of the 
nature and extent of the myriad of deleterious impacts generated by the 
widespread availability and ongoing use of small arms and light weapons 
compels some international actors into taking action, these responses serve to 
reinforce what has become an internationalist orthodoxy. Without prejudicing 
claims that a broad shift toward new forms of governance is occurring in 
contemporary world affairs, Part II of this thesis demonstrates that such a shift, if 
it exists, is neither epitomised by, nor particularly evident in, the ways in which 
the international community composes controls over small arms and light 
weapons.
The following two chapters, comprising Part III of this thesis, signal that not 
all international actors share this commitment to internationalism. In fact, 
Chapters Six and Seven illustrate ways in which arms-producing firms, brokers, 
and chief users of small arms and light weapons each seek to mitigate, resist, or 
subvert those treaties and soft law instruments emerging from within 
intergovernmental organisations, as well as those arms embargoes and DDR 
programmes authorised by the UN Security Council. In so doing, Part III
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illustrates how these actors, as arms control antagonists, contest the notion of the 
political in differing ways and with differing degrees of success.
PART III
D ram atis P ersonae, and the erosion of control
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/  FIRMS AND BROKERS
O  • SUSTAINING WIDESPREAD AVAILABILITY
Whereas arms control protagonists are, generally speaking, quick to recognise firms 
and brokers as international actors contributing to the widespread availability of 
small arms and light weapons, recognition especially evident in their penchant for 
regulating producers and suppliers of these weapons, they appear less keen to 
explicitly acknowledge these actors as potential antagonists of those control 
processes and, more importantly, of those control processes' intended effects. 1 
Before identifying particular ways in which firms and brokers mitigate, resist, and 
elude the intended effects of the various measures established by the international 
community as a means of exerting control over the proliferation and transfer of 
small arms and light weapons, this chapter distinguishes those firms and brokers 
authorised by governments from those commercial operators whom are not. Some 
of these unauthorised firms and brokers operate beyond the administrative and 
enforcement reach of the regulatory regimes established in accordance with 
international law, often in what is commonly referred to as the black market. Focus 
is also given here to those commercial operators deliberately transferring weapons 
in contravention of UN arms embargoes.
In practice, however, both authorised and unauthorised operators can draw 
upon—sometimes simultaneously, at other times interchangeably—a common pool 
of commercial ploys that help erode the international community's control over 
small arms and light weapons. Possessing technical expertise and operational 
flexibility which is frequently superior to the monitoring and enforcement 
capabilities underpinning the intergovernmental frameworks designed specifically
1 A notable exception here is the UNPoA. While the UNPoA focuses on firms as an object of 
control, paragraph 16 of its preamble also recognises the "important contribution of civil 
society, including non-govemmental organizations and industry in, inter alia, assisting 
Governments to prevent, combat and eradicate the illicit trade in small arms and light 
weapons in all its aspects."
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to regulate the small arms and light weapons industry, firms and brokers are 
motivated, often to a large extent, by powerful corporate interests which ought to be 
of significance to those concerned with controlling the widespread availability of 
these weapons. Indeed, given that the commercial practices deployed by firms and 
brokers are not only changing the face of the global arms market and shaping the 
dynamics of contemporary conflict, 2 but also directly contesting the internationalist 
notion of the political informing the major responses examined in Part II of this 
thesis, this motivation is especially relevant to analysts and policymakers alike. By 
way of conclusion, the chapter makes use of 'dark networks/ a conceptual device 
recently elaborated by Jörg Raab and H. Brinton Milward, as a means of 
problematising the dichotomy comprising of those members of the international 
community who help compose controls over these weapons and those international 
actors whose practices help erode the intended effects of those controls.
Captains of Small Arms Industry
While intergovernmental organisations remain the primary members of the 
international community responding to the challenge of controlling small arms and 
light weapons, firms and brokers play a central role in sustaining the widespread 
availability of these weapons. Indeed, the major members of the international 
community seeking to compose controls over small arms and light weapons 
recognise the importance of firms producing the tools frequently used to facilitate 
violent crime, initiate, conduct, and prolong armed hostilities, and hinder post­
conflict reconstruction efforts, each of which threatens peace and intensifies 
insecurity.
According to the Small Arms Survey, for example, "the presence of new and 
increasing numbers of companies and countries that produce small arms —and who 
are willing to sell to anyone, anywhere, at any price—means that it is now easier for 
authoritarian governments, non-state actors, terrorists, and criminals to obtain
2 Amnesty International, Dead on Time—arms transportation, brokering and the threat to human
rights (10 May 2006), 9.
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weapons that are newer, more sophisticated, and more lethal than ever before/ ' 3
IANSA argues, furthermore, that "[a]s access to modem machine technology
becomes widespread, small-scale producers are becoming increasingly capable of
producing significant quantities of highly capable and sensitive firearms, including
semi- and fully-automatic weapons. The issue of 'craft' production also cannot be
dismissed as a small or peripheral issue."4 More decisively, intergovernmental
organisations include weapons-producing firms as an object of control in the
regulatory regimes fostered under international law. The preamble of the Nairobi
Protocol, for instance, acknowledges the link between:
the problem of the proliferation of illicit small arms and light weapons in 
the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa and the devastating 
consequences they have had in sustaining armed conflict and armed 
crime, degrading the environment, fuelling the illegal exploitation of 
natural resources and abetting terrorism and other serious crimes in the 
region.
The notable exception here is, of course, the UN Security Council which, given that 
its five permanent members rank among the largest producers and exporters of 
conventional arms, is less likely to explicitly condemn the role its industries play in 
contributing to contemporary conflicts, many of which are the subject of Security 
Council resolutions.
Brokers are similarly recognised as international actors sustaining the
widespread availability of small arms and light weapons. A recent report issued by
Amnesty International defines "international arms brokering" as:
...activity carried out by individuals or companies to mediate, arrange or 
facilitate an international arms transaction between a buyer and seller in 
return for a fee or material reward or benefit. Brokering activity does not 
necessarily involve the actual purchase, possession or delivery of the arms 
directly by the brokering agent, although this is often linked in practice. 
Rather, the brokering activities focus on mediation and may include the 
provision of vital technical, logistical and financial information to 
customers about arms suppliers and prospective clients and sub­
contractors in different countries, the facilitation of documentation and/or
3 Small Arms Survey, Small Arms Survey 2001, 48.
4 Biting the Bullet, International Action on Small Arms 2005, 299.
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payment between buyer and seller, and/or the arrangement of 
transportation, finance or insurance services for the delivery of the arms 
cargo in question.5
The Small Arms Survey acknowledges that "brokers and their associated networks 
of intermediaries and sub-contractors are increasingly involved in the transfer of 
new and surplus weaponry into contemporary conflict zones. Most of these 
transfers have dubious legitimacy, contravening national and/or international law 
and occurring in the grey and black markets of the global arms trade/'6 According 
to Amnesty International, the "[gjrowing state-sponsored out-sourcing and the 
increasing private mediation of international arms distribution and procurement is 
adding to the risk of arms being delivered, diverted, and used for grave human 
rights violations."7 Much of the Fowler Report, submitted to the UN Security Council 
in 2000, deals with the vital role brokers played in procuring weapons for UNITA, 
thereby enabling conflict to prevail in Angola. Subsequent UN Sanction Committee 
reports also document brokering activities, but rarely do so with the candour so 
forcefully articulated by the Fowler Report. Intergovernmental organisations, such as 
the EU, explicitly recognise "that the availability and accumulation of massive 
quantities of conventional arms and especially their illicit trafficking, often associated 
with destabilising activities, are disturbing and dangerous phenomena, particularly 
for the internal situation of affected states and for the respect of human rights."8 
While somewhat less developed than the treatment of weapons-producing firms as 
objects of control, there has been some progress towards establishing new, and 
improving existing, controls over arms brokers in important agreements constituting 
an emerging body of international law.9
5 Amnesty International, Dead on Time, 58.
6 Small Arms Survey, Small Arms Survey 2001, 95.
7 Amnesty International, Dead on Time, 3.
8 Refer to the EU Programme for Preventing and Combating Illicit Trafficking, (my emphasis 
added).
9 For detailed reports of this progress, please refer to official documents—especially the United 
Nations General Assembly, Report of the Group of Governmental Experts established pursuant to 
General Assembly resolution 56/24 V of 24 December 2001, entitled "The illicit trade in small arms ad
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Despite their recognition as international actors sustaining the widespread 
availability of small arms and light weapons, weapons-producing firms evade easy 
characterisation. At one extreme of the production scale, commercial entities are 
structured as state-owned manufacturing plants in countries where central planners 
continue to exercise a heavy hand in managing domestic economies. China North 
Industries Corporation (NORINCO) is a prime example of a state-owned enterprise 
producing large quantities of small arms and light weapons, including derivatives of 
the near ubiquitous AK47, for PRC's own defence purposes and for export abroad. 
As a means of facilitating its external trade, NORINCO maintains over twenty 
offices outside the PRC; it has also been involved in road building projects in 
Ethiopia and subway construction in Iran.
Also located at this extreme of the production scale are those multinational 
corporations fulfilling ongoing commercial contracts for government defence 
organisations, representing the military-industrial complex found in some western 
liberal democracies. Colt Manufacturing Company is one such firm, privately 
owned by shareholders, which supplies small arms and light weapons to the armed 
forces of the US government, including the M16 assault rifle used during the 
Vietnam War. At present, Colt is a major supplier of weapons to the US military 
forces in Iraq as well as to many of the private security firms currently contracting 
throughout that occupied country.10 These two commercial enterprises, and 
hundreds others like them, provide ongoing employment for thousands of workers 
and generate foreign exchange revenue, both of which are not insignificant concerns 
for policymakers responsible for managing domestic economies.
At the other extreme of the production scale, commercial entities are structured 
as family-owned businesses which operate with fewer than a dozen employees* 11 and 
West African blacksmiths in particular, repairing damaged weapons, also produce
light weapons in all its aspects," UN Doc. A/58/138 (New York: United Nations, 2003), available 
at <http://www.disarmament.un.org/cab/salw.html> (accessed 3 December 2006).
10 For more information on these companies, please refer to their commercial websites 
<http://www.norinco.com> and <http://www.coltsmfg.com> respectively.
11 Small Arms Survey, Small Arms Survey 2004: Rights at Risk (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2004), 10.
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weapons as craft. According to Emmanuel Kwesi Aning, weapons produced as craft 
in Ghana "are now known regionally for their competitive prices, their effectiveness, 
and their accessibility—thus raising concerns that they might one day represent a 
significant source of weaponry for armed groups. Indeed, some local blacksmiths 
now possess the requisite know-how to copy imported AK-47 assault rifles."12
Company structures aside, "it is often difficult to distinguish between end
producers that sell final products (e.g. rifles) to buyers, and intermediate
producers—companies that produce parts or components for small arms that are
then sold by end producers."13 And where production occurs:
[u]nder the guise of producing trinkets, gold ornaments, and basic farm 
implements, blacksmiths secretly [continue] to manufacture the more 
profitable small arms which then [slip] outside the purview of the law 
and the state. Not only [does] clandestine manufacture continue to grow, 
but it also [engenders] networks and mechanisms designed to elude law- 
enforcement agencies.14
To further complicate matters, the actual process of producing a small arm or a light 
weapon can occur across multiple jurisdictions.
Like captains of small arms industry, arms brokers evade easy characterisation. 
In many cases, firearms dealers supply local markets without contravening domestic 
law. In other cases, however, brokers deal on behalf of governments whose 
international responsibilities render such transactions improper and illegal; the Iran- 
Contra affair provides a much-publicised example of such arms-length brokering. 
In addition to these weapons, some brokers traffic missiles, attack helicopters, and 
make claims about accessing nuclear materials, though not all brokers are of so 
dubious a pedigree. According to Brian Wood and Johan Peleman, contemporary 
arms brokers are, more often than not, entrepreneurs possessing professional 
military and security expertise who are driven by financial incentives, are prepared 
to exploit legislative loopholes, employ transport agents and secretive financial 
transactions, and engage in morally repugnant, though in some cases technically
12
13
14
Aning, 79.
Small Arms Survey, Small Arms Survey 2001,11. 
Aning, 81.
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legal, business practices of selling arms to human rights violators, repressive 
governments, and perpetrators of genocide.15
Blurring the distinction between firms and brokers, however, are those 
manufacturers that market and distribute their own products as well as those 
brokers maintaining their own inventories.
Just as weapons-producing firms and arms brokers evade easy characterisation, 
the motives informing proliferation and transfer vary. During much of the Cold 
War, it was almost commonplace for both superpowers to transfer small arms and 
light weapons to client actors as a means of fuelling the ideological rivalry between 
democratic liberalism and communist socialism. The legacies of these transfers are 
readily apparent in many of the locales currently hosting conflict or recovering from 
hostilities: the US, for example, provided weapons to armed groups active in Africa, 
Central Asia, South America, and South East Asia, as did the former USSR. More 
recently, however, a significant proportion of the world's manufacturing 
infrastructure, established for non-commercial reasons during the Cold War, has 
been reduced by the radical neo-liberal reform of those economies formerly 
controlled by Soviet planners and, more generally, by the gradual rationalisation of 
the arms industry throughout the world. Like many industries, the small arms and 
light weapons industry is at once transformed by globalisation and functions as its 
vehicle. And by globalisation, I mean here what Kaldor means when she describes 
it as "the intensification of global interconnectedness—political, economic, military, 
and cultural. " 16
Since the end of the Cold War, direct governmental control over firms 
manufacturing small arms and light weapons has been relaxed, especially within the
15 Wood and Peleman, 12-13. For a very similar description, see Amnesty International, Dead on 
Time, 59.
16 Kaldor, 3. Kaldor goes on to note: "Even though I accept the argument that globalisation has 
its roots in modernity or even earlier, I consider that the globalisation of the 1980s and 1990s 
is a qualitatively new phenomenon which can, at least in part, be explained as a consequence 
of the revolution in information technologies and dramatic improvements in communication 
and data-processing. This process of intensifying interconnectedness is a contradictory 
process involving both integration and fragmentation, homogenization and diversification, 
globalisation and localization."
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former Soviet Union, as these firms are increasingly privately owned and
commercially operated, rather than managed as state-owned enterprises. This is not
to suggest, however, that no state-owned or subsidised arms manufacturing plants
exist, but rather, to signal a broad trend towards private commercial ownership
within this industry. Broadly speaking, these economic reforms appear to follow US
economic leadership and, moreover, according to Derghoukassian:
The growth of the gun business in the 1990s is the consequence of 
aggressive marketing efforts that were put in place in the last two decades 
in the U.S. and created a powerful lobby to preserve an expanding 
business. These efforts are best understood within the free-market logic of 
neoliberal economics that predominated U.S. economic policy since the 
late 1970s and, eventually, became the driving force of globalization. 
Though aggressive marketing is an inherent logic for almost any 
consumer product to maintain competitiveness, guns are not the kind of 
good that needs renewal every few years like cars or computers. The gun 
business, therefore, needed greater creativity to expand the naturally 
more restricted limits of its market. More than demand, thus, it was the 
supply-side of the gun business that was active in creating incentives for 
potential buyers.17
Although the total number of firms manufacturing these weapons has increased 
following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the range of weapon-types produced has 
enlarged, and the geographic distribution of these firms has spread, the estimated 
rate at which these weapons are produced has, however, declined.18
Brokers of small arms and light weapons also benefit from Cold War legacies 
since covert operations conducted by governments — specifically, the US, the UK, 
France, the Soviet Union, and East Germany19—established transfer routes beyond 
regulated channels, enabling certain individuals to acquire skills of strategy 
necessary for successful arms brokering. Normally maintained exclusively by 
governments, these skills include establishing and utilising secret bank accounts, 
straw men, and shell companies. Brokers in less developed countries derive or, in 
some cases, mimic these skills of strategy, with some emerging as former combatants
17 Derghoukassian, 13.
18 Small Arms Survey, Small Arms Survey 2001, 7.
See Wood and Peleman, particularly chap. 1, entitled "Arms Brokering Emerges from the 
Cold War," 6-12.
19
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with closely forged relationships with those belligerents fuelling weapons demand.
As with firms operating in the aftermath of the Cold War, the concomitant
intensification of globalisation further enables many of the world's brokering
activities. Again, Wood and Peleman are instructive here:
The increasing globalization of trade and electronic info-commerce make 
it easier than ever for experienced arms dealers and operators to 
circumvent national arms control systems and to exploit the weakest links 
in a fragile international regulatory chain. Globalization has enabled the 
aviation industry to move away from traditional public ownership and 
regulation. Cross-border mergers between airlines, marketing alliances, 
leasing, chartering, franchising and offshore registration of fleets, crews 
and companies all make it very difficult to monitor and regulate the 
airspace and freighting industry. Brokers and shipping agents have 
become skilled exploiters of these new market realities.20
Yet the commercial relationship between militaries and the transport industry has its 
roots dating back to the logistical support provided by the private sector to the US 
military during the Second World War. Important too is the 'logistics revolution' 
that followed in the ensuing decades. The US military's reliance on the commercial 
logistics service providers for Operation Desert Storm testifies to the importance of 
this enduring relationship.21
This industry, manufacturing and trading small arms and light weapons, is big 
business which, as Tom Diaz alludes, is making a killing.22 Recent estimates suggest 
1,134 firms are currently involved in some stage of small arms, light weapons, and 
ammunition production processes. Signalling the industry's global distribution, 
these commercial enterprises occur in at least 92 countries with the US, the Russian 
Federation, and the PRC ranking as the world's major producers.23 The Small Arms 
Survey estimates the total value of the global small arms and light weapons industry 
to be at least US$7.4 billion, and this for a total volume of between seven-and-a-half 
and eight million weapons, and between ten and fourteen billion units of
20 Wood and Peleman, 11.
21 For more details, see Amnesty International, Dead on Time, 41-48.
22 Tom Diaz, Making a Killing: The Business of Guns in America (New York: New Press, 2000).
23 Small Arms Survey, Small Arms Survey 2004, 9.
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ammunition each year.24 These so-called captains of industry continue producing 
small arms and light weapons, in some cases developing and refining associated 
technologies, in spite of a global stockpile estimated at about 639 million known 
weapons.25
The world's stockpiles not only continue to grow even in the wake of the Cold 
War, but also circulate among users with a high degree of velocity. The Small Arms 
Survey estimates the value of total legal international trade in small arms and light 
weapons to be worth approximately US$4 billion each year,26 though this might be 
an underestimate as it remains difficult to ascertain the quantities of these weapons 
distributed as gifts and aid, or sold at bargain-basement prices. The nature of the 
small arms and light weapons industry, particularly the motives informing 
production and trade, is at once informed by considerations of military strategy— 
including for national defence purposes, to support client armed groups, and to 
undermine and destabilise rivals —and of economic prosperity—including short­
term commercial gains and sources of ongoing employment.
The global small arms industry is, however, so complex that it defies reductive 
categorisation and, according to the Small Arms Survey, "although it is frequently 
treated as a single entity, the industry is in fact highly differentiated."27 Thus, as an 
analytical tool, country profiles (an approach favoured by much of the literature 
examined in Chapter Two) may not fully reflect the many operational complexities 
of commercial enterprises and are, thereby, rendered less meaningful than profiles 
based upon corporate structures and the dynamic incentives to which these actors 
respond. Put simply, country-specific profiling is not necessarily meaningful for 
analysts, nor does it possess much in the way of utility for policymakers.
24 Small Arms Survey, Small Arms Survey 2003,13.
25 Ibid, 9 & 57.
26 Ibid, 97.
27 Small Arms Survey, Small Arms Survey 2005, 39.
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Operating Beyond the Mosaic of Responsibilities
Despite its heterogeneous and dynamic character, the small arms and light weapons 
industry can be meaningfully and usefully differentiated between those commercial 
operators that are authorised and regulated by governments and those operators 
that are not. By regulated and authorised I mean, quite simply, those operators 
engaging in commercial activities with explicit governmental consent, whereas by 
unauthorised and unregulated I mean those operators engaging in commercial 
activities without such consent. In this sense, illicit production and trafficking of 
small arms and light weapons occurs where regulated firms and authorised brokers 
engage in activities that breach domestic legislation and regulation (though such 
technical and administrative breaches are not necessarily minor infringements). It 
also occurs where unregulated producers and unauthorised brokers commit offences 
against domestic legislation, usually but not necessarily in contravention of their 
government's responsibilities under international law, including UN Security 
Council resolutions. Indeed, establishing such a distinction lies at the heart of the 
measures of control examined in Chapter Three.
Few firms and brokers exert much in the way of direct influence over the 
legislature establishing regulatory regimes controlling small arms and light 
weapons, and few directly influence the formulation and advancement of foreign 
policy with respect to these controls. Few firms and brokers, moreover, attend 
relevant international conferences as delegation members.28 But where such firms 
belong to powerful industrialised countries, their influence can be highly 
disproportionate and, more often than not, the weakening of international 
instruments is considered an objective necessary for protecting their corporate 
interests. Whereas few firms and brokers are routinely involved in composing 
intergovernmental measures of control, none are routinely involved in composing 
Security Council resolutions establishing arms embargoes. Taken together, these
28 A notable exception here is the Manufacturers Advisory Group of the World Forum on the 
Future of Sports Shooting Activities, which has submitted reports that recommend standards 
and specifications for weapons marking, in accordance with the UNPoA. Refer to Laurance 
and Stohl, 19.
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responses help comprise a mosaic of responsibilities, identified and assessed by 
Chapters Three and Four of this thesis, which ought to foster regulatory regimes for 
those governments cooperating within various intergovernmental organisations and 
into arms embargoes for those governments belonging to the UN. But, as Chapter 
Three also demonstrates, this mosaic of responsibilities enables the authorised 
manufacture and trade of these weapons which, in turn, generate impacts 
registering violently against the internationalist governance architecture.
These frameworks do not, for instance, restrict the volume of weapons produced 
within each government's jurisdiction, except for those governments committed to 
the ECOWAS Moratorium. Even though many weapons-producing firms engage in 
legal commerce with governments and private consumers, most of the weapons 
replaced by such acquisitions are neither deactivated nor destroyed but are, instead, 
held in poorly-secured stockpiles or armouries, sold at discount prices in order to 
offset the expense of weapons procurement or, in some circumstances, are simply 
given away. Moreover, the mosaic of responsibilities does not restrain the volume of 
weapons transferred, but merely seeks to preclude certain destinations for transfers, 
a commitment consistent with aspects of international humanitarian law (though 
this also is contested by those who debate its application and by those who dissent 
from their responsibilities under it). While only participants of the ECOWAS 
Moratorium prohibit themselves from all transfers, other agreements, including the 
EU Code of Conduct and the Wassenaar Arrangement, create an onus of responsibility 
for governments to act with transparency in all transfers they authorise as a means 
of deterring weapons from reaching destinations where conditions of civil conflict 
prevail or threats to the international peace exist. The legal trade, that is, the transfer 
of these weapons occurring with governmental consent, adds to existing official and, 
in some cases, civilian stockpiles, resulting in leakages of these weapons into 
unauthorised hands. Hence, many legally manufactured and traded weapons are 
subsequently misused or become illicit weapons in the hands of unauthorised users.
As Chapter Three also notes, while the geographic reach of this mosaic of 
responsibilities covers much of the inter-state system, including a very significant
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proportion of the world's small arms industry, it does not span the entire globe, 
thereby excluding from its ambit of control some weapons-producing firms and 
arms brokers. And as Chapter Four notes, while the UN Security Council has 
targeted sanction regimes at Eritrea, Ethiopia, Iraq, Liberia, Libya, Somalia, the 
Former Republic of Yugoslavia, Afghan Taliban, Al-Qaeda, Usama Bin Ladin, 
Angolan UNIT A, Rwandan rebels, and Sierra Leone rebels,29 consensus has not 
always prevailed throughout the council's deliberations and conflict continues in 
many locations, such as Darfur, Sudan. In contexts where might-is-right logic 
prevails over the rule of law, regulatory regimes are unlikely to flourish as the 
manufacture and transfer of these weapons is both easy to organise and highly 
profitable. Less prevalently, some productive capability might be located in 
countries whose governments are non-member observer states (or 'entities') to the 
UN, including Palestine, and, until 2002, Switzerland. Other governments without 
full UN member status, specifically the Cook Islands, Niue, Taiwan, and the Sahrawi 
Arab Democratic Republic, might prove locations useful as safe-havens to arms 
brokers. Even the Fioly See, in 2001, purchased weapons from an Italian firm.30
In short, the manufacture and trade of small arms and light weapons authorised 
by governments with international responsibilities appears unrestrained, negatively 
affecting contemporary world affairs for millions of victims suffering under these 
tools of violence. Moreover, some weapons-producing firms and arms brokers 
operate beyond the frameworks governing the proliferation and transfer of these 
weapons, while others operate from within countries which are not subject to UN 
Security Council resolutions. Consequently, these commercial operators do not 
contravene governmental responsibilities under international law because, simply 
put, none exist.
Although there is no easy way of quantifying all of those operators dispersed 
throughout the world producing and transferring small arms and light weapons
29 For further details of particular mandates and the duration of these UN arms embargoes, 
please refer to fn.18 of Chapter Four.
30 Amnesty International, Dead on Time. 6, fn.14.
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without authorisation from governments, it might be possible to identify those firms 
and brokers that are registered and authorised by governments. Yet since 
information relating to their commercial activities is scarce and often contested, 
especially by those directly involved in business dealings, and since assessments of 
these activities lack veracity, there is no easy way of determining (at least with any 
degree of certainty) either the proportion of those firms and brokers engaging in 
practices mitigating their government's ability to adhere to its international 
responsibilities, or the frequency of such subversive practises. Similarly, it is not 
currently possible to estimate either the full extent to which authorised brokers 
engage in practices resisting the intended effects of arms embargoes or the 
cumulative quantity of small arms and light weapons reaching embargoed actors.
Sufficient evidence exists, however, indicating that regulated firms and 
authorised brokers do engage in a variety of subversive practises, including 
approaches relied upon by brokers as a means of avoiding detection where the 
international community has reinvigorated its monitoring and surveillance efforts 
focusing on embargoed actors. Awareness of these ploys is crucial to any 
appreciation of the international community's attempts to exert control over small 
arms and light weapons because the limitations inherent in these frameworks, some 
of which arise as these frameworks are composed, are exploited by commercial 
operators in such a way as to erode the intended effects of these controls. 
Recognising that these commercial ploys help erode the intended effects of the 
international community's efforts to compose controls over these weapons is as 
useful to those policymakers who, involved in composing controls over these 
weapons, wish to improve the efficacy of these measures, as it is meaningful to those 
analysts who merely wish to better comprehend the reasons why the international 
community's response has proven to be so ineffectual.
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Mitigating Domestic Regulations
While few regulated firms and authorised brokers participate in multilateral 
negotiations of control measures, the ongoing commercial practices of these 
operators are of enormous significance to the efficacy of those measures. 
Notwithstanding the number of regulated firms and authorised brokers abiding by 
their host government's international responsibilities, many are capable of 
mitigating the intent of these responsibilities by deliberately hindering their host 
government's ability to regulate the manufacture and trade of these weapons. And 
just because hard evidence of a few of these commercial practices is scarce, this does 
not mean there is no scope for such practices to occur.
Regulated weapons-producing firms can, for example, mitigate the intended 
effect of their host government's responsibilities by misreporting the type, volume, 
and value of items they manufacture, often exploiting authorities' inadequate 
monitoring efforts. Once produced, weapons that remain unreported are easily 
diverted into the so-called black market, though such diversions are not necessarily 
undertaken for mercantile advantage. Like weapons-producing firms, authorised 
arms brokers can misreport the content, volume, and value of particular 
consignments, and the destination of weapons consignments provided to officials 
may be misleading or false. On one occasion in 1992, Polish authorities granted an 
arms export licence on the basis of an end-user certificate issued by the Peoples' 
Democratic Republic of Yemen, a country which ceased to exist in 1990.31 Declaring 
a false destination enables brokers to transit their consignment through a foreign 
country that is not of particular concern to the international community, but which 
exerts inadequate control over its international borders and is unable to prevent 
these weapons flowing elsewhere: as this chapter illustrates, the use of countries as a 
'staging post' is particularly prevalent among brokers, employed by armed groups, 
resisting the intended effects of arms embargoes.
31 United Nations Security Council, Report of the Panel of Experts on Somalia pursuant to Security 
Council resolution 1425 (2002), UN Doc. S/2003/223 (New York: United Nations, 2003), 
paragraph 44.
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Firms have also granted permission for their weaponry to be reproduced under
licensing to foreign-owned companies based offshore, with some firms providing
design plans, technological support, and skilled professionals in order to facilitate
production. Granting these production licences enables firms located in, and
operating under, the jurisdiction of one government to establish and maintain an
arms-length commercial relationship with firms operating in a foreign territory,
thereby circumventing its host government's authority, mitigating its ability to
adhere to its international responsibilities. According to Pete Abel:
The close manufacturing arrangement between Heckler & Koch 
(Germany) and Royal Ordinance (UK) raised serious concerns that the 
two companies were exploiting inconsistencies between German and UK 
export controls in order to evade arms control embargoes. After reports 
emerged that H&K MP5 weapons had been identified in Bosnia and 
Serbia, apparently breaching the UN arms embargo levied in 1991, 
Heckler & Koch states that the weapons in question 'were made under 
licence by Royal Ordinance at its small arms factory in London, before 
1987/ and that H&K did 'not know how many MP5 barrels have been 
delivered to Enfield.'
Prior to the UN embargo, it was not illegal for UK firms to export to 
Yugoslavia, although it was for German firms.32
In this respect, firms not only circumvent governmental control—and in this case 
defy arms embargoes—but also encourage the spread of a small arms production 
capacity throughout the world, intensifying the challenge of exerting control over 
the proliferation of these weapons.
Similarly, some brokers conduct commercial activities from home soil, but 
register their companies in locations under foreign jurisdiction. Mil-Tec 
Corporation, which sold weapons to the Rwandan Ministry of Defence, was 
registered in the Isle of Man, but continuously used a postal address (and telephone 
and fax numbers) in East Sussex.33 In circumstances such as these, the weapons 
which they transfer might never reach their host government's territory, denying 
authorities both the opportunity to monitor or inspect cargo and the ability to seize
32 Pete Abel, "Manufacturing Trends: Globalising the Source," in Running Guns: The Global Black 
Market in Small Arms, ed. Lora Lumpe (London: Zed Books, 2000), 90.
33 Wood and Peleman, 32.
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or confiscate unauthorised weapons. Some brokers merely facilitate contracts 
between suppliers and those who demand these weapons without ever possessing 
those arms. Without direct access to consignments, enforcement authorities 
necessarily rely upon paperwork generated and authorised by foreign governments, 
and upon inspections conducted by foreign enforcement agencies.
In spite of the emerging mosaic of responsibilities, few governments have yet to 
enact and enforce specific laws controlling brokering activities, especially where 
these activities occur beyond their area of jurisdiction. In particular, less than a 
quarter of all UN members have enacted regulations that specifically control 
brokering activities.34 Of those, few governments enact legislation of extra-territorial 
scope and even fewer possess the capability to enforce the terms of such legislation.35 
Thus, trafficking may go undetected and, if detected, unpunished.
Authorised brokers do not necessarily source all of their weapons directly from
the regulated production line, as some arrange supply from legally-held stockpiles
and illicit arsenals, disguising weapons' illicit origins before reintroducing them into
the regulated sector. Just as Samuel Cummings, one of the world's most notorious
arms brokers, purchased weapons leftover from the Second World War and sold
these to belligerents in postcolonial Africa, South America, and East Asia, 36
contemporary arms brokers purchase surplus weapons held in government
stockpiles. As Wood and Peleman explain:
Surplus stocks from former Soviet military bases all over Eastern Europe 
have turned into warehouses for weapons brokers based in Western 
Europe. Shopping lists circulate between traders and suppliers; when a 
recipient is found who cannot buy in the mainstream government 
markets, the weaponry is shipped by civilian cargo companies to a transit 
point, from where it is transported to a final destination in a war zone. 
Once the war is over, large quantities of weapons are stockpiled or
34 Amnesty International, Dead on Time, 63.
35 Ibid, 70.
36 Wood and Peleman, 10. For further particulars regarding Cummings' career, refer to R.T. 
Naylor, "The Rise of the Modem Arms Black Market and the Fall of Supply-Side Control," in 
Combating Transnational Crime: Concepts, Activities, Responses, eds. Phil Williams and Dimitri 
Vlassis (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2001), 214-215.
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exported abroad, often through the same brokering channels that were 
used as supply channels during the war.37
According to the Fowler Report, the "arms reduction requirements imposed by the 
Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE) have resulted in the need for some 
countries to reduce and dispose of stockpiles. Likewise, the desire of a number of 
former Warsaw Pact countries to join NATO may have resulted in those countries 
selling off non-NATO standard equipment at a discount/'38 Weapons that are 
surplus to military and constabulary requirements and are held in poorly-secured 
stockpiles are especially vulnerable to leakage. Even though former Soviet bloc 
countries have been identified as especially prone to leakage, they are not alone. 
Cameroonian armed forces, for instance, trafficked weapons from their own 
stockpiles, helping fuel internecine conflict in neighbouring Chad in the late 1980s 
and early 1990s. In February 2001, an explosion at the central armoury in Yaounde 
is suspected to have been a deliberate ploy obscuring the extent of missing official 
weapons.39 (Stockpile leakage occurs not only as commodities for exchange, but also 
for immediate use, as the following chapter explores.)
Here, then, regulated firms and authorised brokers hinder their host 
government's ability to regulate the manufacture and trade of small arms and light 
weapons in a variety of ways, none of which are particularly inventive or complex. 
While each of these subversive practices lacks a high degree of sophistication, they 
appear to be relatively effective when deployed against the current monitoring 
procedures used by governments attempting to fulfil their relevant responsibilities 
under international law. The modus operandi used by firms and brokers to misreport 
the type, quantity, value, and destination of the weapons which they manufacture 
and trade depends, of course, as much upon the specific record-keeping regulations 
as it does the level of resources devoted to their administration. The regulatory 
regimes are, as already mentioned, highly varied and inconsistently applied.
37 Wood and Peleman, 44.
38 United Nations Security Council, Report of the Panel of Experts on Violations of Security Council 
Sanctions Against UNITA, paragraph 39.
39 Atanga, 26-27, fn.18.
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Regulated firms and authorised brokers operating with criminal intent rely upon 
their own informal and personal networks in order to overcome the inadequate 
efforts of some law enforcement agencies and necessarily exploit deficiencies in 
state-based law enforcement:40 by saying so, however, I do not mean to slander the 
effort of many law enforcement officers, but rather, wish to signal the challenge of 
monitoring these industrial and commercial sectors, as well as to highlight the 
difficulties involved in verifying commercial and official documents issued or 
authorised by a foreign government without a centralised, time-sensitive repository 
allowing comparison. Such difficulties must be contextualised against the broader 
challenge of monitoring the enormous volume of goods and increasing 
sophistication of transactions occurring across international borders as 
contemporary trade.
Resisting Arms Embargoes
In addition to, and sometimes in concert with, the multiple and ongoing ways in 
which the commercial practices of regulated firms and authorised brokers can 
mitigate the intended effects of the control measures negotiated within 
intergovernmental organisations, authorised brokers can adopt a range of 
approaches resisting the intended effects of arms embargoes authorised by the 
Security Council. And by resist, I mean here that arms brokers can refuse to comply 
fully with those laws and regulations, derived from their host government's 
responsibilities, by continuing to transfer weapons to those actors targeted by arms 
embargoes. But in order to do so, these brokers must avoid the detection of their 
illicit cargoes by authorities.
When trafficking weapons to embargoed actors via overland routes, brokers can 
avoid detection by transporting their consignments to countries bordering areas 
occupied by embargoed actors and then entering this territory though largely 
uninhabited areas and traversing terrain which proves difficult to monitor. In
40 For more on the issues hindering international cooperation among law enforcement agencies, 
see Legget.
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Kosovo, for example, mules were used as a means of ferrying illicit weapons across 
the border located in Albania's alpine regions.41 Romeo Dallaire, Force Commander 
of the United Nations Assistance Mission For Rwanda (UNAMIR), recalls the 
"Ugandan border was hard to monitor because of its altitude, its terrain and mist- 
filled valleys, and I suspected that the [Rwandan Patriotic Front] was already 
sneaking all kinds of supplies into the country, using an old Viet-Cong ploy: loading 
up bicycles and taking the stuff over the tiny mountain paths that criss-crossed the 
border."42 Without timely intelligence, adequate numbers of armoured personnel 
carriers, helicopters, night-vision equipment, and sufficiently well-trained troops, 
effective monitoring proved increasingly elusive as tensions intensified in and 
around Rwanda during 1994. Porous borders such as these provide a multitude of 
trafficking opportunities, especially in land-locked territories targeted by UN 
sanction regimes, including not only Rwanda but also Afghanistan.
Brokers can also avoid detection by using devious flight plans in order to deliver 
weapons to embargoed actors, at times deceiving even the flight crews. One arms 
flight, for instance, which began as a humanitarian aid mission, left the UK for 
Kilimanjaro, but upon arrival there the crew received instructions to fly via Cairo to 
Bulgaria. Once in Bulgaria, the aircraft was loaded with small arms and light 
weapons and the pilot was told to fly to Chad, but during refuelling at Cairo, the 
destination was altered to Oman, and then altered again in mid-flight to South 
Yemen, a country then (in 1994) experiencing civil war and under an international 
embargo.43 At other times, aircraft simply land and unload en route without 
informing authorities.44 Rather than land and unload illicit cargoes at airports, arms 
brokers can use improvised landing strips in remote locations or deploy unusual 
means of delivery including, for example, airdrops to pre-planned locations.
41 Khakee and Florquin, 29.
42 Romeo Dallaire, Shake Hands With The Devil: The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda (London: 
Arrow Books, 2003), 88.
43 Wood and Peleman, 60.
44 Ibid, 54.
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Aircraft are a particularly attractive means of delivery where roads and railroads are 
in poor condition or have been damaged by disaster or conflict.
Where ships are the preferred conveyance for arms trafficking to embargoed 
actors, their re-registering while on the high seas beyond any government's effective 
jurisdiction can deliberately obscure the intended destination of weapons 
consignments, fooling those officials authorising export permits. Unauthorised 
transhipments at sea similarly deceive authorising officials. In 1992, an authorised 
shipment of arms from Poland rendezvoused with a fishing vessel off Somalia's 
coast, after putting in at Latvia where only a small portion of the cargo was 
offloaded even though the entire cargo was signed for.45 The use of two sets of 
documents enables brokers to 'cook the books' and provide plausible records to any 
enforcement agency inspecting their holds. Where coastlines are remote, vessels 
receiving transhipped weapons can put in at concealed bays and coves, with their 
unloading activities undetected by surface patrols.
Brokers using more conventional commercial routes, such as roads, railroads, 
airports, and sea ports, can avoid detection by disguising their illicit cargo as 
medical supplies, agricultural equipment, and development aid.46 Weapons 
transferred from PRC to Somalia have been labelled as "Uniforms and General 
Cargo,"47 for instance. Sometimes the crew transporting such cargo remains 
unaware of its nature and when they do become aware that they are transporting 
weapons, believe they are conducting an authorised govemment-to-govemment 
transfer.48 Brokers can rely upon the sheer volume of international trade to provide 
some cover for their illicit cargoes, and unauthorised consignments can be further 
concealed among authorised cargo.49
45 United Nations Security Council, Report of the Panel of Experts on Somalia pursuant to Security 
Resolution 1425 (2002), paragraph 48.
46 Wood and Peleman, 53.
47 United Nations Security Council, Report of the Panel of Experts on Somalia pursuant to Security 
Resolution 1425 (2002), paragraph 68.
48 Wood and Peleman, 31.
49 Amnesty International, Dead on Time, 8.
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More generally, however, surveillance activities are scarce, if not nonexistent. 
(The exceptions, of course, emerge from the presence of US interests, or the interests 
of other powerful governments possessing enforcement capabilities, most evidently 
in the Gulf and Yugoslavia.) Where surveillance is conducted, it is often targeted 
with poor intelligence and brokers can easily evade patrol units simply by waiting 
for them to retire at nightfall. At other times, brokers can provide either inducement 
or intimidation to patrol teams, though unsurprisingly there is little hard evidence of 
this practice. Brokers can take full advantage of the immense difficulties confronting 
the implementation and enforcement of arms embargoes targeting non-state actors, 
such as that which, focusing on Al-Qaida and the Taliban, are "not restricted to the 
territory of any specific country or region," as an Analytical Support and Sanctions 
Monitoring Team recently observed .50
Arms brokers are sometimes assisted by embargoed groups that have good 
relations with a neighbouring or nearby government which allows weapons to be 
stockpiled in their territory. UNIT A, for instance, used Zaire as a staging-post and 
as a storage point for weapons it procured through brokers while under UN arms 
embargo, but when President Mobutu was overthrown, UNIT A leaders quickly 
shifted their procurement activities to Togo.51 Governments neighbouring territory 
controlled by armed groups, such as Togo and Zaire, can grant official 
documentation, specifically end-users certificates, to support trafficking activities, 
providing legitimate cover for illicit consignments. These examples of 'sanction 
busting/ already identified by Chapter Four as an important limitation of 
international community's response to the challenge of controlling small arms and 
light weapons, encourage, embolden, and enable brokers to continue eroding the 
intended effects of arms embargoes.
50 United Nations Security Council, Third report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring 
Team appointed pursuant to resolution 1526 (2004) concerning Al-Qaida and the Taliban and 
associated individuals and entities, paragraph 114.
United Nations Security Council, Report of the Panel of Experts on Violations of Security Council 
Sanctions Against UNITA, paragraph 35.
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But while governments are culpable for violations of arms embargoes and, by 
extension, the consequences of such violations, the UN must also bear some 
responsibility in certain circumstances. According to a Report of the Panel of Experts 
on Somalia:
Some blame must also be placed on the United Nations for contributing to 
a perception that the embargo need not be taken seriously. In a number of 
instances, certain United Nations agencies had knowledge of apparent 
violations of resolution 733 (1992) that could have been verified and 
publicly reported to the Security Council Committee established pursuant 
to resolution 751 (1992) concerning Somali. In one incident, in June 1992, 
an aircraft used for the delivery of Somali currency to Ali Mahdi was 
previously under contract to a United Nations agency, and still displayed 
United Nations markings at the time of the incident. It was widely held 
by Somalis that the aircraft carried illegal weapons. The United Nations 
conducted an investigation which concluded that there were no weapons 
on the aircraft. The fact that the findings were never published 
contributed to a prevailing attitude among Somalis and others that they 
need not comply with the arms embargo.52
In circumstances where embargoes have no normative value, arms brokers can act 
with a sense of impunity while increasing the widespread availability of these tools 
of violence.
Here, then, the commercial practices of authorised operators hindering a 
government's ability to regulate the manufacture and trade of small arms and light 
weapons occurring within its jurisdiction, and the approaches exploiting the 
practical difficulties confronting those monitoring and enforcing arms embargoes 
both signal the interstices in, and limits to, the international community's various 
attempts to exert control over the widespread availability of these weapons. 
Regulated firms and authorised brokers can routinely exploit the regulatory 
inconsistencies created as various strategic frameworks suffer uneven 
implementation and, where implementation occurs, some governments only 
sporadically enforce their responsibilities. More alarming, however, is the ease with
52 United Nations Security Council, Report of the Panel of Experts on Somalia pursuant to Security 
Resolution 1425 (2002), UN Doc. S/2003/223, paragraph 21. For another example, see Amnesty 
International, Dead on Time, 50-52.
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which brokers can exploit the conceptual disconnect between the various 
intergovernmental measures of control focusing upon regulating transfers at the 
point of origin and at the point of transit, rather than at the point of destination, and 
arms embargoes primarily concerned with preventing weapons from reaching the 
hands of particular belligerents.
The uneven implementation and sporadic enforcement of these various 
frameworks is complicated by the transnational nature of much of the small arms 
and light weapons industry, and by the ways in which this industry continues to 
develop, particularly in the aftermath of the Cold War. The transnational nature of 
this dynamic industry, a dynamic intensified by the processes of globalisation, not 
only frustrates the unevenly implemented and sporadically enforced strategic 
frameworks—or more specifically the intended effects of these frameworks on 
domestic regulation—but also reveals a somewhat more basic conceptual disjunct 
between firms and brokers as relatively autonomous commercial international actors 
and governments as members of the international community seeking to control, by 
way of regulation, the activities of these commercial operators.
This tension is also apparent in the differences between legal definitions seeking 
to create an object of control, and analytical distinctions seeking to identify a subject 
of analysis, especially as comprehending the affairs and consequences of commercial 
operators in light of governmental structures is a somewhat static approach which 
fails to fully confront the profound dynamism of this industry and to illuminate the 
role it plays in the economic dimension of world affairs. As previously mentioned, 
research describing and quantifying proliferation and transfer in terms of country- 
specific output does little to reflect the complexity of contemporary corporate 
structures and business practices deployed across international borders, for 
example.
These commercial practises also further undermine the international 
community's attempts to reinforce and extend the existing internationalist 
governance architecture which, as Chapter Four demonstrates, is already 
undermined by those so-called sanction-busting governments that knowingly
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authorise their nationals to act in ways contravening those embargoes. This is 
especially the case in those locales where UN peacekeeping operations coincide with 
sanction regimes, such as in Angola, Cambodia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, and Somalia 
during the 1990s; targeted by arms embargoes, governments currently involved in 
conflict possess little, if any, surplus capacity with which to patrol international 
borders as a means of detecting and deterring arms trafficking or unregulated 
production, not only of large-scale production, but also as small-scale craft. Where 
UN peacekeepers are deployed as de facto border patrol resources in order to 
enhance border patrol capabilities, embargo-monitoring efforts merely offer a 
somewhat deficient and nearly always temporary compensation for what is often 
woefully inadequate, if not entirely absent, government capability. As Naylor puts 
it, a "conflict zone is for weapons what an offshore banking centre with strict secrecy 
laws is for money—with the added advantage that anyone attempting to probe the 
secrets of the zone's arms business risks considerably more than the mere indignity 
of deportation/'53 The legacies of those sources and routes established under 
conditions of conflict or embargo prove durable, frustrating post-conflict 
reconstruction efforts.
Unauthorised Operators
By engaging in commercial practices within the jurisdiction of governments that 
have international responsibilities to establish and maintain regulatory regimes over 
the manufacture and trade of small arms and light weapons, unauthorised firms and 
brokers help erode the intended effects of the international community's response to 
the widespread availability of these weapons. This erosion of control is especially 
evident where unauthorised operators deliberately elude cooperative law- 
enforcement investigations which, targeting unauthorised proliferation and transfer, 
are provided for by some intergovernmental measures of control. (Almost all of 
these agreements provide for information-sharing relating to authorised operators, 
any operator's conviction records, or intelligence of any trafficking.) And by elude, I
53 Naylor, "The Rise of the Modem Arms Black Market," 219.
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mean that these unauthorised operators conduct their business affairs in such a way 
as to place them, for the most part, beyond the administrative and enforcement 
reach of these regulatory regimes. Significantly, many of the countermeasures 
deployed against cooperative law-enforcement investigations can also prove of use 
to those regulated firms and authorised brokers mitigating domestic regulations and 
resisting arms embargoes.
As unauthorised weapons producers, some artisans and guilds acquire their raw 
materials from established and trusted sources. By marking weapons in such a way 
as to resemble imported weapons, craft producers also protect their identity and 
location. The methods of delivery can be similarly clandestine, with completed 
weapons stored in neighbouring villages and delivered to customers only upon 
receiving final payment.54
Unauthorised operators can use fraudulent identity as part of a web of deception 
misleading, confusing, and ultimately eluding cooperative law-enforcement 
investigations. Unauthorised arms dealers can, for example, act as impostors of 
well-known regulated traders, seeking to introduce unregulated weapons into 
regulated markets, as occurred during the Lebanese Civil War when three 
individuals each separately claimed to represent Colt at a meeting held by the 
Lebanese government in 1980.55 Individuals, and the companies they represent, can 
also provide false or misleading information to authorities at the initial point of their 
registration as regulated firms and authorised brokers. Relying upon registrars' 
inability to verify information, applicants are almost assured that administrators 
remain unaware of any previous trafficking-related convictions. In these 
circumstances, the true identity of those who organise, manage, and derive profit 
from manufacturing and brokering activities remains concealed from authorities. 
Problematically for both analysts and policymakers, where there is no effective 
verification of an applicant's identity and associated details by administrators, the 
distinction between an authorised and an unauthorised operator is undermined and
54 Aning, 89 & 91.
55 Fisk, 949.
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rendered irrelevant. Put simply, governments are unable to prosecute offenders if 
they cannot ascertain their identity.
Brokers wishing to hinder investigations (and to evade accountability and 
punishment following successful enforcement action taken against them) have used 
deliberately complex company arrangements in conjunction with strict 
confidentiality provisions of banks as a means of concealing their identity and of 
obscuring any link between their identity and illicit trafficking. Front companies, for 
example, are sometimes represented by a nominated director who remains unaware 
of the firm's business dealings. These front companies can do business with 
transport agents "whose headquarters is designated by one of several dozen brass- 
plates on the door of a small Cayman Islands office, staffed by one secretary who sits 
watching American soaps for the whole working day . " 56 Such arms-length business 
arrangements are used to distance commercial dealings from those individuals 
responsible for them and from those accruing their proceeds.
Moreover, brokers and their transport agents can use aircraft and vessels, many 
of which were procured at low cost during the immediate aftermath of the Cold 
War, 57 which are registered under a so-called flag of convenience. Some 
governments, such as Liberia under Taylor's rule, 58 collect revenue derived from fees 
charged for conveyances to be registered under their jurisdiction, but do not actively 
seek to verify the applicants' information and have little in the way of any 
enforcement capability by which to control those conveyances operating under its 
flag. These registers remain closed to foreign scrutiny, frustrating investigations by 
protecting registered client's identities and associated details. The registers are 
significant, given the major flags of convenience—Bahamas, Bermuda, Cyprus, 
Liberia, Malta, and Panama—have granted authorisations to just under half of the 
world's maritime transport capacity.59 Aircraft that sub-lease over-flight
56 Naylor, "The Rise of the Modem Arms Black Market," 225.
57 Amnesty International, Dead on Time, 37.
58 Jörg Raab and H. Brinton Milward, "Dark Networks as Problems," Journal of Public 
Administration Research and Theory 13, no.4 (2003): 428.
Amnesty International, Dead on Time, 33.59
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permissions but use the leaser's call-sign, and unregistered aircraft that act as a 
'phantom' by deliberately resembling another registered aircraft, obscure the 
aircraft's identity, misleading authorities monitoring airspace.60
In addition to the difficulties encountered when trying to untangle deliberately
complex company arrangements, financial transactions also prove difficult for
authorities to trace, especially when funds are funnelled through 'tax haven' style
institutions often used as a means of laundering ill-gotten gains. However, the
secrecy provided by offshore banks is often exaggerated:
Even where secrecy is extremely tight on paper, the key to penetrating it 
is usually no more complicated than a $100 bill. Precisely for that reason, 
it has long been an adage among users of foreign banks for illicit purpose 
that real bank secrecy comes not from legislation but from keeping one's 
mouth shut—and working where possible using multiple or false 
passports as identification. Under those circumstances, a bank in New 
York open to the full force of the law can be just as effective, and just as 
discrete, as one in Nauru protected by all manner of legal barriers to 
information flows.61
Moreover, the Financial Action Taskforce of the OECD recently proposed a set of 
measures that might help lift the so-called corporate veil in these 'fiscal paradises,' 
though it has done so for reasons other than for combating arms trafficking.62 
Officials from the US Treasury, however, opposed the plan which would have 
targeted the Bahamas, Cayman Islands, Cook Islands, Dominica, Israel, Lebanon, 
Lichtenstein, Marshall Islands, Nauru, Niue, Panama, Philippines, Russia, St. Kitts 
and Nevis, St. Vincent and Grenadines.63 As "epicentres of globalization," the 
world's largest cities, specifically London, New York, and Tokyo, not only provide 
banking expertise to shift funding surreptitiously, but also provide the kinds of
60 Wood and Peleman, 53-54.
61 Naylor, "Gunsmoke and Mirrors," 174-175
62 For further details of these measures, please refer to <http://www.oecd.org/ 
document/60/0.2340.en 2649 201185 36791868 1 1 l,00.html> (accessed 31 March 2007), 
specifically Tax Co-operation: Towards a Level Playing Field (2006).
Amnesty International, Dead on Time, 8, fn.20.63
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cosmopolitan societies in which "criminals and entire criminal organizations [can] 
blend into legitimate institutions in ethnic neighbourhoods."64
Instead of hard currency, blood diamonds have been used by belligerents 
involved in contemporary conflict as a means of financing weapons procurement, 
particularly in West Africa: UNITA, for example, generated an estimated US$500 
million from diamond revenues in 1997,65 and Al-Qaida has purchased diamonds 
from Sierra Leone at discounted prices, on-selling them in Europe in order to help 
finance its activities.66 Although the international community has made some 
progress towards restricting this trade under the auspices of the so-called Kimberley 
Process, a recent report from Global Witness claims that while "the scheme makes it 
more difficult for diamonds from rebel held areas to reach international markets, 
there are still significant weaknesses in the scheme that undermine its effectiveness 
and allow the trade in blood diamonds to continue."67
Financial transactions are sometimes complemented by, or in lieu of hard 
currency payments replaced with, the granting to arms brokers of extraction rights 
for other natural resources. Charles Taylor, for example, "sold off as much of 
Liberia's timber and mineral wealth as he could get his hands on. And when still 
more funds were needed to equip his forces, Taylor sought to gain control over the 
diamond trade in Sierra Leone."68 By some accounts, ships disembarking arms to 
Liberia depart with cargoes of timber.69 (France and China, both importers of 
Liberian timber, objected to timber's inclusion in a sanction regime during 
deliberations within the Security Council.70) The multiple sources of revenue used to
64 James H. Mittelman and Robert Johnston, "The Globalization of Organized Crime, the 
Courtesan State, and the Corruption of Civil Society," Global Governance 5, no.l (January- 
March 1999): 112.
65 McQueen, 418.
66 Raab and Mil ward, 426.
67 Global Witness, "The Kimberley Process at Risk," November 2006, 2.
68 Michael T. Klare, Resource Wars: The New Landscape of Global Conflict (New York: Henry Holt 
and Company, 2002), 200.
69 Amnesty International, Dead on Time, 26.
70 Ibid, 24.
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finance wars and procure weapons also complicates investigations into arms
trafficking, especially as accompanying:
the unparalleled expansion of international migration in the last two 
decades has come the formation of underground trade diasporas, regional 
and global networks based on extended family or ethno-sectarian 
loyalties that are well positioned by virtue of their contacts with the 
underground economy to smuggle everything from diamonds to designer 
jeans, from cigarettes to heroin, with at least part of the profits recycled 
back into arms.71
When authorities are closing in on a trafficking operation, brokers can quickly 
dismantle and abandon their operation, immediately establishing new companies in 
other territories.72 In this respect, the leasing of aging aircraft and other conveyances 
mitigate any capital losses incurred by brokers if their operations are detected and 
assets seized as evidence, and confiscated as a penalty if prosecutions are successful. 
Here, the burden of such losses fall on the owner's shoulders, not the leaser who 
engages in indictable criminal offences.
Without sufficient proof reaching a high evidential standard, brokers are 
unlikely to confess the true nature of their commercial practices when confronted by 
investigators, instead providing flimsy cover stories and implausible excuses. When 
Wilhelm Tertius Ehler, an experienced arms broker operating out of South Africa in 
the mid and late 1990s, was informed that Colonel Bagosora (whom he had helped 
obtain weapons) was not a Zairian defence official, but a high ranking officer of the 
Rwandan Hutu-in-exile government, Ehler simply replied that he was "shocked."73 
Similarly, when Israeli arms dealer Yair Klein was prosecuted for supplying 
weapons and training to the Medellin drug cartel operating out of Colombia, he 
claimed to have thought "his trainees were ranchers in Colombia who wanted to
71 Naylor, "The Rise of the Modem Arms Black Market," 225.
72 Brian Wood and Johan Peleman, "Making the Deal and Moving the Goods: The Role of 
Brokers and Shippers," in Running Guns: The Global Black Market in Small Arms, ed. Lora 
Lumpe (London: Zed Books, 2000), 137.
73 Wood and Peleman, The Arms Fixers, 29.
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defend themselves against leftist guerrillas."74 Such responses, while not surprising, 
are nevertheless disingenuous.
The risk of detection by routine monitoring posed to those without authorisation 
to participate in this sector, and the prospect of any subsequent prosecution, can be 
managed by firms and brokers as an operating cost. Operators can, for example, 
manage this risk where the cumulative profits derived from their illegal commerce 
exceed the financial penalties of prosecution. This risk is further managed in 
circumstances where routine monitoring and related enforcement action are 
predictable. Firms and brokers not only appreciate that law-enforcement officers are 
unlikely to discover them, or if discovered, will be unable to successfully prosecute 
them, but also take practical steps in order to reduce the likelihood of detection and 
prosecution. Law enforcement officers can be offered bribes To look the other way' 
during routine monitoring of productive and export sectors. If government officials 
prove resilient in the face of inducements and threats, then brokers can obtain 
counterfeit documents, specifically fraudulent export authorisations and fake end- 
user certificates, in order to fool or mislead local enforcement officers. (However, 
particular transfers of weapons were halted when authorities discovered fakes, as 
occurred in 1995 in the Ukraine and in Russia.75) Such counterfeit documentation 
also enables brokers to transit their consignments through third countries, thereby 
avoiding the close scrutiny of foreign countries monitoring and inspecting their 
cargo because it is likely to be considered a legitimate transfer.
Here, then, the so-called black market for small arms and light weapons is not a 
single, autonomous, unified, global economic underworld, detached from regulated 
arms manufacture and the authorised weapons trade. Rather, it is a term used to 
denote a dark side of globalisation in which unauthorised and authorised operators 
necessarily co-exist within regulated markets, while a set of complex processes not 
only helps facilitate the transfer of these weapons, but also encourages the
74 Wood and Peleman, The Arms Fixers, 75.
75 United Nations Security Council, Report of the Panel of Experts on Violations of Security Council 
Sanction Against UNITA, paragraph 37.
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interconnectivity among official regulators and commercial operators. The 
confluence of globalisation's intensification with the post-Cold War era, during 
which many governments reduced their stockpiles of, and ongoing demand for, 
conventional weapons, has facilitated a growth in this illicit commerce. "This 
situation, in which the terms of trade turn progressively against the legal market," 
argues Naylor, "will persist until illegally available second-hand stocks approach 
exhaustion, a point that is today nowhere in sight. When the phenomenon of lower 
cost is added to the traditional black-market advantages of anonymity and rapid 
delivery, the competitive balance shifts decisively in favour of the black market."76
The reality of illicit arms dealing is, therefore, more complex than simplistic
analytic dichotomies imply. As this chapter demonstrates, the distinction between
'regulated' and 'unregulated' is blurred by illegal practises undertaken by
authorised operators and by commercial practises undertaken by unauthorised
operators. It is also true, as James H. Mittelman and Robert Johnston point out, that:
a realm of cooperative and conflictual relationships blurs the lines 
between the legal and the illegal. For example, in order to collect actionable 
information that leads to arrests and interdictions, intelligence services 
must cooperate with and attempt to recruit defectors from organized 
crime groups and terrorist organization. This process often means turning 
a blind eye to the activities, past and present, of individuals who may 
have broken laws but are the only ones with firsthand experience and 
insights into the opaque world of the terrorist group, organized crime 
gangs, and other illicit groups with which they are associated.77
Similarly, unregulated operators can coerce regulated operators into engaging in 
unlawful practices. For example, according to Peter Bleach, a UK-based military 
equipment broker and former intelligence officer, an insurgent group based in West 
Bengal approached him for 2,500 Kalashnikov rifles in 1995. After agreeing to 
supply weapons, he was then targeted for intimidation, though on this particular 
occasion these weapons were unwittingly delivered into the hands of local law
76
77
Naylor, "Gunsmoke and Mirrors," 158-9. 
Mittelman and Johnson, 106.
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enforcement officers.78 Despite Bleach's efforts to keep the UK Security Services 
informed of the deal—indeed. Bleach claims to have been encouraged to pursue the 
business arrangement by officers belonging to Special Branch—he was arrested by 
Indian authorities.
The distinction between officials (regulators) and commercial operators 
(regulated and unregulated) is also blurred by the selective application of the rule of 
law. In some situations, firms and brokers operate without authorisation, but are 
nonetheless tolerated by authorities. Craft production in West Africa, mentioned 
earlier in this chapter, persists regardless of the official policy because enforcement 
officers are reluctant to investigate gunsmiths creating weapons for traditional 
purposes and customary usage.79 The Philippines also has a significant informal 
production capability, with an estimated 3,000 gunsmiths operating in the south of 
the country.80
Unauthorised operators can also express power over domestic regulation by 
corrupting those employed to administer its processes and to enforce its provisions. 
Brides, extortion, and intimidation go hand-in-hand with colluding officials with 
respect to routine monitoring, the authorisation of exports, and the issue of end-user 
certificates. So much so that for Naylor "the end-user certificate ceased to be a 
technique of control so much as a tool for the personal enrichment of corrupt 
officials in the purchasing country, and a means by which selling countries could 
establish an alibi (the weapons were supposed to go elsewhere) whenever news of a 
sale to some embargoed or illegal destination leaked out."81 In PNG, furthermore, 
corruption appears in little need of external stimulation, especially as "the real arms 
dealers are shown to be much closer to home than the 'foreign gun-runners' so often 
blamed by public figures. Politicians and civil servants emerge as being deeply
78 For a more detailed account of this case, please refer to Wood and Peleman, The Arms Fixers, 
16-24.
79 Aning, 98.
80 Capie, Small Arms Production and Transfers in Southeast Asia, 21 & 72-73.
Naylor, "The Rise of the Modem Arms Back Market," 217.81
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implicated in the small arms trade, with each election seen as an opportunity to seize 
votes, political influence, and resources at gunpoint/ ' 82
Government officials have acted illegally in foreign jurisdictions by posing as 
officials from other foreign governments. For example, Colonel Bagosora, a 
Rwandan national suspected of perpetrating genocide, purchased weapons 
confiscated by the Seychelles government by identifying himself as a member of the 
Zairian Ministry of Defence, and presenting a fraudulent end-user certificate 
authorised by the Zairian Ministry of Defence.83 In other cases, statemakers, rather 
than their officials, are culpable. As already mentioned, Charles Taylor 
appropriated the apparatus of government to pursue private interests. But Taylor is 
not alone in his kleptocracy: other West African leaders, such as Bah, Campaore, and 
Sankoh "are at the center of a network that uses war for means other than power. 
Their power is based on terror and the use of the state for their own purposes. The 
means for this are guns, diamonds, and increasingly timber, all under the mantle of 
whatever legitimacy a failed state can provide. " 84
Where weapons-producing firms and arms brokers are highly organised, they 
can form networks. Networks have, of course, been described "as appropriate 
devices to tackle public management problems and to successfully coordinate 
political, social, and economic action....Because the problem is bigger than any 
single organization, collaborating with other organizations is necessary if there is 
any hope of making progress in alleviating the problem . " 85 In the specific case of 
controlling small arms and light weapons, as Chapter Five relates, civil society 
organisations have adopted this organising principle as their primary approach, 
establishing IANSA as a "network of networks." Civil society organisations have 
also fostered coalitions of like-minded governments following this network 
approach. These kinds of networks are bright networks, engaging in "a legal and
82 Phillip Alpers, Gun-running in Papua New Guinea: From Arrows to Assault Weapons in the 
Southern Highlands, Special Report no.5 (Geneva: Small Arms Survey, 2005), 30.
83 Wood and Pelemen, The Arms Fixers, 28.
84 Raab and Milward, 426.
88 Ibid, 413-414.
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overt governance form that is supposed to create benefits for the participating actors 
and to advance the common good and does not—at least intentionally—harm 
people . " 86
By contrast, unauthorised dealers of small arms and light weapons operate as
dark networks. And by dark networks, I mean what Jörg Raab and H. Brinton
Milward mean when they explain that:
there is a set of individuals and organizations that constitute a network 
striving to achieve ends that create collective-action problems for 
governments all over the world...This network may be strictly a terrorism 
network, or it may be connected to other illegal networks such as arms 
smuggling, money laundering, and drug dealing. These connections 
among illegal networks in the problem space can be critical to the success 
of their wicked ends....Forgetting the requirement to be functionally non- 
judgemental in the social sciences, the actors and organizations that 
cooperate in the problem space are called dark networks, in that their 
activities are both covert and illegal.87
David Kinsella notes that "[bjecause black market arms transfers occur in a lawless 
environment, one without formal mechanisms of contract enforcement, parties to 
these transactions must rely heavily on trust (often reinforced by threat) than is the 
case for legal market transactions," though at the same time he concedes "[m]ore 
theoretical work needs to be done in order to fully conceptualize the global arms 
trade, and its multiple legal and illegal forms as a social network . " 88 Resembling 
IANSA's approach to organising their arms control campaign, firms and brokers 
form networks because it enables them to circumvent administrative processes and 
reduces their exposure to law-enforcement investigations. Because these dark 
networks prove relatively successful, unlike IANS A they do directly contest the 
internationalist notion of the political informing the composition of controls over 
these weapons.
Maturing relationships among actors involved in these dark networks strengthen 
them. Discussing the nexus between organised crime and terrorist groups, Picarelli
86 Ibid, 419.
87 Ibid, 415.
88 David Kinsella, 'The Black Market in Small Arms: Examining a Social Network/' 
Contemporary Security Policy 27, no.l (April 2006): 105.
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asserts "(wjhen such interactions are closely timed and repeated, it becomes an 
increasingly likelihood that bonds of trust will evolve between the groups that can 
serve to cement common bonds/ ' 89 The Tri-Border Area of South America, 
comprising of Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay, has emerged as a subregion where 
dark networks coalesce.90 West Africa, specifically Liberia, Sierra Leone, and 
Burkina Faso, is another. These maturing relationships are encouraged, in part, by 
the lack of governments exercising a legitimate monopoly over the coercive use of 
force and, in part, by the mining and distribution of diamonds, a highly valuable 
and exchangeable currency for dark networks.91
More problematically for those composing controls over these tools of violence, 
however, is a nascent interconnectivity among commercial operators and those 
officials regulating their commercial affairs. Indeed, dark networks connect with 
certain members of intergovernmental organisations, undermining not only the 
domestic regulatory regimes, but also the dichotomy comprising of those actors of 
the international community seeking to compose controls over small arms and light 
weapons and those actors whose practices help erode the intended effects of those 
controls. The implication here—that the broader politico-strategic framework helps 
sustain the challenge of controlling these weapons— acknowledges that not all 
members of the international community are fully behind the various efforts to 
compose controls over small arms and light weapons. In fact, that the challenge 
remains, and even intensifies, suggests that those members of the international 
community colluding with international actors deliberately sustaining the 
widespread availability of these weapons at once erodes the control measures and 
contests the notion of the political to a decisive degree.
89 Picarelli, 20.
90 Ibid.
91 Raab and Milward, 431.
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C onclusion
Often absent from the formal processes composing controls over small arms and 
light weapons, firms and brokers engage in a range of commercial practices eroding 
those controls' intended effects. In some cases, these commercial practices, helping 
fuel the widespread availability of these weapons, are often authorised, enabled, or 
assisted by governments belonging to the frameworks designed to confront the 
challenge of controlling small arms and light weapons. However culpable these 
governments might be, they are often not held to account for their actions. In light 
of this operational complexity, the analytical dichotomy—between 
intergovernmental organisations as protagonists composing arms controls and firms 
and brokers as their antagonists—is unsustainable and dissolves.
Like some governments, authorised brokers act as sanction-busters, though 
unlike governments, brokers possess flexible corporate identities and can change 
business names, premises, and contact details almost immediately when their illegal 
enterprise is detected or at risk of imminent detection. These commercial actors not 
only rely upon governments of dubious pedigree and exploit the inconsistent 
implementation and irregular enforcement of a mosaic of responsibilities created by 
intergovernmental measures of control and Security Council resolutions, but also 
take advantage of the conceptual disconnect between responsibilities relating to the 
production of small arms and light weapons and responsibilities relating to the 
transfer of these weapons. Whereas commercial practices undertaken by regulated 
firms and authorised brokers mitigate a government's ability to fulfil its 
responsibilities under international law, contributing to the erosion of the intended 
effects of the international community's attempts to exert control over these 
weapons, commercial actors that are neither registered nor authorised by their 
governments also erode the intended effects, but do so by eluding the administrative 
and enforcement reach of these frameworks. Ineffective, to a large extent, in 
constraining the activities of firms and brokers, the existing state-centric control 
measures fail to restrain the widespread availability of small arms and light 
weapons sustained by both legal and illicit commerce, a distinction serving to
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endorse the monopoly of the so-called legitimate use of force enjoyed by many 
governments by disadvantaging those armed non-states groups violently contesting 
key institutions of civil governance.
Whereas governments acting as sanction-busters undermine the notion of the 
political informing the major responses to the challenge of controlling small arms 
and light weapons, unregulated production and unauthorised transfers explicitly 
contest (despite its clandestine nature) this internationalist orthodoxy, especially 
where the proliferation occurs and transfers are successfully transacted. Indeed, the 
challenge of controlling small arms and light weapons is sustained because this 
notion of the political is contested by firms and brokers, a contest that is ongoing, 
remains unresolved, and is, perhaps, unresolvable. Also contesting the primacy 
accorded to internationalism in contemporary world affairs, and thereby sustaining 
the challenge of controlling small arms and light weapons, are those international 
actors involved in the ongoing use of these weapons, many of which are obtained in 
ways other than those international transfers described in this chapter. The 
following chapter, the thesis' penultimate, explores particular ways in which key 
users of these weapons obtain arms intended for immediate use, rather than as 
tradable commodities, and retain their arms when confronted by disarmament
initiatives.
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ry BROTHERS IN ARMS 
/  • SUSTAINING ONGOING USE
Like those firms and brokers sustaining the widespread availability of small arms 
and light weapons, these weapons' chief users can prove antagonistic to the 
collective will of the international community, especially when it responds to the 
ongoing use of these weapons. At a time when these weapons circulate with a high 
degree of velocity, intergovernmental controls over weapons users have, however, 
often lagged behind the development and implementation of supply-side controls. 
As Neil Cooper correctly suggests, "the reality of contemporary arms diffusion 
requires a corresponding shift to a system of regulatory diffusion that incorporates a 
greater focus on recipient initiatives, an enhanced role for civil society and a shift to 
an outputs/impacts model of regulation. " 1 Even though militaries, constabularies, 
private security firms, civilians, organised crime groups, and non-state armed 
groups are, each to varying degrees, emerging as objects of the international 
community's attempts to exert control over these weapons, this diverse array of 
actors persist with their almost insatiable appetite for these weapons. 
Supplementing the weapons which they already possess with arms obtained directly 
from various sources—including existing governmental stockpiles, caches captured 
during combat operations, nearby recently concluded conflict, and members of the 
criminal fraternity—these users are, in spite of their competing interests, brothers in 
arms.
Before identifying particular ways in which these brothers in arms mitigate, 
resist, or elude the intended effects of an emerging framework governing the 
possession of small arms and light weapons, this chapter distinguishes those users 
authorised by governments to possess weapons within their jurisdiction from those 
users possessing these weapons without official authorisation. Focus is also given
1 Neil Cooper, "What's the Point of Arms Transfer Controls?" Contemporary Security Policy 27,
no.l (April 2006): 118.
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here to those belligerents who are targeted by DDR programmes administered as 
part of recent UN peacekeeping operations, but who nevertheless retain their arms 
in the face of these disarmament initiatives.
This chapter concludes Part III of this thesis by contextualising the activities of 
those international actors sustaining the ongoing use of small arms and light 
weapons against the international community's responses explored in Part II. 
Compared to the controls over the manufacture and trade of these weapons, controls 
over weapons possession are underdeveloped, signalling a serious weakness in the 
emerging mosaic of responsibilities to regulate these weapons. The final section of 
the chapter shows that the controls emerging from within intergovernmental 
organisations, including collective action authorised by the UN Security Council, are 
not only deliberately weakened by some of those governments implementing them, 
but are also easily circumvented and sometimes exploited by those actors who are 
targeted by them. It builds on the previous chapter which problematised the 
dichotomy comprising of those members of the international community who help 
compose controls over these weapons and those international actors whose practices 
help erode the intended effects of those controls. A post-internationalist heresy is 
shown to emerge from, amplify weaknesses in, and exploit to its own ends, the 
grand politico-strategic frameworks which underpin the internationalist governance 
architecture. And it is this framework which underpins the international 
community and its major responses to the challenge of controlling small arms and 
light weapons.
Chief Users of Small Arms and Light Weapons
Preferred by most combatants ahead of nuclear, biological, chemical, and major 
conventional weapons, small arms and light weapons are overwhelmingly the 
weapons of choice used in contemporary conflict. Compared to those other 
weapons of war, a combination of characteristics inherent in, and unique to, small 
arms and light weapons make them particularly attractive to a diverse and dynamic 
array of potential users. These weapons are, as Boutwell and Klare argue,
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inexpensive, widely available, simple to use, durable, portable, easily concealed, 
and, importantly, lethal.2 To be sure, these characteristics enable non-state armed 
groups to engage governmental military forces, as well as other armed groups, in 
protracted and, in some cases, internecine conflict. Although much of the 
burgeoning literature focusing on small arms and light weapons draws attention to 
the deadly consequences resulting from the ongoing use of these weapons by 
government forces and rival armed groups—especially where either are involved in 
what have been described as intra-state, internal, or civil war, 3 as well as low- 
intensity, ethno-political, or protected social conflict4—not all users of these weapons 
are directly involved in conflict as combatants. Rather, as tools of violence, these 
weapons are demanded and used by a broader range of actors, specifically 
constabularies, 5 private security firms, and civilians, including organised and 
opportunistic criminals.
The international community recognises the importance of each of these actors 
possessing small arms and light weapons. Such recognition is reflected not only in 
some of the work published by researchers, including those, like Boutwell and Klare, 
associated with various civil society organisations, but also in the texts of some 
instruments of international law. Whereas agreements relying upon export criteria, 
such as the EU Code of Conduct and the Wassenaar Arrangement, acknowledge 
governments as ongoing users of these weapons, other instruments give focus to 
non-state actors. Upon agreeing to the Andean Plan, for example, the Andean 
Council of Foreign Ministers recognised the link between trafficking these weapons
2 Jeffrey Boutwell and Michael T. Klare, Light Weapons and Civil Violence: Policy Options for the 
International Community Project on World Security (New York: Rockefeller Brothers Fund, 
1999), 6. Refer also to a very similar argument published as Jeffrey Boutwell and Michael T. 
Klare, "Small Arms and Light Weapons: Controlling the Real Instruments of War," Arms 
Control Today (August/September 1998): 1-2.
3 Alley, 1.
4 Christopher Mitchell, "Mediation and the Ending of Conflicts," in Contemporary Peacemaking: 
Conflict, Violence and Peace Processes, eds. John Darby and Roger Mac Ginty (New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 77.
5 The constabulary, used here in its broad sense, includes prison services, customs officers, 
anti-poaching emits of national parks and wildlife reserves, police reserve forces, and special 
constables.
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and terrorists, drug traffickers, transnational organised criminals, and mercenaries.6 
Similarly, the preambles of the SADC Firearms Protocol and the OAS Convention note 
the connection between these weapons and "drug trafficking, terrorism, 
transnational organized crime, mercenary, and other violent criminal activities. " 7 As 
Chapter Three mentions, the UN Firearms Protocol exclusively targets organised 
crime groups, while the Nadi Framework provides for civilian possession of these 
weapons.8
Recognising these actors' importance does not, however, immediately or 
necessarily convert them into objects of control targeted by the international 
community. In fact, as this chapter later demonstrates, user-focused measures of 
control negotiated multilaterally are underdeveloped in comparison to those 
instruments of international law fostering regulatory regimes over the manufacture 
and trade of these weapons. While most instruments of international law tend to 
focus upon supply-side controls, the collective action authorised by the UN Security 
Council targets specific weapons users. These targets are almost always 
belligerents —a term used here to signify both active non-state armed groups and 
governmental military forces. Yet UN arms embargoes, as well as the export criteria 
used by some intergovernmental organisations, are selectively applied and therefore 
often perceived by some analysts such as Cooper (and no doubt by the targets) as 
tools punishing those actors deemed to be either strategic enemies or political 
pariahs .9 So even though UN arms embargoes and DDR programmes are user- 
focused controls, they are selectively applied in accordance with the Security 
Council's deliberations, are temporary measures when they are implemented, and as 
Chapter Four argues are difficult for UN members to observe, monitor, and enforce. 
Flence, they do not, in and of themselves, constitute a holistic approach to 
controlling weapons' users.
6 Refer to the Andean Plan.
7 Refer to the respective preambles of SADC Firearms Protocol and the OAS Convention.
8 Refer to the UN Firearms Protocol and the Nadi Framework.
9 Cooper, 121.
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Researchers have been singled out for particular censure from among the 
members of the international community who, recognising the importance of 
controlling weapons' users, respond inadequately to this aspect of the challenge. 
Researchers not only lag behind those policymakers recognising the need for 
meaningful and useful research into the demand for these weapons, but the research 
exploring the demand dimension of weapons use is also "frequently imbued with 
normative and bureaucratic interests that encourage a prescriptive (as opposed to an 
empirical) approach to arms control."10 Such research is prized more for its intended 
policy utility, than for its analytical clarity and sense-providing quality. This is not 
to suggest, however, that meaningful and useful research into weapons' users and 
their stockpiles has not yet been conducted.
The Small Arms Survey 2001 Yearbook, for instance, provides estimates of the 
known stockpiles held by major users of these weapons. It categorises these 
stockpiles as police firearms, government armed forces firearms, insurgent and other 
non-state actor firearms, private legal firearms, and private illegal firearms.* 11 
According to the Survey's first yearbook, constabularies possess an estimated 18 
million weapons shared among somewhere between 10 to 21 million police 
officers,12 whereas government armed forces possess an estimated 226 million 
weapons.13 Stockpiles of less than one million weapons are attributed to the world's 
non-state armed groups.14 Civilians privately own at least 305 million firearms, 
representing over half of the world's stockpile.15 Excluded from these estimates are 
stockpiles held as inventories belonging to manufacturers and suppliers, as arsenals 
by private security firms, mercenaries, and state-supported militia, as caches by 
organised crime groups, and as illegal firearms by civilians. These estimates of the 
global stockpile of small arms and light weapons are, nevertheless, meaningful for
10 Jurgen Brauer and Robert Muggah, "Completing the Circle: Building a Theory of Small Arms 
Demand," Contemporary Security Policy 27, no.l (April 2006): 139.
11 Small Arms Survey, Small Arms Survey 2001, 65.
12 Ibid, 70.
13 Ibid, 77.
14 Ibid, 89.
is Ibid, 88-89.
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analysts and useful for policymakers because they signal its magnitude and lend a 
sense of proportionality to its distribution among those holding them.
Yet chief users of small arms and light weapons prove easy to categorise, but 
difficult to characterise. The size and composition of the world's police forces varies 
enormously, as does the size and composition of the world's militaries. Private 
security firms, sometimes hired in order to supplement or bolster a government's 
weak military or constabulary capability, are also hired by civilians as a means of 
protecting private property and providing personal security. Furthermore, militias 
and organised crime groups prove equally difficult to characterise, especially given 
"their ability to stay flexible and adapt quickly to changing pressures and 
circumstances."16 The difficulties associated with identifying and characterising 
insurgent groups is not only an analytical problem, but is also a concern for those 
"[military personnel engaged in peace operations [who] sometimes tend to look for 
constituted armies, a hierarchy, and officers with whom to negotiate. A significant 
number of fighters, however, have little in common with the typical image of the 
professional solider."17
Notwithstanding these quibbles, the global stockpile of small arms and light 
weapons has reached a disturbing magnitude: this world arsenal probably stands 
somewhere between about 550 million and 638 million firearms.18 And as the 
previous chapter observes, this arsenal continues to grow as proliferation persists. 
Furthermore, the world's stockpile increases at a rate faster than that which natural 
obsolescence and deliberate deactivation can reduce it. Regardless of the exact size
16 Raab and Milward, 430.
17 Pouligny, The Politics and Anti-Politics of Contemporary 'Disarmament, Demobilization and 
Reintergration' Programs, 7.
18 Small Arms Survey, Small Arms Survey 2001, 88, and Small Arms Survey 2002, 103. While the 
Small Arms Survey 2002 Yearbook revised its estimate upwards to 638 million firearms, from 
the Small Arms Survey 2001 Yearbook's estimate of 550 million, this revision reflects a mixture 
of potential stockpile increases, additional information becoming available, and improved 
estimating procedures and techniques. Subsequent yearbooks, however, refrain from offering 
revised estimates, focusing instead on refining and re-expressing global stockpiles in terms of 
regional, subregional, and governmental contexts. This shift in attention is due, at least in 
part, to the enormous difficulties encountered when attempting to obtain reliable and 
accurate information pertaining to quantitative estimates of these various stockpiles. It is 
also, no doubt, to present research and analysis in terms more relevant to policymakers.
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of this stockpile, substantial quantities of these weapons remain widely available 
and are frequently put to ongoing use in ways generating immediate and lasting 
effects. The ways in which only a few of these weapons are used in specific contexts 
can, as Chapter One demonstrates, have vastly disproportionate effects, rendering 
quantitative estimates less useful in identifying and assessing the qualitative 
consequences following weapons' use. Moreover, this confluence of weapons' users 
is not a temporary feature of contemporary world affairs, since "the ongoing intra- 
and inter-state conflicts in many parts of the world, together with attempts by the 
international community (e.g. UN, NATO) to deal with them, means that the 
demand for new small arms from governments and non-state actors will continue."19
Reasons motivating demand for, and possession of, small arms and light 
weapons vary and are, at times, contingent on highly dynamic circumstances. Most, 
if not all, governments refer to the right of self-defence enshrined in international 
law by Article 51 of the UN Charter and these weapons are routinely used by 
constabularies to maintain the rule of law within their government's jurisdiction. 
UN peacekeepers, often placed in harm's way, also rely at times upon these 
weapons in order to fulfil mission objectives. Some civilian users of these weapons 
claim legitimate possession based upon cultural and customary usage, retaining 
them as 'family possessions,'20 while others claim privilege as sporting shooters, or 
cite necessity as game-hunters and farmers of livestock. Where the rule of law 
appears tenuous, civilians demand weapons as a means of self-protection and of 
protecting private property, including livestock.21
In other cases, however, these weapons serve the purposes of organised 
criminals, who have little or no concern for commonly-held notions of social justice. 
These weapons also feature as poaching tools in Africa's game reserves and national
19 Small Arms Survey, Small Arms Survey 2001, 48.
20 Khakee and Florquin, 17.
21 Guy Lamb, "Puzzling over the Pieces: Comparing the Demand, Proliferation, Impact and 
Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons in Nine Southern Africa Countries," in Hide and 
Seek: Taking Account of Small Arms in Southern Africa, eds. Chandre Gould and Guy Lamb 
(Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, Centre for Conflict Resolution, and Gun Free South 
Africa, 2004), 322.
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parks.22 The possession of, and easy access to, these weapons has enabled repressive 
governments to commit human rights violations, often with impunity. Such 
weapons are also used by those contesting the apparatus of the state, both as an 
aggressive means of recourse against perceived grievance and as a means of 
expressing a communal right to self-defence. In Burundi, for example, the 
government established community-based militia, known as gardiens de la paix, 
drawing upon some 30,000 people as a means of providing protection for 
communities against rebel attacks.23 Others have, moreover, relied upon the 
possession of these weapons as a means of enhancing social standing within local 
communities, even when those in possession of weapons did not actually use them 
during conflict, with some joining belligerents after combat operations had ceased.24 
Thus, as Naylor suggests, small arms and light weapons "are a capital good, 
demanded not for their own sake (except by a handful of oddball collectors), but for 
what they will accomplish. In all too many cases the demand for weapons is 
ultimately a surrogate for the demand for social justice."25
Less varied, but equally powerful, are the main reasons informing resistance to 
disarmament programmes established in post-conflict settings, especially where the 
imminent danger posed by others' possession of these weapons remains forcefully 
felt. As a kind of localised security dilemma, these immediate concerns abound, 
deterring participation in disarmament programmes: combatants and others who 
possess weapons are unlikely to embrace disarmament if security conditions are 
perceived to be inadequate, with some weapons stored in clandestine caches as 
insurance against deteriorating security. As Sami Faltas points out:
People will be reluctant to give up their arms unless the motives that
drive them to want firearms are convincingly addressed. Attempts to
22 Undule Mwakasungula and David Nungu, "Country Study: Malawi," in Hide and Seek: 
Taking Account of Small Arms in Southern Africa, eds. Chandre Gould and Guy Lamb (Pretoria: 
Institute for Security Studies, Centre for Conflict Resolution, and Gun Free South Africa, 
2004), 90.
23 United Nations Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on Burundi, UN Doc. 
S/2004/210 (New York: United Nations, 2004), paragraph 46.
24 Khakee and Florquin, 13.
25 Naylor, "Gunsmoke and Mirrors," 178.
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forcibly disarm them will typically heighten their desire for private 
firepower. So practical disarmament can only work in the context of a 
dual effort to improve the capacity of the state to enforce the law, on the 
one hand, and to create effective safeguards against the abuse of state 
power, on the other.26
Significantly, a lack of viable employment opportunities in contemporary post­
conflict settings also encourages membership of militia groups, or engagement in 
other forms of illegal activity, as a means of generating income. In other 
circumstances, reluctance to disarm is sometimes embedded in long-standing 
cultural practices where, in Afghanistan for instance, "guns have become an 
inalienable part of Afghan culture, a sign of manhood that are fired in the air at 
celebrations such as weddings or to mark the birth of a child. " 27 Pouligny goes as far 
as to suggest that "[i]n many other countries, to deprive a male inhabitant of his gun 
is like questioning his virility. " 28
Here, then, personal security, economic opportunity, social status, and cultural 
practice can motivate combatants to retain their arms in the face of disarmament 
initiatives and, in spite of their competing interests, all of those who possess (or have 
immediate access to) and use (or intend to use) small arms and light weapons are 
brothers in arms. Enabling a sense of security and social standing for many of those 
who use them, sometimes as a last resort, while creating opportunities to prosper for 
others, small arms and light weapons assist users to obtain and use power over 
others for non-trivial purposes and are, therefore, political instruments. 
Unsurprisingly, then, attempts to exert control over the possession of these tools of 
violence have been—and are since most of these attempts are ongoing—a highly 
charged and contentious issue for members of the international community. The 
demarcation between Part II (entitled 'Dramatis Personae, and the composition of 
control') and Part III (entitled 'Dramatis Personae, and the erosion of control') of this
26 Faltas, McDonald, and Waszink, 3.
27 Sedra, 37.
28 Pouligny, The Politics and Anti-Politics of Contemporary 'Disarmament, Demobilization and 
Reintegration' Programs, 9.
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thesis seeks to illustrate this issue' divisive effect among actors who are prominent 
on the stage of contemporary world affairs.
Mitigating Domestic Regulations
Chief users of small arms and light weapons can be distinguished between those 
who are authorised by their governments to possess a small arm or light weapon, 
and those who are not. By authorised I mean, quite simply, those users who have 
received explicit permission from their government to carry and operate a firearm. 
In this sense, illicit use occurs either when an authorised user possesses or operates a 
firearm in contravention of their permit conditions or an unauthorised user 
possesses and operates any firearm in contravention of domestic law. Here, 
governments differ from both authorised and unauthorised users since they are 
themselves the authorising actors directly involved in negotiating measures of 
control over weapons they hold.
Notwithstanding the usefulness of best estimates, there is no easy way of 
identifying all of those actors located throughout the world possessing a small arm 
or light weapon without their government's permission. Even identifying those 
users authorised to possess these weapons and quantifying those weapons held by 
the world's authorising actors proves unfeasible, as Chapter One explains. The 
velocity at which these weapons circulate among these users is also unknown and is, 
probably, unknowable. Research profiling the distribution of small arms and light 
weapons, particularly those weapons held by non-state armed groups, is of limited 
utility too if it does not consider the ways available to replenish or increase 
stockpiles and the ease with which access to sources of these weapons may be 
obtained. Moreover, there is no accurate way of knowing precisely how many users 
retain their weapons in the face of disarmament initiatives, regardless of whether 
these are led by members of the international community, local authorities, or 
community groups.
There is, however, evidence indicating some of the ways in which authorised 
users of these weapons mitigate a government's ability to adhere to its international
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responsibilities. There is also evidence indicating some of the ways in which 
unauthorised operators elude enforcement investigations, and targets of DDR 
programmes resist disarmament initiatives. Awareness of these subversive practises 
is an essential part of any comprehension of the international community's attempts 
to exert control over small arms and light weapons because the limitations inherent 
in these frameworks are easily and frequently exploited by various actors possessing 
weapons. Appreciating that these practices help erode the intended effects of the 
international community's efforts to compose controls over the possession of these 
weapons is crucial not only to those policymakers who, involved in composing these 
controls, wish to strengthen them, but also to those analysts aspiring to better 
understand, and then explain, the reasons for the international community's largely 
ineffectual response.
As authorised users, civilians and private security firms can mitigate the 
intended effects of the emerging framework governing the possession of small arms 
and light weapons. There are, more specifically, three main ways in which those 
who are authorised to possess these weapons can moderate their government's 
ability to abide by its responsibilities, each of which undermines the domestic 
regulatory regimes providing for the licensing of firearms possession and ownership 
by civilians.
Civilians, including personnel employed by private security firms, can provide 
registrars with false details of their identity at the point at which they apply to 
become registered users of these weapons. This is easily achieved where 
background checks on applicants are weak or nonexistent. In PNG, for example, 
poorly maintained intelligence databases are often unable to identify those 
applicants who might have criminal records, including violent offences or serious 
mental health problems.29 Where reasons for the permit application are required, 
less than honest reasons are seldom questioned by administrative staff processing
29 Alpers, 111.
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applications.30 Like the commercial operators examined in the previous chapter, the 
distinction between 'authorised' and 'unauthorised' has little utility in circumstances 
where administrative processes are insufficiently critical of information they receive 
and where they are without verification capability.
Once registered, authorised users can misreport both the quantity and the type of 
weapons held, thereby excluding some weapons from the registers maintained by 
authorities. Such misreporting enables, for example, two or more similar guns with 
identical markings to be held under a single permit—of which one is considered 
legal while the others function as ghost weapons, for either illicit use or sale. Also, 
where licences are automatically renewed, users that no longer have valid reasons 
for possessing a weapon can retain it; in Lesotho, for instance, a business owner may 
seek a firearm in order to protect his or her business and can then sell that business 
while retaining the firearm .31 Weapons transferred from deceased users to their 
offspring, following customary hereditary protocol, similarly evade poor 
administrative and monitoring processes, as do those authorised weapons which are 
subject to pawning and pledging. Relying upon authority's poor monitoring 
capabilities, authorised users can make their arms available to unauthorised users.
Users who are authorised to carry small arms or light weapons as part of their 
professional duties, such as military personnel, members of the constabulary, and 
agents employed by private security firms, can sometimes take their weapons home 
after working hours, either lend or lease their firearms while off-duty, and 
occasionally retain their weapons once their term of service lapses.32 Some weapons,
30 Martin Boer, "Country Study: Namibia," in Hide and Seek: Taking Account of Small Arms in 
Southern Africa, eds. Chandre Gould and Guy Lamb (Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 
Centre for Conflict Resolution, and Gun Free South Africa, 2004), 120.
31 Katleho Perfole, "Country Study: Lesotho," in Hide and Seek: Taking Account of Small Arms in 
Southern Africa, eds. Chandre Gould and Guy Lamb (Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 
Centre for Conflict Resolution, and Gun Free South Africa, 2004), 66.
32 Mpho G. Molomo, Bertha Osei-Hwedie, David Sedudubuda, Ian Taylor, and Shelly 
Whitman, "Country Study: Botswana," in Hide and Seek: Taking Account of Small Arms in 
Southern Africa, eds. Chandre Gould and Guy Lamb (Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 
Centre for Conflict Resolution, and Gun Free South Africa, 2004), 27; see also Shedrack Gaya 
Best and Dimieari Von Kemedi, "Armed Groups and Conflict in Rivers and Plateau States,
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in the hands of off-duty constabulary and military, have been used to perpetrate 
domestic violence, whereas in Iraq, the violence has criminal and political 
motivation. In countries such as Albania and Romania, private security companies 
acquire their weapons by leasing them from constabulary arsenals.33 Where routine 
inspections of armouries are rare, record-keeping is lax, and audits are non-existent, 
inventories are increasingly porous.
Placing these subversive practices —each of which mitigates a government's 
ability to administer its regulatory regime over the possession and, by extension, 
ongoing use of these weapons—in the broader context of the frail responsibilities to 
control civilians' weapons possession, reveals the international community's 
somewhat pallid response to this major aspect of the challenge of controlling small 
arms and light weapons. None of the treaties examined in Chapter Three, for 
instance, oblige governments to place restrictions on the volume of weapons held by 
civilians or on the number of civilians holding weapons. Reflecting a basic 
prerogative of sovereignty, governments retain the power to decide the amount of 
civilian holdings that is appropriate within their respective jurisdictions, a 
determination that governments also exercise in relation to the total volumes of 
weapons manufacturing they authorise. Whereas the SADC Firearms Protocol and 
Nairobi Protocol, calling for all civilian ownership of small arms to be registered, 34 
create obligations for governments to prohibit civilian ownership of light weapons 
within their respective jurisdictions, 35 the OAS Convention and the UN Firearms 
Protocol focus exclusively on combating the illicit manufacture and trafficking of 
small arms and light weapons which, presumably, requires the regulation of the
Nigeria/' in Armed and Aimless: Armed Groups, Guns, and Fluman Security in the ECOWAS 
Region, eds. Nicolas Florquin and Eric G. Berman (Geneva: Small Arms Survey, 2005), 36.
33 Michael Page, Simon Rynn, Zack Taylor, and David Wood, SALW  and Private Security 
Companies in South Eastern Europe: A  Cause or Effect of Insecurity (Belgrade: South Eastern and 
Eastern Europe Clearinghouse, 2005), 13 & 73.
34 Refer to the SADC Firearms Protocol, Article 5 (3)(a) and the Nairobi Protocol, Article 3 (c)(i), 
respectively.
35 Refer to SADC Firearms Protocol, Article 5 (3)(b) and Nairobi Protocol, Article 3 (c)(ii), 
respectively.
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industrial and commercial sectors.36 In fact, unauthorised civilian possession is not 
only neglected here, but the preamble of the OAS Convention stresses the issue of 
civilian possession is beyond its remit, 37 while the UN Firearms Protocol restricts its 
applicability to organised crime groups (and only where their activities are 
transnational in scope) and excludes state-to-state transfers and govemment-to-non- 
state actors transfers in certain situations.38
The commitments to regulate civilian possession of these weapons, which are 
generated by soft law agreements, are also underdeveloped in comparison to 
controls over the manufacture and transfer of these weapons. Where many of the 
soft law measures examined in Chapter Three focus on controlling authorised 
weapons transfers, 39 and target law-enforcement efforts at combating the 
unauthorised manufacture and trafficking of these weapons, 40 few generate concrete 
commitments to regulate civilian possession of these weapons. The main exception 
here is the Nadi Framework which, alongside export, in-transit, and import controls, 
proposes a common regional permit regime for PIF members.41 This relative 
underdevelopment of user-focused controls is due, to a large extent, to the US
36 Refer to the OAS Convention, Article IV(1) and (2), and the UN Firearms Protocol, Article 5, 
provision (l)(a) and (b), respectively.
37 In particular, the preamble of the OAS Convention states: "Recognizing that states have 
developed different cultural and historical uses for firearms, and that the purpose of 
enhancing international cooperation to eradicate illicit transnational trafficking in firearms is 
not intended to discourage or diminish lawful leisure or recreational activities such as travel 
or tourism for sport shooting, hunting, and other lawful ownership and use recognized by 
the States Parties; Recalling that State Parties have their respective domestic laws and 
regulations in the areas of firearms, ammunition, explosives, and other related materials, and 
recognizing that this Convention does not commit States Parties to enact legislation or 
regulations pertaining to firearms ownership, possession, or trade of a wholly domestic 
character, and recognizing that State Parties will apply their respective laws and regulations 
in a manner consistent with this Convention."
38 Refer to the UN Firearms Protocol, Article 4(1) and (2).
39 The following soft law measures generate commitments to control (though to varying 
degrees) authorised weapons transfer: the Wassenaar Arrangement; the ECOWAS Moratorium; 
the EU Code of Conduct; the Nadi Framework; and the OSCE Document.
40 The following soft law measures generate commitments to combat the unauthorised
manufacture and/or trafficking of small arms and light weapons: the EU Programme for 
Preventing and Combating Illicit Trafficking; Bamako Declaration; Andean Plan (which also targets 
civilian unauthorized weapons' possession); OSCE Document; and the UNPoA.
41 Refer to the Nadi Framework, Part 1.2.
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position on civilian possession of these weapons and on weapons transfers to non­
state actors. So much so that many of those agreements negotiated without US 
participation include controls targeting weapons users; the SADC Firearms Protocol, 
the Nairobi Protocol, and the Nadi Framework are prime examples.
Governments can mitigate their own international responsibilities to constrain 
further accumulation of these weapons for their own arsenals. Governmental 
accumulations are, of course, vulnerable to close scrutiny where relevant 
intergovernmental measures of control apply. The SADC Firearms Protocol and the 
Nairobi Protocol, for instance, oblige governments to establish and maintain 
inventories of weapons held by military, security, and constabulary forces and to 
enhance the secure storage of such stockpiles. However, where increases of such 
accumulations could be deemed to be of concern by other members of the 
international community, these governments can invoke a shield under the necessity 
for secrecy.
The arsenals held by, and the weapons-producing capacity of, some 
governments—most notably Iraq, Iran, and North Korea—have undergone intense 
scrutiny since the early 1990s, but mostly with respect to weapons of mass 
destruction. Indeed, each of these countries has been the topic of recent Security 
Council deliberations resulting in specific resolutions.42 This intense scrutiny, which 
overlooks small arms and light weapons stockpiles, signals an ongoing obsession 
with perceived threats surrounding weapons of mass destruction, reflecting the 
legacy of Cold War theorising more than it addresses contemporary security 
realities. This intense scrutiny also signals that the fears and preoccupations of the 
major powers of the Security Council outweigh the fears and preoccupations of the 
millions of less powerful individuals confronted by the nightmare of conflict, fuelled 
by the ongoing use of these tools of violence. Such policymaking preferences — 
which are especially callous and unconscionable where governments authorise the 
manufacture and trade of these weapons, as well as hold stockpiles and authorise 
civilian possession of them—suggest that the term 'subaltern killers/ used in this
42 For further details, please refer to the thesis' introduction, fn.9.
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thesis to refer to small arms and light weapons, might also aptly apply to the 
members of the international community whose responses to the challenge of 
controlling the weapons are not merely inadequate, but also function as tools of 
violence in their own right.
Governments can also enter into debates over interpretations of the nature, 
extent, and application of their responsibilities under international law, exploiting 
the lack of consensus regarding interpretations of ancillary terms found in the texts 
of multilateral arms control agreements. In particular, 'excessive' and 'destabilising' 
are two such terms referring to the quantities of accumulations and transfers of 
small arms and light weapons deemed unacceptable to the international community 
which abound in these agreements. Reaching a common interpretation over what 
exactly constitutes 'excessive' transfers and 'destabilising' accumulations, a 
distinction that the UN Panel of Governmental Experts found difficult to draw,43 
remains elusive, however. Consensus is elusive because a small number of weapons 
can prove highly 'destabilising,' as those used in the Fiji coup of 2000 have proven,44 
and because a few weapons transferred to criminals, terrorists, or insurgents are 
often automatically deemed as 'destabilising.' Consensus also remains elusive 
because large stockpiles held by a so-called responsible government might not 
appear to some as 'excessive/ though the application of the term 'responsible' is 
itself, to put it mildly, highly contingent. Such assessments are both provisional and 
circumstantial. As Graciela Uribe de Lozano points out, "[t]he basic problem here, 
of course, is in defining when a government can be considered 'responsible' in 
matters of arms control and when such weapons are thought to be 'in the wrong 
hands/"45
43 Refer to paragraph 36 of the Report of the Panel of Governmental Experts on Small Arms, which 
states: "The terms 'excessive' and 'destabilizing' are relative and exist only in the context of 
specific regions, sub-regions, or States. The mere accumulation of weapons is not a sufficient 
criterion by which to define an accumulation of weapons as excessive or destabilizing, since 
large numbers of weapons that are under the strict and effective control of a responsible State 
do not necessarily lead to violence."
44 Capie, Under the Gun, 106.
45 Uribe de Lozano, 166-7.
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Placing the two main ways in which governments can mitigate their own 
responsibilities in the broader context of the frail responsibilities to control official 
stockpiles further reveals the international community's pallid response to this 
major aspect of the challenge of controlling small arms and light weapons. The UN 
Firearms Protocol and the OAS Convention both construe governments as important 
elements of the solution to the problems generated by the widespread availability 
and ongoing use of illicit small arms and light weapons, but do so without 
acknowledging the complicity of those governments sustaining the availability, and 
stimulating the use, of these weapons. Consequently, these two treaties are without 
obligations for governments to restrict the volume of weapons they accumulate. In 
contrast to these two measures, the SADC Firearms Protocol and the Nairobi Protocol 
establish obligations relating to official inventory management and secure storage of 
weapons.46 In particular, Article 18 of the Nairobi Protocol provides for cooperative 
action to curb corruption in relation to unauthorised manufacture and transfers, as 
well as possession of these weapons. As soft law measures, the Wassenaar 
Arrangement, the ECOWAS Moratorium, the EU Code of Conduct, and the OSCE 
Document each generate commitments to prevent destabilising accumulation of 
governmental stockpiles. However, when contrasted against the responsibilities to 
regulate authorised manufacture and trade, and to target law-enforcement efforts at 
combating unauthorised manufacturing and trafficking of these weapons, the 
responsibilities to control official stockpiles are underdeveloped. Regardless of the 
reasons given by policymakers, the underdevelopment of controls over official 
stockpiles reinforces governmental claims over the exclusive use of legitimate force 
within its area of jurisdiction, collectively reaffirming the principle of sovereignty as 
paramount in contemporary world affairs.
46 Refer to the SADC Firearms Firearms Protocol, Article 8(a) and (b), and to the Nairobi Protocol 
Article 6(a) and (b), respectively.
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Unauthorised Possession
Whether organised or opportunistic, criminals residing within territories subject to 
regulatory regimes controlling the possession of small arms and light weapons can, 
nevertheless, possess weapons without official authorisation. More than simply 
refusing to participate in disarmament initiatives, exemplified by arms amnesties, 
volunteer weapons-surrendering campaigns, and government-run buy-back 
schemes, 47 such unauthorised possession must elude the law enforcement 
investigations targeting illicit possession, which are encouraged by relevant 
intergovernmental measures of control. Not all unauthorised weapons are sought as 
tools for crirninal enterprise, however, as many civilians perceive a need for these 
weapons for self-protection and to protect private property, but may be disqualified 
from registering as weapons' users, unable to afford registration fees, or unwilling to 
wait for time-consuming application processes to unfold .48
Perhaps the easiest way in which unauthorised users maintain possession of 
these weapons is by concealing them in a myriad of locations, including homes, 
nearby forests, caves, wells, and, in some cases, buried in the ground. From a law- 
enforcement perspective, dormant small arms and light weapons are extremely 
difficult to detect, as are those weapons leftover from nearby conflict as caches or 
which are carried by refugees fleeing nearby conflict, with both examples occurring 
recently in Zambia.49
Criminals who are not in direct possession of weapons can maintain immediate 
access to those that are held legally, but secured poorly. Poorly-secured 
governmental stockpiles are especially vulnerable to leakage. "Combatant groups 
and criminals alike seem satisfied with the rich and easily available domestic supply 
of firearms within PNG," Alpers argues, "while the leakage of weapons and
47 For a broad overview of these practices as crime prevention, peace-building, and post-conflict 
recovery measures, refer to Faltas, McDonald, and Waszink.
48 Pefole, 58-9.
49 Robert Mtonga and Gregory Mthembu-Salter, "Country Study: Zambia," in Hide and Seek: 
Taking Account of Small Arms in Southern Africa, eds. Chandre Gould and Guy Lamb (Pretoria: 
Institute for Security Studies, Centre for Conflict Resolution, and Gun Free South Africa, 
2004), 291-2.
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ammunition from state-owned stocks remains a major hazard. It must be 
emphasized that existing local stockpiles, and not cross-border trafficking and 
smuggling, are the primary source of firearms misused in crime, conflict, and 
intentional and unintentional death and injury in the Highlands/'50 Civilian 
stockpiles are also vulnerable, though for different reasons, as Katleho Pefole relates: 
"legal and illegal firearms are frequently lent by their owners to friends, neighbours, 
or relatives who might need them for temporary/short-term security."51
If willing to steal, then unauthorised users appear spoilt for choice given the easy 
access to some authorised weapons held as government stockpiles, on the local 
premises of dealers in firearms and manufacturing plants, and stored in civilian 
homes. Taken together, official and civilian stockpiles represent a significant source 
of weapons for immediate use by unauthorised users. During the period 1994-2002 
in South Africa, for example, the Defence Force and Police Service each year lost, on 
average, about 190 firearms and 1,450 weapons, respectively. For the same period, 
South Africa's civilian firearms owners each year lost, on average, about 20,810 
firearms.52 Even though such leakages might be an unintentional consequence of an 
authorised user's negligence, governments can hold permit holders accountable by 
prosecuting them through judicial procedures; however, when not in possession of 
them, it can be difficult for authorities to prosecute unauthorised users, though 
weapons can be seized as evidence of an offence and then destroyed if the 
authorities so choose.
However, unauthorised users do not necessarily have to steal weapons from 
legally-held stockpiles in order to obtain them for immediate use. They can, of 
course, have weapons made locally. In Malawi, for example, "the country has an 
extensive home-based small arms industry at village level, producing 'home-made' 
weapons. The industry has been sustained by a demand for low cost and low
50 Alpers, 121.
51 Pefole, 59.
52 Lamb, 328.
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maintenance guns for (illegal) hunting and crop protection against game. " 53 The 
previous chapter noted the growing artisan production in Ghana and in the 
Philippines, and that damaged weapons can, of course, be repaired by craftsmen too.
As criminals, unauthorised users can also make illicit purchases of weapons from 
those responsible for guarding locally-stored weapons, licensed dealers in firearms, 
and corrupt officials. A common enough anecdote illustrates this point: "an illegal 
firearm was taken from a villager during a police raid. The villager was not detained 
because he surrendered the firearm voluntarily. A few days later the firearm was 
believed to be in the possession of another villager who had bought it from the 
police officer. " 54 Paid poorly, those who are charged with guarding arsenals and 
security stockpiles, like those officials who grant fake end-user trade certificates, are 
vulnerable to collusion and corruption. Mercenaries from nearby or neighbouring 
countries can carry weapons, surpluses of which are put out for hire .55 In the 
Central African Republic, retreating Congolese troops sold weapons to locals in 
order to support themselves and their dependents.56 Even peacekeepers, such as 
those deployed as part of the ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group, return home 
with weapons collected in conflict zones which are ready for resale.57
When unauthorised possession of weapons occurs, it can be part of the dark 
networks noted in the previous chapter. Yet the activities of organised crime groups 
can go even further than corrupting law-enforcement officers and officials, as 
Mittelman and Johnston explain:
criminal groups are alternative social organizations that in some respects 
challenge the power and authority of the state to impose its standards, 
codified as law. These groups constitute an alternative system by offering 
commerce and banking in black and gray markets that operate outside the
53 Andrew Charman, Small Arms Proliferation in Malawi: An Overview of the Supply of Weapons 
and Small Arms Demand for Crime and Game Poaching (Geneva: Graduate Institute for 
International Studies, 2003), as quoted in Mwakasungula and Nungu, 88.
54 Pefole, 60.
55 Best and Von Kemedi, 35.
56 United Nations Security Council, Eighth Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations 
Mission in the Central African Republic, UN Doc. S/1999/1038 (New York: United Nations, 
1999), paragraph 38.
57 Best and Von Kemedi, 24-25.
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regulatory framework of the state; buying, selling, and distributing 
controlled or prohibited commodities such as narcotics; providing swift 
and usually discreet dispute resolution and debt collection without 
reference to the courts; creating and maintaining cartels when state laws 
proscribe them; and arranging security for the so-called protection of 
businesses and sheltering them from competitors, the state, and rival 
criminals.
Adding to the concentration of unaccountable power amassing with 
economic globalization, organized crime groups are tapping into a global 
system of arms trade and raising and channelling immense amounts of 
money for this purpose. Insurgents in different regions increasingly rely 
on organized crime groups, and their armed forces are now intermingled 
with Serbs, Croats, and other soldiers of fortune, demobilized at home 
and seeking new employment opportunities.58
Competing with the authority and legitimacy of the state, the activities of organised 
crime groups can lead to the decomposition, reconfiguration, or corruption of civil 
society, especially where the state is viewed by many as playing a courtesan role, 
which "services clients, especially wealthy or upper-class ones."59 The rise of 
vigilante groups in South Africa taking justice into their own hands signals 
dissatisfaction with an ineffective governmental judicial system. Citizens have also 
relied on organised crime groups as service providers, evident in the protection 
rackets run in the former Soviet Union and the people smuggling operations 
emerging out of Asia.60 Members of the Yakuza provided relief supplies to victims 
of the Kobe earthquake in 1995, contrasting with the tardy official response.61 
Hezbollah in Lebanon have consolidated domestic support by funding health care, 
other social services, and most recently, cash hand-outs to aid those whose homes 
were destroyed by the Israeli military strikes. However, as Mittlelman and Johnston
58 Mittelman and Johnston, 114-5.
59 Mittleman and Johnston elaborate the following: "Some countries are cast literally in this 
role, offering or promoting a sex industry, now organized transnational!/ in eastern Asia, in 
which the state does not provide social protection for its young women and men (or children) 
but rather tacitly forsakes safeguarding the local culture in favour of global market forces. 
For other countries, the courtesan role is less blatant and more figurative but nonetheless 
emblematic of the interregnum between a Westphalian, interstate system and a more 
multilevel, post-Westphalian world order," 116-117.
Ibid, 119-121.
61 Picarelli, 9.
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caution, "a large segment of civil society itself is undemocratic, if not fundamentally 
repressive. " 62
By contextualising the multiple ways in which unauthorised weapons users 
elude the enforcement reach of the regulatory regimes against the weak 
responsibilities of governments to target law-enforcement efforts at combating 
unauthorised civilian weapons' possession, this chapter underscores the 
international community's narrow response to this major aspect of the challenge of 
controlling these weapons. Unlike the OAS Convention and the UN Firearms Protocol, 
the SADC Firearms Protocol and Nairobi Protocol provide for cooperative law- 
enforcement investigations targeting illicit possession of these weapons.63 By 
comparison, however, all of these treaties provide for the exchange of information 
relating to the illicit manufacture and trafficking of small arms and light weapons, 
and for cooperative law-enforcement investigations targeting illicit manufacturing 
and trafficking of small arms and light weapons.64 Of the soft law measures 
committing governments to target law-enforcement efforts at combating the illicit 
manufacture and trafficking of these weapons, only the Andean Plan provides for 
law-enforcement efforts targeting the unauthorised possession of weapons by 
civilians.65
62 Mittelman and Johnston, 123.
63 Refer to the SADC Firerams Protocol, Article 15 and to the Nairobi Protocol, Article 16(b) and 
(c), respectively.
64 Refer to: Article 15 of the SADC Firearms Protocol; Article 15 of the Nairobi Protocol; Articles 
XIII, XIV, XV, XVI of the OAS Convention; and Articles 12 and 13 of the UN Firearms Protocol.
65 Refer to the Andean Plan, Part A "in the domestic sphere," paragraph 3, which reads: 
"Recommend the adoption, as promptly as possibly and whenever appropriate, of the 
legislative and other measures that are needed to classify as a criminal offence under national 
law the illicit manufacture, import, export, transfer, sale, brokerage, transport, possession, 
concealment, usurpation, carrying and use of small arms and light weapons." Then refer to 
Part B, "in the subregional Andean sphere," paragraph 4, which reads: "Enhance subregional 
and hemispheric cooperation among competent national authorities who are responsible for 
ensuring compliance with and the full implementation of all laws connected with small arms 
and light weapons in all their aspects. These efforts should include, but not be limited to, 
training and the exchange of information to support common and coordinated efforts to 
control and reduce illicit cross-border trade in small arms and light weapons, and the signing 
of agreements for those purposes."
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In practice, however, most of the high-profile cooperative law-enforcement 
investigations combating the illicit trafficking of small arms and light weapons have 
occurred under bilateral circumstances, before many of the instruments were 
negotiated and agreed: perhaps the best known, Operation RACHEAL, involving 
the South African Police Service and the police force of the Republic of Mozambique, 
has been ongoing since 1995.66
Incidentally, unauthorised weapons which are seized and confiscated during 
law-enforcement investigations are sometimes made legal and incorporated into 
governmental arsenals. Authorities in Kosovo now use, as an important part of their 
arsenal, the AK47 assault rifles which were seized and confiscated during border 
monitoring and control operations.67 Despite the advantage of the initial low cost 
per unit, this particular weapon-type might not necessarily be the most appropriate 
tool for the purposes of border control and enforcing the rule of law, and its routine 
use might undermine the enforcement effort. More disturbingly, some weapons that 
are seized and confiscated by authorities are lent, leased, or sold back to criminals, as 
occurs in PNG.68
In sum, by focusing on the methods by which these brothers in arms obtain and 
retain possession of small arms and light weapons, this chapter illustrates that the 
frameworks governing the civilian possession of these weapons are less developed 
than the equivalent frameworks governing the authorised manufacture and trade of 
these weapons. This, in turn, signals the international community's emphasis on 
supply-side controls at the neglect of demand/users focused controls. Similarly, the 
chapter shows that international community has been much more focused upon 
restricting the potential destinations of official weapons transfers through the use of 
export criteria and sanction regimes, than on controlling accumulations of 
governmental stockpiles. Moreover, focusing on the methods used by these brothers 
in arms highlights that few governments are obliged to regularly target civilians
66 Faltas, McDonald, and Wasink, 15.
67 Khakee and Flor quin, 12.
68 Alpers, 50.
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possessing illicit weapons, whereas most major intergovernmental measures of 
control—with the exceptions of the ECOWAS Moratorium and of the Wassanaar 
Arrangement—encourage the targeting of law-enforcement efforts at combating illicit 
manufacturing and trafficking. In this light, the international community's response 
to controlling this major aspect of the challenge to control small arms and light 
weapons is held hostage to the interests of sovereignty, is unduly narrow, and easily 
circumvented. The significance of this narrow focus is illuminated by those best 
estimates suggesting the world's civilian stockpiles amount to about 305 million 
firearms, and the world's governments hold about 240 million weapons. Taken 
together, this represents most of the estimated small arms and light weapons in the 
world. While estimates of unauthorised weapons are highly unreliable, these 
weapons are used, with frequency and disproportionate affect, to perpetuate armed 
crime, initiate, intensify, and prolong conflict, and to destabilise post-conflict 
settings. Indeed, as Chapter One illustrated, the prevalent and intense criminal use 
of these weapons help blur the distinction between areas under the rule of law and 
locations deemed a conflict zones.
Resisting DDR Programmes
Belligerents can use an array of methods with which to deliberately resist DDR 
programmes, including those that are administered as part of UN peacekeeping 
operations, as well as the many disarmament initiatives undertaken outside the 
auspices of the DPKO. (While the thesis' focus is on the former, relevant lessons can 
be learned from the latter.) And by resist, I mean that by retaining unauthorised 
weapons and/or by maintaining access to existing caches and other sources from 
which they can immediately supplement their existing stockpiles, belligerents 
circumvent the intent behind those DDR programmes. At other times however, 
these weapons users, especially local force commanders, can subvert the DDR 
programmes, rendering them into the service of their own political purposes.
Like unauthorised users eluding the reach of law-enforcement investigations, 
belligerents can resist the disarmament component of DDR programmes by
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retaining their weapons as hidden caches. In Nicaragua during early 1990, for 
example, large numbers of combatants were unimpressed with the peace agreement 
and the associated peace dividend, and by 1991 re-armed with weapons which they 
had hidden.69 In some cases, such as in Kosovo, clandestine storage facilities have 
become more sophisticated as a reaction to active weapons collection initiatives and 
DDR programmes.70 The simple practice of concealing weapons caches proves 
effective against those peacekeeping operations which are authorised to provide 
incentives for disarmament, but which are without authority to conduct search and 
seizure operations: these scenarios are cases of too much carrot and not enough 
stick.
Belligerents can erode the intended effects of DDR programmes by giving them 
partial support, preferring to only surrender either obsolete, low quality, or 
damaged weaponry, as occurred during the initial phase of the Mozambique DDR 
programme.71 In these circumstances, a fraction of belligerents' caches are captured 
by collection programmes. While this limited participation might be seen by some 
as a symbolic gesture of endorsement for such programmes, it also, more 
importantly, signals the reluctance of ex-combatants to fully disarm; or put more 
cynically, reveals a keenness to withhold their best weaponry for future use. In 
Angola, both the UN and the government expressed concern regarding the caches of 
small arms and light weapons held by Savimbi's personal 'security detachment,' a 
small contingent of UNITA's battle-tested fighters.72 This concern was not 
misplaced given the resumption of hostilities already noted in Chapter Four of this 
thesis.
Force commanders can abuse DDR programmes, taking advantage of 
administrative processes with weak screening procedures, by refusing to provide
69 Atanga, 21.
70 Khakee and Florquin, 20.
71 United Nations Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation 
in Mozambique, UN Doc. S/1994/89, paragraph 7.
McQueen, 412.72
308
detailed lists of those combatants under their command.73 Some commanders have 
been unwilling to identify the precise number of their combatants, perhaps because 
they believe that by overestimating the forces and weapons under their command 
their negotiation position is strengthened and their bargaining power is increased. 
In Burundi, the armed forces withheld both troop lists and information relating to 
munitions stockpiles.74 Pouligny is poignant on this point (though she makes it in 
relation to the NATO-led intervention in Afghanistan), when she writes the 
following:
As in Afghanistan today, every commander tends to inflate the number of 
his men, to show political superiority and to draw more entitlement from 
the donors. In Kabul and Mazar, the commanders made up smaller units 
for disarmament, by taking bits from several military units. This is just 
one of the strategies that can be used to hide significant forces and 
weapons.
The situation is even more complicated when, as in Haiti, 
Afghanistan, Iraq, or in various places in Africa, local militias have been 
paid and armed by external powers. It is even more the case in 
Afghanistan due to the war against terrorism. Such situations are very 
difficult to manage in DDR programs, among other reasons because 
former patrons are inclined to apply double standards to their former 
clients, and are reluctant to reveal any information regarding the actual 
strength and composition of these forces.75
Force commanders can continue exerting control over former combatants by 
coercing them to relinquish the inducement money provided to them by the 
international community for surrendering their weapons at official collection points. 
Commanders can also disarm those under their control in order to either reallocate 
their weapons to less valued fighters or sell these weapons to non-combatants who 
then benefit in terms of financial gain, health care, and training opportunities 
through their involvement in DDR programmes.76 In so doing, commanders
73 Nichols, 114.
74 United Nations Security Council, Second report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations 
Operation in Burundi, UN Doc. S/2004/902 (New York: United Nations, 2004), paragraph 24.
75 Pouligny, The Politics and Anti-Politics of Contemporary 'Disarmament, Demobilization and 
Reintergration' Programs, 9.
76 Nichols, 121. According to Nichols, "[t]he power that faction leaders continue to exercise over 
their followers is significant: during a post-disarmament uprising of disgruntled ex-
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compress the effect of DDR programmes, ensuring their powerbase remains 
unchanged while any lucrative activities, with which they may have been engaged 
during conflict, remain unmolested.77
Force commanders do not hold a monopoly over the abuse of DDR programmes, 
however. If incentives for surrendering weapons are sufficient, individuals (not 
necessarily directly involved in conducting hostilities) who do not possess weapons 
may attempt to steal them, and those who receive funds for their weapons might 
seek to procure more in order to obtain further compensation.78 Where cash 
incentives are high, belligerents can hand in weapons, but use funds to purchase 
more arms which, in some cases, prove more lethal. In Liberia, 3,000 of the 13,000 
ex-combatants disarmed were probably disarmed twice a result of poor screening 
procedures.79
In addition to retaining access to at least some of those weapons under their 
control, belligerents can continue to source weapons in order to either replenish 
depleted stocks or increase the size and quality of their arsenals for immediate use. 
In Northern Afghanistan, for instance, weapons collected were then either held by 
local factions or transferred for safe storage to the control of warlords in adjacent 
areas and factions outside the immediate region.80 Significantly, such weaponry was 
neither transferred to an independent authority, nor destroyed. Consequently, these 
weapons can easily be requisitioned informally from official stockpiles, as raids on 
armouries represent relatively simple military operations. Many of the 12,000 
weapons which were collected from armed non-state groups by the government of 
Sierra Leone but not destroyed, where recaptured following the collapse of the peace 
process in May 2000.81 According to Nicolas Florquin and Stephane Pezard, during
combatants in Tabmanburg, UNMIL troops had to bring in a former LURD commander to 
quell the rioting," 127.
77 Pouligny, The Politics and Anti-Politics of Contemporary 'Disarmament, Demobilization and 
Reintegration' programs, 19.
78 Faltas, McDonald, and Waszink, 7.
79 Nichols, 113.
80 International Crisis Group, Disarmament and Reintegration in Afghanistan, Asia Report no. 65 
(Kabul/Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2003), 8.
81 Faltas, McDonald, and Waszink, 14.
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the Malian insurgency, non-state armed groups relied heavily on weapons they 
captured during combat operations or seized from official stockpiles, eventually 
supplementing these sources with weapons purchased illegally from soldiers and 
Malian officers.82 Yet belligerents are not the only sources of weapons in conflict 
zones and post-conflict settings; as Gamba laments, "one of the most interesting 
aspects of the Sierra Leone case is the fact that so many of the weapons used by the 
RUF were obtained by seizing arms from the peacekeeping force itself: the 
contingents of Guinea, Kenya, Nigeria, Jordan, Zambia, and India have all suffered 
heavily in this regard/'83 At other times, of course, hard-line leaders of armed 
groups can exert influence over combatants to refuse to participate in DDR 
programmes, as occurred in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.84
Here, then, the intent of these DDR programmes is eroded where weapons that 
have been collected are neither destroyed, nor deactivated permanently. The easy 
access to official stockpiles due to poor armoury controls is exacerbated by 
belligerents who use the financial incentives and employment opportunities 
inherent in DDR programmes as a means of fostering patronage while targeting 
their rivals for demobilisation.85 Thus, it is not merely the disarmament component 
of DDR programmes which is vulnerable to exploitation, because economic 
incentives are abused which, in turn, undermines the assistance intended for those 
ex-combatants reintegrating into civilian life. Also, demobilising combatants and 
then reintegrating some of them into the national armed forces is not always 
seamless. In the Solomon Islands during 2001, the lack of discipline of these so-
82 Nicolas Florquin and Stephanie Pezard, "Insurgency, Disarmament and Insecurity in 
Northern Mali, 1990-2004," in Armed and Aimless: Armed Groups, Guns, and Human Security in 
the ECOWAS Region, eds. Nicolas Florquin and Eric G. Berman (Geneva: Small Arms Survey, 
2005), 51-53.
83 Virginia Gamba, "Managing Violence: Disarmament and Demobilization," in Contemporary 
Peacemaking: Conflict, Violence and Peace Processes, eds. John Darby and Roger Mac Ginty (New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 132.
84 United Nations Security Council, Second special report of the Secretary-General on the United 
Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, UN Doc. S/2003/266 (New 
York: United Nations, 2003), paragraph 21.
85 International Crisis Group, 23.
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called special constables contributed to further lawlessness, which perpetuates 
cycles of violence and impedes weapons collection initiatives.
As the Angolan experience testifies, failed DDR programmes can result in 
dissatisfied combatants storming demobilisation encampments and compounds, as 
well as triggering aggression and reigniting tensions that, perhaps, contribute to 
renewed conflict which, in turn, creates conditions which impede future weapons 
collection initiatives. The legacy of failed disarmament attempts not only erodes 
confidence in current and future DDR programmes, but also emboldens those 
belligerents unwilling to relinquish their weapons; or worse, encourages those who 
desire to subvert DDR programmes to their own advantage. This subversion, 
producing very dangerous results for local communities in post-conflict settings, 
fosters insecurity beyond the parameters of the initial conflict zone.
Armed Beyond the Mosaic of Responsibilities
Just as arms embargoes authorised by the Security Council reinforce those 
intergovernmental measures seeking to exert control over transfers of small arms 
and light weapons, DDR programmes administered as part of UN peacekeeping 
operations reinforce those international agreements seeking to exert control over the 
possession of these weapons. In some cases, the mosaic of responsibilities relating to 
weapons possession is extended by peacekeeping operations deployed to those 
conflict zones which the UN Security Council deems a threat to international 
security. Despite the many disarmament initiatives conducted in recent years, 
including those administered as part of DDR programmes and those undertaken in 
accordance with instruments of international law, collected weapons have not 
always been destroyed or deactivated permanently. This is of particular concern to 
those analysts and policymakers confronting the challenge of controlling small arms 
and light weapons because the mosaic of responsibilities over proliferation does not 
restrict the volume of weapons produced, exposing another central conceptual 
disconnect among the international community's various responses to the major 
aspects of this challenge.
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While over 42 peacekeeping operations have been authorised by the Security 
Council since the early 1990s, the Security Council has not authorised interventions 
for each and every recent conflict. Areas of conflict where armed non-state groups 
either control territory or contest a government's monopoly over the legitimate use 
of force within its jurisdiction therefore lie outside this governance framework; in 
these areas, technically speaking, such possession is unauthorised, but is not illegal. 
These are areas in which dark networks flourish. Where DDR programmes are 
exploited to the extent that they serve belligerents' ends, they resemble the dark 
networks of the previous chapter, where organised crime groups cooperate in order 
to coerce and corrupt officials and law-enforcement officers who have professional 
duties to administer, monitor, and enforce regulatory regimes. Indeed, "[n]ew forms 
of criminality infringe the principle of sovereignty, the centrepiece of the 
Westphalian state system."86 New forms of authority, based on criminality, gather 
legitimacy in conflict theatres and post-conflict settings where dark networks 
provide much-need public services. As noted in the introduction to this thesis, the 
widespread availability of these weapons blurs the analytical distinction between 
conflict zones and post-conflict settings, just as the rise and persistence of armed 
criminality blurs the distinction between areas under the rule of law and those 
deemed conflict zones. For some belligerents, this blurring represents opportunities: 
"Most of the bandits who operated under the guise of fighters and took advantage of 
the [Malian] rebellion to rob civilians and loot villages kept their arms and continued 
to pursue their illicit activities."87
In circumstances where state authority has been eroded and rule of law is no 
longer observed, regardless of whether they are described as conflict zones or post­
conflict settings, black markets necessarily flourish. The situation in Burundi is 
instructive. According to Nelson Alusala, "[t]en years of armed conflict have turned
86
87
Mittelman and Johnston, 115. 
Florquin and Pezard, 59.
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Burundi into an open theatre for the illicit arms trade, whose lethality has made
almost every citizen a victim. " 88 A recent UN report supports this view:
While hostilities have generally ceased, criminality appears to have 
increased, aided by the thousands of weapons in circulation. Attacks, 
ambushes and harassment of individuals or groups along the main roads 
are commonplace, particularly in Cibitoke, Bubanza, and Bururi 
Provinces, as well as in areas along the border with the United Republic 
of Tanzania. Refugees and internally displaced persons have also 
reported cases of rape and general insecurity during the return process. 
Furthermore, some uncontrolled [Burundi Armed Forces (FAB)] elements 
are allegedly involved in criminal activity, and elements belonging to the 
armed parties regrouping in assembly areas have been cited as harassing 
local civilians.89
As Capie notes, "some groups also manufacture their own military weapons and 
ammunition. TTie sophistication of these operations varies enormously. Many armed 
group can service their own arms or produce simple homemade firearms, but some 
have also been able to manufacture high quality weapons. " 90 Lawlessness in areas 
such as these represent especially troublesome scenarios for those policymakers 
seeking to better control small arms and light weapons.
Seeking to reduce the world's total stockpiles by seizing, confiscating, and in 
some cases deactivating unauthorised weapons (but, in effect, only curbing its the 
extent of its burgeoning), intergovernmental measures of control do so as a means of 
enhancing governmental claims for the monopoly over the legitimate use of force 
within its jurisdiction. However, contrasted against those agreements fostering 
regimes regulating the proliferation and transfer of small arms and light weapons, 
few governments have responsibilities concerning the possession of these weapons 
within their jurisdictions. As already mentioned, the UN Firearms Protocol, the OAS 
Convention, and the UNPoA are each silent on controls over civilian possession of 
these weapons. Many governments, therefore, do not have domestic laws covering
88 Nelson Alusala, Disarmament and the Transition in Burundi: How Soon?, ISS Paper no.97 
(Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 2005), 1
89 United Nations Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on Burundi, UN Doc. 
S/2004/210, paragraph 17.
Capie, "Armed Groups, Weapons Availability and Misuse," 6.90
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the civilian possession of these weapons which have resulted from their 
international responsibilities referred to in Chapters Three and Four.
The US is of particular significance here since its government refuses to 
uniformly register its civilian gun ownership despite its citizens holding over half of 
the world's small arms and light weapons. US domestic controls over civilian 
firearms ownership and possession, which are permissive relative to many other 
countries, continue to generate serious problems for US domestic enforcement 
agencies and health care providers —diverting precious resources away from other 
health and social services91 — as well as for those countries bordering the US or 
located within its region. The so-called ant trade across the US-Mexico border, for 
instance, occurs where weapons are purchased legally by individuals in US territory, 
but then trafficked across the border into Mexico where they are used to commit 
crime. This trafficking continues to occur in spite of recent efforts by US border 
control agencies.92 Accordingly, the lax control over civilian gun ownership 
perpetuated by US domestic policy contributes to the widespread availability of 
these weapons and, at the same time, informs US foreign policy which helps dilute 
the provisions, relating to civilian ownership, of those measures of control that the 
US negotiates and to which it is a party.
In short, there are multiple methods—which can be used separately, 
successively, or in concert with one another—that authorised users, unauthorised 
users, and targets of DDR programmes can employ in order to mitigate, resist, and 
elude the emerging controls over the possession of small arms and light weapons. 
The chapter has shown that the international community's responses to the 
challenge of controlling the possession of these weapons are unduly narrow, easily 
circumvented, and, in some cases, subverted specifically by: civilians, including 
personnel employed by private security firms; opportunistic and organised 
criminals; governmental military forces and constabularies; and non-state armed
91 Cukier and Sidel, 6.
92 Boutwell and Klare, "Small Arms and Light Weapons: Controlling the Real Instruments of 
War," 5.
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groups. Yet, even though it is possible to categorise chief users of these weapons, 
these categories prove malleable, with some users shifting from category to category. 
In conflict situations, officially-constituted militaries blend with politico-mafioso 
armies supporting organised crime. Moreover, ad-hoc and part-time combatants 
help problematise the strict demarcation drawn between combatants and civilians.93 
A conflict's outcome can help dissolve the basis of such categories as insurgencies 
and so-called rebel armies that successfully obtain power over the apparatus of 
government legitimate themselves.94 Certain researchers appear attentive to this: in 
their study of Human Security in West Africa, for instance, Florquin and Berman 
prefer the term 'armed groups'—which they define "as groups equipped with small 
arms and light weapons that have the capacity to challenge the state's monopoly of 
legitimate force" —over 'insurgents' and 'militias' because governments "change 
frequently and often violently...an armed group formed ostensibly to protect the 
state may soon find itself in opposition to it...[and] a group might support the state 
politically and still challenge its monopoly on coercion. " 95 Authorised users of these 
weapons acting in unauthorised ways also undermine the basis for these categories. 
Where civilians, registered as firearms owners, breach conditions of their firearms 
licences, they too become criminals.
As authorising actors, governments and their military and constabulary forces 
can act in criminal ways. For example, officials belonging to the Iraqi government 
have used these weapons in order to commit crimes, such as car-jacking, hostage­
taking, and highway robbery. As Robert Fisk maintains, these men are "cops by 
day, killers by night. " 96 So too in Cameroon, where members belonging to the 
security forces commit crime, or act as accomplices to crime, as junior and middle­
ranking officers of the constabulary and military are responsible for initiating and
93 Pouligny, The Politics and Anti-Politics of Contemporary 'Disarmament, Demobilization and 
Reintegration' programs, 7.
94 Small Arms Survey, Small Arms Survey 2001, 82.
95 Nicolas Florquin and Eric G. Berman, "Introduction," chap, in Armed and Aimless: Armed 
Groups, Guns, and Human Security in the ECOWAS Region (Geneva: Small Arms Survey, 2005), 
1 .
* Fisk, 1244.
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coordinating much of the violent crime occurring in the country's major urban 
centres.97 There are many instances where government employees have illegally 
sold weapons from official stockpiles.98 A recent study by Mark Galeotti signals the 
extent to which Russia's state security apparatus has become criminalised not just 
since the dismantling of the Soviet Union, but more recently under President Putin. 
"Russian organised crime," this expert concludes, "has not only benefited 
immensely from the protection, weapons, and skills it can buy from corrupted 
members of the security forces, it has also infected it. " 99 Such activities, and others 
like these, undermine the analytical distinction drawn among these categories of 
weapons' chief users.
Post-internationalist Heresy
Authorised by their governments to produce, possess, and transfer small arms and 
light weapons, regulated commercial operators and approved weapons users can 
employ various means with which to circumvent their government's ability to fulfil 
its responsibilities under international law. In so doing, those who operate within 
the relevant regulatory regimes illuminate weaknesses inherent in the mosaic of 
responsibilities exerting control over small arms and light weapons. Even though 
the activities of those who are authorised by governments help erode the intended 
effects of the international community's attempts to compose measures of controls, 
they do not necessarily represent a direct challenge to the internationalist orthodoxy 
underpinning those attempts. In fact, because these actors seek out and rely upon 
the authority of governments, they simultaneously endorse their primacy in 
contemporary world affairs and, in this respect, resemble IANSA.
By virtue of their central role in developing and implementing the various 
frameworks governing the possession, as well as the proliferation and transfer, of 
these weapons, statemakers hinder the efficacy of these frameworks by unevenly
97 Atanga, 43.
98 See, for example, Mtonga and Mthembu-Salter, 290.
Mark Galeotti, “The Criminalisation of Russian State Security," Global Crime 7, nos.3-4 
(August-November 2006): 485.
99
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implementing, sporadically enforcing and, in some cases, deliberately contravening 
them. In spite of their responsibilities to do so, for example, some governments have 
not yet nominated a national point of contact for international small arms issues.100 
Many governments have not reviewed their legal frameworks covering small arms 
and light weapons since 2001 and most do not have laws controlling arms 
brokering.101 Few governments have criminalised illicit stockpiling of these 
weapons102 and even fewer have reported destroying surplus weapons.103 Scarcer 
yet are those governments reporting on regular cooperative law-enforcement 
investigations targeting the illicit possession of these weapons.104 In addition to 
authorising civilian possession of these weapons, governments rank among chief 
users of these weapons and, as Chapter Four demonstrates, occasionally transfer 
weapons in contravention of arms embargoes. Where governments allow or 
facilitate the proliferation, transfer, or stockpiling of these weapons, but do not 
officially authorise them, they are antagonists to the international community's 
attempts to exert control over small arms and light weapons. While governments 
are not alone in their intransigence, they are the only actors that feature as both 
major protagonists confronting the challenge of controlling small arms and light 
weapons and as antagonists sustaining this challenge.
Like regulated weapons-producing firms, authorised arms brokers, and 
registered users of small arms and light weapons, unauthorised dealers and users of 
these weapons exploit the uneven implementation and sporadic enforcement of, as 
well as the technical and conceptual inconsistencies inherent in, the mosaic of 
responsibilities created by various intergovernmental organisations and Security 
Council resolutions. Unlike those actors regulated by governments, however, 
unauthorised arms brokers and weapons users operate beyond the administrative 
and enforcement reach of the regulatory regimes fostered by a mosaic of
100 Biting the Bullet, "Global Table 1: Foundations," Reviewing Action on Small Arms 2006, 34-42.
101 Ibid, "Global Table 2: Laws and Procedures," Reviewing Action on Small Arms 2006, 44-55.
102 ibid.
103 Ibid, "Global Table 3: Weapons Management," Reviewing Action on Small Arms 2006, 56-71.
104 Ibid, "Global Table 4: International Assistance, Co-operation, and Transparency," Reviewing 
Action on Small Arms 2006, 72-83.
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responsibilities generated by various instruments of international law, arms 
embargoes of UN sanction regimes, and DDR programmes of UN peacekeeping 
operations. Particularly recalcitrant—at least from the point of view of analysts 
considering, and policymakers confronting, the challenge of controlling small arms 
and light weapons —are those unauthorised brokers facilitating transfers of small 
arms and light weapons to recipients who are the targets of UN-authorised arms 
embargoes, and those belligerents retaining their weapons in the face of DDR 
programmes administered by UN peacekeeping operations. By deliberately 
undermining the efficacy of those responses, these unauthorised actors seriously 
contest the primacy of internationalism as the central notion of the political, testing 
the resilience of the internationalist governance architecture, the current 
configuration of the international community, and the internationalist orthodoxy 
which binds them.
Where unauthorised actors form dark networks among themselves and with 
coerced and corrupt law-enforcement officers and officials, they problematise the 
dichotomy between those who compose controls and those who erode the intended 
effects of those controls. Where such networks are sustained and gather 
momentum, they coalesce around a set of beliefs contrary to the prevailing 
internationalist orthodoxy. Such networks reflect the emergence of a post- 
internationalist dimension to world affairs, a dimension in which, as Picarelli 
explains, categorises:
two sets of actors based on their relationship to sovereignty....States serve 
as the perfect example of an actor characterised by its binding to the 
principle of sovereignty, and thus states and actors like them are referred 
to as sovereign-bound. The other category of actors is composed of 
individuals and groups who do not consider sovereignty as the primary 
ideational compass for their organisational composition, and thus these 
actors are deemed "sovereign-free." The realm of sovereign-free actors 
includes a wide range of actors, ranging from super-empowered 
individuals to sub-national interest groups to multinational 
corporations.105
105 Picarelli, 10-11 (my emphasis added).
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The parallels between the terms 'sovereign-bound' and 'sovereign-free/ on the one 
hand, and the distinction drawn between those actors authorising the manufacture, 
trade, and possession of those weapons and those actors who produce, trade, and 
possess these weapons without the necessary authorisation on the other hand, are 
readily apparent. Unauthorised actors, who might be construed as sovereign-free, 
can and indeed do exert strong influence over authorising actors, who might be 
construed as sovereign-bound, for instance. Moreover, both sovereign-bound and 
sovereign-free actors can circumvent and subvert the mosaic of responsibilities 
comprising of intergovernmental measures of control and Security Council 
resolutions, limiting the efficacy of the international community's attempts to exert 
control over these weapons.
It is, therefore, not simply the case that these 'sovereign-free' actors emerge only 
in opposition to the state. Rather, they collectively engage in a set of practices used 
to exploit, to their own ends, specific opportunities embedded in concrete situations, 
all of which occurs as a broader reaction to the state's preponderance, especially 
where governments cooperate for collective advantage. A post-internationalist 
heresy thus emerges from, signals weaknesses in, and exploits the grand politico- 
strategic frameworks ordering contemporary world affairs. Accordingly, 
statemakers ought to be contextualised as but one type of actor embedded in a so- 
called post-Westphalian world order, though the recognition of just such a 
phenomenon probably reflects a revised intellectual appreciation of analytical 
constructs, than the emergence, existence, or decline of particular social realities.106 
And as an actor of world affairs, the state is not a static entity, enduring without 
change down through the centuries; it is instead better understood as a dynamic, 
reflective, composite feature of world affairs, which is made and remade as it 
oscillates between responding to domestic and external pressures, to historical 
traditions and calculations of future aspirations.
Here, then, the contrast between Parts II and III of this thesis demonstrate the 
multifarious ways in which a specific cast of actors—distinguished in this thesis as
106 Pouligny, NGOs as transnational forces, 6.
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playing an important role among a particular dramatis personae of world affairs —can 
erode the intended effects of the international community's major responses to the 
challenge of controlling small arms and light weapons. More specifically, this 
contrast amplifies the technical inconsistency and conceptual incoherence of these 
responses, exposes domestic influences which, hampering these responses, 
contribute to their uneven implementation and irregular enforcement, and illustrates 
the exploitation of these weaknesses while their efficacy is, consequently, eroded. 
Underpinning these actors eroding the intended effects of those responses is a post- 
internationalist heresy, the vitality of which is signalled by the overwhelming extent 
of the widespread availability and ongoing use of small arms and light weapons and 
by the lethal legacy of these subaltern killers.
Conclusion
The international actors examined in the two chapters of Part III of this thesis— 
weapons-producing firms, arms brokers, and chief users of these weapons —are able 
to mitigate, resist, and elude the intended effects of the international community's 
major responses to the challenge of controlling small arms and light weapons. To be 
sure, these actors, most of which are both non-state and sovereign-free, can not only 
easily circumvent these intergovernmental measures of control, arms embargoes, 
and DDR programmes, but can also sometimes exploit them in such a way as to 
subvert them into the service of their own political ends. Contextualised against 
those responses examined in Part II of this thesis, which contain technical 
inconsistencies and conceptual disconnects that continue to dog these measures 
despite the slow pace at which these measures of control are often negotiated in 
multilateral settings, the recalcitrance of these international actors erodes the 
intended effects of those responses and, thereby, helps render the challenge of 
controlling small arms and light weapons intractable and insurmountable for the 
international community.
This chapter has shown that, by retaining their arms for immediate and ongoing 
use, weapons users not only erode the efficacy of the framework governing the
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possession of small arms and light weapons, but also contest the internationalist 
notion of the political determining who has legitimate access to these tools of 
violence and in which circumstances their possession and use are to be restricted. 
Some of these brothers in arms not only infect the state in the way that organised 
crime groups explored in the previous chapter form dark networks, but also help 
provide alternative public services which, in turn, compete with the primacy of the 
state, at least in local affairs. In certain circumstances, civil society is reconfigured by 
international actors relying on small arms and light weapons as political tools. 
Weapons users targeted for control by the international community are, therefore, 
neither devoid of politics, nor assert an anti-politics, but rather, like other key 
international actors targeted for control by the international community, engage in a 
set of practices and activities which are saturated with various notions of the 
political. Significantly, these various notions are, for the most part, at odds with the 
internationalist orthodoxy which, as Part II demonstrates, is deeply embedded in the 
grand politico-strategic frameworks comprising the governance architecture 
essential to conducting world affairs; this orthodoxy also imbues the architecture 
strengthened by those members of the international community involved in 
invoking, conducting, or monitoring the various efforts to control small arms and 
light weapons. In response to more than a decade of the international community's 
attention and action, the unauthorised manufacture, transfer, and possession of 
small arms and light weapons conveys a post-internationalist heresy, the power of 
which is reflected by the widespread availability and ongoing use of these weapons 
and by the lethal legacy of these subaltern killers.
In this light, overcoming the challenge of controlling small arms and light 
weapons is not simply a case of the international community providing sufficient 
resources and fostering adequate political will, as some analysts and policymakers 
claim. Rather, as the thesis' epilogue contends, an ongoing contest over the notion of 
the political currently renders the challenge of controlling small arms and light 
weapons an intractable and insurmountable one for the international community. 
And this contest, which is both unavoidable and unresolvable, is merely one of the
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multifarious dynamics of international security informing contemporary world 
affairs, albeit a vitally important one.
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EPILOGUE EXEUNT,
SUBALTERN KILLERS?
While certain actors of contemporary world affairs have been prompted into 
action by an awareness of the grisly and macabre impacts associated with small 
arms and light weapons—ranging from civil disturbance and violent crime to 
human rights violations by repressive governments and full-scale conflict—the 
international community's major responses to the widespread availability and 
ongoing use of these weapons have so far proven ineffectual as reliable methods 
of arms control. In particular, the mosaic of responsibilities comprising of 
various instruments of international law negotiated multilaterally within 
intergovernmental organisations, the arms embargoes contained in UN sanction 
regimes, and the DDR programmes administered as part of UN peacekeeping 
operations, is technically inconsistent and conceptually incoherent. It is also 
unevenly implemented and sporadically enforced. Consequently, each of the 
major aspects of this challenge—proliferation, transfer, possession, collection and 
deactivation—are not addressed by the international community in a 
coordinated, comprehensive, and holistic manner. And where these responses 
are negotiated, implemented, and enforced, they are subject to the dictates of 
state self-interest, including those of the permanent members of the UN Security 
Council that are pursued, on occasion, in blatant disregard of their special 
responsibilities enshrined in the UN Charter.
In spite of the maturing relationships among important members of the 
international community and the nascent interconnectivity among their strategies 
for, and approaches toward, controlling these weapons, these crucial disconnects 
and shortcomings persist, enabling the captains of small arms industry, arms 
brokers, and a range of weapons users to easily circumvent these responses. 
Significantly for policymakers with professional obligations relating to 
international security, and crucially for the millions of these weapons' victims, 
this assessment is unlikely to alter dramatically in the foreseeable future.
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Even though the well-founded epistemic anxiety over available information 
signals that such an assertion is unprovable, it does not render it false, however. 
Best estimates suggest that, despite the abovementioned efforts, the global 
stockpile of small arms and light weapons increases because, quite simply, the 
rate of proliferation exceeds the combined rate of natural obsolescence and 
deliberate deactivation. At the same time, advancements in technology render 
new weapons more lethal, while existing weapons appear to circulate with a high 
degree of velocity. In any case, given the multiple and ongoing ways in which 
these control measures are frequently circumvented, this assessment holds a high 
degree of validity, regardless of whether these responses are treated by analysts 
as autonomous instruments or as a collective mosaic of responsibilities.
While the impacts associated with these weapons are of a disturbing 
magnitude, they do not, in and of themselves, constitute a magnitude sufficient 
to induce a radical reordering of contemporary world affairs. Rather, the 
challenge of controlling small arms and light weapons is seized upon by certain 
actors as an opportunity to strengthen the status quo. To this end, the four 
chapters of Part II collectively demonstrate the ways in which particular 
members of the international community justify, project, embed, and uncritically 
endorse the prevailing world order, preferring major responses strengthening the 
internationalist governance architecture of which they are, or seek to be, part. 
Yet since the preferred responses strengthen the existing internationalist 
governance architecture by either co-opting or excluding non-state actors, the 
potential membership of the international community, as well as the unique 
contributions that each of these potential members could make, are seriously 
circumscribed. As such, the current configuration of, and subsequent 
engagement among, the international community at best inhibits, or at worse 
prevents, effective control over small arms and light weapons.
The assumptions underpinning this governance architecture are, however, 
contested not only by many analysts of world affairs, but also by various 
international actors, as both chapters of Part III illustrate. Notwithstanding the
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scarcity of relevant quantitative information, commercial practices engaged by 
those operators authorised by their governments to manufacture or trade small 
arms and light weapons can help erode the intended effects of these controls. 
Where the intended effects of these controls are eroded—because they are 
successfully mitigated, resisted, or eluded—the internationalist orthodoxy 
informing these controls is interrogated and its provisional primacy, as a 
preferred notion of the political asserted with contemporary world affairs, is 
strained. The activities of those who are not authorised by governments to 
produce, trade, or possess these weapons, yet who nevertheless do so, not only 
helps erode the intended effects of these controls, but also overtly contests this 
notion of the political—despite the clandestine nature of these activities.
Where unauthorised operators, coopting or corrupting officials, form dark 
networks in order to pursue their clandestine commercial activities, they subvert 
the regulatory regimes fostered under international law. Statemakers 
deliberately enabling, encouraging, or coercing unauthorised operators in their 
lethal commerce dissolve the dichotomy drawn between arms control 
protagonists composing measures of control and arms control antagonists 
eroding the intended effects of those controls. Cohering around a counter-notion 
of the political, a range of international actors including some governments 
described as pariah or failed states, emerge from, signal weaknesses in, and take 
advantage of, the grand politico-strategic frameworks helping to order 
contemporary world affairs. Here, a post-internationalist heresy is conveyed 
with powerful effect, at once disturbing and consolidating the internal cohesion 
of the international community.
Subscribing to this post-internationalist heresy, so-called black marketeers can 
contest the primacy of governments, even where governments cooperate for 
collective advantage, in a manner far more politically effective than the 
campaigning of civil society organisations. And here, I place an emphasis on the 
term 'politically' because, as the thesis' introduction mentions, politics is "all 
those things we do, individually and in concert, to get and use power over others
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for non-trivial purposes. Politics is always about trying to get our way to some 
substantive end."'1 Despite the increasing prominence given by some analysts 
and policymakers to the arms control campaign of civil society organisations, the 
lack of any significant policy outcome unique to civil society—as opposed to their 
mere participation—demonstrates that no discernible shift towards global 
governance has occurred with respect to the challenge of controlling small arms 
and light weapons. Conversely, the widespread availability, ongoing use, and 
lethal legacy of these subaltern killers signal the forcefulness this post- 
internationalist heresy brings to bear upon in contemporary world affairs.
The challenge of controlling small arms and light weapons is, therefore, 
underpinned by the greater challenge of building a substantive consensus among 
all actors of world affairs—not merely governments, though governments remain 
crucially important—around this particular notion of the political. Given that a 
substantive (let alone common) consensus surrounding internationalism has not 
yet been reached and is, in fact, highly unlikely to be reached in the foreseeable 
future, then these weapons will continue to be both widely available and find 
ongoing use, no doubt, with lethal consequence. Indeed, as vital ingredients in 
contemporary conflict and violent crime, these weapons also function as security 
enablers sought by individuals, communities, groups, and governments. This 
insatiable appetite for these tools of violence, particularly coming from members 
of the international community claiming to lead efforts to control them, serves 
merely to attenuate these control efforts.
Since key international actors subscribe to, endorse, and assert contending 
notions of the political, the challenge of exerting control over the widespread 
availability and ongoing use of small arms and light weapons is unlikely to be 
overcome by emboldening political will and increasing resources. This reasoning 
is not yet fully appreciated, nor seemingly comprehended, by those analysts 
authoring the numerous policy-orientated reports confidently asserting all that is 
required to resolve this problem is sufficient political will and the provision of
1 Refer to fn.20 of the introduction.
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additional resources. Conversely, placing blame on insufficient will and 
inadequate resources as a prime reason for the international community's 
inability to curb these weapons' availability and use, construes the challenge of 
controlling these weapons as a problem to be solved, without paying due regard 
to the complicity of some of the problem-solvers themselves; as a mode of 
explanation this line of reasoning, while not necessarily invalid, is highly suspect 
because it is advanced by, and on behalf of, those whose interests lie in 
preserving the status quo it serves. Accordingly, this thesis eschews those 
simplistic explanations blaming the existence of insufficient political will and the 
provision of inadequate resources as prime reasons for the international 
community's failure to exert adequate control over these weapons. Rather, the 
thesis contends that even if sufficient political will could be mustered and 
adequate resources could be summoned and effectively marshalled, the 
international community would not necessarily be in a better position to exert 
control over small arms and light weapons, leaving it confronting a challenge 
that remains intractable and insurmountable.
As the contrast between Parts II and III of this thesis illustrates, the challenge 
of controlling small arms and light weapons is both enabled and restrained by a 
series of contests over the notion of the political. This tension, among 
statemakers and between statemakers and non-state actors, is unavoidable and, 
probably, without remedy: it is also a central dynamic of international security 
informing contemporary world affairs which warrants further attention from, 
and consideration by, policymakers. The topic of this thesis thus reflects a much 
deeper ongoing tension in contemporary world affairs, one which could also 
sustain and sharpen the analytic focus of much research into questions of 
contemporary conflict and international security. It highlights the analytic need 
for something like a postcolonial politics which, according to Phillip Darby, 
"cannot be read from the canon of Western political theory, much less from the 
archive of [disciplinary international relations], hobbled as it is by its insistence 
on the primacy of the state, the privileging of the modem (meaning Western) and
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a circumscribed understanding of what constitutes the political. " 2 In policy­
relevant terms, however, internationalism seems a less problematic response, 
especially in foreseeable circumstances, than other alternatives, though of course 
"[accepting the broad objectives of liberal internationalism—peace through 
political and economic liberalization—does not preclude criticism of the methods 
that peacebuilders have employed to pursue this objective. " 3 Given this insight, 
the research conducted for this thesis, its central findings, and, most importantly, 
the argument it conveys, hold relevance for the discipline of international 
relations.
This thesis has shown that, as tools of violence, these subaltern killers will not 
be exiting the stage of world affairs anytime soon. Their fatal echoes, however, 
can remain easily ignored by those diplomats who, writing the script of small 
arms control by attending conferences dealing with international security issues, 
do not fully revise their policymaking preferences in accordance with the 
contemporary realities occurring beyond their own milieu. At the same time, 
domestic prerogatives, especially those with significant economic and social 
dimensions, are powerful sovereign determinants shaping international security 
ventures, including those undertaken in multilateral fora. This suggests that, 
even as they attempt to compose controls over these weapons, policymaking 
diplomats representing the international community are themselves possible 
candidates for the malevolent label of subaltern killers. Assertions to the 
contrary will likely echo the rhetoric of Milton's Satan as he disingenuously 
persuades his crew of rebel angels that no-one could possibly fathom the "force 
of those dire Arms."
2 Phillip Darby, "Pursuing the Political: A Postcolonial Rethinking of Relations 
International," Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 33, no.l (2004): 31. Darby goes 
on to say that "[t]he politics that we seek must in the first instance be drawn from within 
non-European societies, tapping sources that give us glimpses of other life worlds. These 
glimpses will tell us of how people come to terms with external influences and 
intervention, but they will also tell us much about other concerns, quite unrelated to 
imperialism and its aftermath."
3 Roland Paris, "Peacebuilding and the Limits of Liberal Internationalism," International 
Security 22, no.22 (Fall 1997): 81.
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